Where the title claimed by the State of Iowa to land formerly
the bed of a lake rested solely upon the proposition that the state
became vested, upon its admission into the Union, with sovereignty
over the beds of all lakes within its borders, and upon the act of
the general government in meandering such lakes and excluding from
its survey of public lands all such as lay beneath their waters,
and the supreme court of the state has decided adversely to the
state and in favor of one who claimed under the Act of Congress of
September 28, 1850, known as the Swamp Land Act, there is no
question involving the validity of any treaty or statute of the
United States or the constitutionality of any state statute or
authority which gives this Court jurisdiction.
Neither Article III of the treaty with France ceding Louisiana,
Article IV, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States,
nor the act of Congress of 1848, admitting the Iowa into the Union
on an equality with the original states, has even a remote bearing
upon the question of title of the Iowa to the land beneath its
lakes.
The mere fact that the plaintiff in error asserts title under a
clause of the Constitution or an act of Congress, or that such act
or a patent of the United States appears in the chain of title,
does not constitute such a right, title, or immunity as to give the
federal courts jurisdiction, unless there is either a plausible
foundation for such claim or the title involves the construction of
the act or the determination of the rights of the party under
it.
The action of the government surveyors in segregating and
setting apart the lakes in question by meander lines from the
public lands and the approval of such survey by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office was not an adjudication by the government
of the United States by its duly authorized officers and agents
that the lake so segregated and set
Page 187 U. S. 88
apart was the property of the State of Iowa, and not a part of
the public
domain. It was beyond the powers of a government surveyor to
determine the title to such lands, or to adjudicate anything
whatever upon the subject.
This was a controversy over about 800 acres of land lying in the
bed of what is known as Owl lake, in Humboldt County, Iowa. The
original plaintiffs, the appellees in this case, claimed under the
Act of Congress of September 28, 1850, commonly known as the Swamp
Land Grant. Defendants' position was that the lands were unsurveyed
lands belonging to the national government, subject to entry under
the homestead and preemption laws, under which they had made entry.
The State of Iowa intervened and claimed to own the land in virtue
of its right of sovereignty over the beds of all lakes meandered by
the general government.
The suit was originally instituted by a petition in equity filed
in the district court of Humboldt County by Edwin O. Rood and
others against George A. Wallace and others, founded upon
allegations: (1) that the lands were conveyed to the state under
the Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850, and thence by
intermediate conveyances to the plaintiff; (2) that, at the date of
this act, the lands were in fact swamp and overflowed lands, and
continued to be until Pearsons, plaintiffs' grantor, received the
title, marshy and unfit for cultivation without artificial
drainage. That in 1884, Pearsons began to reclaim the land by
ditches, building fences around it, and for several years used and
occupied it for pasturage, and spent a large amount of money in
draining, reclaiming it, and making it fit for cultivation; (3)
that defendants have taken possession, and built a cabin upon the
land, and are interfering with the plaintiffs in their use and
enjoyment of it.
Wherefore an injunction was prayed.
A demurrer to this bill was overruled and an answer filed in
general denial of the petition.
Thereupon the State of Iowa filed a petition of intervention,
alleging that the land in question was a part of the bed of Owl
Lake, and did not constitute any part of the land which the United
States government was authorized or empowered to sell.
Page 187 U. S. 89
That the state was duly admitted into the Union in 1846, and, as
a sovereign state, became the owner of all the lakes within its
borders, subject to the right of the public to use the same, and
that the title to the soil was in the state. That, in surveying the
public lands adjoining the lake, the same was meandered, and the
land up to the meander lines sold by the United States to different
persons, and after such survey and sale, the United States had no
right, title, or interest in any part of the lake bed, and that the
same had passed to the state upon its admission to the Union.
The petition denied that the land described was within the swamp
land grant, and averred that the act of the plaintiffs and their
vendors in draining the said lake and drawing off the water was
unlawful.
Wherefore the state prayed a decree against both plaintiffs and
defendants, quieting its title to the land, and for a writ of
possession removing both parties therefrom.
Defendants Wallace and others subsequently amended their answer
to the effect that the lands were unsurveyed lands, subject to
entry by settlers, and that defendants had entered the lands as
homesteads, built houses thereon, and occupied the same as homes.
That, at the date of the Swamp Land Act, the lands were covered by
water from six to fifteen feet in depth, with well defined shores
and high banks upon the south and east sides, and navigable by
ordinary steamboats. That the lands were never swampy, and never
came within the meaning of the grant as swamp and overflowed lands.
And that whatever rights plaintiffs might have in the land were
junior and inferior to those of defendants.
Plaintiffs thereupon amended their petition by averring that,
since the commencement of the suit, the lands had been patented to
the state under the Swamp Land Act of 1850, and answered the
petition of the interveners, alleging that, by the proper officer
of the government the character, quality, and condition of said
lands were duly adjudicated in the manner provided by law, and that
the title of the United States passed through certain patents
mentioned in amendments to plaintiffs' petition, and finally inured
to the benefit of the plaintiffs,
Page 187 U. S. 90
and that said patents have never been set aside nor
cancelled.
Testimony was taken by the plaintiffs, and a decree entered
dismissing the interveners' petition, and quieting the title in
this and several other cases involving the same facts, in the
plaintiffs. On an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of Iowa, the
judgment of the district court was confirmed. Whereupon the state
sued out a writ of error from this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Motion is made to dismiss this case upon the ground that no
federal question is involved, or if there be such question, that
there was another nonfederal question, the decision of which was
sufficient to sustain the judgment, irrespective of what the
decision of the supreme court may have been upon such federal
question.
1. From the foregoing abstract of the pleadings it will be seen
that the title set up by the state rests solely upon the
proposition that it became vested, upon its admission into the
Union under the Act of Congress of December 28, 1846, 9 Stat. 117,
with sovereignty over the beds of all lakes within its borders, by
the act of the general government in meandering such lakes, and
excluding from its survey of public lands all such as lay beneath
their waters. This clearly does not involve the validity of any
treaty or statute of the United States, or the constitutionality of
any state statute or authority, so that, if jurisdiction exists in
this Court, it must be by reason of the claim of a title, right,
privilege, or immunity under the Constitution, or an authority
exercised under the United States, the
Page 187 U. S. 91
decision of which was against such title, right, privilege, or
authority.
The real question, then, is whether the sovereignty of the state
over the beds of its inland lakes rests upon some statute or
provision of the Constitution, or upon general principles of the
common law which long antedated the Constitution, and had their
origin in rights conceded to the Crown centuries before the
severance of our relations with the mother country. If the latter,
then the state must look to the decisions of this Court,
recognizing and defining such rights and determining how far they
are inherited, first, by the United States as the successor of the
Crown, and, second, by the several states upon their admission into
the Union. This would not involve a construction of the
Constitution, nor of any title derived thereunder, but a
determination of the title of the Crown to lands beneath the beds
of inland lakes, and of the respective rights of the states and the
general government as successors thereto.
In support of our jurisdiction, the state relies (1) upon
Article III of the treaty with France for the cession of Louisiana.
8 Stat. 200, which merely provides that
"the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in
the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible,
according to the principles of the federal Constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the United States;"
(2) the provision of the Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 3, which
merely declares, with certain immaterial qualification, that "new
states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;" and (3)
upon the act of Congress of 1846, admitting the State of Iowa into
the Union, with the provision that it should be admitted on an
equal footing with the original states in all respects
whatsoever.
None of these provisions was questioned by the Supreme Court of
Iowa in its opinion, but neither of them has even a remote bearing
upon the question of the title of the state to the land beneath its
lakes. Indeed, the argument now made by the attorney general, that
the title of the state depends upon the construction given to this
act of Congress, is quite inconsistent with his first assignment of
error upon the merits,
Page 187 U. S. 92
which charges the court with error
"in not holding that the beds of all the meandered lakes and
streams in the State of Iowa belong to said state in trust for the
public by virtue of its sovereignty, and that this right
does
not depend upon any act of Congress or any grant from the United
States."
In other words, the state is put in the dilemma of insisting,
for the purpose of sustaining the jurisdiction of this Court, that
the title of the state is dependent upon the proper construction of
these three instruments, and, for the purpose of sustaining its
case upon the merits, denying that the title depends upon either of
them. This is an attempt to blow hot and cold upon the same
question.
The mere fact that the plaintiff in error asserts title under a
clause of the Constitution or an act of Congress is not, in itself,
sufficient, unless there be at least a plausible foundation for
such claim. A party may assert a right, title, privilege, or
immunity without even color for such assertion, and if that were
alone sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction, a vast number of
cases might be brought here simply for delay or speculative
advantage.
New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana,
185 U. S. 336.
It is equally clear that the mere fact that an act of Congress
or a patent of the United States appears in a chain of title does
not constitute such a right, title, or immunity as gives the
federal court jurisdiction unless such title involves the
construction of the act or the determination of the rights of the
party under it.
De Lamar's Nevada G.M. Co. v. Nesbitt,
177 U. S. 523.
The case of
New Orleans v. De
Armas, 9 Pet. 224, is directly in point. Plaintiffs
claimed a parcel of land in the City of New Orleans by incomplete
title from the Spanish government, which was, however, confirmed
under the laws of the United States, and a patent issued therefor.
The city claimed the land as a part of a quay dedicated to the city
in the original plan of the town, and therefore not grantable by
the King. The state court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, which
was affirmed by the supreme court, and the city sued out a writ of
error. The court held, through Chief Justice Marshall, that to
Page 187 U. S. 93
sustain its jurisdiction, it must be shown that the title set up
by the city was protected by the treaty ceding Louisiana to the
United States (the treaty involved in this case), or by some act of
Congress applicable to that title. It was held that the third
article of the treaty, above quoted, did not embrace the case, and
that the act of Congress admitting Louisiana into the Union, which
is identical in language with the act admitting Iowa, court not be
construed to give appellate jurisdiction to this Court over all
questions of title between citizens of Louisiana; that the case
involved no principle upon which this Court could take jurisdiction
which would not apply to all the controversies respecting titles
originating before the cession of Louisiana to the United States,
and that
"it would also comprehend all controversies concerning titles in
any of all controversies concerning titles in any of the Union by
laws expressed in similar language."
The writ of error was dismissed. This case is conclusive against
the existence of a federal question in the case under
consideration.
2. We are also asked to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court
upon the ground that the action of the government surveyors in
segregating and setting apart the lake in question by meander lines
from the public land, and the approval of such survey by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, was an adjudication by the
government of the United States, by its duly authorized officers
and agents, that the lake so segregated and set apart was the
property of the State of Iowa, and not a part of the public
domain.
We do not so interpret the action of these officers. They
undoubtedly did survey the lands adjoining this lake and meander
the lake itself, but they determined nothing as to the title of the
land beneath its waters -- a determination which would have been
wholly beyond their powers -- but simply omitted those lands from
the survey, and left their title to be subsequently determined
either by state or congressional action. It was obviously beyond
the powers of a government surveyor, or of the Land Office, to
determine the title to these lands, or to adjudicate anything
whatever upon the subject.
Had the decision of the supreme court been adverse to the
Page 187 U. S. 94
plaintiffs, who claimed title under the Swamp Land Act, it is
possible that a writ of error might have lain from this Court, but
we have frequently held that, to sustain such writ, the decision
must be adverse to a right claimed under an act of Congress, or to
the exercise of an authority granted by the United States.
Baker v. Baldwin, decided this term,
ante, p.
187 U. S. 61.
The writ of error must be
Dismissed.
