This Court has jurisdiction over a decision of a state court
that a statute of the state compelling the removal of grade
crossings on a railroad is constitutional and a judgment in
accordance therewith enforcing the provisions of the statute.
The Act of the legislature of the Connecticut relating to
railway grade crossings, Act of June 19, 1889, c. 220, Laws 1889,
134, being directed to the extinction of grade crossings as a
menace to public safety is a proper exercise of the police power of
the state.
A power reserved by a statute of a state to its legislature to
alter, amend, or repeal a charter of a railroad corporation
authorizes the legislature to make any alteration or amendment of a
charter granted subject to that power, which will not defeat or
substantially impair the object of the grant or any rights vested
under it.
Railroad corporations are subject to such legislative control as
may be necessary to protect the public against danger, injustice,
or oppression, and this control may be exercised through a board of
commissioners. There is no unjust discrimination and no denial of
the equal protection of the laws in regulations regarding railroads
which are applicable to all railroads alike.
The imposition upon a railroad corporation of the entire expense
of a change of grade at a highway crossing does no violation to the
Constitution of the United States if the statute imposing it
provides for an ascertainment of the result in a mode suited to the
nature of the case.
By section 1 of an Act of the legislature of Connecticut
approved June 19, 1889, entitled "An act relating to grade
crossings," Pub.Laws Conn. 1889, c. 220, p. 134, it was
provided:
"The selectmen of any town, the mayor and common council of any
city, the warden and burgesses of any borough within which a
highway crosses or is crossed by a railroad, or the directors of
any railroad company whose road crosses or is crossed by a highway
may bring their petition in writing to the railroad commissioners
therein alleging that public safety requires an alteration in such
crossing, its approaches, the
Page 151 U. S. 557
method of crossing, the location of the highway or crossing, the
closing of a highway crossing and the substitution of another
therefor, not at grade, or the removal of obstructions to the sight
of such crossing, and praying that the same may be ordered;
whereupon the railroad commissioners shall appoint a time and place
for hearing the petition, and shall give such notice thereof as
they judge reasonable to said petitioner, the railroad company, the
municipalities in which such crossing is situated, and to the
owners of the land adjoining such crossing and adjoining that part
of the highway to be changed in grade, and after such notice and
hearing, said commissioners shall determine what alterations,
changes, or removals, if any, shall be made and by whom done, and
if the aforesaid petition is brought by the directors of any
railroad company, or in behalf of any railroad company, they shall
order the expense of such alterations or removals, including the
damages to any person whose land is taken, and the special damages
which the owner of any land adjoining the public highway shall
sustain by reason of any change in the grade of such highway in
consequence of any change, alteration, or removal ordered under the
authority of this act to be paid by the railroad company owning or
operating the railroad in whose behalf the petition is brought, and
in case said petition is brought by the selectmen of any town, the
mayor and common council of any city, or the warden and burgesses
of any borough, they may, if the highway affected by said
determination was in existence when the railroad was constructed
over it at grade, or if the layout of the highway was changed for
the benefit of the railroad after the layout of the railroad, order
an amount not exceeding one-quarter of the whole expense of such
alteration, change, or removal, including the damages, as
aforesaid, to be paid by the town, city, or borough in whose behalf
the petition is brought, and the remainder of the expense shall be
paid by the railroad company owning or operating the road which
crosses such public highway; if, however, the highway affected by
such order, last mentioned, has been constructed since the railroad
which it crosses at grade, the railroad commissioners may order an
amount not exceeding one-half of the whole
Page 151 U. S. 559
expense of such alteration, change, or removal, including the
damages, as aforesaid, to be paid by the town, city, or borough in
whose behalf the application is brought, and the remainder of the
expense shall be paid by the railroad company owning or operating
the road which crosses such public highway. The directors of every
railroad company which operates a railroad in this state shall
remove or apply for the removal of at least one grade crossing each
year for every sixty miles of road operated by it in this state,
which crossings, so to be removed, shall be those which in the
opinion of said directors are among the most dangerous ones upon
the lines operated by it, and if the directors of any railroad
company fail so to do, the railroad commissioners shall, if in
their opinion the financial condition"
of the company will warrant, order such crossing or crossings
removed as in their opinion the said directors should have applied
for the removal of under the above provisions, and the railroad
commissioners in so doing shall proceed in all respects as to
method of procedure and assessment of expense as if the said
directors had voluntarily applied therefor.
Section 2 related to alterations of highways, one-fourth of the
expense of which was to be paid by the state. Appeal from any
decision of the commissioners under the act was specifically
provided for.
On September 2, 1890, the railroad commissioners of the State of
Connecticut made an order reciting that whereas the directors of
the New York & New England Railroad Company had failed to
remove or apply for the removal during the year ending August 1,
1890, of any grade crossing of a highway which crossed or was
crossed by their railroad, and whereas, in their opinion, said
directors should have applied for the removal of the grade crossing
of their road and the highway known as "Main Street," in the Town
of Bristol, and directing a hearing upon the matter, with notice to
the railroad company, the town, and the owners of land adjoining
that portion of the highway. The hearing was had on several days,
from September 24, 1890, to February 11, 1891, and the
commissioners, being of opinion that the financial condition
Page 151 U. S. 559
of the company warranted the order, and that public safety
required it, ordered the crossing removed, and determined and
directed the alterations, changes, and removals to be made and
done, and that they be executed by the railroad company at its sole
expense, including damages occasioned thereby. The company appealed
from this order to the Superior Court of the County of Hartford,
the petition for appeal setting forth various grounds therefor,
which, by voluntary amendment and by direction of the court, were
reduced to these:
"1. On the second day of March, 1891, the railroad commissioners
of this state made an order to said company, requiring the removal
of the grade crossing of its railroad in Main Street in the Town of
Bristol, a full copy of which, marked 'Exhibit A,' is to be annexed
hereto and filed herewith."
"1
a. Said company is not, and at the date of said order
was not, of sufficient ability to execute the work of making the
changes required by said order, and its financial condition does
not, and did not then, warrant the making of such an order."
"11. Said company cannot meet the expenses of executing the said
order of the railroad commissioners, and have enough income left to
pay its fixed charges, including interest on its bonds issued as
aforesaid and outstanding, and the dividends on its preferred stock
issued as aforesaid, and maintain its railroad in good and proper
condition."
"12. If the law under which the proceedings were had, as set
forth in said order, justifies said order, then it and said law are
void as violating both the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Connecticut in that said order
impairs the obligation of the contracts made by said company with
the holders of its bonds and preferred stock, by making it
impossible for said company to pay the interest on their bonds and
dividends on their preferred stock as agreed between them and said
company, and yet maintain and operate its railroad efficiently,
and, further, in that it takes the property of said company without
just compensation and without due process of law, and denies to it
the equal protection of the laws. "
Page 151 U. S. 560
"16. Said order, herein appealed from, was not an order
necessary for the safety of the public."
"17. Said order should have been so made, and proceedings
leading up thereto had, if at all, under section 2 of the act of
1889, as that one-quarter of the expense of its execution should be
paid by the state."
Paragraph 1
a was substituted for paragraphs 2 to 10,
inclusive, struck out by the court as mere statements of
evidence.
The court, upon hearing the parties -- the evidence not being
preserved in the record, but it appearing that evidence was adduced
by the company as to its earnings, expenses, and property -- made
findings of fact that the railroad company was of sufficient
ability to execute, and that the financial condition of the company
warranted, the order of the commissioners for the removal of the
grade crossing in question; that the crossing was among the most
dangerous upon the line of the railroad, and that the safety of the
public required its removal, and affirmed the order appealed from.
Thereupon the company prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut and assigned various errors to the rulings of
the superior court in amendment of the petition on appeal, and in
the exclusion and admission of evidence, and afterwards amended its
reasons for appeal by adding the following:
"8. Because the court erred in holding that the statute under
which said proceedings were had, as set forth in said order of the
railroad commissioners, justified said order instead of holding
that it was no law, because contrary to the constitution of this
state in that it takes the property of the plaintiff without just
compensation and without due process of law."
"9. Because the court erred in holding that the statute under
which said proceedings were had, as set forth in said order of the
railroad commissioners, justified said order, and in therefore
affirming said order, and overruling the plaintiff's claim that
said statute was void as violating the Constitution of the United
States in that it impaired the obligation of the contracts made by
said company with the holders of its bonds and preferred stock, by
making it impossible for said company
Page 151 U. S. 561
to pay the interest on its bonds and dividends on its preferred
stock as agreed between them and said company, and yet maintain and
operate its railroad efficiently, and further in that it took the
property of said company without due process of law and denied to
it the equal protection of the law."
"10. Because the court erred in overruling the claim of the
plaintiff, in the twelfth paragraph of its petition of appeal, that
said statute was void, and was no justification of said order,
under the Constitution of the United States and the Fourteenth
Amendment thereof."
"11. Because the judgment does not meet the issues. There is no
general finding of the issues against the plaintiff, and no finding
as to issues raised in paragraphs 11 and 17."
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut decided that there
was no error in the judgment appealed from, 62 Conn. 527, and
thereupon a writ of error was allowed to this Court and errors
assigned as follows:
"1. The said court erred in holding that the statute under which
were had the proceedings as set forth in the order of the railroad
commissioners exemplified in the record of the case justified said
order, and in affirming the judgment of the superior court in and
for Hartford County affirming said order, and in overruling
plaintiff's claim that said statute was void as violating the
Constitution of the United States in that it impaired the
obligation of the contracts made by said company with the holders
of its bonds and preferred stock, by making it impossible for said
company to pay the interest on its bonds and dividends on its
preferred stock, as agreed between them and said company, and yet
maintain and operate its railroad efficiently, and further in that
it took the property of the company without due process of law and
denied to it the equal protection of the law."
"2. The said court erred in overruling the claim of the
plaintiff in error in the twelfth paragraph of its petition of
appeal from the railroad commissioners to the supreme court, as set
forth in the record, that said statute was void and was no
justification on said order under the Constitution of the United
States and the Fourteenth Amendment thereof. "
Page 151 U. S. 565
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The reasons of appeal to the supreme court were filed October 7,
1892, and assigned errors in the action of the superior court in
dealing with various paragraphs of the petition of appeal from the
order of the railway commissioners, and in the admission and
exclusion of evidence, but contained nothing questioning the
constitutionality of the law under which the proceedings were had
until they were amended, December 17, 1892, by adding the
paragraphs raising that question. This tardiness in bringing the
contention forward is perhaps not to be wondered at, in view of the
repeated adjudications of the Supreme Court of Connecticut
sustaining the constitutionality of similar laws, as well as of
this particular statute, and of the rulings of this Court in
reference to like legislation.
A motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction
is now made, and with it is united a motion to affirm on the
ground, in the language of our rule, Rule 6, par. 5,
"that although the record may show that this Court has
jurisdiction, it is manifest that the writ or appeal was taken
Page 151 U. S. 566
for delay only, or that the question on which the jurisdiction
depends is so frivolous and not to need further argument."
We agree with counsel that this Court has jurisdiction, but are
of opinion that the principles to be applied in its exercise are so
well settled that further argument is not needed, and that, this
being so, the jurisdiction may be said, under the circumstances, to
rest on so narrow a foundation as to give color to the motion to
dismiss and justify the disposal of the case on the motion to
affirm.
It must be admitted that the Act of June 19, 1889, is directed
to the extinction of grade crossings as a menace to public safety,
and that it is therefore within the exercise of the police power of
the state. And, as before stated, the constitutionality of similar
prior statutes, as well as of that in question, tested by the
provisions of the state and federal constitutions, has been
repeatedly sustained by the courts of Connecticut.
Woodruff v.
Catlin, 54 Conn. 277;
Westbrook's Appeal, 57 Conn,
95;
N.Y. & N.E. Railroad Co.'s Appeal, 58 Conn. 5320;
Woodruff v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 63;
State's
Attorney v. Branford, 59 Conn. 402;
N.Y. & N.E.
Railroad Co. v. Waterbury, 60 Conn. 1;
Middletown v. N.Y.,
N.H. & Hartford Railroad, 62 Conn. 492.
In
Woodruff v. Catlin, the court, speaking through
Pardee, J., said in reference to a similar statute:
"The act, in scope and purpose, concerns protection of life.
Neither in intent nor fact does it increase or diminish the assets
either of the city or of the railroad corporations. It is the
exercise of the governmental power and duty to secure a safe
highway. The legislature, having determined that the intersection
of two railways with a highway in the City of Hartford at grade is
a nuisance dangerous to life, in the absence of action on the part
either of the city or of the railroads, may compel them severally
to become the owners of the right to lay out new highways and new
railways over such land, and in such manner as will separate the
grade of the railways from that of the highway at intersection; may
compel them to use the right for the accomplishment of the desired
end; may determine that the
Page 151 U. S. 567
expense shall be paid by either corporation alone, or in part by
both, and may enforce obedience to its judgment. That the
legislature of this state has the power to do all this for the
specified purpose, and to do it through the instrumentality of a
commission, it is now only necessary to state, not to argue."
And as to this act, the court, in 58 Conn. 532, on this
company's appeal, held that grade crossings were in the nature of
nuisances, which it was competent for the legislature to cause to
be abated, and that it could, in its discretion, require any party
responsible for the creation of the evil in the discharge of what
were in a sense governmental duties to pay any part or all of the
expense of such abatement.
It is likewise thoroughly established in this Court that the
inhibitions of the Constitution of the United States upon the
impairment of the obligation of contracts, or the deprivation of
property without due process, or of the equal protection of the
laws, by the states are not violated by the legitimate exercise of
legislative power in securing the public safety, health, and
morals. The governmental power of self-protection cannot be
contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted, nor the
use of property, be withdrawn from the implied liability to
governmental regulation in particulars essential to the
preservation of the community from injury.
Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25;
Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S.
659;
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.
27;
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co.,
115 U. S. 650,;
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623;
Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517. And
also that
"a power reserved to the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal
a charter authorizes it to make any alteration or amendment of a
charter granted subject to it, which will not defeat or
substantially impair the object of the grant, or any rights vested
under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to secure
either that object or any public right."
Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.
S. 466,
107 U. S. 476;
Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U.
S. 347;
Pennsylvania College
Cases, 13 Wall.190;
Tomlinson
v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454.
Page 151 U. S. 568
The charter of this company was subject to the legislative power
over it of amendment, alteration, or repeal, specifically and under
general law. Priv. & Spec. Laws Conn. vol. 5, pp. 543, 547;
vol. 7, p. 466; vol. 8, p. 353; Spec.Laws Conn. 1881, p. 64; Stats.
1875, 278; Gen.Stats. 1888, § 1909;
N.Y. & N.E.
Railroad v. Waterbury, 60 Conn. 1.
The contention seems to be, however, that the legislature, in
discharging the duty of the state to protect its citizens, has
authorized by the enactment in question that to be done which is,
in certain particulars, so unreasonable, and so obviously
unjustified by the necessity invoked, as to bring the act within
constitutional prohibitions.
The argument is that the existing grades of railroad crossings
were legally established in accordance with the then wishes of the
people, but with the increase in population, crossings formerly
safe had become no longer so; that the highways were chiefly for
the benefit of the local public, and it was the duty of the local
municipal corporation to keep them safe; that this law applied to
railroad corporations treatment never accorded to other citizens in
allowing the imposition of the entire expense of change of grade,
both costs and damages, irrespective of benefits, on those
companies, and in that respect, and in the exemption of the town
from its just share of the burden, denied to them the equal
protection of the laws.
And further that the order, and therefore the law which was held
to authorize it, amounted to a taking of property without due
process in that it required the removal of tracks many feet from
their present location, involving the destruction of much private
property, the excavation of the principal highway and those
communicating, and the building of an expensive iron bridge, all at
the sole expense, including damages, of the company, without a
hearing as to the extent to the several responsibilities of the
company and the town, or as to the expense of the removal of this
dangerous crossing, as compared with other dangerous crossings, or
of the degree of the responsibility of the company for the dangers
existing at this particular crossing. The objection is not that
hearing was
Page 151 U. S. 569
not required and accorded, which it could not well be in view of
the protracted proceedings before the commissioners and the
superior court and the review in the supreme court, but that the
scope of inquiry was not as broad as the statute should have
allowed, and that the particular crossing to be removed was
authorized to be prejudged.
It is further objected that the supreme court had so construed
the statute that, upon the issue whether the financial condition of
the company warranted the order, no question of law could be raised
as to the extent of the burdens which a certain amount of financial
ability would warrant, and thus, in that aspect, by reason of the
large amount of expenditure which might be, and as matter of fact
was, in this instance, required, the obligation of the contracts
made by the company with the holders of its securities was
impaired. Complaint is made in this connection of the striking out
by the superior court of certain paragraphs of the petition on
appeal, held by that court and the supreme court to plead mere
matters of evidence, and the decision by the supreme court that all
the material issues were met by the findings. Those issues were
stated by the court to be whether or not the company's directors
had removed, or applied for the removal of, a grade crossing, as
required by the statute; whether or not the grade crossing ordered
to be removed by the commissioners was in fact a dangerous one,
which the directors ought to have removed, or for the removal of
which the directors ought to have applied, and whether or not the
company's financial condition was such as to warrant the order.
And upon these premises it is urged in addition that the right
to amend the charter of the corporation was not controlling,
because that did not include the right to arbitrarily deprive the
stockholders of their property, which, though held by them for
purposes of management and control under a corporate organization
created by special law, was nevertheless private property not by
virtue of the charter, but
"by force of the most fundamental and general laws of modern
society, which, from their nature, necessarily protect alike and
fully all legitimate acquisitions of the members of the
community,
Page 151 U. S. 570
no matter whether held by them as individuals or partnerships or
associations or corporations."
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the statute operated
as an amendment to the charters of the railroad corporations
affected by it; that, as grade crossings are in the nature of
nuisances, the legislature had a right to cause them to be abated
and to require either party to pay the whole or any portion of the
expense; that the statute was not unconstitutional in authorizing
the commissioners to determine their own jurisdiction, and that,
besides, the right of appeal saved the railroad companies from any
harm from their findings; that it was the settled policy of the
state to abolish grade crossings as rapidly as could be reasonably
done, and that all general laws and police regulations affecting
corporations were binding upon them without their assent.
We are asked, upon the grounds above indicated, to adjudge that
the highest tribunal of the state in which these proceedings were
had, committed, in reaching these conclusions, errors so gross as
to amount in law to a denial by the state of rights secured to the
company by the Constitution of the United States, or that the
statute itself is void by reason of infraction of the provisions of
that instrument.
But this Court cannot proceed upon general ideas of the
requirements of natural justice, apart from the provisions of the
Constitution supposed to be involved, and in respect of them we are
of opinion that our interposition cannot be successfully
invoked.
As observed by Mr. Justice Miller in
Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
96 U. S. 104,
the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be availed of
"as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this
Court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in the
state court of the justice of the decision against him, and of the
merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be
founded."
To use the language of MR. JUSTICE FIELD in
Missouri Pacific
Railway v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512,
115 U. S.
520,
"it is hardly necessary to say that the hardship, impolicy, or
injustice of state laws is not necessarily an objection to their
constitutional validity, and that the remedy for evils of that
character is to be sought from state legislatures. "
Page 151 U. S. 571
The conclusions of this Court have been repeatedly announced to
the effect that though railroad corporations are private
corporations, as distinguished from those created for municipal and
governmental purposes, their uses are public, and they are invested
with the right of eminent domain, only to be exercised for public
purposes; that therefore they are subject to legislative control in
all respects necessary to protect the public against danger,
injustice, and oppression; that the state has power to exercise
this control through boards of commissioners; that there is no
unjust discrimination, and no denial of the equal protection of the
laws, in regulations applicable to all railroad corporations alike;
nor is there necessarily such denial, nor an infringement of the
obligation of contracts, in the imposition upon them, in particular
instances, of the entire expense of the performance of acts
required in the public interest, in the exercise of legislative
discretion; nor are they thereby deprived of property without due
process of law, by statutes under which the result is ascertained
in a mode suited to the nature of the case, and not merely
arbitrary and capricious, and that the adjudication of the highest
court of a state that, in such particulars, a law enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the state, is valid, will not be
reversed by this Court on the ground of an infraction of the
Constitution of the United States.
Nashville &c. Railway v.
Alabama, 128 U. S. 96;
Georgia Railway & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.
S. 174;
Minneapolis &c. Railway v.
Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26;
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114;
Charlotte, Columbia &c. Railroad v. Gibbes,
142 U. S. 386;
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Emmons,
149 U. S. 364.
Judgment affirmed.
