Thomas W. Means died in 1890, leaving a large estate and a will
made some ten years before his death, containing, among other
provisions, the following:
"Item 4. I give, devise and bequeath all the residue and
remainder of my estate, personal, real and mixed, wherever situated
or located, of which I shall die possessed, to be equally divided
among my four children, John Means, William Means, Mary A. Adams,
and Margaret A. Means, and my grandson, Thomas M. Culbertson (son
and sole heir of my deceased daughter Sarah Jane Culbertson) who
shall be living at the time of my decease, and the issue of any
child now living, and of said grandson, who may then have deceased,
such issue taking the share to which such child or grandson would
be entitled if living. But said share given, devised and bequeathed
to said grandson or his issue is to be held in trust as hereinafter
provided, and to be subject to the provisions hereinafter contained
as to said grandson's share."
"Item 5. I have made advances to my said children which are
charged to them respectively on my books, and I may make further
advances to them respectively, or to some of them, and to my said
grandson, which may be charged on my books to their respective
accounts. I desire the equal provision herein made for said
children and the provision for said grandson to be a provision for
them, respectively, in addition to said advances made and that may
hereafter be made, and that in the division, distribution and
settlement of my said estate, said advances made and that may
hereafter be made be treated not as advances, but as gifts not in
any manner to be accounted for by my said children and grandson, or
any of them or the issue of any of them."
He was in the habit of advancing money to his children, the
amounts advanced to each individually being entered against him in
the father's books. At the date of the will, the several amounts so
advanced were as follows: John, $79,214.36; William, $58,409.54;
Mrs. Adams, $51,207.48; Margaret, $39,120.78; Mrs. Culbertson,
$29,609.82. Subsequently, in 1898, William becoming involved, the
amount advanced to him was largely increased in manner as set forth
in the statement of the case and opinion of the Court. After the
death of the father, a claim was made that the money thus paid out
for William was to be held to be a part of his share of his
father's estate.
Held:
(1) That in the absence of some absolute and controlling rule to
the contrary, the intentions of a testator, as deduced from the
language of the will, construed in the light of the circumstances
surrounding
Page 177 U. S. 472
him at the date of its execution, always control as to the
disposition of the estate.
(2) That the testator believed that, after be had done in his
lifetime what in his judgment his children severally required,
there would be an abundance of his estate left for distribution,
and intended that all dealings between himself and each of his
children should be wiped out, and that what was left after having
discharged to each his paternal obligation should be distributed
equally.
After the probate of his father's will, William gave to the
administrators of the estate with the will annexed an
acknowledgment of the receipt from them of $136,035.75 in his own
notes to his father as part of his distributive share of his
father's estate. At the time when this was done, he was in
straitened circumstances, was broken in spirit, and was wavering in
his purposes.
Held that while a man in the full possession
of his faculties and under no duress may give away his property,
and equity will not recall the gift, yet it looks with careful
scrutiny upon all transactions between trustee and beneficiary, and
if it appears that the trustee has taken any advantage of the
situation of the beneficiary, and has obtained from him, even for
only the benefit of other beneficiaries, large property without
consideration, it will refuse to uphold the transaction thus
accomplished, and that the conclusions of the circuit court of
appeals in this case must be sustained, and its decree
affirmed.
On November 16, 1891, the respondents, trustees for the wife and
children of William Means, filed their bill in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of Kentucky against the
petitioners as administrators (with the will annexed) of Thomas W.
Means, deceased, and John Means, a son of said Thomas W. Means. The
case passed to hearing in that court upon pleadings and proofs, and
resulted in a decree, on July 31, 1895, in favor of the defendants
dismissing the bill. From such dismissal the plaintiffs appealed to
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which court, on
February 8, 1897, reversed the decree of dismissal and entered a
decree in favor of the plaintiffs. 78 F. 536, 80 F. 448. On May 24,
1897, a petition was filed in this Court for a certiorari, which
was allowed, and on December 6, 1897, the certiorari and return
were duly filed. At the October term, 1898, of this Court, after
argument and on May 22, 1899, the decree of the circuit court of
appeals was affirmed by a divided court. Thereafter, upon petition,
a rehearing was ordered, and the case was argued at the present
term before a full bench.
Page 177 U. S. 473
The facts are these: Thomas W. Means, a resident of Ashland,
Kentucky, died there on June 8, 1890, leaving an estate consisting
chiefly of personal property, which was appraised (including the
notes of his son, William Means for $136,035.75) at $752,302.44. He
left four children, John Means, William Means, Margaret A. Means,
and Mary A. Adams, and one grandson, Thomas M. Culbertson, the only
child of a deceased daughter. Some ten years prior to his death,
and on July 20, 1880, he made a will in which, after provisions for
the payment of his debts, funeral expenses, and expenses of
administration, were these two items:
"Item 4. I give, devise, and bequeath all the residue and
remainder of my estate, personal, real, and mixed, wherever
situated or located, of which I shall die possessed, to be equally
divided among my four children, John Means, William Means, Mary A.
Adams, and Margaret A. Means, and my grandson, Thomas M. Culbertson
(son and sole heir of my deceased daughter, Sarah Jane Culbertson),
who shall be living at the time of my decease, and the issue of any
child now living, and of said grandson, who may then have deceased,
such issue taking the share to which such child or grandson would
be entitled if living. But said share given, devised, and
bequeathed to said grandson or his issue is to be held in trust as
hereinafter provided, and to be subject to the provisions
hereinafter contained as to said grandson's share."
"Item 5. I have made advances to my said children which are
charged to them respectively on my books, and I may make further
advances to them respectively, or to some of them, and to my said
grandson, which may be charged on my books to their respective
accounts. I desire the equal provision, herein made for said
children, and the provision for said grandson, to be a provision
for them respectively, in addition to said advances made and that
may hereafter be made, and that in the division, distribution, and
settlement of my said estate, said advances made and that may
hereafter be made, be treated not as advancements, but as gifts not
in any manner to be accounted for by my said children and grandson,
or any of them, or the issue of any of them. "
Page 177 U. S. 474
Thomas W. Means was a prosperous iron manufacturer who had, as
stated, accumulated in his lifetime a large estate. For many years
he had been in the habit of letting his children have money. This
he had been doing for at least twenty-five years before the making
of the will. This money was not given to them in equal sums at
regular or irregular intervals. In other words, he was not making a
partial and equal distribution of his estate in advance of his
death, but the money was paid to or for one or another of his
children as occasion seemed to call for it. Accounts were entered
with each of these children in his books, and the money thus paid
to or for them was charged against them in these accounts, so that,
upon the face of the books, they stood as debtors to him for the
amounts so charged. The amounts thus charged were sometimes large.
The accounts were often reduced by money or property returned to
the father. So the father dealt separately with each child, letting
him or her have money whenever in his judgment the interest of the
child called for it. He was helping them in their business, paying
their debts, and otherwise using his large properties for their
benefit. At the same time, the accounts were kept in his books in
such a way as to indicate that he retained a claim against each
child for the balance shown on such account. He made memoranda on
his books, such as this at the head of John's account:
"This account and the accounts of William Means and Mary A.
Adams are not to be charged with interest when final settlement is
made, or at any time. Thomas W. Means."
With that as the relation between himself and children, Thomas
W. Means made the will containing the two items above quoted. He
was then seventy-seven years old. At the date of the will, the
accounts showed the following debtor balances:
John . . . . . . . . . . . . . $79,214.36
William. . . . . . . . . . . . 58,409.54
Mrs. Adams . . . . . . . . . . 51,207.48
Margaret . . . . . . . . . . . 39,120.78
Mrs. Culbertson. . . . . . . . 29,609.82
In 1888, a bank in Cincinnati, of which William was president,
failed, a failure which brought financial ruin to William. To
Page 177 U. S. 475
relieve him from the embarrassment and dangers which threatened
by reason of such failure, a large sum of money was paid out by
Thomas W. Means for William's benefit. The question presented in
this case is whether the money thus paid out is to be held a part
of William's share of his father's estate, or whether it is to be
deducted from the estate and the division made of the balance
between the five legatees.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question is upon the construction of the fifth item
of the will of Thomas W. Means. If there had been no such item, of
course, all sums due from the children and grandchild to the father
and grandfather would be part of the property of his estate and to
be counted in determining the sum to be divided among the five in
accordance with item 4. But item 5 evidently contemplated that some
amounts were to be deducted from the gross sum of the decedent's
property before a division was to be made. What were those
deductions? What did the testator intend should be deducted? For,
in the absence of some absolute and controlling rule of law to the
contrary, the intentions of a testator, as deduced from the
language of the will, construed in the light of the circumstances
surrounding him at the date of its execution, always control as to
the disposition of the estate. Without entering into any
discussion, we make these quotations from prior decisions of this
Court. In
Smith v. Bell,
6 Pet. 68, it was said by Chief Justice Marshall:
"The first and great rule in the exposition of wills, to which
all other rules must bend, is that the intention of the testator
expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be consistent with
the rules of law. 1 Dougl. 322; 1 W.Bl. 672. This principle
Page 177 U. S. 476
is generally asserted in the construction of every testamentary
disposition. It is emphatically the will of the person who makes
it, and is defined to be 'the legal declaration of a man's
intentions which he wills to be performed after his death.' 2
Bl.Com. 499. These intentions are to be collected from his words,
and ought to be carried into effect if they be consistent with law.
In the construction of ambiguous expressions, the situation of the
parties may properly be taken into view. The ties which connect the
testator with his legatees, the affection subsisting between them,
the motives which may reasonably be supposed to operate with him
and to influence him in the disposition of his property, are all
entitled to consideration in expounding doubtful words and
ascertaining the meaning in which the testator used them. . . . No
rule is better settled than that the whole will is to be taken
together, and is to be so construed as to give effect, if it be
possible, to the whole. . . . Notwithstanding the reasonableness
and good sense of this general rule, that the intention shall
prevail, it has been sometimes disregarded. If the testator
attempts to effect that which the law forbids, his will must yield
to the rules of law. But courts have sometimes gone farther. The
construction put upon words in one will has been supposed to
furnish a rule for construing the same words in other wills, and
thereby to furnish some settled and fixed rules of construction
which ought to be respected. We cannot say that this principle
ought to be totally disregarded, but it should never be carried so
far as to defeat the plain intent, if that intent may be carried
into execution without violating the rules of law. It has been said
truly (3 Wils. 141)"
"that cases on wills may guide us to general rules of
construction; but unless a case cited be in every respect directly
in point, and agree in every circumstance, it will have little or
no weight with the court, who always look upon the intention of the
testator as the polar star to direct them in the construction of
wills."
And in
Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U. S.
315,
98 U. S. 324,
Mr. Justice Strong used these words:
"It is a common remark that when interpreting a will, the
attending circumstances of the testator, such as the condition
Page 177 U. S. 477
of his family and the amount and character of his property, may
and ought to be taken into consideration. The interpreter may place
himself in the position occupied by the testator when he made the
will, and from that standpoint discover what was intended."
See also Clarke v.
Boorman, 18 Wall. 493;
Colton v. Colton,
127 U. S. 300;
Lee v. Simpson, 134 U. S. 572.
In the light of these decisions, we turn to inquire what was the
intention of the testator? Suppose that, on the next day after
making this will, he had died -- upon what basis would the
distribution of his estate have been made? Obviously by first
cancelling all the gifts and advances made to his children and then
distributing the balance equally between the five. For he declares
that the equal provision made by item 4 shall be in addition to his
advances,
"and that in the division, distribution, and settlement of my
said estate said advances . . . be treated not as advancements, but
as gifts not in any manner to be accounted for by my said children
and grandson, or any of them, or the issue of any of them."
Language could not be more clear. Nothing could express the
intent of the testator more forcibly that these words. Whatever he
had done in the way of letting his children and grandson have money
was to be taken as a matter of gift, for which none of the
recipients was to account, and only his estate, less such gifts and
advances, was to be equally distributed between the legatees named.
And this intent, which is so clearly disclosed in respect to what
he had already done, is equally clear in respect to what he might
do thereafter. He says that he "may make further advances to them
respectively, or to some of them," and declares that in the
division, distribution, and settlement of his estate "said advances
. . . that may hereafter be made, be treated, not as advancements,
but as gifts." In other words, as he had used some of his property
in the past again and again to help his children, he saw that it
was likely in the future he might do the same thing, and declared
not only that every dollar he had let them have in the past, but
also every dollar that he might let them have in the future, should
be taken "not as advancements, but as gifts." Not only that, but
that such gifts should not be accounted for in any manner
Page 177 U. S. 478
by any of the recipients, and that only the balance of his
estate, after all these personal gifts were cancelled, should be
distributed equally among the legatees. As in the past, he had
freely used his estate for the benefit of his children, so he
announced his intention to deal as freely with it in the future,
and to use any part of it in any way that he might deem best for
the interests of any one of his children, and declared that such
help given, or that might be given in the future, should not be
made the basis of any accounting between his legatees. He knew he
had a large estate, and that, whatever he might do with a fraction
of it, there would be an abundance left for each of them -- enough
to place them beyond the reach of want. He had the large and
generous paternal feeling -- that feeling which prompts the parent
to care as best he can during his lifetime for each of his children
according to their respective wants -- and he did not mean that
anything he did for one child should be challenged by another. He
doubtless recalled, as every parent does, that during infancy and
childhood one child had called for more attention and care, more
hours of toil and watch, than another. He realized that as they had
grown to manhood and womanhood, and entered into their various
places in life, there had been different calls for pecuniary
assistance, and that doubtless there would be differences in the
future. He knew that he had responded to every need of each child
in its early days, was trying in the later days of manhood and
womanhood to make like responses, and felt that, while life should
be prolonged to him, he would be under the same pressure of
affection to each. He believed that after he had done in his
lifetime what in his judgment they severally required, there would
be an abundance of his estate left for distribution, and intended
that all dealings between himself and each of his children should
be wiped out -- there should be a
tabula rasa -- and that
what was left (and it would be a large estate) after having
discharged to each one his paternal obligation, the untouched
estate, should be distributed equally. We do not see how that
purpose and thought of his could be expressed more clearly and
forcibly than it was done in the fifth item of the will, and it
would be a sad commentary on the wisdom of the law if that purpose
was not recognized and enforced.
Page 177 U. S. 479
It is said that there is an expressed limitation on this
generous purpose in that he describes the advances already made as
"charged to them respectively on my books," and that, as to further
advances, they "may be charged on my books to their respective
accounts," and that in order that any subsequent advances should
come within the scope of this provision, they should be formally
charged on his books "to their respective accounts." We cannot
believe that the generous purposes of the father were intended to
be limited by the action of a bookkeeper. In the full possession of
his faculties and watchful over his books, he knew what entries had
been made, and that they told the full story of his advances to his
children, and so, not unnaturally, he referred to those books as
evidence of those advances, but as to future advances, he says only
that they "may be charged on my books," and surely he did not make
the possibilities of such entries the measure of his generosity. He
was seventy-seven years of age when this will was made. He could
not foresee the length of days which might be allotted to him nor
the possible failure of any of his faculties -- and indeed before
his death there was a failure of eyesight, and possibly, towards
the last, of his mental powers. Of course, when he made this will,
he knew the possibility of these things, and it is inconsistent
with the whole spirit of the will to suppose that he meant that his
generosity should be determined and measured by the fidelity or
forgetfulness of a mere clerk. No man acting in a spirit of
generous affection ever contemplates that a stranger shall measure
the scope and reach of such affection. It is a matter personal to
himself, the beginning and ending of which the scope and limits of
which he and he only is to determine.
With this understanding of the scope and purpose of this clause
in the will, we pass to a consideration of what took place in
respect to the advances for the benefit of his son William. At that
time, the father was feeling the weaknesses of old age, his
eyesight was failing, and he had called his son John to act as his
agent in the care of his estate. News of the disaster to the bank
and the effect of its failure on the welfare of his son William
came to the father, and John went to Cincinnati to investigate,
came back and reported the situation as he
Page 177 U. S. 480
found it; told his father of the personal loans made to William
by the bank, and that they were secured by collateral. We quote his
testimony as to the conversation with his father:
"Q. 832. What communication did you have with your father upon
your return to Ashland?"
"A. I told him of William's debt to the bank -- individual debt
-- and what it would probably amount to, and that friends here
advised it was for William's interest that that debt, individual
debt, should be paid. I told him that the securities which William
had turned over to the bank as security on the debt would some of
them probably be sacrificed at a sale here -- that I thought we had
better pay the debt."
"Q. 833. What did he say?"
"A. He said that he was satisfied to do whatever I thought was
best."
"Q. 834. What else did he say about the matter other than to say
to you that he was satisfied to do whatever you thought was
best?"
"A. Well, I think I have answered it. I cannot repeat the
conversation between us any more than give the general result of
it."
On the faith of this conversation, John returned to Cincinnati,
and having raised the needed money, paid off William's obligations
to the bank and took up the collateral, whose face value was
largely in excess of the indebtedness. That the collateral when
properly utilized, as it apparently was, did not pay the amount of
William's indebtedness to the bank is immaterial, nor is it
material that William gave a note for the amount of this advance,
as well as other notes afterwards for like advances, and that such
notes were entered on the books of the father in the account of
"bills receivable." It appears that this payment was not made at
the request of William, but made upon consultation between the
father and his son and agent, John, and made probably with the
expectation that the collateral, if properly used, would pay the
amount of the indebtedness.
And here it becomes important to consider the relations of John
Means to his father. As the father grew old and his faculties began
to fail, he naturally called his oldest son John into his service,
and John acted during the last years of his father's life as his
agent, and it was really at John's suggestion
Page 177 U. S. 481
that the money was advanced for the benefit of William. But in
calling John to his service as agent and caretaker of his property,
there is nothing to indicate that the father meant that the son
should do anything to prevent the full carrying out of the purpose
expressed in his will. He had no express authority, and indeed no
implied authority, to alter that instrument in which had long been
recorded the settled determination of the father. So that whatever
he may have done in caring for the property as the agent of his
father during his lifetime is not to be taken, unless there are
other circumstances to indicate the fact, as showing an intent on
the part of the father to change in any way the scope and effect of
the will.
And indeed it is but simple justice to John Means to say that,
from the evidence, we are satisfied that there was no thought or
intent on his part to change or limit his father's will. He did not
intend by any strategy or device to thwart his father's purpose of
kindness to any of his children, nor did he pursue the course he
did in respect to this advance with the idea that he could satisfy
his father's desire to help William and at the same time place the
act of help outside the reach of item 5 of the will, and thus
advance the pecuniary interest of himself and the other legatees
not thus helped by his father. Very likely, he was uncertain as to
the construction which would be placed upon item 5; possibly
thought that, even if it meant exactly that which we are clear it
does mean, there might be an impropriety at his father's age and
feebleness in his advancing so much money for the benefit of a
single child, and in order that the transaction, in case of his
death before that of his father, might be clearly disclosed, took
notes from William and entered them on his father's books under the
head of "bills receivable." It appears from some of the testimony
that there was also a thought of protecting William's share in the
estate which by the death of the father might soon come to him from
attacks of creditors, and it may also be that, partly on that
account, William executed the notes which were received for these
moneys. At any rate, the correspondence between the brothers at the
time of these transactions indicates that they were friendly, and
that John was willingly doing that which he thought the
Page 177 U. S. 482
father desired in using a portion of the father's estate in
helping William out of his troubles. But whatever John or William
may have purposed or thought, the evidence does not indicate that
the father intended that this help extended to William should stand
in any different attitude to that which he had theretofore extended
to others of his children, or meant that this advance should not
come within the scope of the provisions in item 5, and that is the
fundamental question in the case. It is the father's estate which
is being distributed, and it is the duty of the courts to see that
it is distributed according to his expressed intention.
The testimony in this case is voluminous, and there are many
facts and circumstances disclosed in it throwing light on the
questions which we have considered. We have deemed it unnecessary
to refer to them in view of the very full and satisfactory opinion
filed by the circuit court of appeals, in which these facts and
circumstances are recited and considered at length, and which in
the main meets our approval.
One further question remains for consideration: the father died
June 8, 1890. The will was duly probated, and administrators with
the will annexed were appointed and qualified. On October 16, 1890,
William Means executed and delivered to these administrators the
following receipt:
"Ashland, Ky., October 16, 1890"
"Received of Thomas M. Adams and E. C. Means, administrators
with the will annexed of the estate of Thomas W. Means, deceased,
the sum of one hundred and thirty-six thousand and thirty-five and
75-100 dollars, being a part of my distributable share as legatee
under said will applied by them as ordered by me upon the following
notes and claims owed by me to the estate of said decedent, and
payable to his order, viz.:"
"[Here follows description of ten notes, with balance due on
each, aggregating $136,035.75.]"
"This receipt is given in pursuance of settlement made October
6, 1890."
"William Means"
"Attest:"
John F. Hager
"A. E. Lampton"
Page 177 U. S. 483
The validity of this receipt or release was challenged by the
respondents (plaintiffs in the circuit court), who claimed title to
that portion of the estate of Thomas W. Means passing under the
will to William Means by virtue of the following proceedings: at
the May term, 1891, of the Common Pleas Court of the County of
Greene, State of Ohio, a decree was entered in a cause then pending
in said court between William Means on the one side and on the
other Martha E. C. Means, his wife, and their children, Gertrude E.
Means and Pearl E. Means and Patti Means, a minor, by her next
friend, her mother, which, after finding that in the lifetime of
Thomas W. Means, for a good and valuable consideration, William
Means made an agreement with his wife and children whereby he
settled upon them, through trustees, for their maintenance and
support, his interest in expectancy in the estate of his father,
Thomas W. Means, transferred all such interest to the plaintiffs as
trustees. This decree having been entered after personal service
upon William Means, of course, binds him both by its findings and
order. How far the findings in such decree as to the agreement and
the time at which it was made may affect the action of the
administrators is a matter discussed in the briefs, but which we
deem it unnecessary to consider.
Neither do we stop to consider the charge of fraudulent conduct
on the part of the administrators, for, independently of those
considerations, we are of opinion that equity will not enforce this
receipt or release. It was a surrender by William Means, without
any consideration, of practically his whole interest in his
father's estate, amounting to between $100,000 and $200,000. The
administrators were acting in a fiduciary capacity. Their
obligations to each of the beneficiaries were equal. Their duty was
to dispose of the property placed in their hands according to the
expressed will of the testator, and they were not at liberty to act
in the interests of one legatee as against those of another. If
they were doubtful as to the meaning of any clause in the will,
they should have applied to the court for its construction and
direction. If they chose to act upon their own interpretation of
its meaning, they should have so acted, and not sought to conclude
any of the legatees by a contract
Page 177 U. S. 484
binding him to accept their interpretation. As shown by papers
introduced in evidence signed by William Means, they proceeded with
more than promptness and with great activity and energy to secure
this and other releases. Obviously William Means was in such a
condition as to require that they who were in fact trustees of his
interests should seek to protect instead of destroying them. We
think the evidence justifies that which was said by the court of
appeals in its opinion:
"William had lost all his property, and was in very straitened
circumstances. Since his downfall, he has been broken in spirit and
wavering in his purposes. He seems at times to have been impressed
that the administrators had a moral, if not a legal, claim upon
him, that he should yield up his legacy to the estate, and this
claim was pressed and insisted upon by the administrators. That
they had no such legal claim upon him we have already determined.
His brother and sisters all being in affluent circumstances, and
his own family in needy circumstances, that he should have
voluntarily given up the whole of this large sum, with no mistake
in regard to what his legal rights were, it is difficult to
believe. It amounted simply to a gift to the administrators for the
benefit of the other legatees, whose only claim rested on the
bounty of the testator. Courts of equity view such transactions
with distrust, and, if the circumstances indicate that the trustee
has dealt with the beneficiary unjustly, will not hesitate to set
them aside. The absence of any adequate consideration in itself
raises a presumption of unfairness which the trustee is bound to
repel."
While a man in the full possession of his faculties and under no
duress may give away his property, and equity will not recall the
gift, yet it looks with careful scrutiny upon all transactions
between trustee and beneficiary, and if it appears that the trustee
has taken any advantage of the situation of the beneficiary, and
has obtained from him, even for only the benefit of other
beneficiaries, large property without consideration, it will refuse
to uphold the transaction thus accomplished.
Taylor v.
Taylor, 8 How. 183;
Comstock v. Herron, 55
F. 803, and cases cited; 1 Story's Eq.Jur. secs. 307, 308; 2
Pomeroy's Eq.Jur. secs. 951, 958, 1088. So, without considering
Page 177 U. S. 485
the debatable questions presented in respect to this receipt or
release, we are of opinion that the circuit court of appeals was
right in refusing to uphold it.
There is nothing else in the case that seems to us to call for
consideration. We find no error in the conclusions of the circuit
court of appeals, and its decree is
Affirmed.
Dissenting: MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE GRAY, MR. JUSTICE
BROWN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
