The Act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, concerning Indian
depredations, confers, by § 1, clause 1, no jurisdiction upon
the Court of Claims to adjudicate upon such a claim, made by a
person who was not a citizen of the United States at the time when
the injury was suffered, although he subsequently became so; nor by
§ 1, clause 2, unless the claim was one which, on March 3,
1885, had either been examined and allowed by the Department of the
Interior or was pending therein for examination.
On March 3, 1891, Congress passed an act, 26 Stat. 851, c. 538,
vesting certain jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, the material
portion of which is found in the first section, and reads as
follows:
"That in addition to the jurisdiction, which now is or may
hereafter be conferred upon the Court of Claims, said court shall
have and possess jurisdiction and authority to inquire into and
finally adjudicate, in the manner provided in this act, all claims
of the following classes, namely:"
"First. All claims for property of citizens of the United States
taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe, or
nation, in amity with the United States, without just cause or
provocation on the part of the owner or agent in charge, and not
returned or paid for."
"Second. Such jurisdiction shall also extend to all cases which
have been examined and allowed by the Interior Department and also
to such cases as were authorized to be examined under the act of
Congress making appropriations for the current and contingent
expenses of the Indian department, and for fulfilling treaty
stipulations with various Indian tribes for the year ending June
thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-six, and for other purposes,
approved March third, eighteen hundred and eighty-five, and under
subsequent acts, subject however, to the limitations hereinafter
provided. "
Page 160 U. S. 547
The Act of March 3, 1885, referred to in this second clause, is
found in 23 Stat. 362 and following, and the clause providing for
examination is on page 376, and is as follows:
"For the investigation of certain Indian depredation claims, ten
thousand dollars, and in expending said sum, the Secretary of the
Interior shall cause a complete list of all claims heretofore filed
in the Interior Department and which have been approved in whole or
in part and now remain unpaid, and also all such claims as are
pending but not yet examined, on behalf of citizens of the United
States on account of depredations committed, chargeable against any
tribe of Indians by reason of any treaty between such tribe and the
United States, including the name and address of the claimants, the
date of the alleged depredations, by what tribe committed, the date
of examination and approval, with a reference to the date and
clause of the treaty creating the obligation for payment, to be
made and presented to Congress at its next regular session, and the
secretary is authorized and empowered, before making such report,
to cause such additional investigation to be made and such further
testimony to be taken as he may deem necessary to enable him to
determine the kind and value of all property damaged or destroyed
by reason of the depredations aforesaid, and by what tribe such
depredations were committed, and his report shall include his
determination upon each claim, together with the names and
residences of witnesses and the testimony of each, and also what
funds are now existing or to be derived by reason of treaty or
other obligation out of which the same should be paid."
The subsequent acts (May 15, 1886, c. 333, 24 Stat. 29, 44;
March 2, 1887, c. 320, 24 Stat 449, 464; June 29, 1888, c. 503, 25
Stat. 217, 234; March 2, 1889, c. 412, 25 Stat. 980, 998; August
19, 1890, 26 Stat. 336, 356) simply make additional appropriations
for the examination of the same claims.
On June 20, 1891, claimant filed his petition in the Court of
Claims to recover for property taken from him on June 10, 1866, by
the Ute Indians. Subsequently, and on November 17, 1893, he filed
an amended petition, containing these allegations:
Page 160 U. S. 548
"Your petitioner, Benjamin H. Johnson, a resident of Scipio,
Millard County, in the Territory of Utah, and a citizen of the
United States, respectfully shows:"
"That he was not a citizen of the United States on or about the
10th day of June, 1866, the date of the loss hereinafter described,
not having taken out his final citizenship papers until 1873."
"That he moved to the United States in 1848, when he was 13
years old, and has resided here ever since, and was a citizen of
the United States at the date of the passage of the Indian
depredation law of March 3, 1891. 26 Stat. 851, c. 538, p.
851."
"That it is admitted in allowing claims for Indian depredations
under the Act of March 3, 1885, c. 341 (1 Supp.Rev.Stat., 2d ed.,
p. 913, note), it has been the practice of the Interior Department
to interpret the words 'citizens of the United States,' therein
used, as meaning only those who were citizens, or had declared
their intention to become citizens at the time the depredations
were committed, and such citizenship was found when neither alleged
nor testified to where the contrary did not appear."
"That this claim was never presented to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, nor to Congress, nor any agent nor department of
the government."
Whereupon the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that
"the claimant was not a citizen of the United States at the time of
the depredation alleged to have been committed," which motion was
sustained, and on December 4, 1893, a judgment entered dismissing
the case for want of jurisdiction. 29 Ct.Cl. 1.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Page 160 U. S. 549
The principal question turns on the matter of citizenship.
Claimant was a citizen at the time of the passage of the act of
1891, but not when the wrongs complained of were committed. Had the
Court of Claims jurisdiction?
That court has no general jurisdiction over claims against the
United States. It can take cognizance of only those matters which
by the terms of some act of Congress are committed to it.
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.
S. 163.
Congress did not, by the act of 1891, assume in behalf of the
United States responsibility for all acts of depredation by
Indians, nor grant to the Court of Claims authority "to inquire
into and finally adjudicate" all claims therefor. It carefully
specified those which might be considered by that court.
By the first clause, jurisdiction is given of "claims for
property of citizens of the United States taken or destroyed." But
claimant has no such claim. It is for property of an alien taken
and destroyed. True, he is how a citizen, and was at the time of
the passage of the act. But the language is not "claims of citizens
for property," which might include his case. The definition is of
the character of the claim, and not of the status of the claimant.
If the property was not, when taken or destroyed, the property of a
citizen, a claim therefor was at that time clearly outside the
statute, and, while the status of the claimant may have changed,
the nature of the claim has not. Suppose the property taken or
destroyed had at the time belonged to a citizen, and an alien had
succeeded by inheritance to the right to recover compensation for
its loss or destruction, is it not clear that such alien would have
a claim within the very terms of the act for property of a citizen
taken and destroyed, and upon what construction of its language
could the court have refused to take jurisdiction?
Further, the property must have been taken or destroyed by
Indians "in amity with the United States." Clearly, that refers to
the status of the Indians at the time of the depredation. Any other
construction would lead to manifest absurdities. The certainty of
this date renders equally certain the date at which citizenship
must exist in the owner of the property taken or destroyed.
Page 160 U. S. 550
Much was said in argument, and many authorities are cited in the
briefs, in respect to the difference between retrospective and
prospective statutes, but we fail to see the pertinency of this
discussion. Obviously the act is prospective in its operation in
that it grants to the Court of Claims a jurisdiction it did not
theretofore possess, and authorizes it in the future to hear and
determine certain claims. But as to the claims thus committed to
its consideration, the statute is expressly retrospective. The last
proviso in section 2 reads:
"
And provided further that no suit or proceeding shall
be allowed under this act for any depredation which shall be
committed after the passage thereof."
The only question for determination in this case is whether the
claim presented is within either of the classes of past wrongs
which are submitted by the act to the jurisdiction of the court.
And for the reasons given, we are clear that it does not come
within the first clause defining such jurisdiction.
Is it within the second clause? By that, jurisdiction is
extended to
"cases which have been examined and allowed by the Interior
Department, and also to such cases as were authorized to be
examined under the Act of Congress"
of March 3, 1885, and subsequent acts. As the claimant alleges
in his petition that his claim was never presented to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, nor to Congress, nor any agent nor
department of the government, it was not a case which had been
examined or allowed by the Interior Department, and does not come
under the first of the two classes named. We turn therefore to the
Act of March 3, 1885, to see what cases were authorized to be
examined under it.
It appropriates ten thousand dollars for the investigation of
certain Indian depredation claims, and in describing them it
mentions such claims as had been theretofore filed in the Interior
Department, and approved in whole or in part, and adds: "Also all
such claims as are pending but not yet examined, on behalf of
citizens of the United States on account of depredations
committed." In order to come within the second class, the claim
must be one on behalf of a citizen of the United States, and also
one pending, but not yet examined.
Page 160 U. S. 551
If it be assumed that claimant was on March 3, 1885, a citizen,
as may be inferred from the language of the petition, although not
explicitly averred, the question arises whether the different
phraseology of that act would include a claim in his favor,
although he was not a citizen at the time of the depredation. But,
passing that question, the claim must be one then "pending, but not
yet examined," and this language, taken in connection with the
words descriptive of the prior class, manifestly refers to such
claims as had been presented for examination, and so, in a
technical sense of the term, were pending, and does not embrace all
cases of depredations, whether claims therefor had been presented
or not.
We are aware of the fact that the Interior Department, acting
under an opinion of its chief law clerk of August 23, 1886, has
construed the authority given by the second clause of this act to
reach to all claims existing and not barred, whether at the date of
the act on file or not in the Interior Department. We quote from
that opinion, approved by the assistant secretary, as follows:
"I am of the opinion, however, that all claims that were not
barred March 3, 1885, are included within the claims to be
investigated, although filed after the passage of either the act of
1885 or 1886, because the Act of May 29, 1872, and the rules and
regulations made in pursuance thereof, require the Secretary of the
Interior to investigate such claims and make report thereof to
Congress in the same manner as provided for by the Act of March 3,
1885. This act and the rules and regulations adopted by the
secretary, as provided for by said act, are not repugnant to any
provision of section 2156, but provide for the enforcement and
execution of that section. As no statutory bar attaches to any
claim for depredations committed since the adoption of the Revised
Statutes, such claims may be filed at any time."
We are unable to concur in the views thus expressed. Without
stopping to inquire whether § 2156, Rev.Stat., may or may not
be repealed by this Act of March 3, 1885, and conceding for the
purposes of this case that such section remains in full force and
effect, we are of the opinion that the Act of
Page 160 U. S. 552
March 3, 1885, is special and limited in its scope. It purports
to be limited, for it is for the investigation of "certain Indian
depredation claims." Not only is it by these words restricted, but
the meagerness of the appropriation -- $10,000 -- indicates the
narrowness of the investigation intended and the limited number of
claims which were designed to be examined. The claims to be
reported are defined. First, those which "have been approved." This
necessarily limits, so far as this portion of the section is
concerned, the report to those claims presented, considered, and
acted upon by the Interior Department. It refers to what has been,
and not to what may be. It defines and includes not claims which
might thereafter be presented and investigated, but those which at
the date of the act had been finally passed upon and determined by
the Interior Department. There is no possibility of construction
which would open this clause to include any claims other than those
already considered and determined by the department. The other
clause of the section describes "such claims as are pending, but
not yet examined." That either means such claims as have been
already presented, and are before the department for consideration,
or it includes all unallowed claims then existing and not barred.
If the latter was the thought of Congress in this enactment, there
was no need of a division into classes, for the one description of
claims existing would include all, both those allowed and those not
yet examined and allowed, those filed and those not filed. The
obvious intent was not to reach all Indian claims, but to call from
the Interior Department a statement of the claims then before the
department, and upon such presentation to determine its future
action. And the purpose of the second clause in the Act of March 3,
1891, was to take the cases which on March 3, 1885, were pending in
the department, and transfer them in bulk to the Court of
Claims.
It follows, therefore, that this claim, having never been filed
in the department, does not come within the category of claims
provided for in the second clause of the act conferring
jurisdiction upon the court.
It was further insisted in the argument that the claimant
Page 160 U. S. 553
had taken out his first papers at the time of the depredation,
and therefore that when he took out his final papers, citizenship
related back, and he was entitled, for all the benefits of this
act, to claim the privileges of citizenship from the date of his
first papers. But there is nothing in his petition to show when he
took them out, and therefore the contention, if it had any
foundation in law, has none in fact. It is true, mention is made in
the opinion of the Court of Claims of the time of taking out his
first papers, but we cannot act upon any such statement, but must
be governed by the averments of the petition.
We see nothing else in the record which requires comment. The
judgment of the Court of Claims was correct, and it is
Affirmed.
