When, in a suit in equity brought by the United States to set
aside and cancel patents of public land issued by the Land
Department, no fraud being charged, it appears that the suit is
brought for the benefit of private persons and that the government
has no interest in the result, the United States are barred from
bringing the suit if the persons for whose benefit the suit is
brought would be barred.
When a land-grant railroad company conveys a part of its grant
without having received a patent from the United States, and it
appears that the United States had issued a patent of the tract to
a state, as part of a land grant to the state, and the state parts
with its title to an individual, the relative rights of the parties
can be determined by proceedings in the courts on behalf of the
grantees of the company against the grantees of the state.
This was a bill in equity filed by the United States in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of
California, July 23, 1883, against Henry Curtner and others,
Page 149 U. S. 663
patentees of the State of California, for the purpose of having
certain listings of indemnity school lands situated in that state
in township three south, range three east, and in township two
south, range one east, set aside and cancelled, and the lands
decreed to be held subject to the grant made for the purpose of
aiding the construction of the Pacific Railroad, as provided in the
Acts of Congress of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864.
The bill was demurred to and amended, and to the amended bill a
demurrer was interposed which was overruled, Judge Sawyer
delivering an opinion. 26 F. 296.
The bill averred that on July 1, 1862, Congress passed an act by
which the Union Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated for the
purpose of constructing a railroad and telegraph line from the
Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, and by which it was provided
that
"there be, and is hereby, granted to the said company, for the
purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad, . . . every
alternate section of public land, designated by odd numbers, to the
amount of five alternate sections per mile on each side of said
railroad, on the line thereof, and within the limits of ten miles
on each side of said road, not sold, reserved, or otherwise
disposed of by the United States, and to which a preemption or
homestead claim may not have attached at the time the line of said
road is definitely fixed. . . . And all such lands, so granted by
this section, which shall not be sold or disposed of by said
company within three years after the entire road shall have been
completed shall be subject to settlement and preemption like other
lands at a price not exceeding one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre, to be paid to said company."
12 Stat. 489, 492; that the Central Pacific Railroad Company of
California was by the act declared entitled to the benefit of this
land grant, on the same terms and conditions as the Union Pacific
Railroad Company; that on October 31, 1864, the Central Pacific
Railroad Company of California assigned to the Western Pacific
Railroad Company the right to earn the land grant along and through
the location where the land in controversy is situated, and that
this assignment
Page 149 U. S. 664
was ratified by Act of Congress of March 3, 1865. 13 Stat. 504,
c. 89.
It was further alleged that, by the Act of July 1, 1862, the
railroad company seeking the benefit of the grant therein provided
for was required, within two years after its passage, to file a map
of its general route in the Department of the Interior, and
thereupon the Secretary of that department should cause the lands
within fifteen miles of such general route to be withdrawn from
preemption, private entry, and sale. That when any portion of said
route was finally located, the Secretary of the Interior should
cause the said lands so granted to be surveyed and set
That a map of the general route of the road was filed in the
Department of the Interior on December 8, 1864, and that the
Secretary of that department, on January 30, 1865, caused the lands
within twenty-five miles of such general route to be withdrawn from
preemption, private entry, and sale. That the land in controversy
was within those limits. That on February 1, 1870, the map of the
line of the road, as definitely fixed, was filed with the Secretary
of the Interior, and on that day the line of the road was
definitely fixed. That on December 29, 1869, the road was completed
in all respects as contemplated by said act of Congress, and the
Western Pacific Railroad Company was entitled to have and receive
patents from the United States for the land in controversy, the
same being within ten miles of the road so completed and not sold,
reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States.
And also that the Western Pacific Railroad Company and
Page 149 U. S. 665
the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California became
consolidated on June 22, 1870, under the name of the Central
Pacific Railroad Company, and that the said Western Pacific and its
successor, the Central Pacific, did, within three years of the
completion of the said road, sell and dispose of the land in
controversy to persons other than the defendants.
The bill then averred that
"the Commissioner of the General Land Office did at the various
and respective times hereinafter stated, without right and through
error, inadvertence, and mistake, wrongfully list, by certified
lists thereof, to the State of California, the said above-described
lands,"
and then follow four lists, covering the lands in controversy,
dated September 8, 1870; March 11, 1871; November 15, 1871, and
March 24, 1873.
That on May 12, 1874, the railroad company, by its deputy land
agent, presented to the register and receiver of the local land
office a selection of lands claimed by it under its grant, numbered
thirteen, including these lands; that the
"mistake, error, and inadvertence of the said commissioner of
the General Land Office in listing by certified lists said land to
the State of California was not discovered by complainants or its
officers of the said Land Department, or by said Central Pacific
Railroad Company or its grantees, until the 12th of May, 1874, nor
could the same by reasonable diligence have been discovered sooner;
that thereupon said register and receiver wrongfully, and in
violation of their duty, refused to certify said list as aforesaid
requested, and refused to certify the same in any manner
whatever."
It was further alleged
"That the State of California did at various times subsequent to
said eighth (8th) day of September, A.D. 1870, by its land patents,
purport to convey said lands mentioned in said list to divers and
sundry persons other than 'the Western Pacific Railroad Company' or
its successors, the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and against
the will and without the consent of the said companies, or either
of them, as follows, to wit . . ."
And then follow the dates of the patents, the lands patented,
and the names of the patentees, the dates being February 3, 1871;
April 3, 1871; November 29, 1871,
Page 149 U. S. 666
May 18, 1872, and March 4, 1878, respectively. And that the
patentees subsequently to the issue of the patents by the state to
them, respectively, and prior to the commencement of this action,
"did by valid mesne conveyances, duly executed and acknowledged,
convey all their right, title, and interest in and to said lands to
the defendants herein."
The bill further averred that the lands so patented by the state
were on July 1, 1862, November 30, 1862, July 2, 1864, October 5,
1864, January 30, 1865, and December 29, 1869, alternate sections
of the public lands of the United States, and were within the
limits of the railroad grant, and had not been sold or reserved or
otherwise disposed of by the United States, and that no preemption
or homestead claim had attached thereto at the time the line of the
road was definitely fixed; that the President of the United States
refused to issue patents to the railroad company for said lands
"not because the said the Western Pacific Railroad Company and
its successors had not complied with the said acts of Congress, nor
because it was not the kind and description of land granted, but
solely because said land had previously been, by mistake,
wrongfully and inadvertently listed to the State of California, as
hereinbefore set forth,"
and that the defendants and their grantors at the time mentioned
in the bill
"had actual notice of the said grant of said lands to said
company, the said withdrawal thereof, the said erroneous and
unlawful listing thereof by the said error, inadvertence, and
mistake of the said commissioner, and of each and all of the
matters and things hereinbefore set forth."
The bill then set forth various steps taken by the railroad
company to procure patents from the Interior Department
notwithstanding the listings to the state, and, among other things,
that on March 18, 1879, the register and receiver at San Francisco
reported that, in accordance with instructions of January 24, 1878,
they had on February 25, 1878, made demand on the State of
California for the surrender of the certification of the lands
hereinbefore described, and that no surrender had been made; that
they also reported on the same day that in accordance with
instructions of March 9,
Page 149 U. S. 667
1878, they furnished the state surveyor general, on March 26,
1878, with a copy of said instructions and made demand on the State
of California to surrender her title and listing of said lands, but
that up to that date, she had failed to surrender as requested;
that on April 2, 1879, the reports were submitted to the Secretary
of the Interior, and on the 26th of June, the Secretary affirmed
the commissioner's decision of March 9, 1878, awarding the land to
said company, but refusing to issue patents for the reason that
said land had been wrongfully listed to the State of California. On
December 8, 1879, the Secretary of the Interior transmitted to the
commissioner a letter from the Attorney General of California,
dated April 1, 1878, refusing to relinquish the certification and
listings of said lands theretofore listed and certified to the
state by the commissioner; that afterwards a petition was filed in
the General Land Office for a reconsideration of so much of the
Secretary's decision of June 26, 1879, as declined to issue to the
railroad company patents for the lands that by mistake were
wrongfully listed and certified to the State of California, and
thereafterwards the papers were sent to the Secretary, who on July
1, 1882, requested the opinion of the Attorney General of the
United States whether patents could then be issued for the lands,
or whether the certification to the state must be first judicially
vacated; that on October 18, 1882, the Secretary of the Interior
wrote to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, enclosing a
copy of the Attorney General's opinion and directing the papers to
be prepared for a suit to set aside the listing and certification
to the state, and thereafterwards, on December 6, 1882, the
Secretary requested the Attorney General to commence suit in the
proper court.
The bill then charged that a demand was duly made by the United
States upon the state, February 25, 1878, and refused, and that the
United States were bound, in equity and good faith, to hold the
Central Pacific Railroad Company, its grantees and assigns,
harmless from the consequences of errors and mistakes, and
particularly those relating to the mistake and inadvertence of the
commissioner of the general
Page 149 U. S. 668
land office. The bill further averred that proceedings had been
continuously pending before the Land Department for the purpose of
correcting the error and mistake, and had been prosecuted with due
diligence, and in accordance with the usages of the department in
relation to such matters. It was further stated that prior to
December 6, 1882, it had been the practice of the department to
issue second patents to claimants of land whenever it was made to
appear that the first patent had been wrongfully issued.
The prayer was that
"the said listings of said lands to the State of California as
aforesaid be set aside, recalled, cancelled, and annulled, and that
all the defendants herein be forever estopped and forbidden from
asserting any right or title to said lands, and that the same in
said decree be declared to be public lands of the United States of
America, subject to said rights of the Central Pacific Railroad
Company, its grantees and assigns, as hereinbefore set forth,"
and for general relief.
Answers having been put in, evidence taken, and hearing had, a
decree was rendered which annulled the listings and certifications
to the state, adjudged the patents issued to the state to be void,
and enjoined the defendants from asserting any title under
them.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The lands in question were odd sections lying within the
twenty-mile limit of the grant of lands made to the Central Pacific
Railroad Company to aid in the construction of its road, and
situated partly in township 3 south, range three
Page 149 U. S. 669
east, Mount Diablo base and meridian, and partly in township two
south, range one east.
It is stated in the opinion of the circuit court rendered on the
final hearing and reported in 38 F. 1, that
"between May 15, 1863, and May 16, 1864, after actual survey in
the field, but before the survey had been officially adopted or
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and before it had been
approved by the surveyor general and filed in the district land
office, the State of California, by its locating agent, made
selections and locations of all the lands now in controversy in
township three, range three, in part satisfaction of the grant to
the State of lands in lieu of sections 16 and 36 under the Act of
March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 246, c. 145. Between February 17, 1864, and
February 9, 1866, the state had issued its certificates of purchase
to the several purchasers thereof, the first payments of the
purchase money having been made. The selections, apparently at
their respective dates, were by the register of the land office
entered in his office. A portion of these lands were certified over
to the state by the Land Department at Washington, approved by the
Secretary of the Interior on November 15, 1871, and the remainder
on March 24, 1873, and they were afterwards patented to the
purchasers by the state. The lands in controversy, situate in said
township two, range one, were selected in advance of any survey in
the field by the United States surveyor general, upon surveys made
by the county surveyors of the state, between July 28, 1862, and
July 20, 1863. Certificates of sale were issued to purchasers by
the state for a part between March 2, 1863, and January 25, 1864,
and for the remainder between February 20 and March 14, 1865. These
selections were entered by the register of the land office on June
12, 1865. A part was certified over to the state by the Secretary
of the Interior on September 8, 1870, and the rest on March 11,
1871. These lands were also afterwards patented to the purchasers
by the state."
In the view which we take of the case, this summary of the
evidence, in the particulars mentioned, may, for convenience, be
accepted without restatement.
The map of the general route of the railroad company was
Page 149 U. S. 670
filed in the General Land Office December 8, 1864, and the order
of withdrawal issued January 30, 1865. The road was completed
December 29, 1869, and the map of definite location filed February
1, 1870. The selections of the railroad company embracing these
lands were made May 12, 1874. The bill alleges, and the record
shows, that patents for all but three hundred and twenty acres of
the lands were issued to persons mentioned in the bill, from
November 9, 1870, up to and including April 5, 1873, and that the
three hundred and twenty acres were patented by the state to one of
such persons March 4, 1878. The purchasers from the state and their
grantees entered into actual occupation of the lands in controversy
under their certificates of purchase, and from that time on had
continued in the possession of the same. This suit was commenced
July 23, 1883, over twelve years and eight months after the first
patent issued, and over five years and four months after the issue
of the last-named patent.
The circuit court held that lands are not surveyed lands by the
United States until a certified copy of the official plat of survey
has been filed in the local land office; that this had not been
done in respect of these lands, or, if done, that the filing was
too late; that they were therefore unsurveyed, and that the
selections, being made on unsurveyed lands, were "utterly void."
These premises were denied by appellants both as to the law and the
fact.
The circuit court also held that the state selections were void
for the reason that the act of 1853, under which they were made,
excepted from selection by the state, in lieu of school sections
lost, "lands reserved by competent authority," and "lands claimed
under any foreign grant or title," and "mineral lands," and that
these lands were excepted because at the time of their selection,
location, and sale by the state they were claimed under a Mexican
grant known as "Las Pocitas." Appellants contended that this
conclusion was based on a mistaken construction of the act of 1853
and an erroneous application of the act, if properly so construed,
under the facts in the case.
Page 149 U. S. 671
Among the points raised upon the demurrer and necessarily
presented upon the final hearing, were these: first, whether the
United States had such an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy as warranted their filing the bill; second, whether the
claim set up was not barred by laches and limitations.
The bill averred that the United States had granted the land to
the railroad company; that the railroad company was entitled to a
patent; that the lands had been wrongfully listed to the state, and
for that reason the United States refused to grant a patent to the
same, and therefore the bill was filed to enable the government to
issue the patent. But it was also alleged that the Western Pacific
Railroad Company and its successor, the Central Pacific Railroad
Company, did, within three years of the completion of the road,
sell and dispose of the land hereinbefore described to persons
other than defendants. The road was completed December 29, 1869, so
that the sale of the land by the railroad company to others than
the defendants must have been before January, 1873, or nine and
one-half years before the original bill was filed.
The rule in relation to the institution of suit by the Attorney
General of the United States to vacate a patent is thus stated by
Mr. Justice Miller in
United States v. San Jacinto Tin
Company, 125 U. S. 273,
125 U. S.
285:
"But we are of opinion that since the right of the government of
the United States to institute such a suit depends upon the same
general principles which would authorize a private citizen to apply
to a court of justice for relief against an instrument obtained
from him by fraud or deceit, or any of those other practices which
are admitted to justify a court in granting relief, the government
must show that, like the private individual, it has such an
interest in the relief sought as entitles it to move in the matter.
If it be a question of property, a case must be made in which the
court can afford a remedy in regard to that property; if it be a
question of fraud which would render the instrument void, the fraud
must operate to the prejudice of the United States, and if it
is
Page 149 U. S. 672
apparent that the suit is brought for the benefit of some third
party, and that the United States has no pecuniary interest in the
remedy sought and is under no obligation to the party who will be
benefited to sustain an action for his use -- in short, if there
does not appear any obligation on the part of the United States to
the public, or to any individual, or any interest of its own -- it
can no more sustain such an action than any private person could
under similar circumstances."
"In all the decisions to which we have just referred it is
either expressed or implied that this interest or duty of the
United States must exist as the foundation of the right of action.
Of course, this interest must be made to appear in the progress of
the proceedings, either by pleading or evidence, and if there is a
want of it, and the fact is manifest that the suit has actually
been brought for the benefit of some third person, and that no
obligation to the general public exists which requires the United
States to bring it, then the suit must fail. In the case before us,
the bill itself leaves a fair implication that if this patent is
set aside the title to the property will revert to the United
States, together with the beneficial interest in it."
And in
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.
S. 338,
127 U. S. 342,
it was said by Mr. Justice Lamar, delivering the opinion of the
court:
"If a patent is wrongfully issued to one individual which should
have been issued to another, or if two patents for the same land
have been issued to two different individuals, it may properly be
left to the individuals to settle by personal litigation the
question of right in which they alone are interested. But if it
should come to the knowledge of the government that a patent has
been fraudulently obtained, and that such fraudulent patent, if
allowed to stand, would work prejudice to the interests or rights
of the United States or would prevent the government from
fulfilling an obligation incurred by it, either to the public or to
an individual, which personal litigation could not remedy, there
would be an occasion which would make it the duty of the government
to institute judicial proceedings to vacate such patent."
In the case before us, the State of California and its
grantees
Page 149 U. S. 673
claimed title under the United States, as did the railroad
company and its grantees. Either the grantees of the state or the
grantees of the railroad had, when the bill was filed, the title to
the land. No fraud or imposition or wrong as against the United
States was charged, and no case made upon which the United States
sought relief for themselves. Nor was the case one of mistake, in
the sense that the action of the United States and the state would
have not been what it was but for ignorance of particular facts or
of the law. If the state acquired the legal title by the listings,
that legal title passed to its grantees, and if the railroad
company and its grantees acquired an equitable title, no reason is
perceived why the real parties in interest could not litigate their
claims, as between each other. And this was equally true if the
state's selections and the listings were wholly void. No wrong was
chargeable to the state, and if the state and railroad company each
claimed the land in good faith upon mere questions of law and fact,
without any element of wrong or fraud, it does not appear to us
that the bill should be regarded as accomplishing anything more
than raising a controversy between the parties actually in
interest.
Under the railroad grant acts themselves, nothing contained
therein was to impair or defeat any valid claim existing at the
time the line of road was definitely fixed, and upon the face of
this record there can be no question that the claim of the State of
California, based upon its making selections of the lands and
presenting the same for approval, was a claim in good faith, and
the obligation of the United States to the state was as much to be
considered as the obligation of the railroad company, and its
liability to make good the loss was to that one of the parties upon
whom the loss might finally fall.
We are of opinion that, upon the case made, the same principles
must be applied as if the litigation were between private
parties.
In this regard, the case of
United States v. Beebe,
127 U. S. 338, is
exactly in point and of controlling weight. There, a
bona
fide claimant had made a location under a New
Page 149 U. S. 674
Madrid certificate, perfected his claim, and received a
certificate upon which he had become entitled to a patent for the
land. Afterwards, and while the matter was pending, Beebe and
others, as was alleged, by some imposition or fraud, procured a
patent to be issued to them for the same land. Suit was permitted
to be brought in the name of the United States to cancel the Beebe
patent, and the defenses relied on in the court below were (1) the
want of authority in the Attorney General to file a bill for an
annulment of a patent in a case like that; (2) that the claim was
barred by the statute of limitations; (3) that the claim sued on
was stale; (4) that the complainant had no equity to maintain the
suit. It was held by this Court that the United States could
properly proceed, by bill in equity, to have a judicial decree of
annulment and an order of cancellation of a patent issued by
mistake, or procured by fraud, where the government had a direct
interest or was under an obligation respecting the relief sought,
but that, in the language of Mr. Justice Lamar,
"when the government is a mere formal complainant in a suit not
for the purpose of asserting any public right or protecting any
public interest, title, or property, but merely to form a conduit
through which one private person can conduct litigation against
another private person, a court of equity will not be restrained
from administering the equities existing between the real parties
by any exemption of the government, designed for the protection of
the rights of the United States alone. The mere use of its name in
a suit for the benefit of a private suitor cannot extend its
immunity as a sovereign government to said private suitor whereby
he can avoid and escape the scrutiny of a court of equity into the
matters pleaded against him by the other party, nor stop the court
from examining into and deciding the case according to the
principles governing courts of equity in like cases between private
litigants. These principles, so far as they relate to general
statutes of limitation, the laches of a party, and the lapse of
time, have been rendered familiar to the legal mind by the
oft-repeated enunciation and enforcement of them in the decisions
of this Court. According to these decisions, courts of equity, in
general,
Page 149 U. S. 675
recognize and give effect to the statute of limitations as a
defense to an equitable right when at law it would have been
properly pleaded as a bar to a legal right."
The decision of the circuit court in that case, dismissing the
bill on the ground of laches, was sustained because, although Beebe
had procured his patent by fraud and imposition upon the government
or its officers, and the superior right to the land was originally
in others, yet it was apparent that the suit was prosecuted in the
name of the United States only on behalf of private persons, and
therefore should be barred if they were.
Tested by this rule, it is clear that the claim of the railroad
company and its grantees cannot be sustained.
The grant was
in praesenti, and attached upon the
filing of the map of definite location. When the identification of
a granted section became so far complete as to authorize the
grantee to take possession, the legal title of the granted land
passed, and an action for possession could be maintained by the
company or its grantees before the issue of a patent. The patent
would have been evidence that the land named was granted, that the
grantee had complied with the conditions of the grant, and that the
grant was to that extent relieved from the possibility of
forfeiture for breach of its conditions, but was not essential to
transfer the legal right.
Deseret Salt Company v. Tarpey,
142 U. S. 241;
Sioux City Company v. Griffey, 143 U. S.
32.
The company had, on February 1, 1870, whatever title it could
obtain, and whatever rights belonged to it, and its cause of action
then accrued. The land had already been certified to the state by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of
the Interior, and their action in that regard was, in law, the same
as if patents had been issued to the state.
Frasher v.
O'Connor, 115 U. S. 102.
If that action was wholly void, then it was open to collateral
attack, and the railroad company and its grantees could have
brought suit to test the legal title at once.
Doolan v.
Carr, 125 U. S. 618.
If that action was not void, but the Interior Department had
taken mistaken views of the law or drawn erroneous conclusions
Page 149 U. S. 676
from the evidence, and the railroad company and its grantees
possessed such equities as would control the legal title vested in
the state and its grantees, then resort could have been had to a
court of equity for relief.
Smelting Co. v. Kemp,
104 U. S. 636.
In either aspect, the rights of the parties could have been
determined by proceedings on behalf of the company or its grantees
against the patentees of the state or their grantees; but instead
of instituting such proceedings, the railroad company besieged the
principal officers of the Land Department to ignore the action of
their predecessors in office and to exercise a power that had
become
functus officio. Noble v. Union River Logging
Railroad, 147 U. S. 175.
If patents had been issued to the railroad company, then the case
would have been presented of two patents for the same land issued
to two different parties, and, as pointed out in
United States
v. Beebe, the matter might properly be left to those parties
to settle by personal litigation.
This bill was not filed until more than thirteen years after the
cause of action had accrued, and twelve years after the first
patent, and over five years after the last patent, was issued, by
the state, while the selections and purchases thereunder were made
long before.
Under the laws of California, an action may be brought by any
person against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property adverse to him for the purpose of determining such adverse
claim, but no action can be brought for the recovery of real
property, or for possession thereof, or arising out of the title
thereto, unless such action is commenced within five years after
the cause of action shall have accrued, and an action for relief
not otherwise provided for must be commenced within four years.
Code Civil Proc. Cal. §§ 318, 319, 343, 738.
Whether the statute be applied directly or by analogy, or the
rule in equity founded upon lapse of time and staleness of claim,
the delay and laches here are fatal to the maintenance of the
suit.
The ineffectual pressure of the company on the Land
Department
Page 149 U. S. 677
furnished no excuse as between the real parties to this
litigation, and the United States occupied no such relation to the
case as to be entitled to the exemption from litigation and laches
accorded to governments proceeding in their own right.
If, through erroneous action of its officers, the bounty of the
government in the particular instance has not reached those for
whom it was intended, but has reached beneficiaries who were not
intended to have these particular lands, the government may be
relied on to effectuate its own designs and to make good any moral
obligation that rests upon it; but it had not such pecuniary or
other interest in this litigation as entitled it to ask the
suspension of the beneficent rules applied by the courts in the
administration of justice between individuals.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded with a
direction to dismiss the bill.
Mr Justice FIELD, dissenting.
I am not able to agree with the majority of the Court in their
decision of this case. The lands in controversy fall within the
limits of the grant to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, but by
mistake and inadvertence of the Land Department they were listed to
the State of California. Discovering its mistake, the department
refused to issue to the company a patent for the lands to which it
was entitled until the erroneous listing to the state was set aside
and annulled. The present bill was filed by the Attorney General
for that purpose, and because of this proceeding, and the delay of
the company in waiting on its issue instead of taking steps to
enforce its rights at law for the lands, this Court now holds that
it has lost the right to them, and that, as the United States have
no interest in the property, except to clear it of the cloud of the
listing wrongly made, they cannot maintain the suit. The result,
which produces simple injustice to the railroad company without
wrong on its part, ought not, in my judgment, to be upheld.
Page 149 U. S. 678
In
United States v.
Hughes, 11 How. 568, a patent had been issued by
mistake to Hughes in disregard of the prior rights of one Goodbee
and of parties deriving title under him. The United States filed an
information in the nature of a bill in equity against Hughes for
the repeal and surrender of his patent on the ground that its
existence impaired the ability of the government to fulfill its
engagements to Goodbee. The case was before this Court originally
on demurrer, and it was held that the court had jurisdiction to
annul the patent thus improvidently issued. When here a second
time,
71 U. S. 4 Wall.
232, the Court, reaffirming its first decision, said:
"When this case was here on demurrer, the patent was considered
by the court to be a valid instrument, conveying the fee of the
United States, and, until annulled, as rendering them incapable of
complying with their engagement to Goodbee or his alienees. Whether
regarded in that aspect or as a void instrument issued without
authority, it
prima facie passed the title, and therefore
it was the plain duty of the United States to seek to vacate and
annul the instrument to the end that their previous engagement
might be fulfilled by the transfer of a clear title, the only one
intended for the purchaser by the act of Congress. The power of a
court of equity by its decree to vacate and annul the patent, under
the circumstances of this case, is undoubted. Relief, when deeds or
other instruments are executed by mistake or inadvertence of agents
as well as upon false suggestions, is a common head of equity
jurisprudence."
Upon this doctrine, the court below proceeded in this case in
order that the government might discharge its obligation to the
railroad company. It is a case where the government admits the
error of its officers of the Land Department, acknowledges its
obligation to correct it, and seeks to remove from its records the
inadvertent and erroneous certification to the state of the lands
so that it may be able to issue a clear title to the railroad
company, the right of that company having been finally determined,
and thus carry out the pledge of its grant.
There was at no time an admission by the railroad company
Page 149 U. S. 679
of the correctness of the original action of the Land Department
or any acquiescence therein, but, insisting always upon the error
of its proceedings, the company urged upon the department to
correct them and issue to it the patent which the law
authorized.
The case is not, in my judgment, within the doctrine of
United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338,
which would exclude the interference of the United States, but is
within the doctrine which there recognizes and upholds it. In that
case, the original claimant had rested on the action of the Land
Department, and sought the assistance of the United States only
after the lapse of nearly half a century, and it was held that the
interference of the government, after such a lapse of time, was
simply a proceeding to avoid the laches of the claimant, and to
give to him the benefit of its exemption from them. But it declared
that a suit of the United States would lie to set aside a patent
where the government was under an obligation respecting the relief
invoked. In this case, the railroad company has not remained
inactive, but, upon a decision in its favor by the department,
asked for its promised patent, which was only withheld because of
the previous inadvertent and mistaken action of the government's
officers in issuing a certificate to the state. In such
circumstances, the government, it seems to me, ought not to be
debarred the right to correct the mistake of its officers, by which
alone the intention of the law was defeated. I think the decree
below should be affirmed.
