The courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of
all seizures made on land or water for a breach of the laws of the
United States, and any intervention of a state authority which, by
taking the thing seized out of the hands of the United States
officer, might obstruct the exercise of this jurisdiction is
unlawful.
In such a case, the court of the United States having cognizance
of the seizure may enforce a redelivery of the thing, by attachment
or other summary process.
The question under such a seizure whether a forfeiture has been
actually incurred belongs exclusively to the courts of the United
States, and it depends upon the final decree of such courts whether
the seizure into be deemed rightful or tortious.
If the seizing officer refuse to institute proceedings to
ascertain the forfeiture, the district court may, upon application
of the aggrieved party, compel the officer to proceed to
adjudication or to abandon the seizure.
And if the seizure be finally adjudged wrongful and without
probable cause, the party may proceed, at his election, by a suit
at common law or in the instance court of admiralty, for damages
for the illegal act.
But the common law remedy in such a case must besought for in
the state courts, the courts of the United States having no
jurisdiction to decide on the conduct of their officers in the
execution of their laws in suits at common law until the case shall
have passed through the state courts.
When a seizure was made, under the eleventh section of the
embargo act of April 1808, it was determined that no power is given
by law to detain the cargo if separated from the vessel, and that
the owner had a right to take the cargo out of the vessel and to
dispose of it in any way not prohibited by law, and in case of its
detention to bring an action of replevin therefor in the state
court.
Page 15 U. S. 2
John Slocum, the plaintiff in error, was surveyor of the customs
for the port of Newport, in Rhode Island, and under the directions
of the collector had seized the
Venus, lying in that port
with a cargo ostensibly bound to some other port in the United
States. The defendants in error, who were owners of the cargo,
brought their writ of replevin in the state court of Rhode Island
for the restoration of the property. The defendant pleaded that the
Venus was laden in the night not under the inspection of
the proper revenue officers, and that the collector of the port,
suspecting an intention to violate the embargo laws, had directed
him to seize and detain her till the opinion of the President
Page 15 U. S. 3
should be known on the case, and concluded to the jurisdiction
of the court. The same matter was also pleaded in bar. To both
these pleas the plaintiff in the state court demurred, and the
defendants joined in demurrer. Judgment having been rendered in
favor of the plaintiff in the state court, the cause was removed
into this Court by writ of error.
Page 15 U. S. 9
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court,
and after stating the facts, proceeded as follows:
In considering this case, the first question which presents
itself is this -- has the Constitution or any law of the United
States been violated or misconstrued by the court of Rhode Island
in exercising its jurisdiction in this cause?
The Judiciary Act gives to the federal courts exclusive
cognizance of all seizures made on land or water. Any intervention
of a state authority which, by taking the thing seized out of the
possession of the officer of the United States, might obstruct the
exercise of this jurisdiction would unquestionably be a violation
of the act, and the federal court having cognizance of the seizure,
might enforce a redelivery of the thing by attachment or other
summary process against the parties who should divest such a
possession. The party supposing himself aggrieved by a seizure
cannot, because he considers it tortious, replevy the property out
of the custody of the seizing officer or of the court having
cognizance of the cause. If the officer has a right under the laws
of the United States to seize for a supposed forfeiture, the
question whether that forfeiture has been actually incurred belongs
exclusively to the
Page 15 U. S. 10
federal courts, and cannot be drawn to another forum, and it
depends upon the final decree of such courts whether such seizure
is to be deemed rightful or tortious. If the seizing officer should
refuse to institute proceedings to ascertain the forfeiture, the
district court may, upon the application of the aggrieved party,
compel the officer to proceed to adjudication or to abandon the
seizure. And if the seizure be finally adjudged wrongful and
without reasonable cause, he may proceed, at his election by a suit
at common law or in the admiralty for damages for the illegal act.
Yet even in that case, any remedy which the law may afford to the
party supposing himself to be aggrieved other than such as might be
obtained in a court of admiralty could be prosecuted only in the
state court. The common law tribunals of the United States are
closed against such applications, were the party disposed to make
them. Congress has refused to the courts of the union the power of
deciding on the conduct of their officers in the execution of their
laws in suits at common law until the case shall have passed
through the state courts and have received the form which may there
be given it. This, however, being an action which takes the thing
itself out of the possession of the officer, could certainly not be
maintained in a state court if by the act of Congress it was seized
for the purpose of being proceeded against in the federal
court.
A very brief examination of the act of Congress will be
sufficient for the inquiry whether this cargo was so seized. The
second section of the act,
Page 15 U. S. 11
pleaded by the defendant in the original action, only withholds
a clearance from a vessel which has committed the offense described
in that section. This seizure was made under the 11th section,
which enacts
"That the collectors of the customs be and they are hereby
respectively authorized to detain any vessel ostensibly bound with
a cargo to some other port of the United States whenever in their
opinion the intention is to violate or evade any of the provisions
of the acts laying an embargo, until the decision of the President
of the United States be had thereupon."
The authority given respects the vessel only. The cargo is in no
manner the object of the act. It is arrested in its course to any
other port by the detention of the vehicle in which it was to be
carried, but no right is given to seize it specifically, or to
detain it if separated from that vehicle. It remains in custody of
the officer simply because it is placed in a vessel which is in his
custody, but no law forbids it to be taken out of that vessel if
such be the will of the owner. The cargoes thus arrested and
detained were generally of a perishable nature, and it would have
been wanton oppression to expose them to loss by unlimited
detention in a case where the owner was willing to remove all
danger of exportation.
This being the true construction of the act of Congress, the
owner has the same right to his cargo that he has to any other
property, and may exercise over it every act of ownership not
prohibited by law. He may consequently demand it from the
officer
Page 15 U. S. 12
in whose possession it is that officer having no legal right to
withhold it from him, and if it be withheld, he has a consequent
right to appeal to the laws of his country for relief.
To what court can this appeal be made? The common law courts of
the United States have no jurisdiction in the case. They can afford
him no relief. The party might indeed institute a suit for redress
in the district court acting as an admiralty and revenue court, and
such court might award restitution of the property unlawfully
detained. But the act of Congress neither expressly nor by
implication forbids the state courts to take cognizance of suits
instituted for property in possession of an officer of the United
States not detained under some law of the United States;
consequently their jurisdiction remains. Had this action been
brought for the vessel instead of the cargo, the case would have
been essentially different. The detention would have been by virtue
of an act of Congress, and the jurisdiction of a state court could
not have been sustained. But the action having been brought for the
cargo, to detain which the law gave no authority, it was triable in
the state court.
The same course of reasoning which sustains the jurisdiction of
the court of Rhode Island sustains also its judgment on the plea in
bar. The two pleas contain the same matter, the one concluding to
the jurisdiction of the court and the other in bar of the action.
In examining the plea to the jurisdiction, it has been shown that
the officer had no legal right to detain the property; consequently
his plea was
Page 15 U. S. 13
no sufficient defense, and the court misconstrued no act of
Congress nor committed any error in sustaining the demurrer.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
