As public policy forbids the insertion in a contract of a
condition which would tend to induce crime, it also forbids the
enforcement of a contract under circumstances which cannot be
lawfully stipulated for.
Where a man who has committed murder thereafter assigns a policy
of insurance on his own life payable to his estate and is
subsequently convicted and executed for the crime, the
beneficiaries cannot recover on the policy. The crime of the
assured is not one of the risks covered by a policy of insurance,
and there is an implied obligation on his part to do nothing to
wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy.
It is the policy of every state to uphold the dignity and
integrity of its courts of justice, and as contracts insuring
against miscarriage of justice would encourage litigation and bring
reproach upon the state, its judiciary, and executive, they would
be against public policy and void, and therefore an action cannot
be maintained by the beneficiaries of an insurance policy on the
life of a man executed for murder on the ground that his conviction
and execution were unjust.
This was an action to recover on a policy of life insurance,
commenced in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, and
removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western
District of Texas. The policy was issued August 1, 1894. William E.
Burt was the insured. The policy, in case of death, was payable to
Anna M. Burt, the wife of the insured, if living, otherwise to his
executors, administrators, or assigns. On September 10, 1895, the
beneficiary, Anna M. Burt, and her husband, the insured, assigned a
one-half interest to plaintiffs to secure them as creditors of the
assignors. On July 24, 1896, the beneficiary, Anna M. Burt, died
intestate, as did also the only children of the beneficiary and the
insured. On February 4, 1897, the insured, William E. Burt,
conveyed to the plaintiffs the remaining interest in the policy,
making them the sole owners of it. They are also his sole heirs,
and as such are
Page 187 U. S. 363
entitled to the full benefit of the policy, there being no
administration on his estate, nor any necessity for one.
On November 27, 1896, the insured, having been indicted for the
murder of his wife, Anna M. Burt, the beneficiary, was tried and
convicted in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, a court of
competent jurisdiction, was sentenced to be put to death, and on
May 27, 1898, was hanged pursuant to such sentence. The petition in
this case alleged that, notwithstanding such conviction, sentence,
and execution, the insured, William E. Burt, did not in fact commit
the crime of murder, nor participate therein, but that, if he did,
the policy was not avoided thereby because he was at the time
insane.
The policy, which in its general scope was an ordinary policy of
life insurance, contained these provisions:
"Third. If the insured should, without the written consent of
the company at any time enter the military or naval service, the
militia excepted, or become employed in a liquor saloon, or if the
insured should die by self-destruction, whether sane or insane,
within three years from date hereof, this policy shall be null and
void."
"
* * * *"
"The contract of insurance between the parties hereto is
completely set forth in this policy and the application for the
same."
A demurrer to the petition was sustained and judgment entered
for the defendant, which was thereafter affirmed by the Court of
Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, 105 F. 419, and thereupon the case
was brought here on certiorari. 181 U.S. 617.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
There is nothing in the policy which in terms covers the
contingency here presented, the extracts therefrom given in the
Page 187 U. S. 364
preceding statement being all that even remotely, by suggestion
or inference, can have any bearing. The question, therefore, is
whether an ordinary life policy containing no applicable special
provisions is a binding contract to insure against a legal
execution for crime. The petitioners would distinguish between
cases in which the insured is justly convicted and executed and
those in which he is unjustly convicted. The allegation here is
that, notwithstanding his conviction and execution, he was not in
fact guilty, that he did not participate in the killing of his
wife, and that, if he did, he was insane at the time, and therefore
not responsible for his actions.
Accepting the division made by counsel as one facilitating a
just conclusion concerning the rights of the parties hereto, we
inquire first whether a policy of life insurance is a contract
binding the insurer to pay to the beneficiary the amount of the
policy in case the insured is legally and justly executed for
crime. In other words, do insurance policies insure against crime?
Is that a risk which enters into and becomes a part of the
contract?
The researches of counsel have found but one case directly in
point,
Amicable Society v. Bolland, decided by the House
of Lords in 1830, and reported in 4 Bligh N.S.194, 211. The Lord
Chancellor, delivering the opinion, after stating the question,
answered it in the following brief but cogent words:
"It appears to me that this resolves itself into a very plain
and simple consideration. Suppose that in the policy itself this
risk had been insured against -- that is, that the party insuring
had agreed to pay a sum of money year by year upon condition that,
in the event of his committing a capital felony and being tried,
convicted, and executed for that felony, his assignees shall
receive a certain sum of money -- is it possible that such a
contract could be sustained? Is it not void upon the plainest
principles of public policy? Would not such a contract (if
available) take away one of those restraints operating on the minds
of men against the commission of crimes -- namely the interest we
have in the welfare and prosperity of our connections? Now if a
policy of that description, with such a form of condition inserted
in it in express terms, cannot, on grounds
Page 187 U. S. 365
of public policy, be sustained, how is it to be contended that,
in a policy expressed in such terms as the present, and after the
events which have happened, that we can sustain such a claim? Can
we, in considering this policy, give to it the effect of that
insertion which, if expressed in terms, would have rendered the
policy, as far as that condition went, at least, altogether
void?"
There are some differences between that case and the present in
the surrounding facts, but none that are material. There, the
policy was taken out for the benefit of the insured's estate. Here,
the beneficiary was the wife of the insured, or, if she should not
be living at the time of his death, his estate. As her death
preceded his, the conditions of the insurance became practically
the same. In that case, the insured had assigned all his interest
in the policies upon certain trusts, though the plaintiffs were his
assignees in bankruptcy. Here, he and his wife, the original
beneficiary, transferred a half interest to these plaintiffs, who
were their creditors, but the amount of the indebtedness is not
shown, and the policy provided
"should this policy be assigned or held as security, a duplicate
of said assignment must be filed with the company, and due proofs
of interest produced with proofs of death. This company does not
guarantee the validity of any assignment,"
a requirement which does not appear to have been complied with.
So that the rights of the plaintiffs depend mainly, if not wholly,
upon the fact of the assignment made by the insured after the
killing of his wife and prior to his execution, and the further
fact that they are his sole heirs. The plaintiffs, therefore, in
each of the cases, claimed directly under the insured, and sought
to recover on a policy obtained by him, the maturity of which was
accelerated by his execution for crime. In neither policy was there
any express stipulation in respect to such a contingency, so that
the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor is pertinent to this case, and
it is reasoning the force of which it is impossible to avoid. It
cannot be that one of the risks covered by a contract of insurance
is the crime of the insured. There is an implied obligation on his
part to do nothing to wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the
policy. Public policy forbids the insertion in a contract of a
condition which would tend to
Page 187 U. S. 366
induce crime, and as it forbids the introduction of such a
stipulation, it also forbids the enforcement of a contract under
circumstances which cannot be lawfully stipulated for.
That case was cited with approval in
Ritter v. Mutual Life
Insurance Company, 169 U. S. 139, in
which we held that a life insurance policy taken out by the insured
for the benefit of his estate was avoided when he, in sound mind,
intentionally took his own life, and this irrespective of the
question whether there was a stipulation in the policy to that
effect or not. In the opinion, other cases were cited bearing more
or less directly on the general question. Among them was
New
York Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Armstrong, 117 U.
S. 591,
117 U. S. 600,
an action by the assignee of a life insurance policy, and the
defense that the assignee murdered the insured in order to get the
benefit of the policy, in respect to which Mr. Justice Field,
speaking for the Court, said:
"It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if
one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party
whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover
insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired."
Also
Hatch v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 120 Mass.
550, 552, an action on a policy of insurance on the life of a
married woman whose death was caused by a miscarriage produced by
illegal operation performed upon and voluntarily submitted to by
her with an intent to cause an abortion, and without any
justifiable medical reason for such an operation, from the opinion
in which these words were quoted:
"We can have no question that a contract to insure a woman
against the risk of her dying under or in consequence of an illegal
operation for abortion would be contrary to public policy, and
could not be enforced in the courts of this commonwealth."
Also
Supreme Commandery &c. v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala.
436, 447, a case of the suicide of the insured, in which is this
language:
"Death, the risk of life insurance, the event upon which the
insurance money is payable, is certain of occurrence; the
uncertainty of the time of its occurrence is the material element
and
Page 187 U. S. 367
consideration of the contract. It cannot be in the contemplation
of the parties that the assured, by his own criminal act, shall
deprive the contract of its material element; shall vary and
enlarge the risk and hasten the day of payment of the insurance
money. . . . The fair and just interpretation of a contract of life
insurance made with the assured is that the risk is of death
proceeding from other causes than the voluntary act of the assured
producing or intended to produce it. . . . The extinction of life
by disease, or by accident, not suicide voluntary and intentional
by the assured while in his senses, is the risk intended, and it is
not intended that, without the hazard of loss, the assured may
safely commit crime."
But the stress of the plaintiffs' contention rests on the
allegation that the insured was unjustly convicted and executed;
that he did not in fact commit the crime of murder or participate
therein, and that, if he did, it was while he was insane and not
responsible for his actions. It is urged that, according to the
authorities heretofore cited, the risk which is not insured against
is death as a punishment for crime; that, if there be no crime, no
wrong done by the insured, the mere fact of his death as the
outcome of proceedings in a court of justice does not vitiate the
contract of insurance unless there is some express stipulation
therefor. It is said that the adjudication in the criminal case is
not, as to these plaintiffs, conclusive of the insured's guilt;
that they may show in this independent action facts which would
satisfy a jury that the outcome of those legal proceedings was
unjust because the insured did not participate in the crime, or, if
he did, that he was legally irresponsible therefor by reason of
insanity. It is not doubted that the criminal prosecution was an
adjudication of the insured's guilt, his sanity and legal
responsibility for the crime, but the principle of
res
judicata is that a judgment is conclusive only as between the
parties and their privies, and these plaintiffs say they were not
parties to the criminal action, and are not privies to either party
thereto.
If the case turned on the applicability of the principle of
res judicata, there would be little difficulty in reaching
a conclusion. There is no identity of parties, nor are the two
parties to
Page 187 U. S. 368
this action privies to those in the criminal proceeding. A
judgment in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery cannot
be invoked as
res judicata in a civil action by the party
injured to recover damages. But there the two actions run along
parallel lines, and the relief sought in each is the direct and
natural result of the wrong complained of. Here, the civil action
is founded upon the result of the other -- cannot be maintained but
for the fact of that result. If the insured had been acquitted,
there would have been no cause of action on the policy, while the
fact that the defendant in the illustration given was acquitted of
the criminal offense would not bar the civil action to recover
damages.
Cottingham v. Weeks, 54 Ga. 275.
This action can be maintained only on the assumption that there
was a failure of justice in the criminal case. It implies a
miscarriage of justice. But can there be a contract of insurance
against the miscarriage of justice? In the opinion of the court of
appeals, the question is thus stated and answered:
"Can there be a legal life insurance against the miscarriage of
justice? Can contracts be based on the probability of judicial
murder? If one policy so written be valid, the business of insuring
against the fatal mistakes of juries and courts would be
legitimate. The same principle could be applied, in a kind of
accident insurance, to the miscarriage of justice in cases that led
to convictions and punishments not capital. And in each suit to
enforce such a policy, the issue as to the fatal judicial mistake
would be tried by another jury and court not infallible."
"
* * * *"
"It is the policy of every state or organized society to uphold
the dignity and integrity of its courts of justice. Such contracts
would be speculations upon whether the courts would do justice.
They would tend to encourage a want of confidence in the efficiency
of the courts. They would tend to stir up litigation -- litigation
that would reopen tried issues. They would impress the public with
the belief that the results of trials of the gravest kind were so
uncertain that the innocent could not escape condemnation by a jury
and unjust judgment by the court, or obtain pardon of the
executive. Such contracts would encourage litigation and bring
reproach upon the
Page 187 U. S. 369
state, its judiciary, and executive, and would, we think, be
against public policy and void. The policy of the law often permits
and even requires, for error, a new trial of a convicted defendant,
but never after his execution."
The views thus expressed commend themselves to our judgment.
There is a wagering feature in such a stipulation which forbids its
being incorporated into a policy of insurance, and if it cannot be
formally incorporated into the contract, its omission therefrom
does not, by implication, give it life and validity.
See to what any other conclusion would lead: suppose
beneficiaries at the time of the trial of an insured for murder
were possessors, and the sole possessors, of a knowledge of facts
that would establish his innocence. As good citizens, it would be
their duty to furnish that evidence and thus prevent a miscarriage
of justice. As beneficiaries, it would be their interest to
withhold their evidence, and thus let an innocent man be punished.
Can a contract be upheld which is not only a wager upon the result
of criminal proceedings, but also tends to place before individuals
an inducement to assist in bringing about such miscarriage of
justice?
In
Evans v. Jones, 5 Mees. & W. 77, an action was
brought on a wager as to the conviction or acquittal of a prisoner
on trial on a criminal charge, and it was held that the action
could not be sustained. Lord Abinger observed:
"No man has a right to acquire, by his own act, an interest in
interfering with the proceedings of courts of justice, more
especially of criminal justice, in which a man is bound honestly to
declare all he knows relative to the case in the course of
adjudication. Here, the party had acquired by the wager a direct
interest in procuring the conviction of the prisoner, and although
it is impossible to say in what precise manner an improper bias may
be exerted, or whether it will have any effect or not, yet the very
tendency of his mind to act in such a way as to pervert the course
of justice is a sufficient foundation for the illegality of such
wagers."
P. 81. Baron Parke concurred in these words:
"I entirely agree. No case has been cited at variance with the
principle laid down by the Lord Chief Baron. It appears to me that
it is a reasonable objection to the legality of a wager that it has
a tendency to influence and pervert the course of criminal justice.
There ought to be a disposition in every person to come forward and
give any evidence which he may be in possession of tending to
insure either the acquittal or conviction of a person lying under a
criminal charge, but the necessary tendency of a
Page 187 U. S. 370
wager of this description is to induce the party to it either to
give false testimony, if it be his interest to procure a
conviction, or if the other way, to withdraw from the court
evidence which he may either possess at the time of laying the
wager or which may afterwards come to his knowledge. And even if a
party be not in a situation to suppress or fabricate evidence,
still he may influence the result of the trial by prejudicing the
public mind on the case, and thus deprive the party charged of the
fair trial to which he is entitled."
P. 82.
It may be said the plaintiffs have made no contract in which any
element of wager exists. The contract was between the insured and
the company, and in that there was no other element of wager than
is found in any ordinary insurance policy. This may be technically
true. The plaintiffs made no contract, but they are seeking to
enforce one containing, so far as they are concerned, all the
elements which, as indicated in the quotations just made, forbid
its enforcement on the ground of public policy. They claim in part
under an assignment made before the homicide, the value of which,
however, they do not disclose, and they were the heirs of the
insured, and after the death of his wife and children, would, in
the absence of any will, become the beneficiaries in full. So they
stood prior to the trial, with a personal interest drawing them in
one direction and a public duty which might possibly compel active
efforts in a contrary direction. That these plaintiffs may have
known nothing in respect to the circumstances of the homicide, or
been unable to furnish any evidence
pro or
con on
the matter of insanity, is immaterial. It is enough that the
contract has such a tendency, and it is not essential that in fact
it produced a conflict in the minds of these plaintiffs or changed
their conduct.
The judgment of the court of appeals is
Affirmed.