In a prosecution for conspiracy corruptly and by threats and
force to obstruct the due administration of justice in a circuit
court of the United States, the combination of minds for the
unlawful purpose and the overt act in effectuation of that purpose
must appear charged in the indictment.
A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two
or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful purpose or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful
by criminal or unlawful means.
When the criminality of a conspiracy consists in an unlawful
agreement of two or more persons to compass or promote some
criminal or illegal purpose, that purpose must be fully and clearly
stated in the indictment, while if the criminality of the offense
consists in the agreement to accomplish a purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means, the means must
be set out.
An indictment against a person for corruptly or by threats or
force endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede a witness or
officer in a court of the United States in the discharge of his
duty must charge knowledge or notice, or set out facts that show
knowledge or notice, on the part of the accused that the witness or
officer was such.
A person is not sufficiently charged in such case with
obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a
court unless it appear that he knew or had notice that justice was
being administered in such court.
Plaintiffs in error were indicted under sections 5399 and 5440
of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the latter as amended
by the Act of May 17, 1879, 21 Stat. 4, c. 8, which are as
follows:
"SEC. 5399. Every person who corruptly or by threats or force
endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness or
officer in any court of the United States in the discharge of his
duty or corruptly or by threats or force obstructs or impedes or
endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice
therein shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars or by imprisonment not more than three months, or both.
"
Page 148 U. S. 198
"SEC. 5440. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States or to defraud the United States
in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties
to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not more than
ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than two
years, or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court."
The indictment alleged that on May 28, 1892, suit was commenced
in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Idaho
wherein the Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating
Company was complainant, and the Miners' Union of Wardener and
others were defendants; that a writ of injunction was duly and
regularly issued therein by the court, directed to plaintiffs in
error and many others as defendants, which writ of injunction was
set out in full in the indictment, and ordered as follows:
"In the meantime, and until the further order of this court
herein, the said defendants, and each of them, their aiders,
attorneys, officers, agents, servants, and employees be and they
are hereby severally restrained and enjoined from in any manner
interfering with the complainant herein in any of its work in and
upon or about its said mining claims, to-wit, the Bunker Hill, the
Sullivan, and the Small Hopes Lodge mining claims, mentioned in the
complaint herein, or in any part thereof, and from in any manner,
by force or threats or otherwise, making any attempts to intimidate
any employee of the complainant herein, or from attempting to
prevent, by any force or intimidation, any employee of the said
complainant from proceeding to work for the said complainant in a
peaceful, quiet, and lawful manner in and upon any part of the
aforesaid mines or mining claims or in or upon any works of the
said complainant therein or thereabouts, or at all, and that they,
the said parties aforesaid, be, and they are hereby, further
enjoined from intimidating or threatening or by any force, threats
or any intimidation trying to prevent any employee of the
complainant herein from working in or upon the aforesaid mines
mentioned in the complaint herein, or at the
Page 148 U. S. 199
mills of complainant, or in or upon any mining or other property
of complainant, or from preventing anyone from entering the service
of the complainant herein or in any unlawful manner interfering
with the business of said complainant in employing persons to work
upon its said property, or from going upon any part of the said
complainant's property without permission from the complainant or
its agents or employees so to do or in any manner entering upon the
works of the complainant, or within the buildings of the
complainant without its consent or the consent of its managers,
agents, or employees, and reference is hereby had to the bill of
complaint herein, to which your attention is hereby directed, until
the further order of this Court, or the judge thereof, and the
foregoing restraining order is also directed against the agents,
servants, aiders, abettors, members, and associates of the
defendants or either of them."
The indictment thereupon averred that the defendants, on July
11, 1892, and while the writ of injunction was in full force and
effect,
"at Shoshone County, within the Northern Division of the
District of Idaho aforesaid, did unlawfully, corruptly,
fraudulently, and feloniously conspire, combine, confederate, and
agree together to commit an offense against the United States as
follows, to-wit,' said defendants did, then and there, 'unlawfully,
corruptly, fraudulently, and feloniously conspire, combine,
confederate, and agree together to intimidate, by force and threats
of violence, the employees of the said Bunker Hill and Sullivan
Mining and Concentrating Company, then working in and upon the
mines of the said company and within and around the mill and other
buildings of the said company in said Shoshone County, said mines,
mill, and other buildings of said company being then and there the
mines, mill, and other buildings mentioned and described in said
writ of injunction, with the intent then and thereby on the part of
the said"
defendants (naming them)
"to compel the employees of the said Bunker Hill and Sullivan
Mining and Concentrating Company to abandon their work in and upon
the mines, mill, and other buildings of the said mining company
last mentioned;"
that the defendants
"did
Page 148 U. S. 200
then and there further unlawfully, fraudulently, corruptly, and
feloniously conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together to
intimidate, by force and threats of violence, the officers and
agents of the said Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and
Concentrating Company, with the intent then and there and thereby,
by means of said force and threats of violence, to compel the
officers and agents of said mining company to discharge and dismiss
from the employ of the said mining company all employees (other
than such persons as were members of what is called the 'Miners'
Union') who were working either upon or within the mines of the
said company and in the said company's mill and other buildings,
which said last-mentioned mines, mill, and other buildings are the
mines, mill, and other buildings mentioned and described in the
aforesaid writ of injunction issued out of the said United States
circuit court."
The indictment further averred that on July 12, 1892, the
defendants, while the writ of injunction was in full force and
effect, and the suit in which the writ issued was still pending and
undetermined,
"in aid of, and in furtherance of, and for the purpose of
effecting the object of, the said unlawful and malicious
combination and conspiracy, formed and entered into as aforesaid,
and for the purpose and object aforesaid, did on the said 12th day
of July, 1892 at the county and state aforesaid, unlawfully,
fraudulently, corruptly, willfully, and feloniously, by force and
violence and threats of violence, intimidate and compel the
employees of the said Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and
Concentrating Company, then and there working, in and upon the
mines of the said company, and within and around the mill,
property, and other buildings, all the property of said company, to
cease and abandon work in and upon the mines and within and around
the mill, property, and other buildings of said company, said
mines, mill, and other buildings of said company being then and
there the same mines, mill, property, and buildings mentioned and
described in said writ of injunction, and said employees being then
and there in the employ of said company, and did then and there,
unlawfully, corruptly, fraudulently, willfully, and feloniously,
compel
Page 148 U. S. 201
and force the said employees, by the intimidation and violence
and threats of violence aforesaid, to abandon and leave and cease
their said employment under said company, and their work in and
upon the mines, mill, and other buildings of the said mining
company last mentioned."
And the defendants did, by intimidation and violence and threats
of force and violence, intimidate and compel the officers and
agents of said Bunker Hill Company, against their will and consent,
to discharge and dismiss from the service and employment of the
company all its employees other than such persons as were members
of what was called the "Miners' Union," who were then working in
and upon the property of the company.
"And so the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid,
do charge and say that the said" defendants (naming them),
"at the said Shoshone County, within the said Northern Division
of the District of Idaho, did, on the 11th day of July, 1892,
unlawfully, willfully, fraudulently, and feloniously conspire,
combine, confederate, and agree together to commit an offense
against the United States, to-wit, to corruptly, and by force and
threats, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in
the aforesaid United States circuit court for the Ninth Judicial
Circuit, District of Idaho, and did thereafter, on the 12th day of
July, 1892, in pursuance of said unlawful and malicious combination
and conspiracy, unlawfully, willfully and feloniously, in the
manner and form aforesaid, corruptly, and by force and threats of
violence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in
the aforesaid United States circuit court. All of which is contrary
to the form, force, and effect of the United States statutes in
such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of
the United States."
Motions to quash and demurrers were filed and overruled, and,
after verdict, motions in arrest were made and denied. Plaintiffs
in error were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the
Detroit House of Correction, George A. Pettibone, for 2 years, John
Murphy, for 15 months, and M. L. Devine and C. Sinclair, for 18
months each.
This writ of error was thereupon allowed.
Page 148 U. S. 202
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under section 5399, any person who corruptly endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness or officer in any
court of the United States in the discharge of his duty, or
corruptly, or by threats or force, obstructs or impedes or
endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice
therein is punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by
imprisonment not more than three months, or both, and under section
5440, if two or more persons conspire to commit an offense against,
or defraud, the United States, and one or more of them do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties are liable
to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more
than two years or to both. The confederacy to commit the offense is
the gist of the criminality under this section, although, to
complete it, some act to effect the object of the conspiracy is
needed,
United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S.
33.
This is a conviction for conspiracy corruptly and by threats and
force to obstruct the due administration of justice in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Idaho, and the
combination of minds for the unlawful purpose, and the overt act in
effectuation of that purpose, must appear charged in the
indictment.
The general rule in reference to an indictment is that all the
material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the
offense must be stated, and that if any essential element of the
crime is omitted, such Commission cannot be supplied by intendment
or implication. The charge must be made directly, and not
inferentially or by way of recital.
United States v. Hess,
124 U. S. 486.
And in
United States v. Britton, 108 U.
S. 199, it was held, in an indictment for conspiracy
Page 148 U. S. 203
under section 5440 of the Revised Statutes that the conspiracy
must be sufficiently charged, and cannot be aided by averments of
acts done by one or more of the conspirators in furtherance of the
object of the conspiracy.
The courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over
offenses not made punishable by the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States, but they resort to the common law for the
definition of terms by which offenses are designated.
A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two
or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful purpose or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful
by criminal or unlawful means, and the rule is accepted, as laid
down by Chief Justice Shaw in
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4
Metc. 111, that when the criminality of a conspiracy consists in an
unlawful agreement of two or more persons to compass or promote
some criminal or illegal purpose, that purpose must be fully and
clearly stated in the indictment, while if the criminality of the
offense consists in the agreement to accomplish a purpose not in
itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means, the
means must be set out.
This indictment does not in terms aver that it was the purpose
of the conspiracy to violate the injunction referred to or to
impede or obstruct the due administration of justice in the circuit
court, but it states as a legal conclusion from the previous
allegations that the defendants conspired so to obstruct and
impede. It had previously averred that the defendants conspired, by
intimidation, to compel the officers of the mining company to
discharge their employees, and the employees to leave the service
of the company, a conspiracy which was not an offense against the
United States, though it was against the state. Rev.Stats. of
Idaho, § 6541. The injunction was also set out, and it was
alleged that the defendants did intimidate and compel the employees
to abandon work, but the indictment nowhere made the direct charge
that the purpose of the conspiracy was to violate the injunction or
to interfere with proceedings in the circuit court.
Page 148 U. S. 204
The combination to commit an offense against the United States
was averred to consist in a conspiracy against the state, and the
completed act to have been in pursuance of such conspiracy, but the
pleader carefully avoided the direct averment that the purpose of
the confederation was the interruption of the course of justice in
the United States court.
Nor did the indictment charge that the defendants were ever
served with process or otherwise brought into court, or that they
were ever in any manner notified of the issue of the writ or of the
pendency of any proceedings in the circuit court.
That this omission was advisedly made is apparent from the
statement in the bill of exceptions that there was no evidence
given on the trial showing or tending to show that the writ of
injunction mentioned and set forth in the indictment was served
upon the defendants or either or them, or that they or either of
them had any notice or knowledge of the issue thereof.
It was said in
United States v. Carll, 105 U.
S. 611,
105 U. S. 612,
by MR. JUSTICE GRAY, delivering the opinion of the Court:
"In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set
forth the offense in the words of the statute unless those words,
of themselves, fully, directly, and expressly, without any
uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to
constitute the offense intended to be punished, and the fact that
the statute in question, read in the light of the common law, and
of other statutes on the like matter, enables the court to infer
the intent of the legislature does not dispense with the necessity
of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the
case within that intent."
That was the case of an indictment for passing a forged
obligation of the United States, and it was held that by omitting
the allegation that the defendant knew the instrument which he
uttered to be forged, it had failed to charge him with any
crime.
The construction that applies to the first branch of section
5399 must be applied to the second, and if it were essential that
the person accused should know that the witness or officer
Page 148 U. S. 205
was a witness or officer in order to conviction of the charge of
influencing, intimidating, or impeding such witness or officer in
the discharge of his duty, so it must be necessary for the accused
to have knowledge or notice or information of the pendency of
proceedings in the United States court or the progress of the
administration of justice therein before he can be found guilty of
obstructing or impeding or endeavoring to obstruct or impede the
same.
In
United States v. Bittinger, 15 Am.L.Reg. (N.S.) 49,
it was held that a person is a witness, under section 5399 of the
Revised Statutes, who is designated as such, either by the issue of
a subpoena or by the endorsement of his name on the complaint, but
that, before anyone could be said to have endeavored to corruptly
influence a witness under that section, he must have known that the
witness had been properly designated as such.
United States v.
Kee, 39 F. 603.
In
United States v. Keen, 5 Mason, 453, it was ruled by
Mr. Justice Story and Judge Davis that it was no defense to an
indictment for forcibly obstructing or impeding an officer of the
customs, in the discharge of his duty, that the object of the party
was personal chastisement, and not to obstruct or impede the
officer in the discharge of his duty, if he knew the officer to be
so engaged.
In case of that sort it is the official character that creates
the offense, and the
scienter is necessary.
King v.
Osmer, 5 East 304;
King v. Everett, 8 B. and C. 114;
State v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551;
State v. Burt, 25
Vt. 373;
State v. Maloney, 12 R.I. 251;
State v.
Downer, 8 Vt. 429;
Commonwealth v. Israel, 4 Leigh
675;
Yates v. People, 32 N.Y. 509;
Commonwealth v.
Kirby, 2 Cush. 577;
State v. Hilton, 26 Mo. 199;
State v. Smith, 11 Or. 205;
Horan v. State, 7
Tex.App. 183;
Duncan v. State, 7 Humph. 148;
State v.
Hailey, 2 Strob. 73;
State v. Beasom, 70 N.H.
367.
This is so whenever knowledge is an essential ingredient of the
offense and not implied in the statement of the act itself.
Whart.Crim.Pl. & Pr. § 164.
Under section 5398, every person who knowingly and willfully
Page 148 U. S. 206
obstructs, resists, or opposes any officer of the United States,
in serving or attempting to serve or execute any mesne process or
warrant or any rule of or order of any court of the United States
may be imprisoned and fined. It was held in
United States v.
Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatchford 425, that an indictment under this
section must distinctly state and charge that a legal process,
warrant, etc., was issued by a court of the United States and was
in the hands of some officer of the United States for service who
had authority to serve that same, and that after such process was
in the hands of the officer for service, someone knowingly and
willfully obstructed, resisted, or opposed him in serving or
attempting to execute the same. And in
United States v.
Stowell, 2 Curtis 153, it was decided that an averment that
the warrant resisted was issued by a commissioner was not good, but
the facts constituting the due issue must be recited, and the
absence of an averment that the commissioner who issued the warrant
was thereto authorized could not be aided by referring to the court
records.
United States v. Wilcox, 4 Blatchford 391.
It seems clear that an indictment against a person for
corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavoring to influence,
intimidate, or impede a witness or officer in a court of the United
States in the discharge of his duty must charge knowledge or
notice, or set out facts that show knowledge or notice, on the part
of the accused that the witness or officer was such, and the reason
is no less strong for holding that a person is not sufficiently
charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of
justice in a court unless it appears that he knew or had notice
that justice was being administered in such court. Section 5399 is
a reproduction of section 2 of the Act of Congress of March 2,
1831, c. 99, 4 Stat. 487, "declaratory of the law concerning
contempts of court," though proceeding by indictment is not
exclusive if the offense of obstructing justice be committed under
such circumstances as to bring it within the power of the court
under section 725.
Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.
S. 267. In matters of contempt, persons are not held
liable for the breach of a restraining order or injunction unless
they know or have notice, or are chargeable with
Page 148 U. S. 207
knowledge or notice, that the writ has been issued or the order
entered, or at least that application is to be made; but without
service of process or knowledge or notice or information of the
pendency of proceedings, a violation cannot be made out. 2
Dan.Ch.Pr. (4th Amer. ed.) 1684; 2 High on Injunctions (3d ed.)
§§ 1421, 1452;
Winslow v. Nayson, 113 Mass.
411.
Undoubtedly it is a condition of penal laws that ignorance of
them constitutes no defense to an indictment for their violation,
but that rule has no application here. The obstruction of the due
administration of justice in any court of the United States,
corruptly or by threats or force, is indeed made criminal, but such
obstruction can only arise when justice is being administered.
Unless that fact exists, the statutory offense cannot be committed,
and while, with knowledge or notice of that fact, the intent to
offend accompanies obstructive action, without such knowledge or
notice, the evil intent is lacking. It is enough that the thing is
done which the statute forbids, provided the situation invokes the
protection of the law and the accused is chargeable with knowledge
or notice of the situation, but not otherwise.
It is insisted, however, that the evil intent is to be found not
in the intent to violate the United States statute, but in the
intent to commit an unlawful act in the doing of which justice was
in fact obstructed, and that therefore the intent to proceed in the
obstruction of justice must be supplied by a fiction of law. But
the specific intent to violate the statute must exist to justify a
conviction, and, this being so, the doctrine that there may be a
transfer of intent in regard to crimes flowing from general
malevolence has no applicability. 1 Bish.Crim.Law § 335. It is
true that if the act in question is a natural and probable
consequence of an intended wrongful act, then the unintended wrong
may derive its character from the wrong that was intended; but if
the unintended wrong was not a natural and probable consequence of
the intended wrongful act, then this artificial character cannot be
ascribed to it as a basis of guilty intent. The element is wanting
through which such quality might be imparted.
Page 148 U. S. 208
In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731,
illustrates this distinction. There, the acts of Congress and the
statutes of Indiana made it a criminal offense for an inspector of
elections or other election officer to whom was committed the
safekeeping and delivery to the board of canvassers of the poll
books, tally sheets, and certificates of the votes to fail to
perform this duty of safekeeping and delivery, and it was held that
in an indictment in a United States court for a conspiracy to
induce those officers to omit such duty in order that the documents
mentioned might come to the hands of improper persons, who tampered
with and falsified the returns at an election which included a
member of Congress, it was not necessary to allege or prove that it
was the intention of the conspirators to affect the election of the
member of Congress who was voted for at that place the returns of
which were in the same poll books, tally sheets, and certificates
with those for state officers, and that the danger which might
arise from the exposure of the papers to the chance of
falsification or other tampering was not removed because the
purpose of the conspirators was to violate the returns as to state
officers, and not the returns as to the member of Congress.
The general evil intent in tampering with the poll lists, tally
sheets, and certificates was included in the charge, and it was
held that it was not necessary to show that that intent was
specifically aimed at the returns of the vote for Congressman. This
was supported by the analogy of the example that where a man is
charged with a homicide committed by maliciously shooting into a
crowd for the purpose of killing some person against whom he bore
malice, and with no intent to injure or kill the individual who was
actually struck by the shot, he cannot be held excused because he
did not intend to kill that particular person, and had no malice
against him. There, the result naturally followed from the act
done, and it must be presumed to have been in the contemplation of
the party. And so, as the persons accused in
Coy's case
desired and intended to interfere with the election returns, and
purposed to falsify them, the felonious intent which exposed and
subjected the evidences concerning the votes for Congressman
Page 148 U. S. 209
to the opportunity for their falsification, or to the danger of
such changes or forgeries as might affect that election, dispensed
with the necessity of an averment or proof that there was a
specific intent or design to influence the congressional
election.
Nor is this all. The unlawful act which the defendants are
charged with conspiring to commit was not an offense against the
United States, so that, if the defendants were held guilty of a
conspiracy to violate the injunction or interfere with proceedings
about which they knew nothing, such conviction would have to rest
upon a conspiracy to commit an act unlawful in another
jurisdiction, and in itself a separate and distinct offense
therein.
While offenses exclusively against the states are exclusively
cognizable in the state courts and offenses exclusively against the
United States are exclusively cognizable in the federal courts, it
is also settled that the same act or series of acts may constitute
an offense equally against the United States and the state,
subjecting the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each
government.
Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.
S. 131,
132 U. S. 139.
But here we have two offenses in the character of which there is no
identity, and to convict defendants of a conspiracy to obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice in a United States court
because they were guilty of a conspiracy to commit an act unlawful
as against the state, the evil intent presumed to exist in the
latter case must be imputed to them, although ignorance in fact of
the pendency of the proceedings would have otherwise constituted a
defense, and the intent related to a crime against the state.
The power of the United States court was not invoked to prohibit
or to punish the perpetration of a crime against the state. The
injunction rested on the jurisdiction to restrain the infliction of
injury upon the complainant. The criminal character of the
interference may have contributed to strengthen the grounds of the
application, but could not and did not form its basis.
The defendants could neither be indicted nor convicted of a
Page 148 U. S. 210
crime against the state in the circuit court, but their offense
against the United States consisted entirely in the violation of
the statute of the United States by corruptly or by threats or
force impeding or obstructing the due administration of justice. If
they were not guilty of that, they could not be convicted, and
neither the indictment nor the case can be helped out by reference
to the alleged crime against the state, and the defendants be
punished for the latter under the guise of a proceeding to punish
them for an offense which they did not commit.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with
instructions to quash the indictment and discharge the
defendants.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE Brown,
dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case. The burden
of the decision is, as I understand it, that the indictment is
fatally defective because it does not allege that the defendants
knew of the injunction, and also that the conspiracy was to
obstruct the administration of justice in the federal court. In
other words, the defendants cannot be convicted of obstructing the
administration of justice in the federal court, because they did
not know that justice was being there administered, and that, as
they did not combine with the intent of obstructing the
administration of justice, no such intent can in law be imputed to
them. I insist that the true rule is that where parties combine in
an unlawful undertaking -- and by that I mean an undertaking
unlawful in and of itself, and not one simply forbidden by statute,
one which is
malum in se, as distinguished from
malum
prohibitum -- they are amenable to the bar of criminal justice
for every violation of law they in fact commit, whether such
violation is intended or not.
Take the familiar illustration: parties combine to break into a
house and commit burglary. While engaged in the commission of that
offense, resistance being made, one of the party kills the owner of
the house. Can there be a doubt that
Page 148 U. S. 211
they are all guilty of murder, although murder was not the
purpose of the combination and was not in the thought of any but
the single wrongdoer? In other words, they who did not intend
murder, who did not know that murder was in fact being committed,
are ruled to be chargeable with the intent to commit murder and to
be guilty of that offense because they were engaged at the time in
an unlawful undertaking, and the murder was committed in carrying
that undertaking into execution. In 1 Hale P.C. 441, it is said,
quoting from Dalton 241:
"If divers persons come in one company to do any unlawful thing,
as to kill, rob, or beat a man, or to commit a riot, or to do any
other trespass, and one of them, in doing thereof, kill a man, this
shall be adjudged murder in them all that are present of that party
abetting him and consenting to the act or ready to aid him,
although they did but look on."
Also, in 1 East P.C. 257:
"Where divers persons resolve generally to resist all opposers
in the commission of any breach of the peace, and to execute it
with violence or in such a manner as naturally tends to raise
tumults and affrays, as by committing a violent disseisin with
great numbers, or going to beat a man, or rob a park, or standing
in opposition to the sheriff's posse, . . . they must, at their
peril, abide the event of their actions."
In
Weston v. Commonwealth, 111 Penn.St. 251, it was
held that if several persons are with firearms holding a forcible
possession of lands claimed by others, all are guilty of a murder
committed by any one of them therein. In
Williams v.
State, 81 Ala. 1, it appeared that several persons conspired
to invade a man's household, and went to it with deadly arms to
attack and beat him, and in carrying out this purpose one of the
party got into a difficulty with the owner and killed him, and the
others were held guilty of murder, although they did not mean it.
So, in
State v. McCahill, 72 Ia. 111, a case in some
respects like this, it appeared that certain persons combined to
drive employees from premises, and in carrying out this conspiracy
committed a murder, and it was held that the rest, who did not
intend it, were guilty. In that case, on page 117, the court thus
stated the law:
"But
Page 148 U. S. 212
where there is a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful purpose
[as the forcible driving out of the new miners was], and the means
are not specifically agreed upon or understood, each conspirator
becomes responsible for the means used by any coconspirator in the
accomplishment of the purpose in which they are all at the time
engaged."
See also Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34;
Stephens
v. State, 42 Ohio St. 150;
State v. Allen, 47 Conn.
121.
Applying these authorities to this case, if, while these
defendants were thus forcibly driving the employees of the mining
companies away from their work, one of them had shot and killed a
resisting employee, would not all be guilty of murder, although
only the single party had a thought of murder in his heart? Of
course, I do not mean to claim that if a number are engaged in a
single unlawful undertaking, and one of them steps aside and
commits an entirely independent crime, all are responsible for
that; but I do insist that if all are engaged in an unlawful
undertaking, and while so engaged and in carrying out that
undertaking, one commits an additional offense not within the
actual thought and intent of his coconspirators, all are guilty of
that additional offense. And in like manner, where parties conspire
and combine to do an unlawful act, and in carrying that unlawful
purpose into execution they do in fact violate a statute, of whose
terms they may be ignorant, and therefore one which they did not
intend to violate, they are in law guilty of its violation, and may
be punished accordingly. The law under those circumstances imputes
to the wrongdoer the intent to violate every law which he does in
fact violate. So as these parties are guilty of this most unlawful
act, this gross breach of the peace, this act which in and of
itself was a flagrant wrong against the rights of individuals, both
employers and employees, they should be chargeable with the intent
to commit every violation of law which they did in fact commit. And
when parties stop injunctive process, they impede the
administration of justice.
But it is said that this breach of the peace was a disturbance
of only the peace of the State of Idaho, and that this unlawful
Page 148 U. S. 213
aggression was simply a violation of the statutes of that state,
and involved, in and of itself, no infraction of federal law; that
before a conviction can be sustained, it must be alleged and proved
that there was an intent to violate the federal law, and that an
intent of wrong against one sovereignty cannot be imputed to one
who commits a wrong against another sovereignty. The converse of
that has already been settled by this Court in the case of
In
re Coy, 127 U. S. 731.
That was an indictment for a conspiracy, and the conspiracy charged
was to induce, aid, counsel, procure, and advise certain election
officers of the State of Indiana to unlawfully neglect and omit to
perform the duties of the election laws of that state. The
indictment, it is true, described the election as one at which a
Congressman was to be elected, but did not charge any intent or
conspiracy to do anything affecting the election of such
Congressman, and the point -- and the main point -- presented was
that the indictment contained no averment of an intent and purpose
of the defendants to affect in any manner the election of a member
of Congress, or to influence the returns relating to that office,
but this Court held that the objection was not well taken. MR.
JUSTICE FIELD alone dissented from the opinion in that case,
holding that, as it is insisted here, there should be a specific
charge of a conspiracy to do something affecting the election of
the federal officer. I quote this from his opinion:
"The indictment in this case charges a conspiracy to induce
certain election officers appointed under the laws of Indiana to
commit a crime against the United States, the crime being the
alleged omission by them to perform certain duties imposed by the
laws of that state respecting elections. But it contains no
allegation that the alleged conspiracy was to affect the election
of a member of Congress, which, as said above, appears to me to be
essential to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the
court. If the conspiracy was to affect the election of a state
officer, no offense was committed cognizable in the district court
of the United States. If it had any other object than to affect the
election of a member of Congress, it was a matter exclusively for
the cognizance of the state courts."
It seems to
Page 148 U. S. 214
me that in this opinion the Court endorses the views expressed
by MR. JUSTICE FIELD in that dissent and then repudiated by a
majority of the Court.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE BROWN agrees with me in
this dissent.
