In view of the fact that many years have passed since the
certification of the lands in controversy, and since the railroad
company, in reliance upon the title which it believed it had
acquired, disposed of them, and that other parties have become
interested in them, and have dealt with them as private property,
the appellees are justified in saying that they have large claims
upon the equitable consideration of the courts.
The Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, providing for the
adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in the
construction of railroads, and the Act of March 2, 1896, 29 Stat.
42, operated to confirm the title to purchasers from a railroad
company of lands certified or patented to or for its benefit
notwithstanding any mere errors or irregularities in the
proceedings of the Land Department and notwithstanding the fact
that the lands so certified or patented were, by the true
construction of the land grants, although within the limits of the
grants, excepted from their operation, provided that they purchased
in good faith, and paid value for the lands, and provided also that
the lands were public lands in the statutory sense of the term, and
free from individual or other claims.
This was a bill in equity filed by the United States in the
Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota under authority of the
Act of Congress of March 3, 1887, c. 376, 24 Stat. 556, providing
for the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in the
construction of railroads and for the forfeiture of unearned lands,
etc. The charge was that the lands specified in the bill had been
wrongfully certified to the State of Minnesota for the benefit of
the defendant company, and the prayer was for a cancellation of
such certification and a restoration of the lands to the public
domain. After answers by the railroad company and some of the other
defendants, an agreed statement of facts was prepared, upon which
with the pleadings the case was submitted to the circuit court for
decision. Upon hearing, a decree was entered dismissing the
Page 165 U. S. 464
bill, which thereafter was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 67 F. 948.
By the agreed statement, the following facts appear, and upon
them the rights of the parties depend: on March 3, 1857, Congress
passed an act, c. 99, 11 Stat. 195, granting to Minnesota, to aid
in the building of certain lines of railroad, the alternate
odd-numbered sections, for six sections in width, on each side of
the line of each road. The amount of this grant was increased by
the Act of March 3, 1865, c. 105, 13 Stat. 526, to ten sections per
mile. By appropriate state legislation, the defendant railroad
company became one of the beneficiaries of this grant. It duly
constructed its road, and the construction was accepted and
approved. The lands in controversy were within the limits and terms
of the grant, and were certified to the state nearly all in the
years 1872, 1873, 1874, and 1875, though two tracts were not so
certified until the year 1879. At the time of the filing by the
railroad company of its map of definite location, there were on the
records and files of the land office homestead entries or
preemption filings upon these lands, regular in form and
prima
facie valid, some of them having been made intermediate the
time that the line of the railroad was surveyed, staked out, and
marked on the face of the earth, and the date of the filing of the
map of definite location, and some having been made prior to the
first-named time. Proceedings were had in the General Land Office,
after proper notice by publication, by which all these entries and
filings were duly cancelled prior to the certification of the lands
to the State of Minnesota. The cancellations were generally on the
ground of abandonment, and from the time thereof up to the filing
of the agreed statement of facts, July 26, 1893, none of the
persons who had made such homestead entries or preemption filings
had ever made any claim to the lands, so far as shown by the
records of the Land Department. The railroad company sold and
conveyed the lands to parties who paid value and bought believing
that the company's title was unimpeachable. Further, after the
patent from the state the lands were subjected to taxation, and the
land company, the grantee from
Page 165 U. S. 465
the railroad company of most of these lands, alone paid over
$8,000 of taxes while it held the title. It was not pretended that
the amount of lands certified for the benefit of the defendant
railroad company (including therein the lands in controversy)
exceeded the grant. In other words, it was not claimed that the
railroad company ever got more lands than it was entitled to, but
only that these particular tracts were wrongly certified to it.
It was also admitted
"that on, before, and for a long time after the certification of
the lands in question to the state on account of the railroad
grants, it was uniformly held and ruled by the Secretary of the
Interior and the other officers of the Land Department of the
United States (a) that the line of a railroad became and was
definitely fixed so as to attach the grant to the odd-numbered
sections within the granted limits as soon as surveyed, staked out,
and marked on the face of the earth, and (b) that a homestead entry
in all respects regular and legal excepted the land covered thereby
from the operation of a railroad grant attaching during the
existence of such entry, and that the validity of a homestead entry
was open to question by the company, and if it was shown that such
entry was fraudulent or irregular in its inception, or that it had
been abandoned before the right of the road attached, it was held
not to except the land from the grant, but the burden of so showing
was upon the company, and, in the absence of such proof, the entry,
being valid upon its face, was held to except the land from the
grant, even though subsequently abandoned, and (c) that a
preemption claim, which may have existed to a tract of land at the
time of the attachment of a railroad grant, if subsequently
abandoned and not consummated, even though in all respects legal
and
bona fide, was held not to operate to defeat the
grant, but, upon the failure of such claim, the land covered
thereby was held to inure to the grant as of the date when such
grant became effective, and (d) that the rights under the grant
attached to the lands in the granted and indemnity limits as of the
same date, and that selection was not deemed necessary to attach
the grant to any specific tract within the indemnity
Page 165 U. S. 466
limits, and (e) that the lands within the indemnity limits were
withdrawn at the same time as those within the primary or granted
limits, and (f) that within the common limits of like character of
two contemporaneous grants, each was held to be entitled to an
undivided moiety of the lands within such common limits, and (g)
that in pursuance of and in accordance with the aforesaid rules,
the grants to and for each and all of the land grant railroad
companies in the State of Minnesota were, before, at, and for a
long time after the certification of the lands in question,
administered."
The Act of March 3, 1887, is found printed below. [
Footnote 1]
Page 165 U. S. 467
After the passage of that act, and on March 3, 1891, Congress
passed an act, 26 Stat. 1093, containing this provision:
"That suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent
heretofore issued shall only be brought within five years from the
passage of this act, and suits to vacate and annul patents
hereafter issued shall only be brought within six years after the
date of the issuance of such patents."
And
Page 165 U. S. 468
on March 2, 1896, Congress passed a still further act (29 Stat.
42), which is also found in the footnote. [
Footnote 2]
Page 165 U. S. 469
"SEC. 2. That if any person claiming to be a
bona fide
purchaser of any lands erroneously patented or certified shall
present his claim of the Secretary of the Interior prior to the
institution of a suit to cancel a patent or certification, and if
it shall appear that he is a
bona fide purchaser, the
Secretary of the Interior shall request that suit be brought in
such case against the patentee, or the corporation, company,
person, or association of persons for whose benefit the
certification was made, for the value of said land, which in no
case shall be more than the minimum government price thereof, and
the title of such claimant shall stand confirmed. An adverse
decision by the Secretary of the Interior on the
bona
fides of such claimant shall not be conclusive of his rights,
and if such claimant, or one claiming to be a
bona fide
purchaser but who has not submitted his claim to the Secretary of
the Interior, is made a party to such suit, and if found by the
court to be a
bona fide purchaser, the court shall decree
a confirmation of the title, and shall render a decree in behalf of
the United States against the patentee, corporation, company,
person, or association of persons for whose benefit the
certification was made for the value of the land as hereinbefore
provided. Any
bona fide purchaser of lands patented or
certified to a railroad company, and who is not made a party to
such suit, and who has not submitted his claim to the Secretary of
the Interior, may establish his right as such
bona fide
purchaser in any United States court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or, at his option, as prescribed in sections three
and four of chapter three hundred and seventy-six of the acts of
the second session of the Forty-Ninth Congress."
"SEC. 3. That if, at any time prior to the institution of suit
by the Attorney General to cancel any patent or certification of
lands erroneously patented or certified, a claim or statement is
presented to the Secretary of the Interior by or on behalf of any
person or persons, corporation, or corporations, claiming that such
person or persons, corporation, or corporations is a
bona
fide purchaser or are
bona fide purchasers of any
patented or certified land by deed or contract, or otherwise, from
or through the original patentee or corporation to which patent or
certification was issued, no suit or action shall be brought to
cancel or annul the patent or certification for said land until
such claim is investigated in said Department of the Interior, and
if it shall appear that such person or corporation is a
bona
fide purchaser as aforesaid, or that such persons or
corporations are such
bona fide purchasers, then no such
suit shall be instituted and the title of such claimant or
claimants shall stand confirmed, but the Secretary of the Interior
shall request that suit be brought in such case against the
patentee, or the corporation, company, person, or association of
persons for whose benefit the patent was issued or certification
was made for the value of the land as hereinbefore specified. "
Page 165 U. S. 472
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 165 U. S. 473
There are other matters disclosed in the record, such as the
claim at one time asserted by the St. Paul & Sioux City
Railroad Company to these lands or a part of them, the litigation
between the two companies, and the final decision by this Court,
also certain transactions between the railroad company and a land
company, and the litigation resulting therefrom, together with a
series of conveyances by the railroad and the land company of the
lands. But in view of the conclusions to which we have come upon
the facts stated, we deem it unnecessary to cumber the record with
any detailed mention of those matters.
These facts appear: First. The railroad company has constructed
its road and has earned the land grant. Second. It has received no
more land than Congress, by the act referred to, proposed to grant
to aid in the construction of the road. Third. At the time that the
lands were certified to the state for its benefit, they were not
subject to any homestead or preemption entry. They were free from
all claims other than those of the railroad company itself, and
were, except as subject to such claims, in the fullest sense public
lands, and within the jurisdiction of the Land Department. Fourth.
Up to March 2, 1885 (when
Kansas Pacific Railway Company v.
Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, was
decided by this Court), the uniform ruling of the Land Department
had been that the title to railroad lands became settled at the
time the line of the railroad was surveyed, staked out, and marked
on the face of the earth, and not at the time of the filing of the
map of definite location in the Land Department; that a homestead
entry, though apparently regular and valid, was open to question by
the railroad company, and if shown to have been fraudulent or
irregular in inception, or that it had been abandoned before the
right of the company attached, was held not to except the land from
the grant, and also that a preemption claim existing at the time of
the attaching of a railroad grant, if subsequently abandoned and
not consummated -- even though in all respects legal and
bona
fide -- did not defeat the grant, but upon the failure of such
claim, the land covered thereby inured to the grant as of the date
when it became effective. Fifth.
Page 165 U. S. 474
Under such rules of construction, the land in controversy was
all properly certified to the state for the benefit of the railroad
company. Sixth. The lands were sold and conveyed by the railroad
company to parties who paid full value and bought in good faith,
believing the title which the railroad company assumed to convey to
be perfect.
It is in the light of these facts that the scope and effect of
the legislation of Congress is to be considered and determined.
There is certainly much of equity in the contention of the
appellees. The railroad company has constructed the road, in aid of
whose construction Congress made this grant. Even though retaining
all these tracts, it has failed to receive as large an amount of
land as Congress proposed to give. With full performance on its
side, it has not received all that Congress proffered. Of course,
in entering upon its work, it took all the chances of failure of
title of any particular tract, and therefore has no legal ground of
complaint, and yet it may with reason say that, though it must be
content with such lands as the government at the time of the filing
of the map of definite location could rightfully convey, it ought
not to be deprived of any which the government did convey, and
could convey without wrong to anyone, and which were embraced in
the description of the lands which Congress proposed to give. No
individual is wronged by permitting this certification to stand. No
preemptor or person seeking to enter any tract as a homestead has
been deprived of his rights or privileges by virtue of this
certification. The land was free from all individual claims. It was
within the absolute control of Congress. It belonged to the
government, and it is only in the assertion of a technical rule of
construing land grants, first declared by this Court long after the
certification, that the government now asks to have that set aside,
and the title to these lands restored. No fraud or wrong is
imputable to the company, no effort to secure a misconstruction by
the Land Department, but only an acceptance of the then settled
rule of construction and the taking of the lands which, under such
construction, it was entitled to receive. Conceding that that
construction was erroneous, yet it was one made by the officers of
the department
Page 165 U. S. 475
charged with the duty of administering the grant, and
determining what lands did and what did not pass -- the only
tribunal to which the company could then apply, and upon whose
rulings it was bound to act. Many years have passed since the
certification and since the company, in reliance upon the title it
believed it had acquired, has disposed of the lands and other
parties have become interested in, and have dealt with, the lands
as private property. Contracts have been entered into, suits
maintained (carried even to this Court), and decrees and judgments
entered and rendered in full reliance upon the title supposed to
have been conveyed. Surely, after such a lapse of time and after so
many transactions in and in respect to these lands, the appellees
are justified in saying that they have large claims upon the
equitable consideration of the courts.
The first section of the act of 1887 directs the Secretary of
the Interior to adjust all railroad land grants in accordance with
the decisions of this Court, and the second, that upon such
adjustment the Attorney General shall commence the proper
proceedings to cancel all patents, certification, or other
evidences of title erroneously issued. If these two sections were
all the legislation of Congress bearing upon the subject, it might
be difficult to sustain the conclusions of the lower courts, or to
deny to the government the relief sought by this bill, for, by the
construction placed upon such railroad grants in
Kansas Pacific
Railway Company v. Dunmeyer, supra, and other cases, these
lands did not pass under the railroad grant, because at the time of
the filing of the map of definite location, they were on the
records of the department claimed under homestead and preemption
entries. The lapse of time would be no bar, for statutes of
limitation cannot be invoked against the government.
But these sections are not all the legislation. Congress
evidently recognized the fact that notwithstanding any error in
certification or patent, there might be rights which equitably
deserved protection, and that it would not be fitting for the
government to insist upon the letter of the law in disregard of
such equitable rights. In the first place, it has distinctly
recognized the fact that when there are no adverse
Page 165 U. S. 476
individual rights, and only the claims of the government and of
the present holder of the title to be considered, it is fitting
that a time should come when no mere errors or irregularities on
the part of the officers of the land department should be open for
consideration. In other words, it has recognized that, as against
itself in respect to these land transactions, it is right that
there should be a statute of limitations; that when its proper
officers, acting in the ordinary course of their duties, have
conveyed away lands which belonged to the government, such
conveyances should, after the lapse of a prescribed time, be
conclusive against the government, and this notwithstanding any
errors, irregularities, or improper action of its officers
therein.
Thus, in the act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1093, it provided that suits
to vacate and annul patents theretofore issued should only be
brought within five years, and that, as to patents thereafter to be
issued, such suits should only be brought within six years after
the date of issue. Under the benign influence of this statute, it
would matter not what the mistake or error of the Land Department
was, what the frauds and misrepresentations of the patentee were,
the patent would become conclusive as a transfer of the title,
providing only that the land was public land of the United States,
and open to sale and conveyance through the Land Department. The
act of 1896 extended the time for the bringing of suits for patents
theretofore issued for five years from the passage of that act. It
is true that these appellees cannot avail themselves of these
limitations, because this suit was commenced before the expiration
of the time prescribed, and we only refer to them as showing the
purpose of Congress to uphold titles arising under certification or
patent by providing that, after a certain time, the government (the
grantor therein) should not be heard to question them.
But limitation was not only protection given. The act of 1896,
which extended the period of limitation, followed such extension
with this provision:
"But no patent to any lands held by a
bona fide
purchaser shall be vacated or annulled, but the right and title of
such purchaser is hereby confirmed."
It is true this act was passed after the commencement of
this
Page 165 U. S. 477
suit -- indeed, after the decision by the court of appeals --
but it is nonetheless an act to be considered. There can be no
question of the power of Congress to terminate, by appropriate
legislation, any suit brought to assert simply the rights of the
government. This suit was instituted by the Attorney General in
obedience to the direct command of Congress as expressed in the act
of 1887, and Congress could at any time prior to the final decree
in this Court direct the withdrawal of such suit, and it
accomplishes practically the same result when, by legislation
within the unquestioned scope of its powers, it confirms in the
defendants the title to the property which it was the purpose of
the suit to recover. So if this act of 1896, taken by itself alone
or in conjunction with preceding legislation, operates to confirm
the title apparently conveyed by the certification to the state for
the benefit of the railroad company, that necessarily terminates
this suit adversely to the government and compels an affirmance of
the decisions of the lower courts without the necessity of any
inquiry into the reasons advanced by those courts for their
conclusions. We are of the opinion that Congress intended by the
sentence we have quoted from the act of 1896 to confirm the title
which in this case passed by certification to the state. It not
only declares that no patents to any lands held by a
bona
fide purchaser shall be vacated or annulled, but it confirms
the right and title of such purchasers. Given a
bona fide
purchaser, his right and title is confirmed, and no suit can be
maintained at the instance of the government to disturb it.
It is earnestly contended by the government that the present
holders of the title are not "
bona fide purchasers;" that
that term has a fixed and well defined meaning, as announced in the
frequent decisions of this and other courts; that, as said in 2
Pom.Eq.Jur. § 745,
"the essential elements which constitute a
bona fide
purchaser are therefore three -- a valuable consideration, the
absence of notice, and presence of good faith,"
United States v. California &c. Land Company,
148 U. S. 31,
148 U. S. 42;
that while two of these essential elements may be found, to-wit, a
valuable consideration and the presence of good faith, the third,
the absence of notice, is lacking; that all men are
Page 165 U. S. 478
conclusively presumed to know the law, and that, as the true
rule of construction in reference to these grants was laid down by
this Court, the purchasers were bound to know such true rule; that
the records of the land office disclosed the existence of these
homestead entries and preemption filings, and therefore they who
purchased from the railroad company knew, or at least were
chargeable with knowledge, of the fact that those lands could not
rightfully have been certified to the railroad company, but were
excepted from the terms of the grant, and in fact remained the
property of the government. It is further insisted that as
Congress, in this statute, used this well understood expression, it
intended only the protection of such parties as came within the
scope of this settled meaning. It is said that the only cases to be
covered by this provisions were those in which the state or the
railroad company, by presentation to the land office, before the
filing of the map of definite location, of a forged relinquishment
by the preemptor, or one having made a homestead entry, or by some
other fraudulent representations, secured a certification or patent
to the tracts, and thereafter sold and conveyed to one who
purchased in ignorance of the fraud.
We are unable to agree with this contention of counsel for
several reasons. In the first place, the situation as it was known
to exist makes against any such narrow construction. While
instances of such fraudulent conduct on the part of the state to
which the lands were certified, or the company to which the lands
were patented, might exist, yet in the nature of things they would
be few and hardly worth the special notice of Congress, while, on
the other hand, the fact that there had been a difference between
the Land Department and the courts, one construction obtaining in
the former prior to the decisions by the latter, and the further
fact that, by this difference of construction, many tracts had been
erroneously certified or patented must have been well known to
Congress, and naturally therefore a subject for its legislation.
Further, there was no need of any legislation to protect a
"
bona fide purchaser." This had been settled by repeated
decisions of this Court --
United States v. Burlington
& Missouri Rive Railroad
Page 165 U. S. 479
Company, 98 U. S. 334,
98 U. S. 342;
Colorado Coal Company v. United States, 123 U.
S. 307,
123 U. S. 313,
reaffirmed in
United States v. California &c. Company,
148 U. S. 31,
148 U. S. 42 --
for in each of those cases it was decided that although a patent
was fraudulently and wrongfully obtained from the government, if
the land conveyed was within the jurisdiction of the Land
Department, the title of a
bona fide purchaser from the
patentee could not be disturbed by the government, so that this
provision was absolutely unnecessary if that which is now claimed
by counsel for the government is all that was intended by Congress.
We do not mean to assert that because legislation to cover such a
contingency was unnecessary, therefore the language used by
Congress necessarily implies something other and different,
because, of course, it may have been that Congress intended nothing
but a simple declaration of the law as it was known to exist. At
the same time, the fact that under one construction it was needless
raises a presumption that something more was intended, and that
Congress had in view the protection of other parties than were
already protected by general law.
But we need not rest on these inferences and presumptions. Other
provisions of the acts of 1887 and 1896 make clear the intent of
Congress. Section 3 of the act of 1887 provides that if the
homestead or preemption entry of any
bona fide settler has
been erroneously cancelled on account of any railroad grant, it may
be reinstated provided he has not located another claim or made an
entry in lieu of the one so cancelled and also did not voluntarily
abandon such entry. By this section, Congress provided for a
reinstating of the title of one deprived thereof by an erroneous
ruling of the Land Department, but at the same time limited the
right of reinstating to cases in which the original entryman had
not voluntarily abandoned his entry or had not since that time made
a new entry. In other words, it was limiting the restoration of the
title of the original entryman to cases in which he had a
continuing and present equitable right to recognition. As to all
other cases, Congress reserved the determination of the equities
between the government, the railroad company, and purchasers
Page 165 U. S. 480
from the latter, and in subsequent sections it made provision
for the adjustment of such equities.
Section 4 of the same act, expressly referring to all other
lands erroneously certified or patented to any railroad company,
provides that citizens who had purchased such lands in good faith
should be entitled to the lands so purchased, and to patents
therefor issuing directly from the United States, and that the only
remedy of the government should be an action against the railroad
company for the government price of similar lands. It will be
observed that this protection is not granted to simply
bona
fide purchasers (using that term in the technical sense), but
to those who have one of the elements declared to be essential to a
bona fide purchaser, to-wit, good faith. It matters not
what constructive notice may be chargeable to such a purchaser if,
in actual ignorance of any defect in the railroad company's title
and in reliance upon the action of the government in the apparent
transfer of title by certification or patent, he has made an honest
purchase of the lands. The plain intent of this section is to
secure him the lands and to reinforce his defective title by a
direct patent from the United States, and to leave to the
government a simple claim for money against the railroad company.
It will be observed that the technical term "
bona fide
purchaser" is not found in this section, and while it is provided
that a mortgage or pledge shall not be considered a sale, so as to
entitle the mortgagee or pledgee to the benefit of the act, it does
secure to everyone who in good faith has made an absolute purchase
from a railroad company protection to his title irrespective of any
errors or mistakes in the certification or patent.
Section 5 of the same act applies to cases in which no
certification or patent has issued, and yet the lands sold by the
railroad company are the numbered sections prescribed in its grant,
and coterminous with the constructed portions of its road, and it
is there provided that where the lands so sold by the company "are
for any reason excepted from the operation of the grant to said
company," the purchaser may obtain title directly from the
government by paying to it the ordinary
Page 165 U. S. 481
government price of such lands. It is true the term used here is
"
bona fide purchaser," but it is a
bona fide
purchaser from the company, and the description given of the lands
as not conveyed and "for any reason excepted from the operation of
the grant" indicates that the fact of notice of defect of title was
not to be considered fatal to the right. Congress attempted to
protect an honest transaction between a purchaser and a railroad
company, even in the absence of a certification or patent. These
being the provisions of the act of 1887, the act of 1896,
confirming the right and title of a
bona fide purchaser
and providing that the patent to his lands should not be vacated or
annulled, must be held to include one who, if not in the fullest
sense a "
bona fide purchaser," has nevertheless purchased
in good faith from the railroad company.
We have been referred in the arguments of this and other cases
to the debates in Congress and to the reports of the committees of
the two houses to whom the bills were referred as confirmatory of
the conclusions we have reached, but it is unnecessary to consider
any of the evidence derived from these sources, if indeed it is
open to consideration, for the language of the two acts is clear
and fully discloses the intent of Congress. Our conclusion is that
these acts operate to confirm the title to every purchaser from a
railroad company of lands certified or patented to or for its
benefit, notwithstanding any mere errors or irregularities in the
proceedings of the Land Department and notwithstanding the fact
that the lands so certified or patented were, by the true
construction of the land grants, although within the limits of the
grants, excepted from their operation, providing that he purchased
in good faith, paid value for the lands, and providing also that
the lands were public lands in the statutory sense of the term, and
free from individual or other claims.
If it be suggested that under the scope of these acts, though
the suit must fail so far as it is one to set aside and cancel the
certification, it may yet be maintained against the defendant
railroad company for the value of the lands so erroneously
certified, and that the decree should be modified to this
extent,
Page 165 U. S. 482
it is sufficient to say that, first, the government has not
asked any such decree; second, that it may be doubtful whether, for
the mere purpose of recovering money, an action at law must not be
the remedy pursued, but lastly and chiefly, that it does not appear
from this record either that the railroad company received an
excess of lands, or has even received (these lands included) the
full quantity of lands promised in the grant, and further that it
does not appear that there were not within the granted or indemnity
limits lands which the company might have rightfully received but
for this erroneous certification. It will hardly be contended that
if, simply through a mistake of the Land Department, these lands
were certified when at the time other lands were open to
certification which could rightfully have been certified and which
have since been disposed of by the government to other parties, so
that there is now no way of filling the grant, the government can
nevertheless recover the value of the lands so erroneously
certified. In other words, the mistake of the officers of the
government cannot be both potent to prevent the railroad company
obtaining its full quota of lands and at the same time potent to
enable the government to recover from the company the value of
lands erroneously certified. Our conclusion, therefore, is that,
upon the record as it is presented, the decree of the court of
appeals was right, and it is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled that the
Secretary of the Interior be and is hereby authorized and directed
to immediately adjust, in accordance with the decisions of the
supreme court, each of the railroad land grants made by Congress to
aid in the construction of railroad and heretofore unadjusted."
[
Footnote 2]
"SEC. 2. That if it shall appear, upon the completion of such
adjustments respectively or sooner, that lands have been from any
cause heretofore erroneously certified or patented by the United
States to or for the use or benefit of any company claiming by,
through, or under grant from the United States to aid in the
construction of a railroad, it shall be the duty of the Secretary
of the Interior to thereupon demand from such company a
relinquishment or reconveyance to the United States of all such
lands, whether within granted or indemnity limits, and if such
company shall neglect or fail to so reconvey such lands to the
United States within ninety days after the aforesaid demand shall
have been made, it shall thereupon be the duty of the Attorney
General to commence and prosecute in the proper courts the
necessary proceedings to cancel all patents, certification, or
other evidence of title heretofore issued for such lands, and to
restore the title thereof to the United States."
"SEC. 3. That if, in the adjustment of said grants, it shall
appear that the homestead or preemption entry of any
bona
fide settler has been erroneously cancelled on account of any
railroad grant or the withdrawal of public lands from market, such
settler, upon application, shall be reinstated in all his rights
and allowed to perfect his entry by complying with the public land
law,
provided that he has not located another claim or
made an entry in lieu of the one so erroneously cancelled,
and
provided also that he did not voluntarily abandon said
original entry,
and provided further that if any of said
settlers do not renew their application to be reinstated within a
reasonable time, to be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, then
all such unclaimed lands shall be disposed of under the public land
laws, with priority of right given to
bona fide purchasers
of said unclaimed lands, if any; and if there be no such
purchasers, then to
bona fide settlers residing
thereon,"
"SEC. 4. That as to all lands, except those mentioned in the
foregoing section, which have been so erroneously certified or
patented as aforesaid and which have been sold by the grantee
company to citizens of the United States or to persons who have
declared their intention to become such citizens, the person or
persons so purchasing in good faith, his heirs or assigns shall be
entitled to the land so purchased upon making proof of the fact of
such purchase at the proper land office within such time and under
such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior
after the grants, respectively, shall have been adjusted, and
patents of the United States shall issue therefor and shall relate
back to the date of the original certification or patenting, and
the Secretary of the Interior, on behalf of the United States,
shall demand payment from the company which has so disposed of such
lands of an amount equal to the government price of similar lands,
and in case of neglect or refusal of such company to make payment,
as hereafter specified, within ninety days after the demand shall
have been made, the Attorney General shall cause suit or suits to
be brought against such company for the said amount,
provided that nothing in this act shall prevent any
purchaser of lands erroneously withdrawn, certified, or patented as
aforesaid from recovering the purchase money therefor from the
grantee company, less the amount paid to the United States by such
company as by this act required,
and provided that a
mortgage or pledge of said lands by the company shall not be
considered as a sale for the purpose of this act, nor shall this
act be construed as a declaration of forfeiture of any portion of
any land grant for conditions broken or as authorizing an entry for
the same or as a waiver of any rights that the United States may
have on account of any breach of said conditions."
"SEC. 5. That where any said company shall have sold to citizens
of the United States, or to persons who have declared their
intention to become such citizens, as a part of its grant, lands
not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being
the numbered sections prescribed in the grant and being coterminous
with the constructed parts of said road, and where the lands so
sold are for any reason excepted from the operation of the grant to
said company, it shall be lawful for the
bona fide
purchaser thereof from said company to make payment to the United
States for said lands at the ordinary government price for like
lands, and thereupon patents shall issue therefor to the said
bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns: provided, that
all lands shall be excepted from the provisions of this section,
which at the date of such sales were in the
bona fide
occupation of adverse claimants under the preemption or homestead
laws of the United States, and whose claims and occupation have not
since been voluntarily abandoned, as to which excepted lands the
said preemption and homestead claimants shall be permitted to
perfect their proofs and entries, and receive patents therefor,
provided further that this section shall not apply to
lands settled upon subsequent to the first day of December,
eighteen hundred and eighty-two, by persons claiming to enter the
same under the settlement laws of the United States, as to which
lands the parties claiming the same as aforesaid shall be entitled
to prove up and enter as in other like cases."
"SEC. 6. That where any such lands have been sold and conveyed,
as the property of any railroad company, for the state and county
taxes thereon, and the grant to such company has been thereafter
forfeited, the purchaser thereof shall have the prior right, which
shall continue for one year from the approval of this act and no
longer, to purchase such lands from the United States at the
government price, and patents for such lands shall thereupon issue,
provided that said lands were not, previous to or at the
time of the taking effect of such grant, in the possession of or
subject to the right of any actual settler."
"SEC. 7 That no more lands shall be certified or conveyed to any
state or to any corporation or individual, for the benefit of
either of the companies herein mentioned, where it shall appear to
the Secretary of the Interior that such transfers may create an
excess over the quantity of lands to which such state, corporation
or individual would be rightfully entitled."
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that suits
by the United States to vacate and annul any patent to lands
heretofore erroneously issued under a railroad or wagon road grant
shall only be brought within five years from the passage of this
act, and suits to vacate and annul patents hereafter issued shall
only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of
such patents, and the limitation of section eight of chapter five
hundred and sixty-one of the acts of the second session of the
Fifty-First Congress and amendments thereto is extended accordingly
as to the patents herein referred to. But no patent to any lands
held by a
bona fide purchaser shall be vacated or
annulled, but the right and title of such purchaser is hereby
confirmed,
provided that no suit shall be brought or
maintained, nor shall recovery be had for lands or the value
thereof, that were certified or patented in lieu of other lands
covered by a grant which were lost of relinquished by the grantee
in consequence of the failure of the government or its officers to
withdraw the same from sale or entry."
