Under the Act of July 12, 1894, c. 132, enacting that
"all criminal proceedings instituted for the trial of offenses
against the laws of the United States arising in the District of
Minnesota shall be brought, had and prosecuted in the division of
said district in which such offences were committed,"
the court has no jurisdiction of an indictment afterwards
presented by the grand jury for the district in one division for an
offense committed in another division before the passage of the
act, and for which no complaint has been made against the
defendant, although the witnesses whose names are endorsed upon the
indictment were summoned before the grand jury and were in actual
attendance upon the court before the passage of the act.
At June term, 1894, of the District Court for the District of
Minnesota, held at St. Paul, in the Third Division of the district,
the grand jury for the district presented, on July 20, 1894, two
indictments against George W. Post under section 5493 of the
Revised Statutes, for subornation of perjury on February 3, 1894 at
Duluth, in the Fifth Division.
To each indictment the defendant pleaded not guilty, with leave
to withdraw his plea at October term, 1894, held at St. Paul, to
which the cases were continued. At that term, he withdrew his plea
and demurred to each indictment for want of jurisdiction in the
court to take cognizance of the matters and things therein set
forth, because the offenses were alleged to have been committed in
the Fifth division of the district, and the indictment was found
and presented at a term held at St. Paul, in the district and
outside of that division. The demurrer was overruled, the defendant
pleaded not guilty to each indictment, the two cases were
consolidated by order of the court for trial, the jury returned
verdicts or guilty; the defendant moved in arrest of judgment for
want of jurisdiction in the court to
Page 161 U. S. 584
try him upon the indictments, the motion was overruled, and the
defendant was sentenced to be imprisoned three years in the
penitentiary and to pay a fine of $2,000, and sued out this writ of
error.
By stipulation in writing of counsel, it was agreed that there
should be added to the record, as if in obedience to a writ of
certiorari for diminution thereof, an order of the district court
directing the record to be amended by setting forth the following
facts: the grand jury for the District of Minnesota at June term,
1894, was duly impaneled July 5, 1894, and then entered upon the
discharge of its duties for the entire District of Minnesota, and
was continuously in session from that day to and including July 20,
1894, and on this last day returned these two indictments, and made
its final report, and was discharged by the court. All the persons
whose names were endorsed upon the indictments were duly summoned
in these cases before the grand jury prior to July 5, 1894, and
obedience to such summons were in actual attendance upon the court
prior to July 12, 1894.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
By the Revised Statutes, as by the previous act admitting the
State of Minnesota into the Union, the whole state was constituted
one judicial district. Act May 11, 1858, c. 31, § 3; 11 Stat.
285; Rev.Stat. § 531. By Act April 26, 1890, c. 167, which
took effect August 1, 1890, the District of Minnesota was divided
into six divisions for the purpose of holding terms of court. The
courts for the Third Division, which included St. Paul, were to be
held at St. Paul, on the fourth Tuesday in June and the second
Tuesday in January, and the courts for the Fifth Division, which
included
Page 161 U. S. 585
Duluth, were to be held at Duluth on the second Tuesday in May
and the second Tuesday in October. A grand jury and petit jury
might be summoned at each term, and the criminal jurisdiction of
the court was in no wise restricted to a particular Division. 26
Stat. 72.
But by Act July 12, 1894, c. 132, entitled "An act regulating
the procedure in criminal causes in the District of Minnesota," it
was enacted, in section 1, that
"all criminal proceedings instituted for the trial of offenses
against the laws of the United States arising in the District of
Minnesota shall be brought, had and prosecuted in the division of
said district in which such offenses were committed,"
and, in section 2, that "this act shall take effect upon its
passage." 28 Stat. 102.
As was said by this Court in a recent case,
"in all cases where life or liberty is affected by its
proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the
law authorizing it to take jurisdiction, and to try the case, and
to render judgment. It cannot pass beyond those limits in any
essential requirement in either stage of these proceedings, and its
authority in those particulars is not to be enlarged by any mere
inferences from the law or doubtful construction of its terms. . .
. It is plain that such court has jurisdiction to render a
particular judgment only when the offense charged is within the
class of offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction, and
when, in taking custody of the accused and in its modes of
procedure to the determination of the question of his guilt or
innocence, and in rendering judgment, the court keeps within the
limitations prescribed by the law, customary or statutory. When the
court goes out of these limitations, its action, to the extent of
such excess, is void."
In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242,
151 U. S.
256-257.
The act of 1894, now in question, is doubtless to be construed
as operating prospectively, and not retrospectively, upon the
subject legislated upon. That subject, however, is not a matter of
substantive criminal law, but is one of jurisdiction and procedure
only. The act does not create any new offense or make any change in
the proof or the punishment
Page 161 U. S. 586
of an offense already existing. It is but a regulation of
procedure, and of procedure so far only as affects the jurisdiction
of the court with regard to the different divisions into which the
district is divided and in which the court may be held. It
distributes the jurisdiction among the several divisions by
requiring the prosecution of offenses "arising in the District of
Minnesota" to take place in that division "in which such offenses
were committed." It is not limited to offenses which shall arise
after it takes effect, nor does it in terms mention offenses which
have already arisen, but it uses the general words, "offenses
arising," which naturally include both past and future offenses, as
do the words "offenses committed," and it is indisputably within
the discretion of the legislature, when granting, limiting, or
redistributing jurisdiction, to include offenses committed before
the passage of the act.
Cook v. United States,
138 U. S. 157,
138 U. S. 180.
The point of time at which the act is to apply to a particular case
is not the time of committing the offense, but the time of
instituting the proceedings. Treating the direction as operating
prospectively only, that "all criminal proceedings instituted"
"shall be brought, had and prosecuted" in a particular division, it
obviously includes all proceedings which shall be, and none which
have been, instituted. Without regard, therefore, to the time of
the commission of an offense, all the proceedings for its
prosecution, if instituted after the act of 1894 took effect, must
be in the division in which the offense was committed, but if
instituted before this act took effect, they might go on, as under
the earlier acts, in any division.
The two cases principally relied on by the United States, of
Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263,
144 U. S. 297,
and
Caha v. United States, 152 U.
S. 211,
152 U. S. 214,
by implication at least, support this conclusion. In
Caha's case, the act of Congress expressly reserved the
former jurisdiction not only over prosecutions already commenced,
but also over crimes already committed. In
Logan's case,
the act of Congress, as this Court observed,
"does not affect the authority of the grand jury for the
district, sitting at any place at which the court is appointed to
be held, to present indictments for offenses committed
Page 161 U. S. 587
anywhere within the district. It only requires the trial to be
had, and writs and recognizances to be returned, in the division in
which the offense is committed. The finding of the indictment is no
part of the trial."
Criminal proceedings cannot be said to be brought or instituted
until a formal charge is openly made against the accused, either by
indictment presented or information filed in court, or at the least
by complaint before a magistrate.
Virginia v. Paul,
148 U. S. 107,
148 U. S.
119-121;
Rex v. Phillips, Russ. & Ry. 369;
Regina v. Parker, Leigh & Cave 459,
s.c., 9
Cox, Crim.Cas. 475. The submission of a bill of indictment by the
attorney for the government to the grand jury, and the examination
of witnesses before them, are both in secret, and are no part of
the criminal proceedings against the accused, but are merely to
assist the grand jury in determining whether such proceedings shall
be commenced. The grand jury may ignore the bill, and decline to
find any indictment, and it cannot be known whether any proceedings
will be instituted against the accused until an indictment against
him is presented in open court.
In the present case, each indictment, for an offense committed
in the Fifth Division of the district, having been first presented,
after the act of 1894 took effect, to the court held in the Third
Division, and no complaint having been previously made against the
defendant, the court had no jurisdiction of the case, and for this
reason, without considering the other questions argued at the bar,
the judgment is
Reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to set
aside the verdicts, and to sustain the demurrers to the
indictments.
