When the tendency of testimony offered in a criminal case is to
throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a
particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the
trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with unless
it manifestly appears that the testimony has no legitimate bearing
upon the question at issue and is calculated to prejudice the
accused in the minds of the jurors.
When a necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence
in a criminal trial, objections on the ground of relevancy are not
favored, as the effect of circumstantial facts depends upon their
connection with each other, and considerable latitude is allowed on
the question of motive.
The fact that such testimony also has a tendency to show that
the defendant was guilty of the alleged offence is not sufficient
reason for its exclusion, if otherwise competent.
Acting on these principles, the court sustains tire ruling of
the court below admitting testimony stated at length in the
opinion, to show a motive for the alleged murder.
An exception to the denial of a motion for a new trial on the
ground that the verdict was not supported by the evidence is
untenable under repeated rulings of this Court.
This was a writ of error upon the conviction of the plaintiff in
error for the murder of Charles Palmer on July 25, 1889, in Blue
County, Indian Territory. Nelson Moore, defendant's brother, was
indicted with him, but was not tried.
Page 150 U. S. 58
Upon the trial of the case, after the witnesses of the
government had shown that Charles Palmer, the person alleged to
have been murdered by the defendant, was found on the 25th day of
May, 1889, the evidence further showing that he had been murdered
by some person or persons, the United States attorney proposed to
prove that one Camp had disappeared from the same neighborhood
during the month of November, 1888, and had not been heard from
since; that he was last seen in company with defendant and his
brother, Nelson Moore; that Palmer had been trying to find Camp's
body, and that defendant knew that he had been investigating Camp's
disappearance, concerning which the testimony of the proposed
witness, Kitty Young, formerly Mrs. Palmer, relative to said Camp
was substantially as follows:
"Tom Moore, Nelse Moore, and Mr. Camp kept batch and lived
together about 1/4 of a mile from my husband, Charles Palmer. About
9 o'clock at night during the month of November, 1888, Nelse Moore
and Mr. Camp was at our house to borrow a horse from my husband to
drive the next day to a wagon, stating they were going to Caddo.
They did not get the horse. Mr. Palmer and myself promised Mr. Camp
we would go down to the house and milk his cows while he was gone.
Soon after they left on foot that night, I heard a gun in the
direction of their house. About 1 o'clock A.M., I saw Mr. Camp's
wagon and horses pass our house, coming from the direction of where
they lived. Immediately after breakfast, Mr. Palmer and myself went
down to the Moores' house to milk the cows. There was no one there.
We saw blood in the house, and everything torn up around in the
house. We saw a fresh horse wagon tracks which led down into the
bottom. We followed it some distance, and noticed where it returned
by a different road, and came into the road which passes our house.
About five days after this, Nelse Moore returned alone with the
team and wagon that belonged to Camp. He was wearing Camp's boots.
The defendant and Nelse claimed Camp's clothes, horses, watch,
wagon, cows, and all the property which Camp had. I have never seen
or heard of Camp since the night referred to. "
Page 150 U. S. 59
"Mr. Palmer was down in the woods hog hunting on Thursday before
he was killed. When he returned that evening, Tom Moore asked him
where he had been. Mr. Palmer stated that he had been in the bottom
hog hunting. Tom Moore said, 'Yes, I know the kind of hogs you were
looking for.'"
"Tom and Nelse Moore owned no stock or property. Tom had no
money. Mr. Palmer had been furnishing him provisions. Tom had been
hired to Mr. Palmer; was familiar with the premises. Had been
clearing land for Mr. Palmer on the place we lived on. The
defendants claimed to have bought all Camp's property."
The court admitted this testimony to show not that Camp had been
killed by defendant, but as a motive for his alleged murder of
Palmer. To this the defendant excepted upon the ground that the
testimony had a direct tendency to prejudice the minds of the
jurors.
The only other error alleged was to the refusal of the court to
grant a new trial upon the ground that the verdict "was not
supported by that amount and character of evidence that is required
by law."
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The testimony on behalf of the prosecution tended to show that
Charles Palmer, who had been seen alive about 12 o'clock, was found
lying dead in the road in Sandy Creek bottom, about two miles from
his home at 4 o'clock of the same day. About three or four hundred
yards from where the body was found, the defendant, Tom Moore, was
seen by two witnesses about 2 or 3 o'clock of the same day, coming
towards them, and carrying a Winchester gun. When he saw them, he
turned off
Page 150 U. S. 60
at a fast walk out of sight. The wounds in Palmer's body were
made with a Winchester gun or a pistol. Defendant was a person of
no means, living with his brother, Nelson Moore, about a quarter of
a mile from Palmer's, for whom he had been at work, clearing his
land. Palmer's land was rented from an Indian. This land was also
claimed by a full-blooded Choctaw woman named Lizzie Lishtubbi.
Four days before the murder, defendant Moore married this woman. He
had previously boasted that he was going to marry the woman and get
the land, "that she was old and would not live long, and he would
get a good stake." One of the witness told him that he would have
trouble over it, as Charles Palmer was about the gamiest man in the
territory. He replied: "I am some that way myself." As he started
to leave, he said: "I may not get to marry the widow, and if I do
not, if you give me away, I will kill you." But the witness thought
it merely a good natured remark, as he was laughing at the
time.
We think it was within the discretion of the court to admit the
testimony in dispute of Kitty Young. As intimated in the case of
Alexander v. United States, 138 U.
S. 353, where the question relates to the tendency of
certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to
explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain
discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors
will not interfere with unless it manifestly appear that the
testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue and
is calculated to prejudice the accused in the minds of the jurors.
There are many circumstances connected with a trial the pertinency
of which a judge who has listened to the testimony, and observed
the conduct of the parties and witnesses is better able to estimate
the value of than an appellate court, which is confined in its
examination to the very words of the witnesses, perhaps imperfectly
taken down by the reporter. It was said by Mr. Justice Clifford, in
delivering the opinion of this Court in
Castle v.
Bullard, 23 How. 172,
64 U. S. 187,
that
"whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial
evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of
direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of
irrelevancy are not favored, for
Page 150 U. S. 61
the reason that the force and effect of circumstantial facts
usually and almost necessarily depend upon their connection with
each other."
And in
Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 13, 31, it is
said that
"considerable latitude is allowed on the question of motive.
Just in proportion to the depravity of the mind would a motive be
trifling and insignificant which might prompt the commission of a
great crime. We can never say the motive was adequate to the
offense, for human minds would differ in their ideas of adequacy
according to their own estimate of the enormity of crime, and a
virtuous mind would find no motive sufficient to justify the
felonious taking of human life."
See also Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112, 130;
Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 504;
Commonwealth
v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143;
Murphy v. People, 63 N.Y.
590, 594;
Kennedy v. People, 39 N.Y. 245;
People v.
Harris, 136 N.Y. 423;
Commonwealth v. Abbott, 130
Mass. 472.
Even conceding that the prosecution had shown a motive for the
murder of Palmer in the fact that he was in possession of land to
which defendant's wife also had a claim, the further facts that
Palmer was known by the defendant to have been down in the bottom
where Camp had been suspected of being murdered, taken in
connection with the blood found at the house jointly occupied by
himself and the Moores, the report of a gun heard in the direction
of the house, the wagon tracks leading towards the bottom where he
was thought to have been murdered, and the subsequent return of one
of the Moores with Camp's team and clothes and wearing his boots
were such as were calculated to excite defendant's suspicion that
Palmer was there for the purpose of investigating the circumstances
of Camp's death and his connection with it.
The fact that the testimony also had a tendency to show that
defendant had been guilty of Camp's murder would not be sufficient
to exclude it if it were otherwise competent. 1 Greenl. Ev. §
3;
Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521;
People v.
Harris, 136 N.Y. 423.
The exception to the denial of the motion for a new trial upon
the ground that the verdict was not supported by the amount and
character of evidence that is required by law was
Page 150 U. S. 62
untenable under the repeated rulings of this Court.
Crumpton
v. United States, 138 U. S. 361,
138 U. S. 365;
Wilson v. Everett, 139 U. S. 616,
139 U. S. 621;
Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U.
S. 128,
142 U. S.
134.
There was no error in the rulings of the court below, and the
judgment is therefore
Affirmed.
