Parties to collateral proceedings are bound by the
jurisdictional averments in the record, and will not be permitted
to dispute them except so far as they may have contained a false
recital with respect to such parties.
Where the requisite citizenship appears on the face of a bill,
the jurisdiction of the court cannot be attacked by evidence
dehors the record in a collateral proceeding by one who
was not a party to the bill.
A bill brought solely to enforce compliance with the Interstate
Commerce Act, and to compel railroad companies to comply with such
act by offering proper and reasonable facilities for interchange of
traffic with the company complainant, and enjoining them from
refusing to receive from complainant, for transportation over their
lines, any cars which might be tendered them, exhibits. a case
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States of
which a circuit court has jurisdiction.
Page 166 U. S. 549
To render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither
necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the
injunction was issued nor to have been actually served with a copy
of it, so long as he appears to have had actual notice.
The petitioner alleged that he was a citizen of the State of
Ohio, and was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the marshal,
under an order of the circuit court of the United States, made in a
case pending in that court, wherein the Toledo, Ann Arbor &
North Michigan Railway Company, a corporation of the State of
Michigan, was complainant and several railway companies, citizens
of Ohio, as well as the Michigan Central Railroad Company, a
citizen of Michigan, were defendants.
The bill in that case, which was annexed to the petition as an
exhibit, averred the complainant to be the owner of a line of
railroad from Toledo, Ohio, northwesterly through the State of
Michigan; that a large part of its business consisted in the
transportation of freight cars from points in the States of
Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin to points in Ohio and other
states east thereof, and that it was engaged as a common carrier in
a large amount of interstate commerce, which was regulated and
controlled by the interstate act of Congress. The bill further
averred that the defendants' lines of railroad connected with those
of complainant at or near Toledo, and that a large and important
part of its business consisted in the interchange of freight cars
between the defendant and complainant companies, and was subject to
the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act; that it was the duty
of the defendant companies to afford reasonable and equal
facilities for the interchange of traffic and to receive, forward,
and deliver freight cars in the ordinary transaction of business
without any discrimination; that the defendant companies and their
employees had given out and threatened that they would refuse to
receive from complainant cars billed over its road for
transportation by complainant to their destination for the reason
that the complainant had employed
Page 166 U. S. 550
as locomotive engineers in its service men who were not members
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, "an irresponsible
voluntary association," and that the locomotive engineers in the
employ of the defendant companies had refused to handle cars to be
interchanged with the complainant's road notwithstanding that they
continued to afford the other railroad companies full and free
facilities for the interchange of traffic, while refusing to
transact such business with the complainant, thereby illegally
discriminating against it.
Upon the filling or this bill and upon the application of the
complainant, the circuit court issued an injunction against the
defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees,
enjoining them from refusing to afford and extend to the Toledo,
Ann Arbor & North Michigan Railway Company the same facilities
for an interchange of interstate business between the companies as
were enjoyed by other railway companies, and from refusing to
receive from the complainant company cars billed from points in one
state to points in another state which might be offered to the
defendant companies by the complainant.
The injunction was served upon the the Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Railway Company, one of the defendants, one of whose
employees was the appellant, James Lennon, a locomotive engineer,
who had received notice of the injunction, and, still continuing in
the service of the company, had refused to obey it.
Thereupon the Lake Shore Company applied to the court for an
attachment against Lennon, and certain others of its engineers and
firemen, setting forth that, with full knowledge of the injunction
theretofore made, they had refused to obey the order of the court,
and deserted their locomotives and engines in the yard of the
company, for the reason that Ann Arbor cars of freight were in the
trains of such company, and that they had refused to haul such cars
and perform their service for that reason.
The persons named, including the petitioner, Lennon, being
served with an order to show cause, appeared in pursuance of
Page 166 U. S. 551
such order in person and by counsel, and witnesses were examined
as to their knowledge of, and as to their violation of, the order.
The court found that Lennon was guilty of contempt in disobeying
the order of injunction, and imposed a fine of fifty dollars and
costs.
Toledo, Ann Arbor & North Michigan Railway Co. v.
Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746.
Thereupon Lennon filed this petition, setting forth the above
facts, and alleging that the circuit court had no jurisdiction or
lawful authority to arrest or proceed against him in manner as
aforesaid, and that its order and judgment -- whereby he was
committed to the custody of the marshal -- were without authority
of law and void: (1) that such order was issued in a suit whereof
the circuit court had no jurisdiction, because the complainant and
one of the defendants, namely, the Michigan Central Railroad
Company, were at the time of the filing of the bill, and ever since
have been, citizens of the same state, and that said suit did not
arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; (2)
that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the person of the
petitioner, because he was not a party to the suit, nor served with
any subpoena notifying him of the same; had no notice of the
application for the injunction, nor was served with a copy thereof,
nor had any notice whatever of the issuing of such injunction, nor
of its contents; (3) that the circuit court was also without
jurisdiction to make the order, because it was beyond the
jurisdiction of a court of equity to compel the performance of a
personal contract for service, and to interfere, by mandatory
injunction, with the contract between himself and the Lake Shore
& Michigan Southern Railway Company.
Upon a hearing in the circuit court, it was ordered that the
petition be dismissed. Lennon, after appealing to this Court, which
held it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal,
150 U.
S. 393, thereupon appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the decree of the
circuit court,
Lennon v. Lake Shore &c. Railway Co.,
64 F. 320, whereupon petitioner applied for and obtained a writ of
certiorari from this Court.
Page 166 U. S. 552
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only question which can properly be raised upon this writ is
whether the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in holding the
petitioner for a contempt and in imposing upon him a fine therefor.
We are not at liberty to consider the testimony, or to inquire
whether the facts as they appeared upon the hearing justified the
action of the circuit court. It is only upon the theory that the
proceedings and judgment of the court were nullities that we are
authorized to reverse its action. It has been too frequently
decided to be now open to question that a writ of habeas corpus
cannot be made use of to perform the functions of a writ of error
or an appeal.
Ex Parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38,
20 U. S. 43;
Ex Parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289;
Ex Parte Cuddy, 131 U. S. 280;
Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176;
In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 167;
United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S.
48.
Acting upon this theory, the petitioner claims that the circuit
court exceeded its jurisdiction in adjudging him guilty of
contempt, for the reason that it had no jurisdiction of the
original bill, because one of the defendants to such bill was a
citizen of the same state with the complainant; because petitioner
was not a party to the suit, and was never served with a subpoena
or the injunction, and finally because it was beyond the
jurisdiction of a court of equity to compel the performance of a
personal contract for service.
1. The original bill averred the complainant -- the Toledo, Ann
Arbor & North Michigan Railway Company -- to be a corporation
and citizen of the State of Michigan, and the several railway
companies defendant to be citizens either of Pennsylvania or Ohio,
and there is nothing in the record of
Page 166 U. S. 553
that case to show that this averment was not true. It only
appears to be otherwise by an allegation in the petition for the
habeas corpus, and the question at once arises whether, where the
requisite citizenship appears upon the face of the bill, the
jurisdiction of the court can be attacked by evidence dehors the
record in a collateral proceeding by one who was not a party to the
bill. We know of no authority for such action. The general rule is
that parties to collateral proceedings are bound by the
jurisdictional averments in the record, and will not be permitted
to dispute them except so far as they may have contained a false
recital with respect to such parties. Doubtless the averments with
regard to citizenship might have been directly attacked by any one
who was a party to that suit. But this cannot not be done upon
habeas corpus.
Michaels v.
Post, 21 Wall. 398;
Hudson v.
Guestier, 6 Cranch 281;
McCormick
v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat.192,
23 U. S. 199;
Thompson v.
Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157;
Ex Parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193;
Grignon's
Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319;
United
States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691,
31 U. S. 709;
Florentine v.
Bacon, 2 Wall. 210;
Comstock
v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 396;
Dyckman v.
Mayor, 5 N.Y. 434;
Jackson v. Crawford, 12 Wend. 533;
Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pick. 572;
Fisher v. Bassett,
9 Leigh 119, 131;
Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.
S. 327.
Irrespective of this, however, we think the bill exhibited a
case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
as it appears to have been brought solely to enforce a compliance
with the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and to
compel the defendants to comply with such act by offering proper
and reasonable facilities for the interchange of traffic with
complainant and enjoining them from refusing to receive from
complainant, for transportation over their lines, any cars which
might be tendered them. It has been frequently held by this Court
that a case arises under the Constitution and laws of the United
States whenever the party plaintiff sets up a right to which he is
entitled under such laws, which the parties defendant deny to him,
and the correct decision of the case depends upon the construction
of such laws. As was said in
Tennessee v. Davis,
100 U. S. 257,
100 U. S.
264:
Page 166 U. S. 554
"Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as
grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute
the right or privilege, or claim or protection, or defense of the
party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted."
See also Starin v. New York, 115
U. S. 257;
Kansas Pacific Railroad v. Atchison,
Topeka &c. Railroad, 112 U. S. 414;
Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 462;
Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.
S. 135.
2. The facts that petitioner was not a party to such suit, nor
served with process of subpoena, nor had notice of the application
made by the complainant for the mandatory injunction, nor was
served by the officers of the court with such injunction, are
immaterial so long as it was made to appear that he had notice of
the issuing of an injunction by the court. To render a person
amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should
have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued
nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he
appears to have had actual notice. High on Injunctions § 1444;
Mead v. Norris, 21 Wis. 310;
Wellesley v.
Mornington, 11 Beav. 181.
Conceding the question whether he had such notice in this case
to be open to review here, we are of opinion that upon the facts
appearing in this record, this question must be answered, as it was
answered in the court below, in the affirmative. The testimony upon
this point is fully set forth in the opinion of the circuit court,
54 F. 746, 757, and it establishes beyond all controversy that
Lennon had notice and knowledge of the injunction.
It appears that immediately after the injunction order was
granted and served upon the Lake Shore Company, the company had
copies of the order printed, and attached thereto a notice, signed
by its superintendent, calling the attention of employees to the
injunction; that printed copies of the injunction and notice were
posted on all the bulletin boards at roundhouses where engineers
took their engines, and that it was the duty of engineers to
examine all notices so posted before starting on their runs; that
on the morning of the 18th of March, Lennon was upon his engine at
Alexis, making
Page 166 U. S. 555
a run with his train from Monroe to Toledo; that on his arrival
at Alexis, and before he refused to receive and haul the Ann Arbor
car, Mr. Chillcote, an agent of the Lake Shore Company, handed to
him (Lennon) a printed copy of said injunction order and the notice
signed by the general superintendent, and he received and examined
them.
Mr. Chillcote says:
"I handed him these papers, and he said he had seen the order;
that it was posted somewhere; I think at the roundhouse, I think at
Detroit. I wouldn't say positive as to that, but he said he had
seen a copy of it. . . . I simply handed it to him, and he said,
'we understand the order' or 'we have seen the order,' or words to
that effect."
Chillcote further says "[h]e stated, when I handed him the
order, before he read it, that he understood it."
Mr. Keegan testified that he was present when the copy of the
order was handed to Lennon, and that he said, "I have seen it
before." This occurred about 10 o'clock a.m., and Lennon, after
having the copy of the order delivered to him, and admitting that
he had seen it before and understood it, refused to receive the Ann
Arbor car until after 2:30 p.m., when he received a telegram from
Mr. Watson, an officer of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
saying, "[y]ou can come along and handle Ann Arbor cars," and he
then at once proceeded with his train to Toledo, receiving and
hauling the Ann Arbor car.
3. To the objection that it was beyond the jurisdiction of a
court of equity to compel the performance of a personal contract
for service and to interfere by mandatory injunction with
petitioner's contract with the railway company, it is sufficient to
say that nothing of the kind was attempted. The petitioner, as one
of the employees of the Lake Shore Railway, was enjoined from
refusing to extend to the Ann Arbor Railway such facilities for the
interchange of traffic on interstate commerce business between such
railways as were enjoyed by other companies, and from refusing to
receive from the Ann Arbor Company cars billed from points in one
state to points in other states. No attempt was made to interfere
with petitioner's
Page 166 U. S. 556
contract with his own company or to compel a continuance of his
service in such company. There could be no doubt of the power of
the court to grant this injunction, which bore solely upon the
relations of the railway companies to each other. It was alleged in
the bill to have been a part of the regular business of the
defendant roads to interchange traffic with the Ann Arbor road, and
the injunction was sought to prevent an arbitrary discontinuance of
this custom. Perhaps, to a certain extent, the injunction may be
termed mandatory, although its object was to continue the existing
state of things and to prevent an arbitrary breaking off of the
current business connections between the roads. But it was clearly
not beyond the power of a court of equity, which is not always
limited to the restraint of a contemplated or threatened action,
but may even require affirmative action, where the circumstances of
the case demand it.
Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Bro.C.C.
587;
Hervey v. Smith, 1 Kay & Johns. 389;
Beadel
v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465;
Whitecar v. Michenor, 37
N.J.Eq. 6;
Broome v. New York & New Jersey Telephone
Co., 42 N.J.Eq. 141.
It appears from the testimony in this case that Lennon was on
his run as engineer from Detroit, Michigan, to Air Line Junction,
near Toledo, with a train of 45 cars. Having reached an
intermediate station called "Alexis," he was ordered to take on an
empty car from the Ann Arbor road. He refused to take the car into
the train, and held the train there for five hours, and then
proceeded on his run after receiving a dispatch from the chairman
of a committee of the engineer brotherhood instructing him to "come
along and handle Ann Arbor cars." When he first received the order
at Alexis to take the Ann Arbor car, he refused, and said "I quit,"
but afterwards agreed with the superintendent of the division to
take the train to its destination if the order to take the
boycotted car was countermanded. Though he claimed to have quit at
Alexis at about 10 o'clock, he brought his train to its
destination, and, when told what his next run would be, gave no
notice of having quit or intending to quit.
It is not necessary for us to decide whether an engineer may
Page 166 U. S. 557
suddenly and without notice quit the service of a railway
company at an intermediate station or between stations, though
cases may be easily imagined where a sudden abandonment of a train
load of passengers in an unfrequented spot might imperil their
safety and even their lives. It is sufficient in the present case
to observe that the court found upon the testimony that the
petitioner did not quit in good faith in the morning, but intended
to continue in the company's service, and that his conduct was a
trick and device to avoid obeying the order of the court.
The finding of the court in this particular is not open to
review, and hence the question whether the court has power to
compel the performance of a personal contract for service does not
arise. It was a question for the court to determine whether the
petitioner's action in delaying the train five hours at Alexis was
taken in pursuance of a determination to abandon the service of the
company or for the purpose of disobeying the lawful injunction of
the court. The finding of the court was against the petitioner upon
that point.
There was no error in the judgment of the court of appeals, and
it is therefore
Affirmed.
