When a prisoner, convicted of crime in a state court and
sentenced there to punishment, complains that his rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States have been thereby
violated, he may seek relief in the federal courts by an
application either to the proper Circuit Court for a writ of habeas
corpus or to a justice of this Court for a writ of error to the
state court.
The remedy by habeas corpus should be limited to cases in which
the judgment or sentence attacked is clearly void by reason of its
having been rendered without jurisdiction, or by reason of the
court's having exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises, and the
general rule and better practice, in the absence of special facts
and circumstances, is to require the prisoner to seek a review by
writ of error instead of resorting to the writ of habeas
corpus.
This is an appeal from an order denying an application for a
writ of habeas corpus addressed to the court below by
Page 149 U. S. 71
Albert Frederich, a prisoner confined in the penitentiary of the
State of Washington at Walla Walla in that state.
The case, as made by the petition and accompanying exhibits, is
as follows: on the 17th of June, 1891, the prisoner was duly
indicted by the grand jury of King County, Washington, for the
murder of one Julius Scherbring, and upon said indictment he was
subsequently arraigned, pleaded not guilty, was tried by a jury,
and on the 26th of September, 1891, was found guilty of murder in
the first degree. A motion for a new trial having been overruled,
he was sentenced to be hung. From this judgment of death and the
order overruling his motion for a new trial, the accused appealed
to the supreme court of the state, which reversed the judgment of
the trial court and remanded the case, with a direction to set
aside and vacate the judgment imposing the sentence of death, but
to let the verdict stand, and to enter a new judgment thereon for
murder in the second degree, that being, in the opinion of the
state supreme court, the proper degree of his crime inasmuch as the
evidence in the case did not show such deliberate and premeditated
malice as would sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree.
State v. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204.
This judgment of the supreme court was rendered under and in
pursuance of the following provision of 2 Hill's Ann.Stats. and
Code of Washington:
"SEC. 1429. The supreme court may affirm, reverse, or modify any
judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment
or order to be entered or direct a new trial or further
proceedings."
Pursuant to this order of the supreme court, the prisoner, on
the 16th of June, 1892, was again brought before the trial court
and adjudged to be guilty of murder in the second degree, and he
was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary
for the term of twenty years. This sentence having been carried
into execution and the prisoner incarcerated in the penitentiary,
he thereupon, on the 9th of August, 1892, made this application for
a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was deprived of his
liberty without due process of law in violation of the provisions
of the
Page 149 U. S. 72
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
The grounds upon which this application is based are that the
supreme court of the state was without jurisdiction, and did not
have any authority, under said section 1429 of the Code or under
any other law, to render the judgment it did; that all that court
could do was either to affirm the judgment of the trial court
outright or to reverse it outright, and, under proper instructions,
remand the cause for a new trial by a jury; that therefore its
judgment was absolutely void, and the judgment of the trial court
in carrying out the directions of the supreme court was of
necessity void, and that the prisoner ought therefore to be
discharged.
The court below practically agreed with the petitioner that the
supreme court of the state had misinterpreted said section 1429 of
the Code and that what it had actually done by its decision and
judgment was to modify the verdict of the jury, which, under legal
and proper proceedings, it had no authority to do; that its
judgment, and the subsequent judgment of the trial court carrying
it into effect, were both void, and that therefore the petitioner's
imprisonment was without due process of law and in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The circuit court
further ruled, however, that the petitioner's proper remedy was not
by writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts in the first
instance, but that he should first raise the question of his
illegal imprisonment in the state courts, and if it was finally
decided against him by the state supreme court, he could then have
it reviewed and corrected by the Supreme Court of the United States
on a writ of error, and it accordingly denied the application. 51
F. 747.
Page 149 U. S. 74
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
At common law, the general rule undoubtedly was that where an
erroneous judgment was entered by a trial court, or an erroneous
sentence imposed, on a valid indictment, the appellate court, on
error, could not itself render such a judgment as the trial court
should have rendered, or remit the case to the trial court with
directions for it to do so, but the only thing it could do was to
reverse the judgment and discharge the defendant. This rule was
recognized in England in the case of
Rex v. Bourne, 7 Ad.
& El. 58, where the Court of King's Bench reversed the judgment
of the Court of Quarter Sessions and discharged the defendants
because the sentence imposed upon them by that court was of a lower
grade than that which the law provided for the crime of which they
had been convicted.
Some of the states in which the common law prevails, or is
Page 149 U. S. 75
adhered to, have adopted the same rule; but in most of the
states it is expressly provided by statute that when there is an
error in the sentence which calls for a reversal, the appellate
court is to render such judgment as the court below should have
rendered, or to remand the record to the court below with
directions for it to render the proper judgment, and this practice
seems to prevail in the State of Washington. The whole subject is
discussed in Wharton's Crim. Pl. & Pr. §§ 780, 927,
where the authorities are collected and cited.
But whether this practice in the State of Washington is
warranted, under a correct construction of said section 1429 of the
Code, or whether, if it is, that section violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution in that it operates to
deprive a defendant whose case is governed by it of his liberty
without due process of law we do not feel called upon to determine
in this case, because we are of opinion that, for other reasons,
the writ of habeas corpus was properly refused.
While the writ of habeas corpus is one of the remedies for the
enforcement of the right to personal freedom, it will not issue as
a matter of course, and it should be cautiously used by the federal
courts in reference to state prisoners. Being a civil process, it
cannot be converted into a remedy for the correction of mere errors
of judgment or of procedure in the court having cognizance of the
criminal offense. Under the writ of habeas corpus, this Court can
exercise no appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings of the
trial court or courts of the state, nor review their conclusions of
law or fact, and pronounce them erroneous. The writ of habeas
corpus is not a proceeding for the correction of errors.
Ex Parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163;
Ex Parte Siebold,
100 U. S. 371;
Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371;
Ex Parte Carll, 106 U. S. 521;
Ex Parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328;
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651;
Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417;
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241;
In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274;
In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731;
In re Wight, 134 U. S. 136;
Stevens v. Fuller, 136 U. S. 468.
As was said by this Court, speaking by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, in
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241,
117 U. S.
252-253,
"where a person is in custody, under process from a state court
of original
Page 149 U. S. 76
jurisdiction, for an alleged offense against the laws of such
state, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, the circuit
court has a discretion whether it will discharge him, upon habeas
corpus, in advance of his trial in the court in which he is
indicted; that discretion, however, to be subordinated to any
special circumstances requiring immediate action. When the state
court shall have finally acted upon the case, the circuit court has
still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then
existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of
error from the highest court of the state, or whether it will
proceed by writ of habeas corpus summarily to determine whether the
petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States."
The office of a writ of habeas corpus, and the cases in which it
will generally be awarded, was clearly stated by Mr. Justice
Bradley, speaking for the Court in
Ex Parte Siebold,
100 U. S. 371,
100 U. S. 375,
as follows:
"The only ground on which this Court, or any court, without some
special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus
to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the
want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or
some other matter rendering its proceedings void. This distinction
between an erroneous judgment and one that is illegal or void is
well illustrated by the two cases of
Ex Parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163, and
Ex Parte Parks,
93 U. S.
18. In the former case, we held that the judgment was
void, and released the prisoner accordingly; in the latter, we held
that the judgment, whether erroneous or not, was not void, because
the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and we refused to
interfere."
The reason of this rule lies in the fact that a habeas corpus
proceeding is a collateral attack, of a civil nature, to impeach
the validity of a judgment or sentence of another court in a
criminal proceeding, and it should therefore be limited to cases in
which the judgment or sentence attacked is clearly void by reason
of its having been rendered without jurisdiction, or by reason of
the court's having exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises.
Page 149 U. S. 77
It is said in
Ex Parte Royall, supra, that after a
prisoner is convicted of a crime in the highest court of the state
in which a conviction could be had, if such conviction was obtained
in disregard or in violation of rights secured to him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, two remedies are open
to him for relief in the federal courts: he may either take his
writ of error from this Court under section 709 of the Revised
Statutes and have his case reexamined in that way on the question
of whether the state court has denied him any right, privilege, or
immunity guarantied him by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, or he may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to be
discharged from custody under such conviction on the ground that
the state court had no jurisdiction of either his person or the
offense charged against him, or had for some reason lost or
exceeded its jurisdiction, so as to render its judgment a nullity,
in which latter proceeding the federal courts could not review the
action or rulings of the state court, which could be reviewed by
this Court upon a writ of error. But, as already stated, the
circuit court has a discretion as to which of these remedies it
will require the petitioner to adopt. This was expressly ruled in
Ex Parte Royall, supra, and has been repeatedly followed
since that case. In the recent case of
In re Wood,
140 U. S. 278,
140 U. S. 290,
after reaffirming the rule laid down in
Ex Parte Royall,
the Court added:
"After the final disposition of the case by the highest court of
the state, the circuit court, in its discretion, may put the party
who has been denied a right, privilege, or immunity claimed under
the Constitution or laws of the United States to his writ of error
from this Court, rather than interfere by writ of habeas
corpus."
We adhere to the views expressed in that case. It is certainly
the better practice in cases of this kind to put the prisoner to
his remedy by writ of error from this Court under section 709 of
the Revised Statutes than to award him a writ of habeas corpus, for
under proceedings by writ of error, the validity of the judgment
against him can be called in question, and the federal court left
in a position to correct the
Page 149 U. S. 78
wrong, if any, done the petitioner, and at the same time leave
the state authorities in a position to deal with him thereafter
within the limits of proper authority, instead of discharging him
by habeas corpus proceedings, and thereby depriving the state of
the opportunity of asserting further jurisdiction over his person
in respect to the crime with which he is charged.
In some instances, as in
Medley, Petitioner,
134 U. S. 160, the
proceeding by habeas corpus has been entertained, although a writ
of error could be prosecuted; but the general rule, and better
practice, in the absence of special facts and circumstances, is to
require a prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state court
violates his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United
States to seek a review thereof by writ of error, instead of
resorting to the writ of habeas corpus.
In the present case, we agree with the court below that the
petitioner had open to him the remedy by writ of error from this
Court for the correction of whatever injury may have been done to
him by the action of the state courts, and that he should have been
put to that remedy, rather than given the remedy by writ of habeas
corpus. The circuit court had authority to exercise its discretion
in the premises, and we do not see that there was any improper
exercise of that discretion, under the facts and circumstances.
Without passing, therefore, upon the merits of the question as
to the constitutionality of the provision of the Code under which
the supreme court proceeded in disposing of the case when it was
before it, or upon the question of the validity of the judgments
rendered by the state courts in the case, we are of opinion, for
the reasons stated, that the order of the circuit court refusing
the application for the writ of habeas corpus was correct, and it
is accordingly
Affirmed.
