In a suit in a state court to quiet title, two claims to title
were set up by the plaintiff. The first was that his title had been
acquired by adverse possession, sufficient under the local law. On
this point, the trial court found that, in 1862, the plaintiff's
grantor entered into possession of the land in question, and that
he and the plaintiff had since been continuously and then were in
actual, notorious and adverse possession thereof under color and
claim of title. The second claim was under a deed from husband and
wife, executed by the former under an alleged power of attorney
from the latter which had been lost without having been
Page 163 U. S. 64
recorded. On this point the trial court found that the existence
and validity of the power of attorney was established. It entered a
decree that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the
land, that the defendant was not the owner.of it, that the cloud be
removed, and that the power of attorney be established. On appeal
to the supreme court of the state, this decree was affirmed. The
case being brought here by writ of error, the chief justice of the
supreme court of the state certified that the question had been
duly raised in the trial court whether the said power and the deed
made under it, which by the law at the time of its making were
absolutely void, were made valid by the Territorial Act of February
2, 1888, and whether, if so made valid, it was not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Held: that as it was settled in the state that actual,
uninterrupted, and notorious possession under claim of right was
sufficient without color of title, and that a void deed accompanied
with actual occupancy was sufficient to set the statute of
limitations in motion, the judgment could be sustained on the first
point, which raised no federal question, and that consequently this
Court was without jurisdiction.
If the record discloses that a question has been raised and
decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of
the Constitution of the United States, and another question not
federal has also been raised and decided against such party, and
the decision of the latter question is sufficient notwithstanding
the federal question to sustain the decision, this Court will not
review the judgment.
If it appears that the court did in fact base its judgment on
such independent ground, or where it does not appear on which of
the two grounds the judgment was based, if the independent ground
on which it might have been based was a good and valid one,
sufficient in itself to sustain the judgment, this Court will not
assume jurisdiction.
This result cannot be in any respect controlled by the
certificate of the presiding judge, for the office of the
certificate, as it respects the federal question, is to make more
certain and specific what is too general and indefinite in the
record, but it is incompetent to originate the question.
If the conflict of a state law with the Constitution and the
decision by the state court in favor of its validity are relied on,
this must appear on the face of the record before the decision can
be reexamined in this Court, and this is equally true where the
denial of a title, right, privilege, or immunity under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or the validity of an
authority exercised under the United States, is urged as the ground
of jurisdiction.
No rule is more firmly established than that this Court will
follow the construction given by the supreme court of a state to a
statute of limitations of a state, and there is no reason for
disregarding it in this instance.
This was a complaint filed by the Bellingham Bay Land Company
against Carmi Dibble in the Superior Court of
Page 163 U. S. 65
Whatcom County, Washington, on June 7, 1891, seeking a decree
quieting plaintiff's title to certain lands therein described and
establishing the existence and validity of a certain power of
attorney alleged to have been lost without having been recorded.
Defendant disclaimed as to the west half of the property in
question, and, after demurrer overruled to an amended complaint,
answered by way of denial, and assertion of defendant's claim set
out in the complaint, and also by way of cross complaint. A trial
was had on issues joined, and the superior court filed findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
The court found that plaintiff was a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Washington, with full
powers to purchase, own, and sell real estate; that on or prior to
March 28, 1862, Thomas Jones and Betsy Jones, his wife, were the
owners of a certain donation land claim situated in the County of
Whatcom, and Territory of Washington, as particularly described;
that these lands were donated to Thomas Jones and his wife under
the donation laws of the United States, and that, by virtue of the
division which was made of them by the surveyor general and by the
certificate and patent, the west half of the lands was donated to
Thomas Jones and the east half to Betsy Jones, his wife. The court
further found that on March 28, 1862, for a valuable consideration
paid therefor, Thomas Jones, for himself and as attorney in fact
for his wife, executed good and sufficient deeds of conveyance for
all the tract of land to Edward Eldridge, and that since that date,
Eldridge had duly conveyed the premises to plaintiff, a small
parcel excepted; that prior to the execution of the deed by Jones
for himself and his wife, Betsy Jones had duly executed and
delivered her power of attorney to Thomas, authorizing him to sell
and convey the lands; that the power of attorney was executed under
the seal of said Betsy, and was duly acknowledged and witnessed and
properly certified, but that the same was not placed on the records
of the county, but became, and still remained, lost, and at the
date of the execution of the deed, had not been revoked. The court
then described the parcel conveyed by Eldridge to other parties
than plaintiff.
Page 163 U. S. 66
The court further found that
"on the said 28th day of March, 1862, the said Eldridge entered
into possession of all of the said donation claim of Thomas Jones
and Betsy Jones, and that from that date to the present time, the
said Edward Eldridge and his grantees, including the plaintiff in
this case, have been continuously and now are in the actual, open,
notorious, and adverse possession of all of the said property,
under claim and color of title, excepting only the small parcels
hereinbefore referred to as having been conveyed to other persons
by the said Edward Eldridge; . . . that neither the defendant, nor
his grantors, ancestors, or predecessors had been seised or
possessed of the said premises, or any part or parcel thereof at
any time since the said 28th day of March, 1862, and that the
defendant is not now in possession of the said land;"
that defendant claimed to be the owner of the premises, and to
have procured deeds for the land from persons claiming to be the
heirs of Betsy Jones, and had caused these deeds to be recorded in
Whatcom County, and had created a cloud upon plaintiff's title;
that there was not sufficient evidence to establish the fact that
Betsy Jones died intestate or that the persons under whom defendant
claimed (Lovatt and others) were the heirs at law of Betsy Jones;
that at the time when defendant claimed to have purchased the
property from these alleged heirs, he had full notice and knowledge
of the conveyance previously made by Thomas Jones for himself and
his wife, and that he had notice of the existence of the power of
attorney under which Jones conveyed as attorney in fact for his
wife, and had notice that plaintiff was in possession of the
premises, claiming to be owner under the Jones deed, and "that it
and its immediate grantors had been in the possession of the said
premises for more than ten years last past."
The superior court found as conclusion of law that plaintiff was
entitled to the relief prayed (including, among other things, the
establishment of "the existence and validity of the said power of
attorney"), and entered a decree that plaintiff was the owner and
in possession, and entitled to the possession, of the land in
question, excepting the enumerated
Page 163 U. S. 67
parcel; that defendant was not the owner of the premises or any
part or parcel thereof, and that the cloud created upon the title
of the property by the deeds to defendant from Lovatt and others be
removed, and plaintiff's title be quieted against all claims of
defendant, and "that the said power of attorney from the said Betsy
Jones to Thomas Jones, her husband, be, and the same is hereby,
established," and for costs.
The cause was then taken on appeal to the supreme court of the
state, and the decree below affirmed. 4 Wash. 764. Of the four
judges of the supreme court who participated in the decision, all
concurred in the judgment, and three, including the chief justice,
in the opinion. Thereafter, the Chief Justice signed a certificate,
and this writ of error was brought.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
By section 2 of article XXVII of the constitution of the state,
all laws in force in the Territory of Washington not repugnant to
that Constitution were continued in force until they expired by
their own limitation or were altered or repealed by the
legislature.
By section 5 of the Territorial Act of February 2, 1888, brought
forward as section 1447 of the General Statutes (1 Hill's Statutes
and Codes, p. 506), it was provided that all powers of attorney
theretofore made and executed by any married woman joined with her
husband, and duly acknowledged and certified, and all powers of
attorney theretofore made or executed by husband or wife to the
other, authorizing the sale or other disposition of real estate,
duly acknowledged,
Page 163 U. S. 68
and all conveyances theretofore and thereafter executed under
and by virtue of such powers of attorney and acknowledged and
certified as provided, should be valid and binding, but no rights
vested in third persons should be affected by anything in the
section contained.
Plaintiff in error contends that the validity of that section
was drawn in question, as repugnant to the fourteenth article of
amendment to the Constitution, and its validity sustained, in that
the supreme court of the state held that the power of attorney and
deed executed under it were thereby validated.
The certificate of the chief justice of that court was to the
effect that in the trial by the court below, and on the hearing on
appeal,
"the following question was duly and regularly raised, to-wit:
whether the power of attorney alleged to exist, and to have been
made by Betsy Jones to her husband, Thomas Jones, prior to the 28th
day of March, A.D. 1862, and a deed executed under it to Edward
Eldridge on the 28th day of March, 1862, which said power of
attorney and deed, on the respective dates of the execution
thereof, were absolutely void, were made valid and effective by the
retrospective portion of section 1447 of volume one of Hill's Code
of this state,"
and that the section thus applied was in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and, further, that the supreme court
"did not express any written opinion on the question so raised
as aforesaid, except such as is necessarily involved by the decree
of this Court in the above-entitled action, dated on the 17th day
of September, A.D. 1892, and affirming the whole of the decree of
the superior court of Whatcom County, State of Washington, in the
above-entitled action, entered and filed in the office of the clerk
of the said superior court on the 20th day of February, A.D. 1892,
and such opinion as is expressed by the statement of this Court in
its written opinion in the above-entitled action, that the color of
title necessary to support a claim by adverse possession in
respondent, the Bellingham Bay Land Company, rests and depends
solely upon a warranty deed from the owner, Betsy Jones, executed
by her husband, Thomas Jones, by virtue of
Page 163 U. S. 69
the power of attorney urged and alleged by respondent to have
been made valid by the retrospective part of the said Code section,
which said statement, as set forth in the opinion of this Court, is
an integral and necessary part of the decision by this Court
rendered in affirming the said decree of the lower court."
In respect of the supreme court, it is provided by section 5 of
the Code of Procedure of Washington that "in the determination of
causes, all decisions of the court shall be in writing, and the
grounds of the decision shall be stated," and by sections 68 and
73, it is made the duty of its clerk to record its proceedings, and
enter its orders, judgments, and decrees. And the thirteenth rule
of the court provides that "all opinions of the court shall be
recorded by the clerk in a well bound volume and the original filed
with the papers in the case." 2 Wash. 689.
It is the settled course of decision that this Court may examine
opinions so delivered and recorded, to ascertain the ground of the
judgment of the state court.
Kreiger v. Shelby Railroad
Co., 125 U. S. 39.
If the record discloses that a question has been raised and
decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of
the Constitution of the United States, and another question, not
federal, has also been raised and decided against such party, and
the decision of the latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding
the federal question, to sustain the decision, this Court will not
review the judgment.
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.
S. 361,
150 U. S.
366.
If it appears that the court did in fact base its judgment on
such independent ground, or, where it does not appear on which of
the two grounds the judgment was based, if the independent ground
on which it might have been based was a good and valid one,
sufficient in itself to sustain the judgment, this Court will not
assume jurisdiction.
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 257.
Nor can this result be in any respect controlled by the
certificate of the presiding judge, for the office of the
certificate, as it respects the federal question, is to make more
certain
Page 163 U. S. 70
and specific what is too general and indefinite in the record,
but it is incompetent to originate the question.
Parmelee
v.Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36;
Powell v. Brunswick
County, 150 U. S. 433.
If the conflict of a state law with the Constitution and the
decision by the state court in favor of its validity are relied on,
this must appear on the face of the record before the decision can
be reexamined in this Court, and this is equally true where the
denial of a title, right, privilege, or immunity under the
Constitution and laws of the United States or the validity of an
authority exercised under the United States is urged as the ground
of jurisdiction.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Washington, after stating
the case, said:
"The proof of two facts was attempted by the respondent the
establishment of either of which would be fatal to appellant's
claim. The facts attempted to be proven were as follows: (1) that
plaintiff's title to the land in controversy had been acquired by
adverse possession; (2) that Betsy Jones had executed a power of
attorney to her husband, Thomas Jones, authorizing him to sell the
disputed premises."
Thereupon, after overruling a contention by the appellant that
under the pleadings, as framed, no testimony tending to prove
adverse holding was admissible, the court took up the first
proposition and held that plaintiff had established his title by
adverse possession during the statutory period; that the adverse
possession was actual, notorious, exclusive, and continuous under
claim or color of title; that Eldridge entered into possession
under the highest claim of title, to-wit, a warranty deed from the
owners, and on the day he received the deed, which was recorded the
next day, took actual possession of the land and maintained it for
over twenty-nine years before the commencement of the action, or
any assertion of defendant's claim, and that defendant had
knowledge of Eldridge's reputed ownership prior to his acquisition
of the right of the alleged heirs. Having reached this result, the
court added, "This renders an investigation of the second
proposition discussed unnecessary." Thus it appears that the
decision of the court rested on a ground that
Page 163 U. S. 71
did not involve the question of the validity of the power of
attorney and deed. As the record disclosed this ground of defense,
and as the opinion put the decision solely on that ground, it would
be quite inadmissible to allow a certificate of the presiding judge
to overthrow that conclusion. This certificate does not have that
effect, and we cannot believe that any such result was intended. It
was evidently drawn by counsel, as was indeed admitted at the bar,
and states that a federal question was duly raised, but the chief
justice declined to say that it was decided except as such decision
might be involved in the affirmance of the whole of the decree of
the superior court or by the statement of the court in the opinion
that "the color of title necessary to support a claim of adverse
possession" depended on the deed of Betsy Jones executed by her
husband by virtue of the power of attorney.
Although the superior court found as a conclusion of law that
plaintiff was entitled "to have the existence and validity of the
said power of attorney from Betsy Jones established by decree of
the court," yet the terms of the decree in that regard simply
established the power of attorney, which might well enough be held
to mean the establishment of its existence -- its having been lost
and not recorded -- and not of its validity; but, if a broader
signification be attributed, still the affirmance of the decree,
which adjudicated that plaintiff was the owner and that defendant
was not, and quieted the title of plaintiff, did not amount to a
decision of the alleged question, as the legal efficacy of the
power of attorney as a muniment of title became immaterial, in view
of the ground on which the decision of the supreme court was
placed.
Nor was the question of the validity of the Act of February 2,
1888, necessarily disposed of by anything stated in the opinion.
The judgment proceeded on claim of title as well as color of title.
The court held that Eldridge entered into and maintained actual
possession under claim of title, and it seems to be settled in
Washington that "actual, uninterrupted, and notorious possession,
under claim of right, is sufficient, without color of title."
Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23.
In
Probst v. Presbyterian Church, 129 U.
S. 182, this Court
Page 163 U. S. 72
held that it was not necessary that the holder by adverse
possession should have a paper title under which he claimed if he
asserted ownership of the land, and this assertion was accompanied
by an uninterrupted possession.
Ewing v.
Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, and
Harvey v.
Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, were cited, and it was
said:
"The fair implication in both these cases is that where
possession is taken under claim of title, it sufficiently shows the
intention of the party to hold adversely within the meaning of the
law upon that subject. There is no case to be found which holds
that this adverse claim of title must be found in some written
instrument."
In this case, the superior court found that Eldridge and his
grantees had been nearly thirty years "continuously, and now are,
in the actual, open, notorious, and adverse possession of all of
the said property, under claim and color of title," and this
finding was reiterated by the supreme court.
"The intention guides the entry, and fixes its character," said
the court in
Ewing v. Burnet, and the state courts had no
difficulty as to Eldridge's intention in making the entry. Clearly
it was within the province of those courts to determine what
constituted a sufficient claim of ownership to set the statute in
motion. Eldridge entered, with the intention of asserting, and did
assert, ownership, and it was for the state courts to say what the
effect of that adverse possession was -- whether the Jones deed was
void or voidable.
Moreover, as to color of title, it is held in Washington that a
void deed, accompanied with actual occupancy, is sufficient to set
the statute in motion.
Ward v. Huggins, 7 Wash. 617,
624.
This is the usual rule as to general statutes of limitation,
though as to short statutes, in relation to sales of real estate
for taxes, a different view has been expressed.
Pillow v.
Roberts, 13 How. 472;
Hall v.Law,
102 U. S. 466;
Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239;
Hurd v. Brisner, 3 Wash. St. 1. Prior to December 1, 1881,
the limitation of actions for the recovery of real property or the
possession thereof was twenty years, and this, by the Territorial
Act of that date, was reduced to ten years. The general statute of
limitations was relied on
Page 163 U. S. 73
here, and there was an adverse possession for nearly thirty
years.
No rule is more firmly established than that this Court will
follow the construction given by the supreme court of a state to a
statute of limitations of a state.
Bauserman v. Blunt,
147 U. S. 647. And
we perceive no reason for disregarding it in this instance.
We are of opinion that jurisdiction cannot be maintained on the
ground that the validity of the Act of February 2, 1888, being
section 1447 of the General Laws of Washington, was drawn in
question, and its validity sustained.
It is urged that jurisdiction may be sustained on two other
grounds -- namely, that a right claimed under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, or the validity of an authority
exercised under the United States, by virtue of the patent issued
for these lands, was denied by the decision, and that the validity
of the territorial Act of December 1, 1881, being section 26 of the
Code of 1881, now section 112 of the state Code of Procedure (2
Hill 37), was drawn in question as contrary to the Constitution,
and its validity sustained.
We are unable to discover that federal questions in these
particulars were raised or disposed of by the decision.
The contention seems to be that the patent for this land was not
issued until September 6, 1871; that the statute of limitations did
not begin to run until that date; that as the action was commenced
June 9, 1891, a period of less than twenty years elapsed between
these two dates, and that the decision of the supreme court, if
rested on twenty years' adverse possession, held that the bar
commenced at a date anterior to that of the patent, and in that way
denied rights claimed under it, and, if rested on ten years, gave a
retrospective effect to the Act of December 1, 1881, as ten years
had not elapsed between that date and the commencement of the
action.
There does not seem to have been any controversy as to the
effect of the issue of the patent. The superior court, in its
findings, simply referred to the fact that, by the certificate and
the patent, the west half of the land was donated to Thomas,
Page 163 U. S. 74
and the east half to Betsy, Jones, and found nothing as to when
the patent issued, and the supreme court made no reference to the
matter.
If resort be had to the evidence, it appears therefrom that the
patent issued September 6, 1871, and that the right to the patent
matured prior to 1862, when Mrs. Jones left the territory. The
execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to it had
become complete, were the mere ministerial acts of the officers
charged with that duty.
Barney v. Dolph, 97 U. S.
652;
Simmons v. Wagner, 101 U.
S. 260. The state courts could properly hold under the
circumstances of this case that the statute of limitations was set
in motion when that right accrued, and was not postponed to the
issue of the patent.
Eldridge did not occupy the position of a stranger to the title
not connected therewith by transfer from the original holder. If
the Jones deed was sufficient to sustain claim or color of title if
the patent had issued March 28, 1862, its sufficiency for that
purpose could not be rendered any the less by the issue of the
patent at a subsequent time, and, in any view of the alleged
infirmities of the deed, the patent would take effect by relation,
rather than operate extrinsically to the destruction of the claim
under the original owners.
The judgment of the supreme court was based on twenty years'
adverse possession. We presume, as § 760 of the Code of 1881
provided that no right accrued before the Code took effect should
be affected by its provisions, the court was of opinion that the
Act of December 1, 1881, could not be availed of to lengthen the
time originally prescribed. At all events, it was for the state
court to determine the applicable bar,
Murray v.
Gibson, 15 How. 421, and we cannot take
jurisdiction to review its judgment.
Writ of error dismissed.
