In an action in which the plaintiff claims title under the Act
of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, granting to the several
states the swamp and overflowed lands in each unfit for
cultivation, and the defendant claims title under the Act of May
15, 1856, c. 28, 11 Stat. 9, making a grant of lands to the State
of Iowa to aid in the construction of railroads, parol evidence is
inadmissible to show, in opposition to the concurrent action of
federal and state officers having authority in the premises, that
the lands its controversy were, in fact at the date of the act of
1850, swamp and overflowed ground.
This writ of error brings up a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Iowa, which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Linn
County, in that state, declaring the defendant in error, who was
the plaintiff in the suit, to be the owner of the southwest quarter
of the northwest quarter of section 19, township 85, range 8 west
of the fifth principal meridian.
It is assigned as error that the judgment of the state court
deprived the defendant of rights secured to him under the laws of
the United States.
The plaintiff, Hayes, claimed title under the Swamp Land Act of
Congress of September 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 519, c. 84, the defendant,
under an Act of Congress approved May 15, 1856, and the acts
amendatory thereof, granting lands to the State of Iowa in aid of
the construction of certain railroads, 11 Stat. 9, c. 28.
The question of title cannot be fully understood without
examining various enactments (federal and state) under which the
parties respectively claim the lands in dispute, as well as some of
the decisions of this Court. We are the more disposed to enter upon
this examination because of the statement by counsel in argument
that many cases in the
Page 159 U. S. 333
supreme court of the state depend in whole or in part on the
determination of the questions involved in this suit.
By the Swamp Land Act of 1850, Congress granted to Arkansas, to
enable it to construct the necessary levees and drains for
reclaiming the swamp and overflowed lands within that state, the
whole of such lands made "unfit thereby for cultivation." § 1.
The act made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to make
out, as soon as practicable after its passage, an accurate list and
plats of those lands, and transmit it to the governor of the state,
and at the request of the latter, to cause a patent to be issued to
the state therefor. "On that patent," the act declared, "the fee
simple to said lands shall vest in the said State of Arkansas,
subject to the disposal of the legislature thereof." § 2. The
required list and plats, it was provided, should include all legal
subdivisions, the greater part of which were wet and unfit for
cultivation, and exclude each subdivision the greater part of which
was not of that character. § 3. The provisions of the act were
extended to and their benefits conferred upon each state in which
swamp and overflowed lands were situated. § 4.
The Legislature of Iowa authorized the commissioner of the state
land office to provide the proofs necessary to secure those lands
to the state. Laws of Iowa, 1850, 1851, p. 169, c. 69.
By a subsequent statute of the state, approved January 13, 1853,
all the swamp and overflowed lands granted to Iowa were granted to
the counties respectively in which they were situated for the
purpose of constructing the necessary levees and drains for
reclaiming the same. If it appeared that any of such lands had been
sold by the United States after the passage of the act of 1850, the
counties in which they lay were authorized to convey to the
purchaser, the county court taking from the purchaser an assignment
of all his rights in the premises, with authority to receive from
the United States the purchase money. Where a county surveyor had
made no examination and report of swamp lands within his county, in
compliance with instructions from the governor, the county court
was directed to appoint a competent person with authority to
examine such lands, and make reports and plats to the
Page 159 U. S. 334
county court, which should transmit lists of the lands in each
of the counties
"in order to procure the proper recognition of the same on the
part of the United States, which lists, after an acknowledgment of
the same by the general government,"
were to be recorded. Laws of Iowa 1852-1853, p. 29, c. 13,
§§ 1-3.
A subsequent act, approved January 25, 1855, authorized the
governor to draw all moneys due or that might become due to the
state, arising from any disposition of its swamp lands by the
government of the United States, to provide for the selection of
the swamp lands of the state, and to secure the title to the same,
and also for the selection, in the name of the state, of other
lands in lieu of such as had been or might thereafter be entered
with warrants, the selections made by organized counties to be
reported by the governor to the authorities at Washington. Laws of
Iowa 1854-1855, p. 261, c. 138.
Such was the legislation -- so far as it need be noticed -- at
the time Congress, by an Act approved May 15, 1856, granted to
Iowa, to aid in the construction of certain lines of railroad in
that state, every alternate section of land, designated by odd
numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said roads, with
liberty to the state to select, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, from the lands of the United States
nearest to the tiers of sections above specified, so much land, in
alternate sections or parts of sections, as should be equal to such
lands as the United States and sold or otherwise appropriated or to
which the rights of preemption had attached at the time the lines
or routes of the respective roads were definitely fixed, the land
so located to be in no case further than fifteen miles from the
lines of the roads. But the act expressly exempted from its
operation, and reserved to the United States, any and all lands
theretofore reserved by any act of Congress, or in any manner by
competent authority, for the purpose of aiding in any object of
internal improvement, or for any other purpose whatsoever, except
so far as it was found necessary to locate the routes of the
railroads through such reserved lands, in which case the right
of
Page 159 U. S. 335
way only was granted, subject to the approval of the President
of the United States. 11 Stat. 9, c. 28.
The next enactment in point of time was the act of Congress
approved March 3, 1857, 11 Stat. 251, c. 117, providing that the
selection of swamp and overflowed lands granted to the several
states by the Swamp Land Act and by the Act of March 2, 1849,
giving aid to the State of Louisiana in draining the swamp lands
within its limits, and theretofore reported to the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, so far as such lands remained vacant and
unappropriated and were not interfered with by an actual settlement
under any existing law of the United States,
"be and the same are hereby confirmed, and shall be approved and
patented to the said several states in conformity with the
provisions of the act aforesaid, as soon as may be practicable
after the passage of this law."
The trust conferred upon Iowa by the Act of Congress of May 15,
1856, was accepted by the state by an Act approved March 26, 1860,
and by the latter act, so much of the lands, interests, rights,
powers, and privileges as were granted by Congress in aid of the
construction of a railroad from Lyons City northwesterly to a point
of intersection with the main line of the Iowa Central Air Line
Railroad, near Maquoketa, thence on said main line running as near
as practicable to the forty-second parallel across the state to the
Missouri River, were granted and conferred upon the Cedar Rapids
and Missouri River Railroad Company, an Iowa corporation. Laws of
Iowa 1860, p. 40, c. 37.
By an act of Congress approved March 12, 1860, it was provided
that the selection to be made from lands then already surveyed in
each of the states under the authority of the Swamp Land Act of
1850 and of the Act approved March 2, 1849, to aid Louisiana in
draining the swamp lands therein,
"shall be made within two years from the adjournment of the
legislature of each state at its next session after the date of
this act, and, as to all lands hereafter to be surveyed, within two
years from such adjournment at the next session, after notice by
the Secretary of the Interior to the governor of the
Page 159 U. S. 336
state that the surveys have been selected and confirmed."
12 Stat. 3, c. 5.
At the trial in the district court, the plaintiff introduced
witnesses having more or less knowledge of the land in dispute.
Their evidence, it is claimed, showed that at and ever since the
passage of the act of 1850, this land was, within the meaning of
that act, swamp and overflowed land.
The parties stipulated that the land in controversy was
seventeen miles in a direct line from the Cedar Rapids and Missouri
River Railroad (now the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad) as
constructed, built, and operated; that the railway was built,
constructed, and was being operated on the present line of the
latter road, for a distance of about one hundred miles west of
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on and prior to the second day of June, 1864,
and that the assessed value of the land in controversy for each and
every year since 1866 to the present time, as returned by the
assessor, as shown by his assessment books, is $95.
The
northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of
section 19, township 85, range 8, was selected as swamp and
overflowed land.
The land here in dispute is the
southwest quarter of
the northwest quarter of the
same section, township, and
range, and is covered by a quitclaim deed to Hayes, acknowledged
September 4, 1888, from the supervisors of Linn County, State of
Iowa, the consideration recited being one dollar.
The present suit was commenced within a few days after the
making of that deed.
The defendant's witnesses stated facts tending to show that the
land in controversy was not and never was swamp or overflowed
land.
He introduced in evidence a list of lands, aggregating 1,809
acres, certified as having been granted by Congress to Iowa for the
Iowa Air Line Railroad, afterwards the Cedar Rapids and Missouri
River Railroad. This list designated lands within the six-mile
limit,
and included the land in controversy, was signed by
the Commissioner of the General Land
Page 159 U. S. 337
Office December 23, 1858, and approved by the Secretary of the
Interior December 27, 1858.
The defendant read in evidence a list of lands in Linn
County, aggregating 668 acres, certified and approved in 1881
to the state by the Secretary of the Interior, under the
Act of May 15, 1856,
as having inured to the Cedar Rapids and
Missouri River Railroad Company. This list included the land in
suit, was in the form required by the Iowa statutes, and was
signed by the governor and register of the state land office.
He also read in evidence a deed dated March, 1870, from the
Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad Company to the Iowa
Railroad Land Company, and also a deed to him from the Iowa
Railroad Land Company, dated October 30, 1885 -- both deeds
covering the land in dispute.
It appears that the parties made the following stipulation,
which was read in evidence by the defendant, to-wit:
"In order to avoid the introduction of evidence upon the subject
hereinafter mentioned, it is stipulated and agreed by and between
the parties that the County of Linn, prior to 1875, made selections
of swamp lands as shown by the records of the register of the state
land office, which selections so made embrace certain tracts in
section 19, township 85, range 8, in Linn County, and among them
the
northwest quarter of northwest quarter and the
south
east quarter of the northwest quarter of said
above-named section. The said selections so made, or a copy
thereof, are on file in the Secretary of State's office in the
State of Iowa, and that the tract in controversy [the
southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of the same
section]
was not included in any such selections, and
that, so far as shown by any record of the state or county, the
tract in controversy has never been patented to the state nor by
the state to the county."
It was also proven by the defendant that the Cedar Rapids and
Missouri River Railroad Company and the Iowa Railroad Land Company
and himself had annually paid the state, county, and other taxes
assessed and levied on said land from 1866 to 1888, both
inclusive.
Page 159 U. S. 338
Each party objected to the evidence introduced by the other on
the ground of incompetency.
This was the case on which the district court gave judgment
establishing and quieting the plaintiff's title.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Undoubtedly the certification to the state by the Department of
the Interior of the lands in controversy, under the railroad Act of
May 15, 1856, as having inured to the Cedar Rapids and Missouri
River Railroad Company, was unauthorized by law if the lands at the
date of the Swamp Land Act of 1850 were swamp and overflowed lands,
whereby they were unfit for cultivation, for lands of that
character were expressly reserved from the operation of the
railroad grant of 1856. If they were not granted to the state for
the benefit of the railroad company, because previously granted to
the state as swamp and overflowed lands, they could not be legally
certified or transferred to the state to be applied in aid of the
construction of the railroad.
This is made clear by the decision in
Railroad
Company v. Fremont County, 9 Wall. 89,
76 U. S.
94-95.
That was a suit in equity to quiet the title to a tract of land
in Iowa, both parties claiming under grants by Congress -- the
plaintiff, County of Fremont under what is known as the "Swamp Land
Act of 1850;" the railroad company under the above Act of Congress
of May 15, 1856, granting lands to Iowa to aid in the construction
of railroads. After referring to that part of the act reserving
from its operation any and all lands theretofore reserved to the
United States by any act of Congress or in any manner by competent
authority for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal
improvement, or for any other purpose whatever, the Court, among
other things, said:
"These reservations clearly embrace the
Page 159 U. S. 339
previous grant of the swamp and overflowed lands for the purpose
of enabling the states to redeem them and fit them for cultivation
by levees and drains. At the time of the passage of this act [May
15, 1856], a moiety of the lands in controversy had been selected
and reported to the Land Department, and the authorities of the
state, under instructions from that department, were engaged in the
selection of the remainder. The lands already selected and returned
had been withdrawn from sale, and were not in the market at the
time of the passage of the act, and as soon as the remaining lists
were returned, which was January 21, 1857, they were also withdrawn
from the market. In the language of the railroad act, the whole of
the lands in controversy were 'otherwise appropriated,' and were
'reserved' for the purpose of aiding the states in their objects of
internal improvements."
Many decisions of this Court are to the same effect.
The controlling question, therefore, in this case, so far as the
plaintiff is concerned -- and he must recover upon the strength of
his own title even if that of the defendant be defective -- is
whether, under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the
particular lands in controversy, in the absence of any selection
and certification of them by the United States to the state under
the Swamp Land Act, can be shown by parol testimony to have been in
fact, at the date of the act, swamp and overflowed lands. Congress
having made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to make
out accurate lists and plats of the lands embraced by the Swamp
Land Act and transmit the same to the governor of the state, and at
the request of the latter, to cause a patent to be issued to the
state therefor, and having provided that "on that patent the fee
simple to said lands shall vest in said state subject to the
disposal of the legislature thereof," did the title vest in the
state by virtue alone and immediately upon the passage of the act,
without any selection by or under the direction of the Department
of the Interior, so that the state's grantees could maintain an
action to recover the possession of them?
At the term of the court at which Burlington and
Railroad
Company
Page 159 U. S. 340
v. Fremont County was determined, the case of
Railroad Company v.
Smith, 9 Wall. 95, was decided. The latter case was
ejectment by a railroad company to recover certain lands in
Missouri. It deduced title from an Act of Congress approved June
10, 1852, granting public lands to the state to aid in the
construction of certain railroads. The state accepted the grant and
by statute vested in the railroad company the lands so granted,
without any description of their boundaries. The defendant Smith,
asserting title under the Swamp Land Act, introduced parol evidence
tending to show that, at the date of that act, the lands in dispute
were in fact wet and unfit for cultivation, and therefore were to
be deemed swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning of the act
of Congress. It was admitted that the title had vested in the
railroad company unless the land was of the class that was reserved
by the above act of 1852, which in that respect was similar to the
act of 1856 granting lands to Iowa to aid in the construction of
railroads. The court held this evidence to be competent.
Mr. Justice Clifford did not concur in the judgment of the
Court, being of opinion that, as special power was conferred upon
the Secretary of the Interior to make out an accurate list and
plats of the lands, it was quite clear that a jury was no more
competent to ascertain and determine whether a particular
subdivision should be included or excluded from the list and plats
required to be made under that section than they would be to make
the list and plats during the trial of a case involving the
question of title, and that courts and juries were not empowered to
make the required list and plats, nor determine what particular
lands shall be included in the list and plats before they were
prepared by the officer designated by law to perform that duty;
otherwise, he said, the states could select for themselves, and, if
their title was questioned by the United States or by individuals,
they could claim of right that the matter should be determined by
jury.
The next case is that of
French v. Fyan, 93 U. S.
169,
93 U. S. 172.
That was also ejectment, and the question was whether,
Page 159 U. S. 341
as against a patent for the lands there in controversy, issued
by the United States to Missouri under the Swamp Land Act of 1850,
it was competent to show by parol testimony that the lands so
patented were not in fact swamp and overflowed lands within the
meaning of the act. In that case, the plaintiff, by purchase in
1872, became vested with such title as had passed in 1854 to the
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company under the act granting lands to
aid that corporation in the construction of its road. The defendant
based his claim on a patent issued by the United States in 1857
under the Swamp Land Act of 1850. It thus appeared on the face of
the papers -- treating the grant by the Swamp Land Act as one
in praesenti and any patent issued under it, no matter
when issued, as relating to the date of the grant -- that the
better title was with the defendant, because the grant under which
the railroad company claimed was not made until after the passage
of the Swamp Land Act. In this view, the question arose whether, in
an action at law in which these evidence of title came in conflict,
parol testimony could be admitted that the land was never in fact
swamp and overflowed, and in that way collaterally impeach the
patent issued to the state under the act of 1850.
In considering that question, the Court in French v. Fyan
reaffirmed the general doctrine (to which there are some recognized
exceptions, not important to be here stated) that, when the law has
confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear and determine
certain matters arising in the course of its duties, the decision
of that tribunal, within the scope of its authority, was conclusive
upon all others. Speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, who delivered the
opinion in the previous case of
Railroad Co. v. Smith, the
Court in
French v. Fyan said:
"We see nothing in the case before us to take it out of the
operation of that rule, and we are of opinion that in this action
at law it would be a departure from sound principle, and contrary
to well considered judgment in this Court and in others of high
authority, to permit the validity of the patent to the state to be
subjected to the test of the verdict of a jury on such oral
testimony as might be brought
Page 159 U. S. 342
before it. It would be substituting the jury, or the court
sitting as a jury, for the tribunal which Congress had provided to
determine the question, and would be making a patent of the United
States a cheap and unstable reliance as a title for lands which it
purported to convey."
In the argument of
French v. Fyan, great reliance was
placed by the counsel on
Railroad Co. v. Smith, above
cited, in which, as we have seen, parol evidence was held to be
competent to prove that a particular piece of land was swamp and
overflowed land within the meaning of the act of Congress. Upon
this point, the Court in
French v. Fyan said:
"But a careful examination will show that it was done with
hesitation, and with some dissent in the Court. The admission was
placed expressly on the ground that the Secretary of the Interior
had neglected or refused to do his duty; that he had made
no
selection or lists whatever, and would issue no patents,
although many years had elapsed since the passage of the act. The
Court said:"
"The matter to be shown is one of observation and examination.
Whether arising before the Secretary, whose duty it was primarily
to decide it, or before the court, whose duty it became, because
the Secretary had failed to do it, this was clearly the best
evidence to be had, and was sufficient for the purpose."
"There was no means, as this Court has decided, to compel him to
act, and if the party claiming under the state in that case could
not be permitted to prove that the land which the state had
conveyed to him as swamp land was in fact such, a total failure of
justice would occur, and the entire grant to the state might be
defeated by this neglect or refusal of the secretary to perform his
duty.
Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall.
347;
Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9
Wall. 298;
Litchfield v. Register and
Receiver, 9 Wall. 575. There is in this no conflict
with what we decide in the present case, but, on the contrary, the
strongest implication that if, in that case, the Secretary
had
made any decision, the evidence would have been excluded."
The same general question arose, under somewhat different
circumstances, in
Ehrhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S.
67,
115 U. S. 69
Page 159 U. S. 343
which was an action to recover possession of a tract of land in
California, the plaintiff deraigning title through a conveyance by
one to whom the United States had issued a patent in 1875, the
defendant contending that the lands in controversy, although
covered by the above patent, were in fact lands that passed to the
state under the Swamp Land Act of 1850. The question was whether
the defendant, who did not connect himself in any way with the
title, and was a mere intruder without color of title, could be
admitted to show by parol evidence that the lands were in fact
swamp and overflowed. The Court said:
"In that case [
French v. Fyan, 93 U. S.
169], evidence to show that the land covered by a patent
to Missouri under the act was not swamp and overflowed land was
held to be inadmissible. On the same principle, parol testimony to
show that the land covered by a patent of the United States to a
settler under the preemption laws was such swamp and overflowed
land must be held to be inadmissible to defeat the patent. It is
the duty of the Land Department, of which the secretary is the
head, to determine whether land patented to a settler is of the
class subject to settlement under the preemption laws, and his
judgment as to this fact is not open to contestation in an action
at law by a mere intruder without title. As was said in the case
cited of the patent to the state, it may be said in this case, of
the patent to the preemptioner, it would be a departure from sound
principle and contrary to well considered judgment of this Court to
permit in such action the validity of the patent to be subjected to
the test of the verdict of a jury on oral testimony."
It is supposed by counsel that the principles were modified in
Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488,
121 U. S.
511-512,
121 U. S. 518;
but such is not the fact. In that case, the plaintiff sued to
recover possession of a tract of land in California. He asserted
title under that act, claiming by conveyance from parties who had
purchased from the state, the defendants under patents of the
United States issued under the preemption laws to them or to
parties from whom they derived their interest. The particular point
to which the court directed its attention was whether an action
could be maintained upon the title to swamp
Page 159 U. S. 344
and overflowed lands
in California until they had been
certified as such pursuant to the fourth section of the Act of
Congress of July 23, 1886, entitled "An act to quiet land titles in
California." In determining that question, it became necessary to
examine the course of legislation and of judicial decision under
the Swamp Land Act of 1850. Referring to the Act of July 23, 1866,
14 Stat. 218, c. 219, the Court said that
"Congress changed the provisions of law for the identification
of swamp and overflowed lands
in that state. It no longer left
their identification to the Secretary of the Interior, but
provided for such identification by the joint action of the state
and federal authorities."
That act, the Court said, tended to remove the uncertainty and
confusion which prevailed in relation to land titles in that
state,
"principally by recognizing the action of the state in disposing
of the lands granted to her, in cases where such disposition was
made to parties in good faith, and did not interfere with
previously acquired interests, and by providing a mode for
identifying the swamp and overflowed lands in the future without
the action of the Secretary of the Interior."
It appeared in proof that the lands there in controversy had
been segregated as swamp and overflowed lands by the authorities of
the State of California; that their designation as such lands on a
plat of the township made by the Surveyor General of the United
States was approved by that officer, and forwarded to the General
Land Office, pursuant to the act of 1886, and that such plat was
approved by the commissioner, as shown by its official use of it.
"The act of Congress," that Court said,
"intended that the segregation maps prepared by authority of the
state, and filed in the state Surveyor General's office, if found
upon examination by the United States Surveyor General to be made
in accordance with the public surveys of the general government,
should be taken as evidence that the lands designated thereon as
swamp and overflowed were such in fact except where this would
interfere with previously acquired interests."
So far from modifying the rule announced in
French v.
Fyan, the Court recognized the authority of that case, and
distinguished it from the one then under consideration.
Page 159 U. S. 345
In
Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573,
138 U. S. 585,
the Court held that the decision of the Land Department on the
question whether lands were swamp and overflowed within the meaning
of the act of 1850 was the decision of a fact which, in the absence
of fraud or imposition, was conclusive upon the courts.
The latest case in this Court upon the general question before
us is
Chandler v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co.,
149 U. S. 79,
149 U. S. 88-89,
149 U. S. 92.
The action was ejectment, each party holding a conveyance from the
State of Michigan, that to the plaintiff Chandler having been made
many years subsequent to the one made to the defendant. The
plaintiff claimed that the premises in controversy were a part of
the swamp and overflowed lands granted to the state by the Act of
September 28, 1850, and were patented to him by the state on the 3d
day of November, 1887, whereby he acquired a title to the same
superior to that attempted to be passed to the defendant by the
prior patent, based on an act of Congress of August 26, 1852,
granting public lands to Michigan to aid in the construction of a
ship canal around the Falls of St. Mary. There was proof showing
that the state and the Interior Department made a selection of
lands under the Swamp Land Act, and that the lands there in
controversy were not embraced in such selection, nor in the patent
to the state for them. The defendant contended that this action of
the state and of the Interior Department was a determination that
the particular land in dispute was not covered by the act of 1850,
and, it having been selected and certified to the state under the
act of 1852, was a determination that it was included in the canal
grant, and that this determination could not be collaterally
attacked in an action at law. Referring to
Railroad Company v.
Smith, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, after
observing that the converse of the situation existing in that case
was presented in the case then before it, said:
"But aside from this, the rule as to oral evidence recognized in
that case was afterwards explained, and limited in its operation to
cases in which there had been nonaction or refusal to act on the
part of the Secretary of the Interior in selecting lands granted,
as appears in the subsequent cases of
French v.
Fyan, 93
Page 159 U. S. 346
U.S. 169, 173, and
Ehrhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S.
67,
115 U. S. 69, where parol
evidence was offered to show that patented lands were not of the
character described."
After examining
French v. Fyan and
Ehrhardt v.
Hogaboom, above cited, and stating that nothing said or
involved in
Wright v. Roseberry was in conflict with the
rulings in those cases, the Court proceeded:
"Under the principle announced in that case, and under the
foregoing facts in the present case, it would seem that there had
been such affirmative action on the part of the Secretary of the
Interior in identifying the lands in this particular township,
containing the lands in controversy, as would amount to an
identification of the lands therein, which pass to the state by the
swamp land grant, and that the selection by the State of the
demanded premises under the canal grant of 1852, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior, and the certification of the
department to the state that they were covered by the latter grant,
may well be considered such an adjudication of the question as
should exclude the introduction of parol evidence to contradict it.
The exclusion of the land in dispute from the swamp lands selected
and patented to the state, and its inclusion in the selection of
the state as land coming within the grant of 1852, with the
approval of such selection by the Interior Department and the
certification thereof to the state, operated to pass the title
thereto as completely as could have been done by formal patent,
Frasher v. O'Connor, 115 U. S. 102, and, being
followed by the state's conveyance to the canal company, presented
such official action and such documentary evidence of title as
should not be open to question by parol testimony in an action at
law. Under the facts of this case, we are of opinion that the
plaintiff in error could not properly establish by oral evidence
that the land in dispute was in fact swamp land for the purpose of
contradicting and invalidating the department's certification
thereof to the state and the latter's patent to the canal
company."
To this review of the former decisions of this Court but little
need be added. The case before us is not like that of
Railroad
Company v. Smith, in which, as subsequently
Page 159 U. S. 347
explained in
French v. Fyan, it was shown that there
was an absolute neglect of duty on the part of the Interior
Department, in that it neither made nor would make any selection or
lists whatever, and therefore there was no action by that
department that could be relied on as a determination of the
question whether the particular lands then in dispute were or were
not embraced by the Swamp Land Act. That case was exceptional in
its circumstances, and seemed to justify the decision rendered, in
order to prevent a total failure of justice, arising from the
unexplained neglect of the Land Department to perform the duty
imposed by the act of 1850. What was said in
French v.
Fyan shows that this Court not only so regarded the previous
case, but it was in effect said that the ruling in
Railroad
Company v. Smith was not to be extended to any case in which
the Land Department had taken action or made a decision or
determination under the Swamp Land Act.
In the case now before us, the selection by Linn County, grantee
of the state, prior to 1875, of swamp and overflowed lands in the
very section of which the lands in dispute formed a part, without
including the latter in such selection, together with the
acquiescence in that selection by the Interior Department, and the
selection by or under the direction of the Secretary of the
Interior, and their certification to the state -- first in 1858 and
again in 1881 -- of the lands in dispute as lands inuring under the
Act of Congress of May 15, 1856, to the Cedar Rapids and Missouri
River Railroad Company, and therefore not lands embraced by the act
of 1850, constituted a determination, based on "observation and
examination," that the lands here in dispute were not swamp and
overflowed, and therefore had not been reserved or appropriated,
prior to the date of the railroad land grant act, but passed, as
the Secretary of the Interior certified to the state, for the
purposes named in the railroad act. Twice the Land Department
certified these lands to the state as inuring to it under the
railroad land grant act, and it does not appear that the state has
ever questioned the correctness of that certification, or applied
to the Secretary of the Interior for a reexamination
Page 159 U. S. 348
as to the character of the lands. Nor did the County of Linn, so
far as the record shows, ever contend that these lands belonged to
it, under the act of 1850, as the grantee of the state, until its
board of supervisors, for the consideration of $50 (their deed,
however, reciting one dollar as the consideration), sold them to
the plaintiff, taking his promissory note for the price. This was
in 1888, a few days before this suit was brought, and more than
thirty years after the Secretary of the Interior first certified
them to the state as railroad grant lands.
We are of opinion that this case comes within the ruling of
previous cases, particularly
Chandler v. Mining Company
and
French v. Fyan.
Upon the authority of former adjudications, as well as upon
principle, it must be held that parol evidence is inadmissible to
show, in opposition to the concurrent action of federal and state
officers having authority in the premises, that these lands were in
fact at the date of the act 1850, swamp and overflowed grounds,
which should have been embraced by Linn County in its selection of
land of that character, and withheld from the state as lands
granted expressly in aid of railroad construction within its
limits.
The plaintiff was not entitled to the relief asked, and, as the
case was tried by the court, judgment should have been rendered for
the defendant.
As the court below did not proceed upon the grounds we have
stated to be proper, and as its judgment deprived the defendant of
rights secured by the laws and exercised under the authority of the
United States, that judgment must be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
