The measure of damages for the purpose of jurisdiction, in an
action against the grantor of real estate on the warranty of title
in his deed of conveyance, is the purchase money paid with
interest.
The plaintiff below, defendant in error, bought in 1881 from the
defendant below, with full warranty, a tract of land, the purchase
price of which was $1,200. In 1886, one Thomas Hugh sued to recover
the land in question, averring that he had a superior title to that
which had been purchased and conveyed as above stated. This action
culminated in a final judgment, ousting the defendant therein from
the property. The plaintiff here, who was defendant in the suit in
ejectment, then brought this suit in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Nebraska, to recover the sum of
$6,342.40 and costs. The alleged cause of action was the sale,
Page 156 U. S. 329
the warranty, and the eviction, and the sum above mentioned was
laid as the amount of damages claimed. The defendant demurred on
the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the
action
"for that it appears on the face of said amended petition that
the amount in controversy herein between the plaintiff and
defendant, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed the sum
and value of $2,000."
A plea was subsequently filed, but by order of the court was
stricken from the record. The demurrer was overruled. After answer
filed, the case was submitted to the court without the intervention
of a jury; judgment was thereupon rendered for the plaintiff in the
sum of $1,030, and the defendant brought the case here by
error.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The only error complained of here is the absolute want of
jurisdiction in the court below, which it is asserted is apparent
on the face of the record. The argument is that the matter in
dispute did not exceed $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
hence the alleged want of jurisdiction. The demand of the plaintiff
was for damages in the sum of $6,000. This was the principal
controversy. It is insisted, however, that as, under the law of
Nebraska, damages in case of eviction involved responsibility only
for the return of the price, with interest thereon, and the price
here was only $1,200, the sum in controversy could not exceed
$2,000, exclusive of interest -- that is to say, as the measure of
the damage was price and interest, the price being below $2,000,
the jurisdictional amount could not be arrived at by adding the
interest to the price. This contention overlooks the elementary
distinction between interest as such and the use of an interest
calculation as an instrumentality in arriving at the amount of
damages to be awarded on the principal demand. As we have said,
the
Page 156 U. S. 330
recovery sought was not the price and interest thereon, but the
sum of the damage resulting from eviction. All such damage was
therefore the principal demand in controversy, although interest
and price and other things may have constituted some of the
elements entering into the legal unit, the damage which the party
was entitled to recover. Whether, therefore, the court below
considered the interest as an instrument or means for ascertaining
the amount of the principal demand is wholly immaterial, provided
the principal demand as made and ascertained was within the
jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, the confusion of thought which
the assertion of want of jurisdiction involves is a failure to
distinguish between a principal and an accessory demand. The sum of
the principal demand determines the question of jurisdiction. The
accessory or the interest demand cannot be computed for
jurisdictional purposes. Here, the entire damage claimed was the
principal demand, without reference to the constituent elements
entering therein. This demand was predicated on a distinct cause of
action -- eviction from the property bought. Thus considered, the
attack on the jurisdiction is manifestly unsound, since its premise
is that a sum, which was an essential ingredient in the one
principal claim, should be segregated therefrom, and be considered
as a mere accessory thereto.
Judgment affirmed.
