1. The jurisdiction referred to in the first subdivision of the
fifth section of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, is the
jurisdiction of the Circuit and district courts of the United
States as such, and when a case comes directly to this Court under
that subdivision, the question of jurisdiction alone is open to
examination.
2. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts depends not on the relative situation of the parties
concerned in interest, but on the relative situation of the parties
named in the record.
3. It appears from the statutes of Texas and the decisions of
the highest court of that state that a general guardian has the
legal right to bring a suit in the state courts of Texas in his own
name; it follows that a citizen and resident of the Western
District of Texas, who has been duly appointed by the proper court
of Texas the guardian of the person and estate of a minor, whose
father and mother are residents, citizens and inhabitants of
another state, and are not and never have been residents, citizens
or inhabitants of Texas, may bring an action in his own name in the
United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas
against a corporation of another state, as the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court is dependent on the citizenship of the guardian, and
not on the citizenship of the ward.
This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Western District of Texas by J. W. Eckman, a citizen
and resident of that district, as guardian of Alfonso Huesselmann,
a minor, against the Mexican Central Railway Company, a corporation
of Massachusetts, to recover damages for injuries sustained by him
in the Republic of Mexico through the negligence of the company, in
whose employment he then was. The complaint set out certain
sections of the Constitution, of the Penal and Civil Codes, and
acts of Congress and regulations thereunder, of Mexico, and averred
that, "by virtue of the general principles of right and justice,
and by virtue of the laws of Mexico hereinbefore set forth,"
Page 187 U. S. 430
plaintiff had a right of action in Mexico, and that the same
existed in the United States, and also that the acts of negligence
complained of were wrongful and actionable in the United States and
in the State of Texas, as well as in the Republic of Mexico.
Defendant filed a plea in abatement to the effect that Huesselmann
was not then, or at the time of the infliction of the injuries, a
citizen or resident of the State of Texas, but that he and his
parents were citizens and residents of the State of Illinois, and
that defendant was a resident and citizen of Massachusetts, and had
not waived its right to be sued there, which right it pleaded, and
asked that the action be dismissed. The plea was overruled, and
defendant filed an answer containing seven exceptions or pleas to
the jurisdiction, an exception to the complaint for insufficiency,
and a general denial. All of the pleas were overruled, and the case
was tried before a jury, a verdict rendered in plaintiff's favor,
and judgment entered thereon. Thereupon a writ of error was allowed
from this Court on a certificate that the following questions of
jurisdiction arose:
"First. That Alfonso Huesselmann, at the time of the filing of
this suit and now being a minor under twenty-one years of age, and
his father and mother both being now alive, and at the time of the
filing of this suit and now being residents, citizens, and
inhabitants of the State of Illinois, and never having been
residents, citizens, and inhabitants of the State of Texas, nor the
Western District of Texas, and the defendant, the Mexican Central
Railway Company, Limited, being incorporated under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of Massachusetts, and at the time of the
filing of this suit, and now, being a resident, inhabitant, and
citizen of said State of Massachusetts, and never having been
incorporated under the laws of the State of Texas, and was not at
the time of the filing of this suit a resident, inhabitant, or
citizen of the State of Texas or of the Western District of Texas;
that said J. W. Eckman, being guardian of the person and estate of
said Alfonso Huesselmann at the time of the filing of this suit,
and being such now, and being a resident, inhabitant, and citizen
of the State of Texas and of the Western District of Texas,
now,
Page 187 U. S. 431
and at the time of the filing of this suit, has this Court
jurisdiction to try said cause, and does the citizenship of said
guardian, J. W. Eckman, confer jurisdiction on this Court, or does
the citizenship of the minor and his parents control so as to
defeat the jurisdiction of this Court?"
"Second. Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to try and
determine said suit where the minor, Alfonso Huesselmann, and
defendant, Mexican Central Railway Company, Limited, are not
citizens of this state and district, and where the cause of action
arose in the Republic of Mexico, in which republic the contract of
service was made and the services thereby contemplated were to be
performed?"
"Third. Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to try and
determine this suit under the laws of Mexico as pleaded and proved
in this case, insofar as such laws give rights that are to be
determined by successive suits, give the right to extraordinary
indemnity, considering the social position of the injured party,
and insofar as the same are vague, indefinite, and dissimilar to
the laws of our country and contrary to our policy?"
"Fourth. Where plaintiff's cause of action arose in the Republic
of Mexico, and the rights are to be determined by the laws of said
republic, and where defendant has continuously kept its property
and operated its road in said republic, has this Court jurisdiction
to hear and determine this cause in the absence of any reason shown
in the pleading or proof why plaintiff did not bring his suit in
the Republic of Mexico?"
"Fifth. Where, according to the laws of the Republic of Mexico,
no civil liability exists unless the acts that give rise to the
civil liability must be found to be a violation of the criminal
laws of Mexico, is the enforcement of such liability penal in its
nature, and can this Court determine the guilt of defendant
thereunder, and adjudicate the rights of the parties based upon the
criminal laws of said republic? "
Page 187 U. S. 432
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is brought directly from the circuit court to this
Court under the first subdivision of the fifth section of the
Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, providing that that may be done
"in any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue;
in such cases, the question of jurisdiction alone shall be
certified to the Supreme Court from the court below for
decision."
It must be regarded as settled that the jurisdiction here
referred to is the jurisdiction of the circuit or district courts
of the United States as such,
Smith v. McKay, 161 U.
S. 355;
Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U.
S. 501; that the whole case is not open to us, but only
the question of jurisdiction,
Horner v. United States,
143 U. S. 570,
143 U. S. 576;
United States v. Jahn, 155 U. S. 112,
and that review by certificate is limited to the certificates by
the circuit or district courts, made after final judgment, of
questions made as to their own jurisdiction, and to the
certificates by the circuit court of appeals of questions of law in
relation to which the advice of this Court is sought as therein
provided.
United States v. Rider, 163 U.
S. 132.
Defendant's counsel condenses the propositions relied on into
these: (1) that "the citizenship of the ward, the actual plaintiff,
not that of the guardian, the nominal plaintiff, controls;" (2)
that "the laws of Mexico as pleaded and proved, and which are
relied on to support this case, are so vague and indefinite, and so
dissimilar to the laws of Texas, as to be incapable of enforcement
in our courts, and are inconsistent with the statutes and public
policy of Texas;" and (3) that these laws "are penal in their
character, and such as should be given no extraterritorial
effect."
But, apart from the question of jurisdiction in respect of
citizenship, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the circuit
court as a court of the United States was not put in issue, for the
other contentions were matters on the merits, and this judgment to
the contrary is not void, but is only open to be attacked for
error, while, in any aspect, the objections applied to all courts
of this country, and not particularly to the federal courts.
Page 187 U. S. 433
And if the jurisdiction of the circuit court was invoked solely
on the ground of diverse citizenship, the case should have been
taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to
which court previous similar cases have been carried, and by which
the questions suggested here have been dealt with.
Evey v.
Mexican National Railway Company, 81 F. 294;
Mexican
National Railway Company v. Marshall, 91 F. 933.
These matters, however, are not properly before us in this case,
and we intimate no opinion upon them.
The question for us to determine is whether the jurisdiction of
the circuit court can be sustained through the citizenship of the
guardian.
It is admitted that Eckman was duly appointed guardian of both
the person and estate of Huesselmann by the proper court of Texas
thereto empowered, and that he was a citizen and resident of the
Western District of Texas.
Under the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, as
corrected by that of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866, actions
may be brought in any district in which either the plaintiff or the
defendant resides. We have held that a corporation incorporated in
one state only cannot be compelled to answer in a circuit court of
the United States held in another state, to a civil suit at law or
in equity, brought by a citizen of a different state.
Shaw v.
Quincy Mining Company, 145 U. S. 444. But
that is not this case, as here the action was brought by a citizen
of Texas in the district of his residence.
The question is whether, under the laws of Texas, a guardian can
sue in his own name to recover damages for injuries sustained by
the ward, and it is unaffected by the permanent domicil of the
ward.
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613;
New Orleans v. Gaines, 138 U. S. 595,
138 U. S. 606;
Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Company, 133 U.
S. 473,
133 U. S.
488.
It is true that where a state or one of its officials is a mere
figurehead, a nominal party, to a suit on a sheriff's or
administrator's bond, or an action is instituted in the name of a
United States marshal on an attachment bond, the real party in
interest is taken into account on the question of citizenship,
notwithstanding
Page 187 U. S. 434
the general rule that the jurisdiction of the federal courts
depends not on the relative situation of the parties concerned in
interest, but on the relative situation of the parties named in the
record. But those are instances of merely formal parties, whose
names are used from necessity, and, as said in
New Orleans v.
Gaines by Mr. Justice Bradley,
"we have repeatedly held that representatives may stand upon
their own citizenship in the federal courts irrespectively of the
citizenship of the persons whom they represent -- such as
executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, receivers, etc. The
evil which the law was intended to obviate was the voluntary
creation of federal jurisdiction by simulated assignments. But
assignments by operation of law, creating legal representatives,
are not within the mischief or reason of the law."
If, in the state of the forum, the general guardian has the
right to bring suit in his own name as such guardian, and does so,
he is to be treated as the party plaintiff so far as federal
jurisdiction is concerned, even though suit might have been
instituted in the name of the ward by guardian
ad litem or
next friend. He is liable for costs in the event of failure to
recover and for attorneys' fees to those he employs to bring the
suit, and in the event of success, the amount recovered must be
held for disposal according to law, and if he does not pay the same
over to the parties entitled, he would be liable therefor on his
official bond.
The Revised Statutes of Texas provide:
"ART. 2623. The guardian of the estate is entitled to the
possession and management of all property belonging to the ward; to
collect all debts, rents, or claims due such ward; to enforce all
obligations in his favor; to bring and defend suits by or against
him; but in the management of the estate the guardian shall be
governed by the provisions of this title."
"ART. 2624. The guardian of both person and estate has all the
rights and powers, and shall perform all the duties, of the
guardian of the person and of the guardian of the estate."
"ART. 2627. The guardian of the estate shall use due diligence
to collect all claims or debts owing to the ward, and to
Page 187 U. S. 435
recover possession of all property to which the ward has a title
or claim, provided there is a reasonable prospect of collecting
such claims or debts, or of recovering such property, and if he
neglects to use such diligence, he and his sureties shall be liable
for all damages occasioned by such neglect."
In
Roberts v. Sacra, 38 Tex. 580, it was ruled that the
guardian for minor heirs might sue in his own name on a promissory
note payable to the ancestor of his wards on showing that they were
the only heirs of the payee, and that there was no administration
on the estate.
In
Houston & Texas Central Railway Company v.
Bradley, 45 Tex. 171, 176, it was held that, under a law
authorizing suit for death by wrongful act, which provided that
actions thereunder should be
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the surviving husband,
wife, child, or children, and parents of the person whose death
shall have been so caused, and may be brought by such entitled
parties, or any of them,"
the suit might properly be brought in his own name by the
guardian of the estate of minor children of the person whose death
was caused by such act, and the court said:
"It is not regarded as material whether the suit is brought in
the name of the guardian for his ward or in the name of the ward by
his guardian. By the laws of Texas, the guardian of the person is
entitled to the charge and control of the person of the ward, and
the guardian of the estate is entitled to the possession and
management of the property belonging to the ward, and to collect
all claims and debts due him, to enforce all obligations in his
favor, and to bring and defend suits by or against him."
And see March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, where Walker sued
as guardian of one of three children, and as next friend of the two
others, and attention was called in respect of the two to the then
statute, subsequently repealed, providing for the appointment of a
special guardian to prosecute suits, and
Gulf &c. Railway
Company v. Styron, 66 Tex. 421, in which the action had been
brought "by W. W. Styron, next friend of Millie Styron, a minor,"
and it was decided that it was not necessary "that the pleadings
must
Page 187 U. S. 436
show in so many words that the action is brought by the minor by
next friend," although cases so ruling could be found.
We are unable to hold that the circuit court erred in assuming
that this guardian had the legal right to bring the action in his
own name, and it is on his citizenship, and not on the citizenship
of the ward, that the jurisdiction of the circuit court
depended.
Judgment affirmed.
