Under an act of Congress entitled "an act for the relief of the
estate" of a certain person deceased, and conferring upon the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine "the claim of the
legal representatives" of that person for the proceeds in the
Treasury of his property taken by the United States, the executor
is the legal representative, and any sum recovered by him by suit
in that court is assets of the estate and subject
Page 171 U. S. 467
to the debts of the testator, and a decision of the highest
court of a state in favor of creditors against the executor
presents a federal question, as to which it may be reviewed by this
Court upon a writ of error sued out by the executor.
The controversy in this case was between the executor and two
creditors of Charles M. Briggs, and arose as follows:
On April 18, 1862, during the war of the Rebellion, Charles S.
Morehead, of Kentucky, executed and delivered to his nephew,
Charles M. Briggs, a bill of sale of cotton in Mississippi, in
these terms:
"For and in consideration of money loaned and advanced
heretofore by C. M. Briggs, and further valuable consideration by
way of suretyship for me by said Briggs, I hereby sell and transfer
to said C. M. Briggs all the cotton on my two plantations in
Mississippi, near Eggspoint and Greenville. Said cotton so sold
embraces all I have, baled and unbaled, gathered and ungathered.
This is intended to cover all cotton that I have now or may have
this year on said two plantations, supposed to be about 2,000
bales."
At the same time Briggs executed and delivered to Samuel J.
Walker, Morehead's son-in-law, a writing in these terms:
"In consideration of the sale and transfer this day made to me
by C. S. Morehead of all the cotton on his two plantations near
Eggspoint, in the State of Mississippi, as specified in said sale
and transfer in writing, I hereby assume and agree to pay to Samuel
J. Walker the sum of forty thousand dollars, due and owing to said
Walker by said C. S. Morehead, upon condition, however, that I
realize sufficient amount from any cotton on or from said
plantations or proceeds of same, together with about twenty-five
thousand dollars due me from said C. S. Morehead for moneys
advanced and liability for him as surety; also about ten thousand
dollars, more or less, being a claim of A. S. Shotwell as he may
hereafter establish against said C. S. Morehead; but in case I
should not realize sufficient to pay all of said claims or amounts
above named in full, then I am to pay or divide the amount that may
be realized from said cotton, proportionately or
pro rata
according to the respective amounts named, to the parties above
named, first,
Page 171 U. S. 468
however, paying and refunding any moneys paid by the respective
parties for or on account of expenses pertaining to same, and in
case more should be realized than sufficient to pay said amounts,
with interest thereon to the time of realization and payment, then
any surplus to be divided one-half to said Shotwell and C. M.
Briggs jointly for any services, and the remaining one-half to said
Samuel J. Walker, but no other consideration to be paid to said
Shotwell and Briggs for their service."
Briggs at once took steps to get possession of the cotton, but
was prevented by the federal forces and the Confederate forces in
the vicinity. This cotton, amounting to 450 bales, was finally
seized, together with other cotton, by Capt. G. L. Fort, Assistant
Quartermaster General in the United States Army, in behalf of the
United States, and was by him sold, and the proceeds paid into the
Treasury of the United States. Briggs died in 1875 after repeated
and unsuccessful efforts, through his attorneys, to obtain the
proceeds of the cotton in question, and his executor continued the
efforts, and, through the same attorneys, procured the passage of
the Act of Congress of June 4, 1888, c. 348, copied in the margin.
*
Page 171 U. S. 469
Under the provisions of that act, Briggs' executor brought suit
in the Court of Claims, and therein recovered the sum of $88,000.
See Briggs v. United States, 25 Ct.Cl. 126;
143 U. S. 143 U.S.
346. Half of that sum was paid to the attorneys, pursuant to a
contract between them and Briggs, and the rest, being the sum of
$44,000, came to the hands of the executor.
Thereupon the executor, in a suit previously brought against him
for the settlement of Briggs' estate in the Chancery Division of
the Circuit Court for the County of Jefferson and State of
Kentucky, set up by amended answer that he had collected this sum
of $44,000 and prayed that Walker's widow (to whom Walker had
assigned his claim) and Shotwell's administrator might be made
parties to the suit and be required to set up their claims to this
sum. And Mrs. Walker and Shotwell's administrator filed petitions
in the cause claiming the sums mentioned as due to Walker and to
Shotwell, respectively, in the writing signed by Briggs April 18,
1862, and above set forth.
To these petitions the executor of Briggs filed supplemental
answers in which, among other things, he set up the Act of Congress
of June, 4, 1888, and the proceedings in the Court of Claims, and
alleged that
"in pursuance to the said act, this defendant, through his said
counsel, instituted an action against the United States in the
Court of Claims to recover the proceeds of sale of the cotton
aforesaid, and in and by said action it was finally determined and
adjudged that the said
Page 171 U. S. 470
testator was loyal to the United States, and that the assignment
made by said Morehead to defendant's testator was
bona
fide and founded on a valuable consideration, but this
defendant was, by the act aforesaid as well as the final judgment
of the Court of Claims, limited in his recovery to such sum as
would satisfy the debts and claims of his testator, to secure which
the said assignment was given, and this defendant says that, by the
final judgment of said Court of Claims, he only received and
recovered from the United States such sum as was owing directly to
his testator by said Morehead, and did not recover anything
whatsoever for or on account of anything that may have been owing
by said Morehead to A. L. Shotwell or Samuel J. Walker,"
and further alleged that
"the passage of the act aforesaid was an act of grace on the
part of the United States for the sole benefit of this defendant,
and to permit this defendant to assert a claim against the proceeds
of said cotton to the extent that said Morehead was indebted to his
testator; that long prior thereto, all claim that had existed in
favor of said testator as against the United States for any part of
the proceeds of said cotton had been barred by limitation, and said
claim was outlawed and worthless,"
and that "it was not intended by said act that this defendant
should recover anything for the benefit, directly or indirectly, of
any other person."
The Circuit Court of Jefferson County sustained demurrers of the
petitioners to the supplemental answers of the executor, and upon a
hearing found that there was due to Walker $44,000, in the hands of
the executor, after deducting his commissions, be applied
pro
rata to the payment of these two sums, and of the further sum
of $25,000 due from Morehead to Briggs. The executor appealed to
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which affirmed the judgment. 43
S.W. 479. Thereupon he sued out this writ of error.
The case was submitted to this Court upon a motion by the
defendants in error to dismiss the writ of error for want of
jurisdiction, or to affirm the judgment.
Page 171 U. S. 471
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The motion to dismiss must be overruled. An executor represents
the person of the testator, and is charged with the duty of
resisting unfounded claims against the fund in his hands. Co.Litt.
209
a;
McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.
S. 340,
113 U. S. 396.
The record therefore does present the federal question whether the
right given by the act of Congress to the "legal representatives"
of Charles M. Briggs was for the benefit of his next of kin to the
exclusion of his creditors.
But we are of opinion that this question, which is the only
federal question in the case, must be answered in the negative, and
consequently that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
must be affirmed.
The primary and ordinary meaning of the words "representatives,"
or "legal representatives," or "personal representatives," when
there is nothing in the context to control their meaning, is
"executors or administrators," they being the representatives
constituted by the proper court.
In re Crawford's Trust, 2
Drewry 230;
In re Wyndham's Trusts, L.R. 1 Eq. 290; 2
Jarman on Wills (5th ed.), pp. 957, 966 c. 29, § 5; Williams
on Executors (9th ed.), pt. 3, bk. 3, c. 2, § 2(7), 992;
Cox v. Curwen, 118 Mass.198;
Halsey v. Patterson,
37 N.J.Eq. 445.
In
Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 Ves. 139, 152, a claim by the
next of kin of a naval officer to the share awarded him in a prize
condemned after his death and ordered by Treasury warrant to be
paid to his "representatives" was rejected by Sir William Grant,
who said that the intention of the crown in all cases of this kind
is to put what is in strictness matter of bounty upon the footing
of matter of right, and not to exercise any kind of judgment or
selection with regard to the persons
Page 171 U. S. 472
to be ultimately benefited by the gift; that the representatives
to whom the crown gives are those who legally sustain that
character; but the gift is made in augmentation of the estate, and
is to be considered as if it had been actually part of the
officer's property at the time of his death.
In this Court, it is well settled that moneys received by the
United States from a foreign government by way of indemnity for the
destruction of American vessels, and granted by act of Congress to
the owners of those vessels, without directing to whom payment
shall be made in case of death or insolvency, pass to the assignees
in bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors of such owners,
although such assignees have been appointed before the act of
Congress making the grant.
Comegys v.
Vasse, 1 Pet.193;
Erwin v. United States,
97 U. S. 392;
Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529.
In
Emerson v.
Hall, 13 Pet. 409, cited by the plaintiff in error,
in which money paid by the United States to the heirs at law, as
"the legal representatives of William Emerson," under Act March 3,
1831, c. 102, 6 Stat. 464, was held not to be assets in their hands
for the payment of his creditors, the act, in its title, was
expressed to be "for the relief of the heirs of William Emerson,
deceased," and it granted the money as a reward for services,
meritorious indeed, but voluntarily rendered by Emerson, not under
any law or contract, and imposing no obligation, legal or
equitable, upon the government to compensate him therefor, and the
money was therefore held to have been received by his heirs as a
gift or pure donation.
In the provision of the appropriation Act of March 3, 1891, c.
540, concerning the French spoliation claims, the words "personal
representative" and "legal representative" were used to designate
the executor or administrator of the original sufferer, and money
awarded by the Court of Claims to such a representative was held by
this Court to belong to the next of kin, to the exclusion of
assignees in bankruptcy, upon the ground that the act expressly so
provided. 26 Stat. 897, 908.
Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.
S. 439.
The words "legal representatives" or "personal
representatives"
Page 171 U. S. 473
have also been used as designating executors or administrators,
and not next of kin, in acts of Congress giving actions for wrongs
or injuries causing death. Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, § 6,
17 Stat. 15; Rev.Stat. § 1981; Act of February 17, 1885, c.
126, 23 Stat. 30;
Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad, 168 U. S. 445,
168 U. S.
449.
The Act of June 4, 1888, c. 348, now before the Court, is
entitled "An act for the relief of the estate of C. M. Briggs,
deceased," and confers upon the Court of Claims "jurisdiction to
hear and determine the claim of the legal representatives of C. M.
Briggs, deceased," for the proceeds, in the Treasury of the United
States, of cotton owned by him. The only conditions which the act
imposes upon the right of recovery are that the petition shall be
filed in the Court of Claims within two years, that that court
shall find that Briggs was in fact loyal to the United States, and
that Morehead's assignment of the cotton to Briggs was made in good
faith, and that, if it shall find that the assignment
"was intended only as security to said Briggs for indebtedness,
and against contingent liabilities assumed by him for said
Morehead, judgment shall be rendered for such portion of the
proceeds of said cotton as will satisfy the debts and claims of
said Briggs to secure which said assignment was given."
The "debts and claims" in this last clause manifestly include
both classes of debts previously mentioned -- namely, the direct
"indebtedness" of Morehead to Briggs and the "contingent
liabilities assumed by him for said Morehead," including the claims
of the defendants in error, specified in the written agreement
executed by Briggs contemporaneously with the assignment -- and the
amount of each of which has been ascertained by the court
below.
The act of Congress nowhere mentions heirs at law or next of
kin. Its manifest purpose is not to confer a bounty or gratuity
upon anyone, but to provide for the ascertainment and payment of a
debt due from the United States to a loyal citizen for property of
his taken by the United States, and to enable his executor to
recover, as part of his estate, proceeds received by the United
States from the sale of that property.
Page 171 U. S. 474
The act is "for the relief of the estate" of Charles M. Briggs,
and the only matter referred to the Court of Claims is the claim of
his "legal representatives." The executor was the proper person to
represent the estate of Briggs, and was his legal representative,
and as such he brought suit in the Court of Claims and recovered
the fund now in question, and consequently held it as assets of the
estate, and subject to the debts and liabilities of his testator to
the defendants in error.
Judgment affirmed.
*
"
An Act for the Relief of the Estate of C. M. Briggs,
Deceased"
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Court of
Claims is hereby given, subject to the proviso hereinafter
mentioned, like jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the
legal representatives of C. M. Briggs, deceased, for the proceeds
of four hundred and fifty-five bales of cotton, now in the Treasury
of the United States, alleged to have been owned, in whole or in
part, by said Briggs, as is given to said court by the acts of
March twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and July second,
eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon petition to be filed in said
court at any time within two years from the passage of this act,
any statute of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding,
provided, however, that, unless the said court shall, on a
preliminary inquiry, find that said Briggs was in fact loyal to the
United States government, and that the assignment to him
hereinafter mentioned was
bona fide, the court shall not
have jurisdiction of the case, and the same shall, without further
proceedings, be dismissed, and provided further that if the court
shall find that the alleged assignment from one Morehead to said
Briggs, of date April eighteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two,
under which said Briggs claimed said cotton, was intended only as
security to said Briggs for indebtedness, and against contingent
liabilities assumed by him for said Morehead, judgment shall be
rendered for such portion of the proceeds of said cotton as will
satisfy the debts and claims of said Briggs to secure which said
assignment was given provided, said judgment shall not be paid out
of the general fund in the Treasury arising from the sale of
captured and abandoned property, but shall be paid out of the
special fund charged to and accounted for by Captain G. L. Fort,
assistant quartermaster at Memphis, arising from the sale of the
two by Captain G. L. Fort, assistant quartermaster at Memphis,
arising from the sale of the two thousand two hundred and nine
bales of cotton received by him, with which claimant's cotton was
intermingled, said claimant to receive only the proportion which
his cotton bears to the net proceeds accounted for by said
Fort."
25 Stat. 1075.
