In the case of a petition for habeas corpus for relief from a
detention under process alleged to be illegal by reason of the
invalidity of the process or proceedings under which the petitioner
is held in custody, copies of
Page 168 U. S. 125
such process or proceedings must be annexed to, or the essential
parts thereof set out in the petition, mere averments of
conclusions of law being necessarily inadequate.
In this case, which was an indictment for murder, the verdict
being "guilty as charged," and judgment of condemnation to death
thereon being armed by the supreme court of the state, and this
Court having determined, on a former petition by the petitioner
that it had no jurisdiction to review that judgment,
Craemer v.
Washington state, 164 U.S. 704, and the time appointed for
execution having passed pending all these proceedings, it was
within the power of the state court to make a subsequent
appointment of another day therefor, and to issue a death warrant
accordingly, and a judgment to that effect involved no violation of
the Constitution of the United Staten.
This was an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of Washington refusing a writ of
habeas corpus on the face of the petition therefor. The petition
averred that Henry Craemer, the petitioner, was a citizen of the
United States residing in the County of King in the State of
Washington. That he was unlawfully held in custody by the sheriff
of that county, who was about to take his life under certain
alleged process and authority
"wholly without authority of law, without the jurisdiction of
any court, contrary to the law, and contrary to the rights of your
petitioner as a citizen of the United States under the Constitution
of the United States."
"That on or about the 23d day of August, 1894, he was charged by
the State of Washington by information of three separate crimes in
one count, to-wit, the crime of murder in the first degree, to
which the penalty of death attached upon conviction; murder in the
second degree, to which a penalty of not less than ten nor more
than twenty years' imprisonment in the penitentiary attached, and
the offense of manslaughter, to which not less than two nor more
that ten years' imprisonment in the penitentiary attached."
"That your petitioner was tried upon the said information upon
issue joined in the Superior Court of King County."
"That to said issue a jury trying your petitioner did return him
guilty of no greater offense than the offense of murder in the
second degree, and by legal construction, granting inferences and
all presumptions in favor of your petitioner as
Page 168 U. S. 126
accused, finding your petitioner guilty of no higher offense
than that of manslaughter."
"That the said jury in no wise found your petitioner guilty of
murder in the first degree, to which the sentence and penalty of
death could be inflicted."
"That the said verdict was rendered about the 12th day of
September, 1894."
"That your petitioner appealed from the decision finding your
petitioner guilty of murder in the second degree or of manslaughter
to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, upon errors
assigned, and the said judgment was affirmed."
"And, further, upon the validity of the process under which your
petitioner was charged, to-wit, as to whether or not your
petitioner could be tried upon an information for his life, your
petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States upon
that point, and that point alone, and the said supreme court
dismissed said a appeal, returning the said cause and all process
to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, to be dealt with
as in manner and form of the law was both just and proper."
That no death warrant had been issued while the cause was on
appeal, and that there had been no opportunity or occasion to
complain in the supreme court of the state or in any other court as
to the right to issue such warrant. That the cause was tried before
Judge Humes, one of the judges of the Superior Court of the County
of King.
"That after the said cause had been disposed of in the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington and the Supreme Court of the
United States, and returned to the Superior Court of the State of
Washington for the execution of such process as would be legal in
the premises,"
Judge Humes had been succeeded by Judge Jacobs. That on February
6, 1897, the State of Washington moved that petitioner be brought
up for judgment and other process against him, and that Judge
Jacobs issue a warrant of death, and that petitioner duly objected
to Judge Jacobs passing sentence of death upon him and issuing a
death warrant to the sheriff, and insisted that the court was
without
Page 168 U. S. 127
jurisdiction to make such an order, and that such order would be
in denial of due process of law, and in violation of Article VI and
of Article XIV of the federal Constitution, but, notwithstanding
his objections, petitioner was ordered to be executed on April 23,
1897.
That under the laws of the State of Washington, there was no
time allowed further to appeal from that order to the supreme court
of the state. That the governor of the state respited petitioner,
and stayed the execution of the death sentence until July 23,
1897.
"That the next term of the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington is not until the month of October, 1897, in which there
would be any authority on the part of the court by any proceedings
to review the unauthorized act of the said Judge Jacobs and of his
honor the judge of the superior court,"
and the only remedy left petitioner as a citizen of the United
States was application to the circuit court.
Petitioner prayed for the writ of habeas corpus, and for the
writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of the County of King,
ordering the record of the cause to be certified to the circuit
court
"for information, particularly the alleged information, the
verdict, the judgment, and the death warrant made in the premises,
and all other journal entries and orders in the cause."
The appeal came before this Court on motions to dismiss or
affirm.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under existing statutory provisions, appeals may be taken to
this Court from final decisions of the circuit courts in
Page 168 U. S. 128
habeas corpus in cases, among others, where the applicant for
the writ is alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of
the Constitution or of some law or treaty of the United States, and
if the restraint is by any state court or by or under the authority
of any state, further proceedings cannot be had against him pending
the appeal. Rev.Stat. §§ 763, 764, 766; Act March 3,
1885, 23 Stat. p. 437, c. 353.
Such being the law, it has happened in numerous instances that
applications for the writ have been made, and appeals taken from
refusals to grant it, quite destitute of meritorious grounds and
operating only to delay the administration of justice.
From the petition in this case it appeared that petitioner was
held by the Sheriff of King County, Washington, to be executed in
pursuance of a judgment and sentence of death rendered by the
Superior Court of that county, and warrant issued thereon; that
that judgment had been affirmed by the supreme court of the state,
and that this Court had heretofore determined that it had no
jurisdiction to interfere in revision of that judgment.
See
also State v. Craemer, 12 Wash. 217;
Craemer v.
State, 164 U.S. 704.
Nevertheless, petitioner insisted that the judgment against him
was void because in contravention of the Constitution of the United
States, and that the judgment of this Court in dismissing his writ
of error was not to be regarded, as he had not in fact seen fit to
raise in maintenance of that writ the particular point on which he
now relied.
That point seems to be that the verdict returned against him on
the information on which he was tried was either so uncertain that
judgment could not be entered thereon or amounted to no more than a
verdict finding him guilty of murder in the second degree or of
manslaughter, in respect of either of which crimes, the punishment
of death was not denounced.
By § 754 of the Revised Statutes, it is provided that the
complaint in habeas corpus shall set forth "the facts concerning
the detention of the party restrained, in whose custody he is
detained, and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known." The
general rule is undoubted that if the detention
Page 168 U. S. 129
is claimed to be unlawful by reason of the invalidity of the
process or proceedings under which the party is held in custody,
copies of such process or proceedings must be annexed to, or the
essential parts thereof set out in the petition, and mere averments
of conclusions of law are necessarily inadequate.
Whitten v.
Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231;
Kohl v. Lehlbach, 160 U. S. 293;
Church on Habeas Corpus, 2d ed., § 91, and cases cited.
Copies of the information, the verdict, and the judgment thereon
were not attached to this petition, nor the essential parts thereof
stated, nor any cause assigned for such omission. In that regard,
the petition was wholly insufficient.
But reference was made to the record of the case in the Superior
Court of King County, in the supreme court of the state, and in
this Court. The record here, to which we may properly refer,
Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 240,
shows that the information charged Craemer with the crime of murder
in the first degree, that the jury "found him guilty as charged,"
that he was adjudged guilty of the crime of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to death, that the judgment was affirmed, and
that the writ of error to the state court was dismissed.
If the point now suggested was not in fact specifically raised
in the supreme court of the state on appeal or in this Court on
writ of error, it must not be assumed that any point on which the
jurisdiction might have been sustained was overlooked.
Moreover, the settled law of the state was adverse to
petitioner's contention as urged before the circuit court, and no
ground existed which could justify that court in refusing to accept
it.
The statutes of Washington define murder in the first degree,
and prescribe the punishment of death upon conviction; the crime of
murder in the second degree, and punishment by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a term not less than ten nor more than twenty
years, and the crime of manslaughter, and punishment by like
imprisonment not less than one year nor more than twenty years, and
a fine in any sum not exceeding
Page 168 U. S. 130
five thousand dollars. 2 Hill's Codes 642, 644, 646; Wash.Penal
Code, §§ 1, 3, 7, 11. On an indictment or information
charging an offense consisting of different degrees, a jury may
find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged but guilty of
any degree inferior thereto, and in all other cases defendant may
be found guilty of an offense the commission of which is
necessarily included within that with which he is charged. The form
of the verdict is also prescribed as follows: "We, the jury, in the
case of the State of Washington, plaintiff, against _____,
defendant, find the defendant (guilty or not guilty, as the case
may be)." 2 Hill's Codes, p. 509; Pen.Code, §§ 1319,
1320, 1325; Laws Wash. 1891, p. 60, c. 28, §§ 75, 76. The
Code of the territory was to the same effect. §§ 786,
790, 793, 798, 1097, 1098, and 1103.
In
Timmerman v. Washington, 3 Wash.Terr. 445, the
defendant was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree,
and the jury returned a verdict in the statutory form. It was
argued on error that the verdict was defective in that the
defendant might have been found guilty of murder in the first or
second degree, or of manslaughter, and that therefore the verdict
was uncertain, and sentence could not be pronounced upon him; but
the supreme court of the territory held, upon consideration of
sections 1097, 1098, and 1103 of the Code, which are sections 1319,
1320, and 1325, as numbered in Hill's Codes of the state, that if
the jury found the defendant guilty of an offense of an inferior
degree to that charged, the verdict must specify it, but, if the
verdict was intended to be guilty of the degree charged, there
would be no necessity for so specifying it, and that, the jury
having used the statutory form, there was no uncertainty as to the
fact thus found, and that the objection was untenable.
In this case, the verdict was "guilty as charged," and judgment
of condemnation to death thereon was affirmed by the supreme court
of the state as has been said. 12 Wash. 217. The time appointed for
execution having passed, the subsequent appointment of another day
and the issue of the death warrant were in accordance with the
statute. Hill's Codes, §§ 1351, 1354.
Apart, then, from the insufficiency of the petition and the
legal effect of the previous judgment of this Court, the final
order of the circuit court must be held to have been properly
entered, in that the rendition of the judgment complained of
involved no violation of the Constitution of the United States.
Order affirmed.
