The essential elements of due process of law are notice and
opportunity to defend, and in determining whether such rights are
denied, the Court is governed by the substance of things, and not
by mere form.
A person charged with being of unsound mind is not denied due
process of law by being refused an opportunity to defend when in
fact actual notice was served upon him of the proceedings, and
when, if he had chosen to do so, he was at liberty to make such
defenses as he deemed advisable.
The due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution does not necessitate that the proceedings in a state
court should be by a particular mode, but only that there shall be
a regular course of proceedings, in which notice is given of the
claim asserted and an opportunity afforded to defend against
it.
This Court accepts as conclusive the ruling of the Supreme Court
of Alabama that the jury which passed upon the lunacy proceeding
considered in this case was a lawful jury, that the petition was in
compliance with the statute, and that the asserted omissions in the
recitals in the verdict and order thereon were, at best, but mere
irregularities which did not render void the order of the state
court, appointing a guardian.
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme
Page 182 U. S. 428
Court of Alabama affirming a judgment in favor of John N. Craft,
the defendant in error herein. The judgment thus affirmed was
entered by a lower state tribunal upon a verdict rendered on the
second trial of an action in ejectment, wherein Jetta Simon,
plaintiff in error herein, was plaintiff.
In brief the facts are as follows: in 1889, Jetta Simon, a
widow, resided in Mobile, Alabama, with several minor children. She
lived at that time in a house of which she was the owner, being the
real estate affected by the action of ejectment heretofore referred
to. On January 30, 1889, Ralph G. Richard filed in the Probate
Court of Mobile County, Alabama, a petition for an inquisition of
lunacy as to Mrs. Simon. In this petition it was represented that
Richard was a friend of Mrs. Simon and of her family; that she was
of the age of forty-nine years, a resident of Mobile, of unsound
mind and incapable of governing herself or of conducting and
managing her affairs. Upon this petition an order was entered for a
hearing on February 6, 1889, and that a jury "be drawn, as the law
directs, for the trial of this issue." The order also provided that
a writ issue to the sheriff
"requiring him to take the said Jetta Simon, so that he have her
in this court to be presented at said trial, if consistent with the
health and safety of said Simon."
The writ issued. Therein was stated the substance of the
allegations of the petition, and that the order had been entered
appointing February 6, 1889, "for hearing said petition and for the
due trial thereof." The command of the writ was that--
"If it be consistent with the health and safety of said Jetta
Simon, you are hereby required to take her body, so that you may
have her in said court, to be present at said trial, and before the
jury then to be impaneled to make said inquisition."
"And have you then and there this writ with your return thereon
as to how you have executed the same."
The writ was duly returned with the following indorsement:
"Received January 31st, 1889, and on the same day I executed the
within writ of arrest by taking into my custody the within-named
Jetta Simon and handing her a copy of said writ, and as it is
inconsistent with the health or safety of the within-named Jetta
Simon to have her present at the place
Page 182 U. S. 429
of trial, and on the advice of Dr. H. P. Hirshfield, a
physician, whose certificate is hereto attached, she is not brought
before the honorable court."
"W. H. Holcombe,
Sheriff"
"Mobile, February 5th, 1889. By Wm. H. Sheffield,
D.S."
The certificate referred to reads as follows:
"Mobile, Ala.
Jan. 30th, 1889"
"To the Sheriff of Mobile County, Ala.:"
"I, H. P. Hirshfield, a regular physician, practicing in Mobile
County, Ala. hereby certify that I am acquainted with Mrs. Jetta
Simon, and have examined her condition on yesterday, and find that
she is a person of unsound mind, and it would not be consistent
with her health or safety to have her present in court in any
matter now pending."
"H. P. Hirshfield, M.D."
One Vaughan was appointed by the probate court the guardian
ad litem of Mrs. Simon "in the matter of the petition to
inquire into her lunacy." The appointment was accepted, and the
guardian filed in said proceeding an answer averring "that he
wholly denies all the matters and things stated and contained in
said petition, and requires strict proof to be made thereof
according to law." Thereupon a hearing was had before a jury, who
returned a verdict that Mrs. Simon was "of unsound mind." The
probate court then entered the following order or decree:
"
Jetta Simon, Lunatic"
"State of Alabama"
"Probate Court of said County"
"Mobile County"
"February 6th, 1889"
"This being the day appointed, by reference to an entry thereof
made upon the minutes of the court on the 30th of January, 1889,
for the hearing of the petition of Ralph G. Richard, filed,
alleging the lunacy of the said Jetta Simon and praying an
inquisition thereof, and it being shown that it would not be
consistent with the health and safety of said lunatic to bring her
into court at this time, and it appearing that due process
Page 182 U. S. 430
had been served upon said lunatic notifying her of this
proceeding, now comes the said Richard and a jury of good and
lawful men, who reside in the County of Mobile, and who, having
been summoned, to-wit, John Pollock, Jr., and eleven others, who,
having heard the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the charge
of the court in the premises, and being first duly tried,
impaneled, and sworn well and truly to make inquisition of the
facts alleged in said petition and a true verdict to render
according to the evidence, upon their oath say, 'We, the jury, find
Mrs. Jetta Simon to be of unsound mind.'"
"It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that said
petition and all other proceedings thereon, together with the
aforesaid verdict of said jury declaring the said Jetta Simon a
lunatic, be recorded."
Subsequently, on February 11, 1889, Richard was duly appointed
guardian of the estate of Mrs. Simon, and regular proceedings were
had by which, under authority of the court, a sale of the real
estate in question was ordered to be made for the payment of the
debts of Mrs. Simon and for the support and maintenance of her
family. Such sale was had in May, 1889, when Henry J. Simon became
the purchaser, who sold the property to John N. Craft, defendant in
error herein. In September, 1895, more than six years after the
sale to Simon, the action in ejectment heretofore referred to was
instituted against one Brown, a tenant of Craft. Craft, as
landlord, was subsequently substituted in the stead of Brown. Upon
a second trial of the issues joined, the defendant Craft, among
other evidence, introduced the record of the proceedings in the
probate court upon the inquisition of lunacy, to which reference
has already been made, and the record of the subsequent proceedings
resulting in the sale to Henry J. Simon. Objection to the
introduction of such records was made upon specified grounds, all
which are stated in the margin. [
Footnote 1] The objections
Page 182 U. S. 431
were overruled and the record allowed to be read in evidence, to
which action of the court exception was duly taken. The approval by
the Supreme Court of Alabama of this ruling is what is here
complained of.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama reversing the
judgment entered on a verdict in favor of Mrs. Simon rendered at
the first trial of the action of ejectment is contained in 118 Ala.
625. The judgment entered in favor of Craft upon the second trial
was affirmed upon the authority of the previous opinion.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By subdivision 6 of section 787 of the Civil Code of Alabama of
1886, courts of probate in that state are vested with original
jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of guardians for
minors and persons of unsound mind. Pertinent provisions of
Page 182 U. S. 432
the statutes of Alabama relating to the mode of appointment of
guardians of persons of unsound mind, contained in said Civil Code,
are excerpted in the margin. [
Footnote 2]
In the proceedings to inquire into the sanity of Mrs. Simon the
writ which issued to the sheriff was evidently based upon the
following clause of section 2393 of the Civil Code of 1886:
Page 182 U. S. 433
"2393. The judge of probate . . . must also issue a writ
directed to the sheriff to take the person alleged to be of unsound
mind, and, if consistent with his health or safety, have him
present at the place of trial."
The invalidity of the proceedings in the inquisition of lunacy
which formed the basis of the subsequent proceedings for the sale
of the property of Mrs. Simon is in substance predicated on the
contention that the writ directed to the sheriff authorized that
official to determine whether it was consistent with the health and
safety of Mrs. Simon to be present at the trial of the question of
her sanity; that the sheriff decided this question against her, and
she was detained in custody and not allowed to be present at the
hearing on the inquisition. This latter claim, however, is founded
upon the return indorsed by the sheriff on the writ directed to
him. At the trial below, there
Page 182 U. S. 434
was no offer to prove by any form of evidence that Mrs. Simon
was in fact of sound mind when the proceedings in lunacy were
instituted or that she desired to attend, and was prevented from
attending, the hearing, or was refused opportunity to consult with
and employ counsel to represent her. The entire case is thus solely
based on the inferences which are deduced, as stated, from the face
of the return of the sheriff. And upon the assumptions thus made,
it is contended that the statute, as well as the proceedings
thereunder, were violative of the clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which forbids
depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.
It is not seriously questioned that the Alabama statute provided
that notice should be given to one proceeded against as being of
unsound mind of the contemplated trial of the question of his or
her sanity. Indeed, it would seem that it was not urged before the
Supreme Court of Alabama that the statutes
Page 182 U. S. 435
of that state failed to provide for notice, and that court
assumed in its opinion that no question of that character was
presented. As a matter of fact, a copy of the writ which issued and
which embodied a notice of the date of the hearing of the
proceedings in lunacy is shown by the record to have been actually
served on Mrs. Simon. As early as 1870, the Supreme Court of
Alabama, in
Fore v. Fore, 44 Ala. 478, 483, held that the
service of the writ upon a supposed lunatic was the notice required
by the statute, and brought the defendant into court, and that, if
he failed to avail of such matters of defense as he might have, he
must suffer the effect of his failure to do so.
We excerpt in the margin the portion of the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Alabama which dealt with the objection that Mrs.
Simon was deprived of opportunity to be heard. [
Footnote 3]
The contention now urged is that notice imports an opportunity
to defend, and that the return of the sheriff conclusively
established that Mrs. Simon was taken into custody, and was hence
prevented by the sheriff from attending the inquest or defending
through counsel if she wished to do so in consequence of the notice
which she received. It seems, however, manifest -- as it is fairly
to be inferred the state court interpreted the
Page 182 U. S. 436
statute -- that the purpose in the command of the writ, "to take
the person alleged to be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with
her health or safety, have her present at the place of trial," was
to enforce the attendance of the alleged non compos, rather than to
authorize a restraint upon the attendance of such person at the
hearing. In other words, that the detention authorized was simply
such as would be necessary to enable the sheriff to perform the
absolute duty imposed upon him by law of bringing the person before
the court, if in the judgment of that officer such person was in a
fit condition to attend, and hence it cannot be presumed, in the
absence of all proof or allegation to that effect, that the sheriff
in the discharge of this duty, after serving the writ upon the
alleged lunatic, exerted his power of detention for the purpose of
preventing her attendance at the hearing, or of restraining her
from availing herself of any and every opportunity to defend which
she might desire to resort to, or which she was capable of
exerting. The essential elements of due process of law are notice
and opportunity to defend. In determining whether such rights were
denied we are governed by the substance of things, and not by mere
form.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt,
177 U. S. 230. We
cannot, then, even on the assumption that Mrs. Simon was of sound
mind and fit to attend the hearing, hold that she was denied due
process of law by being refused an opportunity to defend, when, in
fact actual notice was served upon her of the proceedings, and
when, as we construe the statute, if she had chosen to do so, she
was at liberty to make such defense as she deemed advisable. The
view we take of the statute was evidently the one adopted by the
judge of the probate court, where the proceedings in lunacy were
heard, since that court, upon the return of the sheriff, and the
failure of the alleged lunatic to appear, either in person or by
counsel, in order to protect her interests, entered an order
appointing a guardian
ad litem "in the matter of the
petition to inquire into her lunacy," and
Page 182 U. S. 437
an answer was filed by such guardian, denying all the matters
and things stated and contained in the petition, and requiring
strict proof to be made thereof according to law.
It is also urged as establishing the nullity of the appointment
of a guardian of the estate of Mrs. Simon that the proceedings
failed to constitute due process of law because (1) they were
special and statutory, and the petition failed to state sufficient
jurisdictional facts; (2) a jury was not impaneled as provided by
law, and (3) there was no finding in the verdict of the jury or the
order entered thereon ascertaining and determining all the facts
claimed to be essential to confer jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian. But the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not necessitate that the proceedings in a state court should
be by a particular mode, but only that there shall be a regular
course of proceedings in which notice is given of the claim
asserted, and an opportunity afforded to defend against it.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt,
177 U. S. 230,
177 U. S. 236,
and cases cited. If the essential requisites of full notice and an
opportunity to defend were present, this Court will accept the
interpretation given by the state court as to the regularity, under
the state statute, of the practice pursued in the particular case.
Tested by these principles, we accept as conclusive the ruling of
the Supreme Court of Alabama that the jury which passed on the
issues in the lunacy proceeding was a lawful jury, that the
petition was in compliance with the statute, and that the asserted
omissions in the recitals in the verdict and order thereon were, at
best, but mere irregularities which did not render void the order
of the state court appointing a guardian of Mrs. Simon's
estate.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"1st. In that there was no process issued notifying Jetty Simon
to be present at the trial of the inquest of lunacy that was
held."
"2d. In that no provision was made in or by said proceedings
whereby said Jetty Simon might be present at the inquest of lunacy
that was held."
"3d. In that the writ of arrest issued for the body of Jetty
Simon was conditional in form and conferred upon the sheriff the
power to determine whether it should be executed or not."
"4th. In that the writ of arrest left it to the judgment of the
sheriff whether the said Jetty Simon should be allowed to appear at
the trial of the inquest of lunacy."
"5th. In that the writ of arrest authorized the sheriff to
restrain Jetty Simon of her liberty and deprive her of the
opportunity to be heard at the inquest of lunacy."
"6th. In that the sheriff's return shows that, under the writ of
arrest, he restrained Jetty Simon of her liberty and did not permit
her to be present at the trial of the inquest of lunacy."
"7th. Because the statute under which Jetty Simon was restrained
of her liberty and deprived of her property is in conflict with
Article V of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, which provides, 'Nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law,' and in conflict with Article
XIV of the Amendments to said Constitution:"
"1
a. In that it authorizes a citizen to be deprived of
his or her liberty without due process of law."
"2
a. In that it authorizes a citizen to be deprived of
his or her property without due process of law."
"8th. Because said proceedings in the probate court are
irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in the cause."
[
Footnote 2]
Sundry sections of Part 2, Title 5, Chapter 4, of the Civil Code
of Alabama of 1886, pp. 535
et seq.:
"2390 (2753, 2754). Appointment. -- The court of probate has
authority, and it is a duty, to appoint guardians for persons of
unsound mind residing in the county, having an estate, real or
personal, and of persons of unsound mind residing without the
state, having within the county property requiring the care of a
guardian, under the limitations, and in the mode hereinafter
prescribed."
"2391. Guardian not appointed until after inquisition. -- A
guardian for a person alleged to be of unsound mind, residing in
the county, must not be appointed until an inquisition has been had
and taken as hereinafter directed."
"2392 (2757). Inquisition; proceedings. -- Upon the petition of
any of the relatives or friends of any person alleged to be of
unsound mind, setting forth the facts and name, sex, age, and
residence of such person, accompanied by an affidavit that the
petitioner believes the facts therein stated to be true, the court
of probate of the county in which such person alleged to be of
unsound mind resides must appoint a day, not more than ten days
from the presentment of such petition, for the hearing
thereof."
"2393 (2758). Jury summoned; writ of arrest. -- The judge of
probate must issue a writ directed to the sheriff, commanding him
to summon twelve disinterested persons of the neighborhood for the
trial thereof, and also issue subpoenas for witnesses, as the
parties may require, returnable to the time of trial; he must also
issue a writ directed to the sheriff to take the person alleged to
be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with his health or safety,
have him present at the place of trial."
"2394 (2759). Oaths of jurors; vacancies filled. -- At the time
set for the trial, if good cause be not shown for continuance, the
jury must be impaneled and sworn well and truly to make inquisition
of the facts alleged in the petition, and a true verdict render
according to the evidence. If any of the jurors are excused from
serving, fail to attend, or are set aside for any cause, their
places may be supplied from the bystanders."
"2395 (2760). On verdict of insanity, papers filed, and guardian
appointed. -- If the jury find by their verdict that the facts
alleged in the petition are true, and that such person is of
unsound mind, the court must cause the petition and all the
proceedings thereon to be recorded, and appoint a suitable guardian
of such person."
"
* * * *"
"2396 (2761). Proceedings when person of unsound mind is
confined in asylum. -- If the person alleged to be of unsound mind
is a resident of the county, and is at the time of the application
confined in an hospital or asylum within or without the state, the
inquisition may be had and taken without notice to him, but on the
filing of the application the court must appoint a guardian
ad
litem to represent and defend for him; it is the duty of such
guardian by answer to put in issue the facts stated in the
application, and to employ counsel at the expense of such person of
unsound mind to appear and defend."
"2397 (2804). Application for revocation of guardianship. -- At
any time after the inquisition the person ascertained to be of
unsound mind, by himself or by next friend, may apply in writing to
the court of probate for a revocation of the proceedings against
him, and of the letters of guardianship; the application to be
accompanied by the certificate in writing of two physicians or of
two other competent persons, stating that, after examination of
such person they believe him to be of sound mind."
"2398 (2804). Proceedings on application. -- On the filing of
such application, the court must appoint a day for the hearing
thereof, not more than ten days thereafter, and the guardian and
the person at whose instance the inquisition was had and taken must
be cited to appear and show cause against it."
"2399 (2805, 2806). Contest of application. -- If the guardian
or person at whose instance the inquisition was had and taken
appear and in writing deny the allegations of the application, the
court must appoint a day for the trial of such contest, not more
than ten days thereafter, and must cause a jury to be summoned for
the trial thereof, and the like proceedings must be had as upon the
original inquisition, or, if there be no contest of the allegations
of the application and the court is satisfied of the truth thereof,
a decree must be entered revoking the proceedings on the
inquisition and the guardianship, and declaring that the ward must
be restored to the custody and management of his estate."
"2400 (2807). Judgment on contest; costs thereof. -- If on the
trial of the contest, the jury find the facts stated in the
application to be true, the court must enter a decree revoking the
proceedings on the inquisition and the guardianship, and declaring
that the ward must be restored to the custody and management of his
estate, and must adjudge the costs as is just and equitable; but if
the verdict of the jury negatives the facts stated in the
application, a judgment of dismissal at the costs of the applicant
or of the next friend must be entered."
"2401 (2803). Revocation on application of guardian. -- If at
any time after his appointment, the guardian becomes satisfied that
the ward has been restored to sanity and is capable of managing his
estate, and the judge of probate is of opinion, from the proof and
the facts stated, that such representation is correct, he must make
an order that the guardian be discharged and that the estate of the
ward be restored to him."
[
Footnote 3]
"The second ground of objection is that the appellee had no
opportunity to be heard at the inquisition. This objection is based
upon the character and wording of the writ directed to the sheriff.
The provision of the statute is that the judge must"
"issue a writ, directed to the sheriff, to take the person
alleged to be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with his health
or safety, have him present at the place of trial."
"The writ that issued, after setting out the facts averred in
the petition, proceeded:"
"Now, therefore, if it be consistent with the health and safety
of said Jetta Simon, you are hereby required to take her body so
that you may have her in said court,"
"etc. The statute is that the sheriff be directed to take her
body, and, if consistent with health, etc. By the statute it is
made the duty of the sheriff to take the body without condition,
and, if consistent with health and safety, to have her present at
the trial. The writ issued, directed to the sheriff, 'if consistent
with health and safety, to take her body,' etc. The return of the
sheriff shows that the writ was executed in accordance with the
statute. It is:"
"I executed the within writ of arrest by taking into my custody
the within-named Jetta Simon and handing her a copy of said writ,
and as it is inconsistent with the health or safety . . . to have
her at the place of trial . . . she is not brought before the
court."
"Technically, the writ of the judge was not accurately correct.
Its meaning, however, is evident. The sheriff's return was complete
and regular in every respect. We do not doubt she was brought into
the court in the manner prescribed by statute, and that she was
subject to its jurisdiction. The second objection cannot be
sustained."
118 Ala. 636.
