Texas was an independent state when admitted into the Union, and
the effect of the admission was to make its citizens, citizens of
the United States. But those who at that time could only become
citizens by naturalization were thereupon relegated to the laws of
the United States in that behalf. Minor aliens in Texas, separated
from their parents, were not made citizens of the United States by
the admission, and in order to become such, were obliged to comply
with the requirements of the laws of the United States. As
appellant was a German subject, and not a citizen of Texas when
Texas became one of the United States, and had not been naturalized
when the injury complained of was inflicted, the Court of Claims
was right in dismissing his petition for want of jurisdiction.
Appellant filed his petition in the Court of Claims alleging
that, on October 20, 1861, a band of Apache Indians raided the
settlement at San Xavier, near Tucson, Arizona Territory, and stole
from his ranch certain cows, horses, and mules of the value of
$10,330; that these Indians were in amity and under treaty
relations with the United States at that date, and "that petitioner
is a naturalized citizen of the United States, and has at all times
borne true allegiance to the government of the United States,"
etc.
The United States pleaded that the claimant was not a citizen of
the United States at the date of the alleged depredation, and that
the court was therefore without jurisdiction to hear and determine
the cause.
The court adopted as its findings of fact the following agreed
statement of facts:
"The claimant, Fritz Contzen, was born in Germany on the 27th
day of February, 1831, and emigrated to Texas in July, 1845. He
remained in Texas until the admission of the state into the union,
December 29, 1845."
"Since the admission of Texas, the claimant has resided
continuously
Page 179 U. S. 192
in the United States, mostly in Arizona and sometime in
California. He visited Germany with his wife and child from 1873 to
1800, his home and furniture remaining all the time in this
country. He was married in the United States. His residence was in
Texas until he came to Arizona, in 1855, with Major Emory, on the
boundary commission."
"In the year 1854, he went into court at San Antonio, Texas, and
he was told that, he being a resident of Texas when it became part
of the United States, that made him a citizen of the United States,
and he voted there. He never took any further steps about
naturalization. There is no record of naturalization, from 1847 on,
of anyone of the claimant's name, when such record should appear in
the courts of San Antonio."
"That, in October, 1861, the defendant Indians were in amity
with the United States."
Judgment was thereupon given sustaining defendants' plea to the
jurisdiction, and dismissing the petition. 33 Ct.Cl. 475.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petition alleged that appellant was a naturalized citizen of
the United States at the time it was filed, but it contained no
averment that he was such citizen at the date of the alleged
depredation. If he was not, the Court of Claims did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon his claims, and its judgment must
be affirmed.
Johnson v. United States, 160 U.
S. 546.
It appeared that Contzen was born in Germany, February 27, 1831,
and came to Texas in July, 1845, and that he was not naturalized
under the statutes of the United States in that behalf prior to
October 20, 1861. His title to citizenship at that time is asserted
on the ground that he was embraced by a collective naturalization
effected by the admission of Texas into the Union.
Page 179 U. S. 193
It is not disputed that citizenship may spring from collective
naturalization by treaty or statute, nor that, by the annexation of
Texas and its admission into the Union, all the citizens of the
former Republic became, without any express declaration, citizens
of the United States.
And the first question is whether Contzen was a citizen of the
Republic when it became a state.
The Declaration of Independence of Texas was adopted March 1,
and proclaimed March 2, 1836, and the Constitution of that Republic
was ordained March 17 of that year.
Section 6 of the "General Provisions" of that instrument
reads:
"All free white persons who shall emigrate to this Republic and
who shall, after a residence of six months, make oath before some
competent authority that he intends to reside permanently in the
same, and shall swear to support this Constitution, and that he
will bear true allegiance to the Republic of Texas, shall be
entitled to all the privileges of citizenship."
By section 10, it was provided that
"All persons (Africans, or descendants of Africans, and Indians
excepted) who were residing in Texas on the day of the Declaration
of Independence, shall be considered citizens of the Republic and
entitled to all the privileges of such."
2 Charters and Constitution, 1760.
The fundamental law of the Republic thus identified as citizens
only such persons as were residing in Texas on the day of the
Declaration of Independence or should be naturalized according to
its provisions.
Section 10 also provided that "no alien shall hold land in Texas
except by titles emanating directly from the government of this
Republic;" and by an act of 1837, appointments of aliens to
military office were forbidden. 2 Laws Rep.Texas, p. 61.
Aliens as well as Africans and Indians were recognized
constituents of the population.
March 1, 1845, a joint resolution for the annexation of Texas
was approved, which provided that the territory of that republic
might be erected into a new state,
"with a republican form of government, to be adopted by the
people of said Republic by deputies in convention assembled, with
the consent of the existing government, in order that the same may
be admitted
Page 179 U. S. 194
as one of the states of this Union."
The government of Texas thereupon consented to annexation, and a
convention was called to sit at Austin on July 4, 1845, for the
adoption of a Constitution for the proposed state. That convention
assented to and accepted the resolution of Congress, and framed a
constitution, which was submitted to and ratified by the people
October 13, 1845.
The joint resolution for the admission of Texas into the Union
was approved December 29, 1845. This recited the previous
proceedings, and that the constitution, "with the proper evidence
of its adoption by the people of the Republic of Texas," had been
transmitted to the President of the United States and laid before
Congress. An act of Congress was passed on the same day, December
29, 1845, by which the laws of the United States were
"declared to extend to and over, and to have full force and
effect within, the State of Texas, admitted at the present session
of Congress into the Confederacy and Union of the United
States."
2 Charters and Constitutions 1764, 1765, 1768, 1783; 5 Stat.
797; 9 Stat. 1, 9 Stat. 108.
Contzen was a minor in 1845, and his nationality of origin
attached. He did not reside in Texas on the day of the Declaration
of Independence; he had not resided there six months at the date of
the admission of Texas into the Union; he had not taken the oath of
allegiance to the Republic; he was simply, as Davis, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court of Claims, said, "a German subject lately
arrived in Texas." Clearly he was not a citizen of Texas when the
state was admitted.
But it is contended that, by his stay in Texas of less than six
months, Contzen became one of the people of Texas, that the people
were admitted into the Union, and that all who were competent
thereupon became citizens of the United States. In other words,
that the effect of the proceedings through which annexation and
admission were accomplished was not simply to collectively make
citizens of the United States of all the then citizens of Texas,
but to collectively naturalize all who might have been naturalized
in Texas, but had not been, and had in no way signified their
election to become citizens of the United States. And that this
included alien minors independently of their parents.
Page 179 U. S. 195
We cannot concur in this view, and do not think such was the
intention of Congress or of the people applying for admission.
Texas occupied towards the United States the position of an
independent sovereignty. Its citizens were determined by its laws,
and they prescribed the manner in which aliens might become
citizens.
The United States admitted Texas as one of the states of the
union with its population as it stood. Those who were citizens of
the state became citizens of the United States, while aliens were
relegated for naturalization to the laws of the United States on
that subject.
It is true that section two of article three of the state
constitution, transmitted to Congress in the process of admission,
provided that
"all free male persons over the age of twenty-one years (Indians
not taxed, Africans, and descendants of Africans excepted) who
shall have resided six months in Texas, immediately preceding the
acceptance of this Constitution by the Congress of the United
States shall be deemed qualified electors."
But we need not consider the effect of that clause, as Contzen
did not come within it.
The subject of collective naturalization is discussed at length
in
Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, and
many cases cited and illustrations given. The case before us,
however, is not one of a treaty of cession, or relating to a
territory of the United States, and involving the construction of
acts of Congress for its government, or of enabling acts for its
admission.
Contzen, as we have said, was a minor at the time Texas was
admitted. If he elected, when he attained his majority, to become a
citizen of the United States, the way was open to him.
By the Act of May 26, 1824, carried forward into section 2167 of
the Revised Statutes, special provision was made for the
naturalization of alien minor residents on attaining majority, by
dispensing with the previous declaration of intention, and allowing
three years of minority on the five years' residence required; but
he was obliged at the time of his admission, to take the oath to
support the Constitution, and of renunciation of all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign sovereign, in court,
Page 179 U. S. 196
and also to declare on oath and prove to the satisfaction of the
court that, for two years next preceding, it had been his
bona
fide intention to become a citizen of the United States and in
all other respects to comply with the laws in regard to
naturalization.
The usual proof of naturalization is a copy of the record of the
court admitting the applicant, though in some instances there may
be facts from which, in the absence of the record, a jury may be
allowed to infer that a person, having the requisite qualifications
to become a citizen, had been duly naturalized. But the finding of
facts in this case excludes any presumption that Contzen had
complied with the statute prior to October, 1861.
Judgment affirmed.
