Adverse possession of real estate in the District of Columbia,
for the period designated by the statute of limitations in force
there, confers upon the occupant a complete title upon which he can
stand as fully as if he had always held the undisputed title of
record.
A possession, to be adverse, must be open, visible, continuous
and exclusive, with a claim of ownership, such as will notify
parties seeking information upon the subject that the premises are
not held in subordination to any title or claim of others, but
against all titles and claimants.
A person who has acquired title by adverse possession may
maintain a bill
Page 144 U. S. 534
in equity against those who, but for such acquisition, would
have been the owners for the purpose of having his title judicially
ascertained and declared, and to enjoin the defendants from
asserting title to the same premises from former ownership that has
been lost.
Such a bill is not a bill of peace, nor is it strictly a bill
quia timet.
The ground of the jurisdiction is the obvious difficulty and
embarrassment in asserting and protecting a title not evidenced by
any record, but resting in the recollection of witnesses, and the
warrant for its exercise is found in the ordinary jurisdiction of
equity to perfect and complete the means by which the right, estate
or interest of holders of real property, that is their title, may
be proved or secured, or to remove obstacles to its enjoyment.
The Court stated the case as follows:
This is a suit in equity to establish, as matter of record, the
title of the complainants to certain real property in the City of
Washington, constituting a part of Square No. 151, and to enjoin
the defendants from asserting title to the same premises as heirs
of the former owner.
The facts which give rise to it, briefly stated, are as follows:
in 1828, Thomas Tudor Tucker died seised of the premises in
controversy. He had at one time held the office of Treasurer of the
United States, and resided in Washington, but at the time of his
death he was a resident of South Carolina. The property did not
pass under his will, but descended to his heirs at law. It does not
appear that after his death any of the heirs took possession of the
property or assumed to exercise any control over it. In 1837, the
square was sold for delinquent taxes assessed by the city against
"the heirs of Thomas T. Tucker," and was purchased by Joseph
Abbott, then a resident of the city. The taxes amounted to $38.76,
and the sum bid by the purchaser was $250. In 1840, a tax deed in
conformity with the sale was made to Abbott, purporting to convey
to him a complete title to the square. It is admitted that the deed
was invalid for want of some of the essential preliminaries in
assessing the property and in advertising it for sale. It does not
appear, however, that the purchaser had any knowledge of this
invalidity. Early in the following year, 1841, he took possession
of the square and
Page 144 U. S. 535
enclosed it with a board fence and a ditch with a hedge planted
on one side of it. It was a substantial enclosure, sufficient to
turn stock and keep them away. He was a stablekeeper, and, in
connection with this business, cultivated the ground and raised
crops upon it in 1841. From the time he took possession until 1854,
the square was enclosed, and each season it was cultivated. In
1854, he leased the square to one Becket for the period of ten
years at a yearly rent of $100. Becket took possession under his
lease, and kept the ground substantially enclosed, and he occupied
and cultivated it from that time up to 1862. In the fall of that
year, soldiers of the United States, returning from the campaign in
Virginia, were encamped upon the square, and, as it appears, they
committed such depredations upon the fence, buildings, and crops
that the lessee was obliged to abandon its cultivation. Abbott died
in April, 1861, and by his will devised the square to his widow. In
August, 1863, she sold and conveyed it to one Perry, and he kept a
man in charge of the same, who lived in a small building which
Becket had built and occupied during his lease of the premises
under Abbott. In 1868, Perry sold the entire square to Henry A.
Willard for the consideration of $17,600. He divided the square
into small lots for buildings for residences, and upon one side of
the square, fronting on T Street, erected 12 substantial dwelling
houses, which have been since occupied up to the commencement of
this suit. In 1872, Willard sold and conveyed a portion of the
square, the premises in controversy, to J. M. Latta, trustee, for a
valuable consideration, and from him the title has passed by
regular conveyances to the complainants herein. From 1840 to 1863,
the square was chiefly valuable for agricultural purposes, but
since then, and especially of late years, its only value has been
for buildings as residences, and has been so regarded by its
owners. From 1840 up to the present time, the taxes upon the
property have been paid by Abbott and his successors in interest.
None of the heirs of Mr. Tucker, nor anyone claiming under the
heirs, has paid or offered to pay any taxes assessed on the
property, nor since that date
Page 144 U. S. 536
up to the commencement of these suits have any of the defendants
therein or their predecessors in interest asserted any claim to the
property or interest in it or attempted in any way to interfere
with its possession or control. Soon after the sale to Perry, in
1863, the tax deed was passed upon by eminent counsel in the
District -- the late Richard S. Coxe and James M. Carlisle -- and
the title by it was pronounced by them to be indisputable. It was
only a short time before the institution of this suit that the
invalidity of the tax deed as a source of title was ascertained. A
desire to dispose of the property led the complainants to have an
investigation made and an abstract of title obtained. It was then
discovered that they could not obtain any abstract of title which
purchasers would accept in consequence of certain defects in the
assessment of the taxes under which the sale was made and the deed
to Abbott was executed. They were consequently embarrassed and
defeated in their efforts to dispose of the property. To remove
this embarrassment, this suit was accordingly brought by the
complainants to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of
their title and injunction against the defendants claiming under
the previous owner.
There was no substantial disagreement between the parties as to
the facts, but the defendants insisted and relied solely upon the
ground that a court of equity could afford no relief to the
complainants because they were not at the commencement of the suit
in actual possession of the premises.
The court below at special term sustained this view, and entered
a decree dismissing the bill. At general term it affirmed that
decree, and to review this last decree the case is brought here by
appeal.
Page 144 U. S. 540
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The title of the complainants is founded upon the adverse
possession of themselves and parties through whom the derive their
interests, under claim and color of title, for a period exceeding
the statutory time which bars an action for the recovery of land
within the District of Columbia. The statute of limitation to such
cases in force in the District is that of 21 James I, c. 16. That
statute, passed "for quieting of men's estates and avoiding of
suits," among other things,
Page 144 U. S. 541
declared that no person or persons should at any time thereafter
make any entry into any lands, tenements, or hereditaments but
within twenty years next after his or their right or title shall
thereafter have first descended or accrued to the same, and that in
default thereof such persons not entering, and their heirs, should
be utterly excluded and debarred from such entry thereafter to be
made, any former law or statute to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Twenty years is therefore the period limited for entry upon any
lands within this District after the claimant's title has accrued.
After the lapse on that period, there is no right of entry upon
lands against the party in possession, and all actions to enforce
any such alleged right are barred. Complete possession, the
character of which is hereafter stated, of real property in the
District for that period, with a claim of ownership, operates
therefore to give the occupant title to the premises. No one else,
with certain exceptions -- as infants, married women, lunatics, and
persons imprisoned or beyond the seas, who may bring their action
within ten years after the expiration of their disability -- can
call his title in question. He can stand on his adverse possession
as fully as if he had always held the undisputed title of
record.
The decisions of the courts have determined the character of the
possession which will thus bar the right of the former owner to
recover real property. It must be an open, visible, continuous, and
exclusive possession, with a claim of ownership, such as will
notify parties seeking information upon the subject that the
premises are not held in subordination to any title or claim of
others, but adversely to all titles and all claimants. In the
present cases, the adverse possession of the grantors of the
complainants, sufficient to bar the right of previous owners, is
abundantly established within the most strict definition of that
term.
The objection of the defendants to the jurisdiction of a court
of equity in this case arises from confounding it with a bill of
peace and an ordinary bill
quia timet, to neither of which
classes does it belong, nor is it governed by the same principles.
Bills of peace are of two kinds: first, those
Page 144 U. S. 542
which are brought to establish a right claimed by the plaintiff,
but controverted by numerous parties having distinct interests
originating in a common source. A right of fishery asserted by one
party, and controverted by numerous riparian proprietors on the
river, is an instance given by Story where such a bill will lie. In
such cases, a court of equity will interfere and bring all the
claimants before it in one proceeding to avoid a multiplicity of
suits. A separate action at law, with a single claimant, would
determine nothing beyond the respective rights of the parties as
against each other, and such a contest with each claimant might
lead to interminable litigation. To put at rest the controversy and
determine the extent of the rights of the claimants of distinct
interests in a common subject, the bill lies, which is thus
essentially one for peace. Second, bills of peace of the other kind
lie where the right of the plaintiff to real property has been
unsuccessfully assailed in different actions, and is liable to
further actions of the same character, and are brought to put an
end to the controversy. "The equity of the plaintiff in such cases
arose," as we said in
Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S.
15,
110 U. S.
19,
"from the protracted litigation for the possession of the
property which the action of ejectment at common law permitted.
That action being founded upon a fictitious demise between
fictitious parties, a recovery in one action constituted no bar to
another similar action, or to any number of such actions. A change
in the date of the alleged demise was sufficient to support a new
action. Thus, the party in possession, though successful in every
instance, might be harassed and vexed, if not ruined, by a
litigation constantly renewed. To put an end to such litigation and
give repose to the successful party, courts of equity interfered
and closed the controversy. To entitle the plaintiff to relief in
such cases, the concurrence of three particulars was essential: he
must have been in possession of the property; he must have been
disturbed in its possession by repeated actions at law, and he must
have established his right by successive judgments in his favor.
Upon these facts' appearing, the court would interpose and grant a
perpetual injunction to quiet the possession of the plaintiff
against any further
Page 144 U. S. 543
litigation from the same source. It was only in this way that
adequate relief could be afforded against vexations litigation and
the irreparable mischief which it entailed. Adams on Equity 202;
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 248;
Stark v.
Starr, 6 Wall. 402;
Curtis v. Sutter, 15
Cal. 259;
Shepley v. Rangely, 2 Ware 242;
Devonsher v.
Newenham, 2 Schoales & Lef. 199."
It is only where bills of peace of this kind -- more commonly
designated as bills to remove a cloud on title and quiet the
possession to real property -- are brought that proof of the
complainant's actual possession is necessary to maintain the suit.
Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552,
121 U. S.
556.
There is no controversy such as here stated in the present case.
The title of the complainants is not controverted by the
defendants, nor is it assailed by any actions for the possession of
the property, and this is not a suit to put an end to any
litigation of the kind. It is a suit to establish the title of the
complainants as matter of record -- that is, by a judicial
determination of its validity -- and to enjoin the assertion by the
defendants of a title to the same property from the former owners,
which has been lost by the adverse possession of the parties
through whom the complainants claim. The title by adverse
possession, of course, rests on the recollection of witnesses, and,
by a judicial determination of its validity against any claim under
the former owners, record evidence will be substituted in its
place. Embarrassments in the use of the property by the present
owners will be thus removed. Actual possession of the property by
the complainants is not essential to maintain a suit to obtain in
this way record evidence of their title, to which they can refer in
their efforts to dispose of the property.
The difference between this case and an ordinary bill
quia
timet is equally marked. A bill
quia timet is
generally brought to prevent future litigation as to property by
removing existing causes of controversy as to its title. There is
no controversy here as to the title of the complainants. The
adverse possession of the parties through whom they claim was
complete within the most exacting judicial definition of the term.
It is now well settled that, by adverse possession for the
period
Page 144 U. S. 544
designated by the statute, not only is the remedy of the former
owner gone, but his title has passed to the occupant, so that the
latter can maintain ejectment for the possession against such
former owner should he intrude upon the premises. In several of the
states this doctrine has become a positive rule by their statutes
of limitations, declaring that uninterrupted possession for the
period designated to bar an action for the recovery of land shall
of itself constitute a complete title.
Leffingwell v.
Warren, 2 Black 599;
Campbell v. Holt,
115 U. S. 620,
115 U. S.
623.
"As a general doctrine," says Angell in his treatise on
Limitations,
"it has too long been established to be now in the least degree
controverted that what the law deems a perfect possession, if
continued without interruption during the whole period which is
prescribed by the statute for the enforcement of the right of
entry, is evidence of a fee. Independently of positive or statute
law, the possession supposes an acquiescence in all persons
claiming an adverse interest, and upon this acquiescence is founded
the presumption of the existence of some substantial reason (though
perhaps not known), for which the claim of an adverse interest was
forborne. Not only every legal presumption, but every consideration
of public policy requires that this evidence of right should be
taken to be of very strong, if not of conclusive, force."
As the complainants have the legal right to the premises in
controversy, and as no parties deriving title from the former
owners can contest that title with them, there does not seem to be
any just reason why the relief prayed should not be granted. Such
relief is among the remedies often administered by a court of
equity. It is a part of its ordinary jurisdiction to perfect and
complete the means by which the right, estate, or interest of
parties -- that is, their title, -- may be proved or secured, or to
remove obstacles which hinder its enjoyment. 1 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, vol. 1, sec. 171. The form of the remedy will vary
according to the particular circumstances of each case. "It is
absolutely impossible," says Pomeroy in his treatise,
"to enumerate all the special kinds of relief which may be
granted or to place any bounds to the
Page 144 U. S. 545
power of the courts in shaping the relief in accordance with the
circumstances of particular cases. As the nature and incidents of
proprietary rights and interests and of the circumstances attending
them and of the relations arising from them are practically
unlimited, so are the kinds and forms of specific relief applicable
to these circumstances and relations."
In
Blight's v. Banks, 6 T.B.Monroe 192, a bill was
filed by the complainant to supply the want of certain records or
conveyances under which he claimed title, said to have been
executed and lost. A patent had been issued by the Commonwealth of
Virginia for a large amount of property which, by various
intermediate conveyances, had become vested in the complainant.
These conveyances had not been recorded, and on that ground the
complainant alleged that his title was in jeopardy from creditors
and innocent purchasers, that with great difficulty any title could
be established at law, because the conveyances could not be given
in evidence without parol proof, and that some of the witnesses
were dead and some of the original conveyances were lost, and could
not be found. His prayer was that his title might be rendered
complete as a recorded title by the decree of the chancellor. The
first question made in the case by the defendant was as to the
jurisdiction of the court. It was contended that such omissions in
completing a defective title were generally the fault of the
grantees, and that equity would not sustain a bill for that
purpose. But the Court of Appeals of Kentucky replied that it could
not doubt the propriety of the interference of the chancellor in
such case. "Equity," said the court,
"will frequently interfere to remove difficulties in land titles
where a party cannot proceed without difficulty at law, where the
conveyances are lost or in the possession of the opposite party, or
where the parties are numerous and the proof hard of access, and in
many such cases it will lighten the burden, and settle many
controversies, and bring them into a small scope. And where the
title is purely legal, for such and similar causes to those we have
enumerated, equity has carved out a branch of jurisdiction, and a
class of bills, termed in the books 'ejectment bills,' in which not
only the title is made clear,
Page 144 U. S. 546
but the possession decreed also. No reason is perceived by us
why the present case is not within the spirit of these cases. The
difficulties in an unrecorded title, especially if it is derived
through a long chain of conveyances, are familiar to our courts in
this country. The danger to which the title is exposed from two
classes of persons, creditors and subsequent purchasers, is often
great, and the facilities afforded from a title which can be read
in evidence without other proof than the authentication annexed are
felt by everyone who has to bring his title into court for attack
or defense, and the present case will furnish a good comment on the
propriety of the interference of the chancellor."
The court therefore decreed the relief prayed. On a petition for
a rehearing, it reviewed its former opinion, the main point of
which was the jurisdiction of the court of equity over the bill,
and said:
"It is true that bills to make legal titles which are valid
against all the world, except two descriptions of persons, recorded
titles, and thus to protect them from creditors and innocent
purchasers, have not been frequent. But if such bills cannot be
allowed under one state of conveyances, it must certainly be said
that there is a defect of justice in our country. A court of common
law can give no relief in such a case, and if equity cannot do it,
then is the case a hopeless one. If, however, the principles which
govern courts of equity are examined, it will be found that there
are many circumstances in this case, independent of defective
conveyances, which sustain the jurisdiction."
Pp. 220-221.
See also Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran,
142 U. S. 417,
142 U. S.
419.
In
Horde v. Baugh, 7 Humph. 576, 578, a bill was filed
by the complainant asking the aid of a court of chancery to set up
a deed of bargain and sale, which was lost or destroyed before
registration, the bargainor having died without executing another.
The chancellor below dismissed the bill upon the ground that the
bargainor, having once conveyed the land, had parted with all his
interest therein, and that the court had no jurisdiction of such a
case. But the Supreme Court of Tennessee thought the chancellor
erred, saying:
"The loss of the deed is a casualty seriously endangering the
complainant's
Page 144 U. S. 547
title, as he can maintain no action of ejectment without it. He
then certainly must have a right to ask the aid of a court of
chancery in his case, either by having the legal title vested in
him as against the bargainor and his representatives or by having
the deed set up and established as in all other cases of lost
deeds. The complainant may have his decree for either or both of
these remedies."
In
Montgomery v. Kerr, 6 Coldwell 199, the same court
sustained a bill and established the complainant's title where a
deed of the property had been lost. The decree was that the
complainant was entitled, by virtue of and under his deed, to hold
the premises in fee simple, and that the defendant had no right,
title, or interest therein.
In
Bohart v. Chamberlain, 99 Mo. 622, 631, the proof
showed that a deed of trust which had been executed by defendant to
the plaintiff had been subsequently lost without being recorded.
The court, on being satisfied of the correctness of the finding of
the lower court to this effect, said:
"No doubt is entertained that a court of equity would have
jurisdiction to afford the relief prayed for in the petition. One
of the most common interpositions of equity is in the case of lost
deeds and instruments. A court of equity, in case of the loss of an
instrument which affects the title or affords a security, will
direct a reconveyance to be made. Citing
Stokoe v. Robson,
19 Ves. 385; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. Secs. 81, 84;
Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 42 N.H. 109; 1 Mad.Ch. 24; Fonblanque's Equity c. 1,
sec. 3."
And the court added that
"under the authorities cited, the lower court might have
directed a re-execution of the deed of trust; but, as its powers
were flexible, it could accomplish the same object by a declaratory
decree establishing the existence of the deed in question. 2
Pomeroy's Eq. Sec. 827;
Garrett v. Lynch, 45 Ala. 204; 1
Pomeroy's Eq. Secs. 171, 429."
Many other authorities to the same purport might be cited. They
are only illustrative of the remedies afforded by courts of equity
to remove difficulties in the way of owners of property using and
enjoying it fully when, from causes beyond their control, such use
and enjoyment are obstructed. The
Page 144 U. S. 548
form of relief will always be adapted to the obstacles to be
removed. The flexibility of decrees of a court of equity will
enable it to meet every emergency. Here, the embarrassments to the
complainants in the use and enjoyment of their property are obvious
and insuperable except by relief through that court. No existing
rights of the defendants will be impaired by granting what is
prayed, and the rights of the complainants will be placed in a
condition to be available. The same principle which leads a court
of equity, upon proper proof, to establish by its decree the
existence of a lost deed, and thus make it a matter of record, must
justify it, upon like proof, in declaring by its decree the
validity of a title resting in the recollection of witnesses, and
thus make the evidence of the title a matter of record. It is
therefore
Ordered that the decree of the court below be reversed, and
the cause remanded to that court with directions to enter a decree
declaring the title of the complainants to the premises described
in their complaint, by adverse possession of the parties through
whom they claim to be complete, and that the defendants be enjoined
from asserting title to the said premises through their former
owner. Each party to pay his own costs.
