Hamblin's claim to the land rests upon the fact that in
February, 1884, nearly eleven years after the issue of the patent,
he took possession and made application to enter it under the
homestead laws of the United States. This application apparently
failed, and he made a second application in September, 1885. The
built a house upon the land and made other improvements, and has
resided on it since March, 1884. It does not appear that the Land
Department ever recognized any right in him to enter the land, so
that his only claim is based upon the fact of occupation, made, as
he says, with a view to entering it as a homestead.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is doubtful whether there is a federal question in this case.
A real, and not a fictitious, federal question is essential to the
jurisdiction of this Court over the judgments of state courts.
Millinger v.
Hartupee, 6 Wall. 258;
New Orleans v.
Waterworks Co., 142 U. S. 79,
142 U. S. 87. In
the latter case, it was said that
"the bare averment of a federal question is not in all cases
sufficient. It must not be wholly without foundation. There must be
at least color of ground for such averment, otherwise a federal
question might be set up in almost any case, and the jurisdiction
of this Court invoked simply for the purpose of delay. "
Page 147 U. S. 533
Now in ordinary cases, it would not be doubted that a party
entering upon vacant land, the title to which had been conveyed
from the general government by patent to an individual, could not
create a federal question, such as to give this Court jurisdiction
over the judgment of the highest court of the state by simply
averring that such possession was taken with a view of entering the
land under the homestead laws of the United States, and that he
went through the form of making application to the local land
office for permission to make such entry; for if he could, as is
suggested in the foregoing quotation from 142 U.S., almost any case
in ejectment could be taken from the supreme court of a state to
this. In order that such claim of the party in possession may raise
a genuine federal question, there must be some reason to believe
that the apparent legal title transferred by the patent from the
United States was wrongfully conveyed and that the real title in
fact remains in the government, and whether there be such shadow
upon the legal title of the land company that the denial of
Hamblin's right to enter the land as a homestead presents a
genuine, rather than a fictitious, federal question is a doubtful
matter. We must therefore investigate not merely the instruments by
which the legal title passed to the land company, but the
legislation and proceedings claimed to give authority therefor.
On May 12, 1864, Congress passed an act granting lands to the
State of Iowa to aid in the construction of two railroads. 13 Stat.
72. So much of the first section as is material for the question
here involved is as follows:
"That there be, and is hereby, granted to the State of Iowa, for
the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from Sioux
City, in said state, to the south line of the State of Minnesota at
such point as the said State of Iowa may select between the Big
Sioux and the west fork of the Des Moines River; also to said state
for the use and benefit of the McGregor Western Railroad Company,
for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from a
point at or near the foot of Main Street, South McGregor, in said
state, in a westerly direction, by the most practicable route, on
or near the forty-third parallel of north
Page 147 U. S. 534
latitude, until it shall intersect the said road running from
Sioux City to the Minnesota state line, in the County of O'Brien,
in said state."
It will be noticed that the road of the McGregor Company was to
proceed westerly, on or near the forty-third parallel, to an
intersection with the Sioux City road, in the County of O'Brien. On
August 30, 1864, that company filed in the General Land Office a
map of the definite location of its line. This line extended
westwardly to a point in section 19, township 95, range 40, in
O'Brien County, where it was then expected that a junction would be
formed with the Sioux City road. In July, 1867, the Sioux City
Company filed its map of definite location. Both of these maps were
approved. The line of the Sioux City Company ran through the
northwest corner of O'Brien County, and the western terminus of the
McGregor Company's line, as located, was about nine miles south and
twelve miles east of the point at which the Sioux City line entered
O'Brien County on the west. The McGregor line did not, therefore,
intersect with the Sioux City line in O'Brien County, nor come
nearer to it than 17 or 18 miles. It will be noticed that under the
statute, the Sioux City line was not to be located so as to
intersect with the McGregor line, but the latter was to proceed in
a westerly direction, and intersect the Sioux City line. In other
words, the Sioux City Company had the primary right of location,
the McGregor Company the subordinate, and the latter company was to
locate its line in a westerly direction, so as to connect with the
Sioux City line wherever located in O'Brien County. So, although
the McGregor Company's map of definite location was approved when
filed, yet, after the filing and approval of the map of definite
location of the Sioux City Company's line, the location made by the
McGregor Company was questioned as not in conformity with the terms
of the act, and on September 2, 1869, a new map of definite
location was filed, and this has since been recognized by the Land
Department as the true line of definite location. On March 15,
1870, and May 11, 1870, the local land offices were instructed by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office to recognize this as
the true line, and to restore to the public domain such lands
Page 147 U. S. 535
reserved upon the location in 1864 as did not come within the
ten-mile limit of the location of 1869. In other words, so far as
it could, the Land Department set aside the location made in 1864,
and approved and adopted that made in 1869. The land in controversy
is within ten miles of the line of the McGregor Company's line as
located in 1869, but is west of the terminus of the McGregor
Company's line as located in 1864, and therefore not within the
place or indemnity limits as determined by that location. It is
also within the indemnity limits of the Sioux City Company's line.
It appears from the recitals in the patent to the state in 1873
that the land in controversy was selected as indemnity land for the
Sioux City Company, and was patented to the state for the use and
benefit of that company. With reference to the subsequent
proceedings, it is sufficient to say that the Chicago, Milwaukee
and St. Paul Railroad Company succeeded, under legislation of the
State of Iowa, to the rights of the McGregor Company, and
constructed its road on nearly the line of 1869, and so as to
intersect with the Sioux City road; that the litigation in the
circuit court was between the Sioux City Company and the Milwaukee
Company; that the outcome of that litigation was an adjudication of
the rights of the Milwaukee Company to this land, and that, in
pursuance of that litigation, the legal title thereto was conveyed
by the state to the Milwaukee Company.
Now the contention of plaintiff in error is that after the
approval by the Land Department of the map of definite location
filed in 1864 by the McGregor Company, the powers of that company
in respect to a location were exhausted, and as authority therefor
reference is made to the cases of
Van Wyck v. Knevals,
106 U. S. 360,
106 U. S. 366,
and
Walden v. Knevals, 114 U. S. 373. In
the former of these cases, this Court said:
"But when a route is adopted by the company and a map
designating it is filed with the Secretary of the Interior and
accepted by that officer, the route is established. It is, in the
language of the act, 'definitely fixed,' and cannot be the subject
of future change so as to affect the grant except upon legislative
consent."
Congress never having assented to a change,
Page 147 U. S. 536
it is claimed that the only valid location was that in 1864, and
that the land in controversy, not being coterminous with the line
as then established, never came within the terms of the grant, but
remained absolutely the property of the government, notwithstanding
the error of the ministerial officers of the government in
executing a patent to the state. It may be observed in reply first
that in all the cases in which this question of the finality of a
location has been before this Court, the line as located conformed
to and satisfied all the terms of the granting act, and the
decision was that such a line, having been once definitely located,
could not be changed, while in the case at bar, the line as located
in 1864 did not satisfy the terms of the act, because it failed to
intersect in O'Brien County with that of the Sioux City Company. Of
course, until the line of the Sioux City Company was definitely
located, it was impossible for the McGregor Company to determine
where it could intersect with it, and it may be that the line of
1864 was justly considered as only a temporary and provisional one,
so at least it seems to have been regarded by the Land Department,
and we are not prepared to say that its decision was not
correct.
But it is unnecessary to decide, and we do not rest the case
upon, this question. It is referred to as perhaps throwing such a
shadow upon the record title of the land company as to justify us
in holding that a real, and not fictitious, federal question was
presented, for on other grounds the ruling of the Supreme Court of
Iowa was unquestionably correct. In the first place, whether the
location of the line in 1869 was of any validity or not, it was in
fact accepted by the Land Department, and by the letters of March
15 and May 11, 1870, the land in controversy was, with others,
withdrawn to satisfy the grant as determined by that location, and
such a reservation by the Interior Department, it is well settled,
operates to withdraw the land from entry under the preemption or
homestead laws.
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Co., 5 Wall. 681;
Wolsey v. Chapman,
101 U. S. 755;
Bullard v. Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railroad,
122 U. S. 167;
United States v. Des Moines Navigation &c. Co.,
142 U. S. 510. As,
therefore, the
Page 147 U. S. 537
land was so situated that Hamblin could not make a valid
homestead entry, it follows that he is not in a position to
question the conveyance of the legal title by the patent from the
government.
But further, the land was within the indemnity limits of the
Sioux City road. It was therefore land which might be selected by
that company to supply any deficiency in the granted lands, and the
patent from the United States shows that it was so selected, and it
was patented to the state for the use and benefit of that company.
There is nothing in the record to show that such selection was not
properly made or that the land was not rightfully conveyed to the
state for the benefit of that company unless it be the decree of
the circuit court, and that decree, if conclusive in this
litigation, establishes the validity of the line located in 1869,
and the rights of the Milwaukee Company to the land by virtue of
the grant and that location. Of course Hamblin is in no position to
insist upon any rights of the Sioux City Company, and the case
stands thus: the patent to the state for the use and benefit of the
Sioux City Company was valid unless the location in 1869 of the
McGregor Company's line was valid. If the latter was valid, then
the patent should have been issued to the state for the benefit of
the Milwaukee Company. The question of right as between the two
railroad companies has been settled by judicial decision, and
Hamblin is in no position to question the force and effect of that
decision. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa was
unquestionably right.
Affirmed.