The plaintiff's contention in this case was that,
notwithstanding the action of the Department of the Interior in
certifying the land in controversy to the State of Nebraska and the
subsequent conveyances in the chain of title from that state to the
appellees, such apparent legal title was absolutely void because,
by the acts of Congress, the land was not subject to selection by
the state, it being within the limits of the land grant to the
Burlington g Missouri River Railroad Company, and reserved for
homestead and preemption, but not for private entry. All the facts
upon which that contention rested were matters of statute and
record, and any defense to the apparent legal title created by them
was available in an action at law to recover possession.
Held that without deciding whether the selection and
certification of these lands were absolutely void or simply
voidable at the election of the government, or were valid and
beyond any right of challenge of the government or anyone else, a
case was not presented for the interference of a court of
equity.
The controversy in this case respects the northeast quarter of
section 14, township 5, range 3, situate in Saline County,
Nebraska. The facts are these: The State of Nebraska, upon its
admission into the Union, became entitled, by virtue of section 8
of the Act of Congress of September 4, 1841, c. 16, 5 Stat. 455, to
500,000 acres of public land to aid in promoting its internal
improvements. March 26, 1868, the state selected 359,708 acres of
land, including the tract in controversy, as part of this grant.
March 24, 1870, the selection was approved by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, who, in his certificate of approval,
certified that the lists had been
"carefully examined and compared with the township plats and
tract books of this office, and are found to be free from conflict,
and I respectfully recommend that the same be approved, subject to
any valid interfering rights which may have existed at the date of
selection."
March 29, 1870, this action was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior in these words: "Approved, subject to all the rights
above
Page 165 U. S. 387
mentioned." The lists, duly certified, were transmitted to the
state and recorded in the proper office. April 20, 1871, the State
of Nebraska patented 100,000 acres of these lands, including the
tract in controversy, to the Midland Pacific Railway Company in
execution of a contract made by the state, through an act of its
legislature of February 15, 1869. Laws Neb. 1869, p. 153. The
appellees hold under a chain of title from the Midland Pacific
Railway Company, the deed to Jacob Reinhard, one of the appellees,
and Frederick Fieser, being dated November 11, 1878, they at the
time paying for the land twelve dollars per acre. On May 12, 1892,
Frederick Fieser died, and his heirs and devisees are, in addition
to Jacob Reinhard, the appellees in this case. The appellees and
their grantors have paid the taxes of every kind levied upon the
land since the patent from the state, amounting at the time of the
decree in the circuit court to $1,375.81.
The claim of appellant was initiated on May 31, 1883, more than
fifteen years after the selection by the state, more than thirteen
years after the approval by the Secretary of the Interior of such
selection and the certification to the state, twelve years after
the state had conveyed the land away to its grantee, and nearly
five years after the deed to appellees. It was initiated by an
occupation of the tract, and an application to enter it as a
homestead. This application was rejected by the local land
officers, and their action in this matter was affirmed by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the
Interior. On July 6, 1888, the appellant, who had been in
continuous possession ever since his first entry, tendered the
local land office proof that he had complied with the terms and
conditions of the homestead laws of the United States, and demanded
a patent for the land. This was denied by the local land officers,
and from such denial no appeal was taken. The theory upon which the
appellant proceeded was that the land was within the limits of the
grant made by the United States to the Burlington & Missouri
River Railroad Company by act of Congress of July 2, 1864, c. 216,
13 Stat. 356, 364, and that, by the Act
Page 165 U. S. 388
of March 6, 1868, c. 20, 15 Stat. 39, the even-numbered sections
within such limits were raised to double minimum lands, and, while
subject to homestead and preemption entry, were not subject to
private entry; that therefore the selection by and certification to
the state were absolutely void, and passed no title; that the title
remained in the United States until he, by full compliance with the
requirements of the homestead laws, acquired an equitable right to
the land.
An action of ejectment having been commenced by Reinhard and
Fieser on November 16, 1885, in the United States Circuit Court for
the District of Nebraska to recover possession, a bill in equity
was filed by the appellant in the same court on October 8, 1888, to
enjoin the further prosecution of that action and to quiet his
title. Upon pleadings and proof, the circuit court entered a decree
dismissing the bill, which decree was affirmed by the circuit court
of appeals, 61 F. 777, from which decree an appeal was taken to
this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the threshold of this case, we are confronted with the
question whether, assuming that the appellant has any rights in the
land, a case is presented for the interference of a court of
equity. His contention is that, notwithstanding the action of the
Interior Department in certifying the land to the state and the
subsequent conveyances in the chain of title from the state to the
appellees, such apparent legal title was absolutely void because by
the acts of Congress, the land was not subject to selection by the
state, it being within the limits of the land grant to the
Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Company, and reserved for
homestead and preemption, but not for private entry. All the facts
upon which his contention rests are
Page 165 U. S. 389
matters of statute and record, and any defense to the apparent
legal title created by them was available in the action to recover
possession. For if it be true, as contended, that this land thus
certified to the state was not, under the acts of Congress, land
open to selection, the validity of such certification, as of a
patent, can be challenged in an action at law.
Burfenning v.
Chicago, St. Paul &c. Railway, 163 U.
S. 321, and cases cited in the opinion.
But the mandate of the statute, Rev.Stat. § 723, affirming
in this respect the general doctrine in respect to the jurisdiction
of courts of equity, is that
"suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts
of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate and
complete remedy may be had at law."
This general proposition has been affirmed by this Court in a
multitude of cases, among others the following, in which the
jurisdiction of courts of equity to restrain proceedings at law was
denied on the ground that there existed a full and adequate defense
available in the legal action:
Hungerford v.
Sigerson, 20 How. 156;
Insurance
Company v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616,
80 U. S. 623 (in
which it was said: "Where a party, if his theory of the controversy
is correct, has a good defense at law to
a purely legal
demand,' he should be left to that means of defense, as he has no
occasion to resort to a court of equity for relief unless he is
prepared to allege and prove some special circumstances to show
that he may suffer irreparable injury if he is denied a preventive
remedy"); Grand Chute v.
Winegar, 15 Wall. 373. It follows from these
considerations that if this suit in equity is to be regarded as
simply one to restrain the action at law, it cannot be sustained,
because, upon the appellant's own theory, he has a full, adequate,
and complete defense at law.
But it is contended by appellant that his suit is something more
than one to restrain the action at law; that it is a suit to quiet
his title, and to hold the appellees as trustees of the legal title
for his benefit; that the restraint of the law action is simply
incidental to, and in furtherance of, the main relief, which is the
quieting of his title. Assuming, for the purposes of this case,
that his contention in this respect is correct, we
Page 165 U. S. 390
agree with the court of appeals that the showing made in his
bill is not one that appeals in the slightest degree to the
conscience of a Chancellor. The theory upon which the appellant
proceeds is substantially that because he has not a legal title, a
court of equity must enforce and establish his right, or, in other
words, that the lack of legal title creates an equitable duty. We
are unable to assent to this contention. Something more than the
absence of legal title is necessary to call into action the
processes of a court of equity. The right, whatever it may be and
from what source derived, must be not only one not protected by
legal title, but in and of itself appealing to the conscience of a
Chancellor. A court of equity acts only when and as conscience
commands; and if the conduct of the plaintiff be offensive to the
dictates of natural justice, then whatever may be the rights he
possesses, and whatever use he may make of them in a court of law,
he will be held remediless in a court of equity.
Upon his own showing, the plaintiff's conduct demands
condemnation, rather than commendation. The title to vacant land
within the states that originally formed the United States remained
in those states severally, while the title to land subsequently
acquired by the United States, whether through cession from the
original states, by conquest or treaty, has been retained by the
general government, lands within the State of Texas furnishing the
one notable exception. Though Congress, on the admission of the new
states, has not transferred to them the vacant lands within their
limits, it has made to them large grants for school and other
purposes. In carrying out this policy, in 1841, Congress passed an
act granting to certain named states, and to each state
subsequently admitted into the Union, 500,000 acres of land, to aid
in internal improvements, the selection of such lands to be made in
such manner as the legislatures of the respective states should
provide. Such selections were subject to the approval of the Land
Department of the United States, but when so made and approved, the
lands were to be certified to the state, and such certification was
to have all the effect of a patent. Now assuming that the
contention of the plaintiff is correct that
Page 165 U. S. 391
subsequent legislation of Congress had the effect of providing
that such selection should be made from certain classes of lands
and that the tract in controversy did not belong to any of those
classes, the fact remains that the land was selected by the state,
and such selection approved by the Land Department, and that the
land so selected and thereafter certified was land belonging to the
United States. At the time of such selection and certification, the
only parties in interest were the United States and the state.
Concede the fact that, through inadvertence, mistake, or (of which
there is no evidence) wrong on the part of the officials, this land
was improperly selected and certified, yet the United States for
thirteen years never questioned in any way the rightfulness of the
selection and certification, or challenged the title which was
apparently confirmed thereby to the state. It may be conceded that
no error or wrong on the part of the officers of the Land
Department concludes the United States, and that they might,
whenever they saw fit, by proper proceedings set aside the title
thus apparently conveyed. But they took no steps. They acquiesced
in the transaction. The land was land which the United States had
power to convey. Congress could, by special act or otherwise, have
transferred this specific tract to the state. The records of the
transaction were public and open. It was no secret conveyance by
which title was wrongfully conveyed to the state, but a matter of
record, of which everybody, both governments included, were
chargeable with notice. Not only was the title thus apparently
transferred unchallenged, but also the state dealt with it as its
own property, and conveyed it in satisfaction of one of its
contracts. It passed from grantee to grantee, the last sale being
at the price of $12 an acre. And further, the state, during the
years subsequent to its conveyance, treated the land as subject to
taxation, and they who purchased from it paid taxes thereon
amounting to over $1,000.
After all this, the plaintiff, assuming to do that which the
United States had not done -- that is, treat the selection and
certification as void -- and acting not for the United States, but
for himself, attempted to build up a right in himself to
Page 165 U. S. 392
the land. This was not done in ignorance of the claims of
others, for when he first applied to enter the land as a homestead,
he was notified by the officers of the Land Department that it had
already been selected and certified to the state, and his
application to enter was on that account rejected. The county
records also notified him of the several conveyances, and the
amount of money paid by the appellees. He was therefore simply an
intruder. It is earnestly insisted by counsel that Congress, by its
legislation, has set apart certain classes of land for the benefit
of preemptors and those desiring to enter homesteads; that the
government thereupon became, as it were, a trustee, holding the
title to those lands in trust for all who should elect to make
themselves
cestuis que trustent; that the plaintiff,
availing himself of this legislation, took the steps prescribed by
the statute, and made himself therefore a
cestui que
trust, with a beneficial right to this land, and the right to
challenge not only all subsequent, but also any prior, action taken
by his trustee in disregard of such beneficial right. We cannot
agree to this contention. Whatever rights such so-called
cestui
que trust may have against his trustee, the government, or all
parties claiming under the government subsequent to the time of the
initiation of his proceedings, he is not in a position to challenge
any action of his so-called trustee anterior to that time. The
government did not bind itself by its statutes to keep any lands
for subsequent occupation and purchase, and if, prior to such
occupation, it has, even though mistakenly, conveyed away a tract
to a third party, such conveyance, although voidable at its
instance, cannot be challenged by a mere intruder. And when such
conveyance is of longstanding, and the transaction has been
acquiesced in for many years by the government, and parties relying
upon the title apparently conveyed have invested large sums of
money, then an attempt by such an intruder to set aside all these
transactions, and to appropriate the property to himself, is
offensive to every sense of right and justice, and equity will lend
no helping hand to such effort. The authorities cited in the
opinion of the court of appeals sustain this conclusion.
Cooper v.
Roberts, 18 How.
Page 165 U. S. 393
173;
Spencer v.
Lapsley, 20 How. 264;
Cragin v. Powell,
128 U. S. 691.
This last case is quite pertinent. It appeared that in 1841, the
United States had issued to one Bach patents to certain surveyed
and described lands, the title to which, by subsequent conveyances,
passed to Cragin. In 1877, Powell, a surveyor, was employed by
Cragin to make a survey of his property, and discovering, as he
supposed, an error by which lands apparently included within the
survey and patent were in fact outside of its limits, persuaded one
Samuel Wolf to obtain a patent which would cover the lands thus
erroneously, as contended, included in the first survey, and
afterwards purchased those lands from Wolf. Thereupon he commenced
a suit "to fix the boundaries," the effect of which, if the
boundary was established according to his claim, would be to set
over to him lands which, as he alleged, were erroneously included
in the first survey and patent, but which had been all these years
occupied and cultivated by Bach, the patentee, and his grantees. A
decree in his favor in the circuit court was reversed, and the case
remanded with instructions to dismiss the bill, Mr. Justice Lamar
saying in the opinion (p.
128 U. S.
700):
"The appellee, Powell, is a surveyor who, in the year 1877,
while employed by appellant to make a survey of his plantation,
thought he discovered an error in the public lands whereby it would
appear that his lands were not in fact situated on Bayou Four
Points. From his own evidence, it is shown that he induced Wolf to
obtain the patent from the State of Louisiana for the land which
he, the said appellee, purchased from him. When he purchased this
land from Wolf, he knew that the tracts to which he was laying
claim had been possessed and cultivated by the appellant for a long
period of years."
"An advantage thus obtained a court of equity will not readily
enforce. As was said in
Taylor v. Brown, 5 Cranch
234,
9 U. S. 256:"
"The terms of the subsequent location prove that the locator
considered himself as comprehending Taylor's previous entry within
his location. . . . He either did not mean to acquire the land
within Taylor's entry or he is to be considered as a man watching
for the accidental mistakes of
Page 165 U. S. 394
others and preparing to take advantage of them. What is gained
at law by a person of this description equity will not take from
him, but it does not follow that equity will aid his views."
Without therefore determining whether the selection and
certification of these lands was absolutely void, or simply
voidable at the election of the government, or valid and beyond any
right of challenge on the part of the government or any one else,
we are of the opinion that equity will not help the plaintiff in
his suit, and the decree of the court of appeals is
Affirmed.
