A Cherokee Indian being indicted in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the western District of Arkansas for the murder
of a white man, it was set up in defense that the murdered man was
also an Indian, and that the court was therefore without
jurisdiction. The evidence for the defense showed that the murdered
man was generally recognized as an Indian, that his reputed father
was so recognized, and that he himself was enrolled, and had
participated in the payment of bread money to the Cherokees. To
offset this, the government showed that he had not been permitted
to vote at a Cherokee election, but it also appeared that he had
not been in the district long enough to vote.
Held:
(1) That the burden was on the prosecution to prove that he was
a white man.
(2) That the testimony offered by the government had no
legitimate tendency to prove that the murdered man was not an
Indian.
This was a writ of error to review the conviction of the
plaintiff in error for the murder of one James Gentry, alleged to
have been "a white man, and not an Indian," on August 1, 1883, in
the Cherokee Nation, Indian Territory. The case was tried before
the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Page 151 U. S. 51
Western District of Arkansas at the May term of 1893, and the
prisoner convicted, and sentenced to death. Thirty-four assignments
of error were contained in the record, none of which was considered
except the first and last, which raised the question of the
jurisdiction of the court arising from the fact that both the
accused and the deceased were Indians.
Page 151 U. S. 53
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, so far as we have found it necessary to consider it,
raises but a single question -- namely, whether, Smith's being
admitted to be a Cherokee Indian, born and raised in the Cherokee
Nation, and a citizen of that nation, the undisputed testimony did
not also show Gentry to have been an Indian.
If this were the case, then it is clear the court had no
jurisdiction of the offense. By Rev.Stat. § 2145, c. 4, Tit.
28, relating to the "government of Indian country," it is
provided
"that except as to crimes the punishment of which is expressly
provided for in this title, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country."
But by § 2146, as amended by the Act of February 18, 1875,
18 Stat. 318, c. 80,
"the preceding section shall not be construed to extend to
crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe,
nor to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian
tribes respectively."
As we held in
In re Mayfield, 141 U.
S. 107, there is nothing in the Treaty of July 19, 1866,
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, 14 Stat. 799,
which renders this statute inapplicable or indicates that the
circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction of crimes
committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another.
Page 151 U. S. 54
Upon this point, a number of witnesses were sworn who all stated
that Gentry claimed to be a Cherokee Indian, and looked like one,
having the dark hair, eyes, and complexion of an Indian, and that
he was generally recognized as one. Kajo Gentry, his reputed
father, appears to have been either of Cherokee blood or mixed
Creek and Cherokee. He also was recognized as an Indian, and
appears to have been enrolled and participated in the payment of
"bread money" to the Cherokees.
The only testimony to the contrary tended to show that in 1883,
Gentry was not permitted to vote at an election held in the
Cherokee Nation, but it also appeared that it was because he had
not been in the district long enough. To entitle him to vote at an
election, he must not only have been a citizen of the Cherokee
Nation, but must have resided in the particular district where he
offered to vote six months prior thereto. There was also some
testimony tending to show that Gentry had lived for some time, but
it does not appear how long, in southern Arkansas, and came to the
Cherokee Nation by the way of the Choctaw Nation.
In this connection, the court charged the jury in substance that
to give the court jurisdiction, it was necessary to charge in the
indictment that Gentry was a white man and not an Indian. "The
meaning of that is that he was a citizen of the United States, or,
more correctly speaking, a jurisdictional citizen of the United
States." That if he were, notwithstanding the defendant was an
Indian, the court still had jurisdiction. That in this connection,
it was important "to ascertain whether he has been recognized
legally by the authorities of that country as a citizen thereof."
That
"if a man is an Indian by blood, and if the goes out and lives
among the white people, abandons his country, lives among white
people, who are citizens of the United States, and performs the
duty belonging to citizenship, or exercises the rights that pertain
thereto, that that is evidence on his part of a purpose to abandon
the relation he may have to that country and to its people, and he
may abandon it in that way so as to cause him to become a
jurisdictional citizen of the United States."
That
Page 151 U. S. 55
the jury also had a right to consider that if he were related
there, his relatives took no interest in him when killed, etc.
Exceptions were duly taken to this portion of the charge.
That Gentry was a white man and not an Indian was a fact which
the government was bound to establish, and if it failed to
introduce any evidence upon that point, defendant was entitled to
an instruction to that effect. Without expressing an opinion as to
the correctness of the legal propositions embodied in this charge,
we think there was no testimony which authorized the court to
submit to the jury the question whether Gentry was a white man and
not an Indian. The objection went to the jurisdiction of the court,
and, if no other reasonable inference could have been drawn from
the evidence than that Gentry was an Indian, defendant was entitled
as matter of law to an acquittal.
Pleasants
v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116;
Commissioners of Marion
County v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278;
Marshall v. Hubbard, 117 U. S. 415.
The testimony offered by the government had no legitimate
tendency to prove that he was not an Indian. The evidence that he
was not permitted to vote in the Canadian district, where the
murder was committed, was explained by the fact that he had not
resided in the district the six months required by law to entitle
him to vote, and by the fact that one of the judges of election
told him that he had no doubt that he was an Indian. Nor did the
fact that Gentry said he lived in southern Arkansas, without any
evidence showing how he came to live there, under what
circumstances, or how long he lived there, constitute any evidence
of his being a white man, or that, being an Indian, he had severed
his tribal relations, and become a citizen of the United
States.
It was held by this Court in
Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U. S. 94, that
an Indian, born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the
United States, which still exists and is recognized as a tribe by
the government of the United States, who has voluntarily severed
himself from his tribe and taken up his residence among the white
citizens of a state, but who has not been naturalized, taxed, or
recognized as a citizen either by the state or by the United
States, is not a citizen of the
Page 151 U. S. 56
United States within the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. Much more is that the case where it appears that the
Indian was but temporarily a resident of a state, the length of his
residence not being shown, and that he had done nothing to indicate
his intention to sever his tribal relations.
Upon the testimony in this case, we think the defendant was
entitled to an instruction that the court had no jurisdiction, and
its judgment must therefore be
"
Reversed, and the case remanded with directions to set
aside the verdict, and for further proceedings in conformity with
this opinion."