The railroad company filed a bill to enjoin the collection of
certain state taxes from 1892 to 1897 inclusive. This Court held
that a new corporation was formed by a consolidation of certain
prior corporations made October 24, 1892, and that the taxes having
accrued subsequent to that date were legally assessed under the
state constitution of 1890, (
180 U. S. 180
Page 181 U. S. 580
U.S. 1). The railroad company moved for a rehearing with respect
to the taxes of 1892 upon the ground that they accrued prior to the
consolidation of October 24.
Held that, as the Supreme
Court of Mississippi had decided that all the taxes had accrued
after the consolidation of October 24, and the company had thereby
lost its exemption, and as this was a construction of the general
tax laws of the state, which were complex and difficult of
interpretation, this Court would accept that construction and deny
the petition for a rehearing.
This was a petition for a rehearing of the case reported in
180 U. S. 180 U.S.
1, upon the ground that the taxes for the year 1892 were separable
from taxes for the succeeding years, inasmuch as the taxes for that
year had been completely levied and assessed on September 22, 1892,
and that the claim of the state, if any, had fully accrued at least
one month before the articles of consolidation were executed
(October 24, 1892), and that the judgment therefore gave to the
consolidation a retrospective effect.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decision of this case was based upon the theory that all the
taxes involved in the case, from 1892 to 1897, accrued subsequent
to the consolidation of October 24, 1892, which was held by this
Court to create a new corporation, subject to existing laws, and
particularly to that provision of the Constitution of 1890, "that
every new grant of corporate franchise shall be subject to the
provisions of the Constitution." No suggestion was made in the
argument or briefs of the railroad company of any distinction in
respect to the liability of the company between the taxes of the
year 1892 and those of subsequent years, and none such was
recognized by the Court in its opinion, but we are now asked to
hold that the taxes for the year 1892 accrued before the
consolidation of October 24, and were
Page 181 U. S. 582
consequently unaffected by that consolidation, and that with
respect to such taxes the right of commutation or exemption,
contained in section 21 of the charter of the Mobile &
Northwestern Railway Company, attached and operated to exempt the
company from the payment of taxes for the year 1892.
We have not found it necessary to decide whether a party, upon a
petition for a rehearing in this Court, may avail himself of a
point not taken in the court of original jurisdiction, or upon
either one of two appeals to the supreme court, nor in the
assignment of errors in this Court, nor even called to our
attention in the briefs or arguments of counsel, as we are of
opinion that, upon the merits the petition must be denied.
Whatever force we might be disposed to give to prior
adjudications of the Supreme Court of Mississippi upholding these
exemptions, there can be no doubt that that court has expressly
held that the taxes for the year 1892 did not accrue until after
the consolidation of October 24 of that year, and hence that this
case does not fall within those adjudications. We quote the
following from the opinion of the court of February 20, 1899, upon
a second appeal to that court:
"So far as concerns the argument that the appellants relied on
the case of
Mississippi Mills v. Cook, 56 Miss. 40, and
that, if the overruling of that case is correct, nevertheless the
appellants should be protected from taxation accruing before the
overruling of that case, it is enough to say that question is not
material here, since all the taxes here sued for accrued after the
consolidation of October 24, 1892, and the appellants were
expressly held to have lost their exemption, if any they had, by
their own voluntary act of consolidation. That was the first and
main ground on which our former opinion was distinctly rested. It
must be too clear for serious disputation, in this view, that all
discussion of the case of Mississippi Mills v. Cook is wholly
unavailing as to these taxes."
77 Miss. 270, 316.
Whether this opinion be conclusive upon us in view of the
argument that a contract has been impaired in violation of the
Constitution we do not feel called upon to decide. The statutes of
the State of Mississippi necessary to be considered for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the taxes for the year 1892
Page 181 U. S. 583
accrued prior to October 24 of that year are complex and
difficult of interpretation. Assuming that we may exercise an
independent judgment respecting their construction, the examination
we have given them leaves us in great doubt whether the argument
that the taxes had accrued prior to the consolidation is a sound
one. The right asserted depends upon a comparison and construction
of such statutes, and the settled rule of this Court is that, even
in a case where we may exercise an independent judgment, any
reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of that construction of
the state statute which has been adopted by the court of last
resort in that state.
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S.
20;
Flash v. Conn, 109 U.
S. 371,
109 U. S. 379;
Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96;
Board of Liquidation v. Louisiana, 179 U.
S. 622.
Had the opinion above cited involved the construction of section
21 of the Mobile & Northwestern charter -- that is, the
contract for commutation or exemption -- it would have directly
involved a federal question; but it did not. It was an opinion as
to when, under the general laws of the State of Mississippi, a
claim for taxes accrued, and a distinct ruling that such taxes did
not accrue until after a certain date.
Raymond's Lessee v.
Longworth, 14 How. 76,
55
U. S. 79;
Bailey v.
Magwire, 22 Wall. 215. For the reasons above
stated, we accept the views of the Supreme Court of Mississippi as
to the proper construction of these laws.
The petition for a rehearing must therefore be
Denied.