In an action of ejectment against private individuals, the
jurisdiction of the circuit court cannot be maintained on the
ground that, by averments that plaintiffs were ousted in violation
of the Treaty of October 21, 1803, and of the Fifth Amendment, the
provisions of which it was the duty of the federal government to
observe, it appeared that the case arose under the Constitution, or
laws, or treaties of the United States.
This was an action of ejectment brought by Hippolite Filhiol and
others in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, against Charles E. Maurice, Charles G.
Convers, and William G. Maurice, for the recovery of a parcel of
land in the City of Hot Springs, Garland County, Arkansas, on the
permanent reservation at Hot Springs described
Page 185 U. S. 109
as Bath House site No. 8, and for rent thereof as damages.
Plaintiffs deraigned title as heirs at law of Don Juan Filhiol, to
whom it was alleged the lands were granted February 22, 1788, by
the then Spanish governor of the Province of Louisiana, by virtue
of which grant said Filhiol became the owner of a tract of "about
three miles square, embracing all the hot springs in the City of
Hot Springs, Garland County, Arkansas," and including the parcel of
land for which plaintiffs brought suit. The complaint did not aver
the citizenship of plaintiff or defendants, although the caption
described plaintiffs as residents of several states other than
Arkansas, but it was averred as follows:
"And for cause of action say that, by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and the third article of the
treaty of the United States of America and the Republic of France,
which was ratified on the 21st day of October, 1803, the United
States undertook and agreed to maintain the said Don Juan Filhiol
and his heirs in their right and title to the land in controversy
and their full enjoyment of the same, but, in violation of the
provisions of said treaty, and without due process of law, and in
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, defendants did, without condemnation and without
compensation to plaintiffs, on or about the second day of January,
1807, wrongfully and without right, oust the plaintiffs from the
possession of the land in controversy, and for more than two years
last past have held possession, and they now hold possession, of
the land in controversy, wrongfully and without right, and they
refuse to surrender possession of the same to plaintiffs."
Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that its
allegations did not "constitute a cause of action."
The circuit court sustained the demurrer, and, plaintiffs
electing to stand on their complaint and declining to amend, the
complaint was dismissed with costs. A writ of error directly from
this Court was then allowed.
Page 185 U. S. 110
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Writs of error may be sued out directly from this Court to the
circuit courts in cases in which the construction or application of
the Constitution of the United States is involved, or in which the
validity or construction of any treaty made under the authority of
the United States is drawn in question. Act of March 3, 1891, c.
517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826.
And we repeat, as has often been said before, that a case may be
said to involve the construction or application of the Constitution
of the United States when a title, right, privilege, or immunity is
claimed under that instrument; but a definite issue in respect to
the possession of the right must be distinctly deducible from the
record before the judgment of the court below can be revised on the
ground of error in the disposal of such a claim by its decision.
The same rule is applicable in respect of the validity or
construction of a treaty. Some right, title, privilege, or immunity
dependent on the treaty must be so set up or claimed as to require
the circuit court to pass on the question of the validity or
construction in disposing of the right asserted.
Muse v.
Arlington Hotel Company, 168 U. S. 430, and
cases cited.
The jurisdiction of the circuit court was not invoked in this
case on the ground of diverse citizenship, but on the ground that
the case arose "under the Constitution or laws of the United States
or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."
And it is settled that, in order to give the circuit court
jurisdiction of a case as so arising, that it does so arise must
appear from the plaintiff's own statement of his claim.
As the circuit court took jurisdiction, which could only have
been on the latter ground, and decided the case upon the merits,
the writ of error was properly taken directly to this Court, the
jurisdiction of which is exclusive in such cases.
Huguley
Manufacturing Company v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U.
S. 290;
American Sugar Company v. New Orleans,
181 U. S. 277.
We are met, however, on the threshold with the question whether
the jurisdiction of the circuit court could be maintained
Page 185 U. S. 111
on that ground. It does not appear that this question was raised
below, and, on the contrary, the circuit court disposed of the case
on the merits -- that is, assuming jurisdiction, the circuit court
decided that the complaint failed to set up a cause of action.
Did it appear from plaintiffs' own statement that the case arose
under the Constitution or a treaty of the United States? We do not
think it did.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the exercise of federal power to
deprive any person of property without due process of law or to
take private property for public use without just compensation, and
the Treaty of October 21, 1803, provided for the protection of the
inhabitants of the territory ceded in the enjoyment of their
property. Public Treaties 200.
But no right, title, privilege, or immunity was here asserted as
derived from the Constitution or the treaty, as against these
private individuals who were impleaded as defendants, either
specifically or through averments that plaintiffs were ousted in
violation of the treaty and of the Fifth Amendment, the provisions
of which it was the duty of the federal government to observe.
The gravamen of the complaint was that plaintiffs' ancestor had
a perfect title, to which they had succeeded, and the appropriate
remedy for illegal invasion of the right of possession was sought,
but it was not made to appear that the circuit court had
jurisdiction, for the action was not against the United States, nor
could it have been, as the United States had not consented to be so
sued, and so far as defendants were concerned, it was not charged
that they took possession by direction of the government, and
plaintiffs set up no more than a wrongful ouster by merely private
persons, remediable in the ordinary course and in the proper
tribunals.
And see Arkansas v. Coal Company, 183 U.
S. 185;
Muse v. Arlington Hotel Company,
168 U. S. 430.
The particular grounds of the decision of the circuit court on
the merits do not appear, nor is it material, as that court
manifestly had no jurisdiction.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with a direction to
dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction, with
costs.
