It is for the Supreme Court of the Virginia to construe the
statute of that state which provides that
"any person duly authorized and practicing as counsel or
attorney at law in any state or Territory of the United States or
in the District of Columbia may practice as such in the courts of
this state,"
and to determine whether the word "person," as therein used, is
confined to males, and whether women are admitted to practice law
in that Commonwealth.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an application by Belva A. Lockwood for leave to file a
petition for a mandamus requiring the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia to admit her to practice law in that court. Mrs. Lockwood
has been for many years a member of the bar of this Court, and of
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and also, she avers,
of the bars of several states of the Union. Her complaint is that
she recently applied to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to
be admitted to the practice of law in that court, and the court
denied her application notwithstanding it is provided by a statute
of that state that
"any person duly authorized and practicing as counsel or
attorney at law in any state or territory of the United States or
in the District of Columbia may practice as such in the courts of
this state."
Code Va. 1887, § 3192, and she alleges that the only reason
for the rejection of her application was that she is a woman. It
appears that no record was made of the refusal complained of, but
she
Page 154 U. S. 117
presents a certificate of the clerk of that court to the effect
that the application was made and rejected, though "no order was
made at the time." Nothing is stated in the papers before us as to
the residence of petitioner, whether in the District of Columbia or
in some other state than the State of Virginia. Our interposition
seems to be invoked upon the ground that petitioner has been denied
a privilege or immunity belonging to her as a citizen of the United
States, and enjoyed by the women of Virginia, in contravention of
the second section of Article IV of the Constitution and of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In
Minor v.
Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, this Court held that the
word "citizen" is often used to convey the idea of membership in a
nation, and, in that sense, women, if born of citizen parents
within the jurisdiction of the United States, have always been
considered citizens of the United States, as much so before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution as since,
but that the right of suffrage was not necessarily one of the
privileges or immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that amendment did not add to these
privileges and immunities. Hence, that a provision in a state
constitution which confined the right of voting to male citizens of
the United States was no violation of the federal Constitution.
In
Bradwell v.
State, 16 Wall. 130, it was held that the right to
practice law in the state courts was not a privilege or immunity of
a citizen of the United States; that the right to control and
regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a
state is one of those powers that was not transferred for its
protection to the federal government, and its exercise is in no
manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States
in the party seeking such license.
Section 3192 of the Code of Virginia, quoted in this
application, is one of 12 sections constituting chapter 154 of that
Code, entitled, "Of Attorneys at Law Generally." Section 3193
reads:
"Every such person shall produce, before each court in which he
intends to practice, satisfactory evidence
Page 154 U. S. 118
of his being so licensed or authorized, and take an oath that he
will honestly demean himself in the practice of the law, and to the
best of his ability execute his office of attorney at law, and
also, when he is licensed in this state, take the oath of fidelity
to the commonwealth."
It was for the Supreme Court of Appeals to construe the statute
of Virginia in question and to determine whether the word "person"
as therein used is confined to males, and whether women are
admitted to practice law in that commonwealth.
Leave denied.