The title of the Des Moines Navigation and Railway Company to
lands granted to the Territory of Iowa for the purpose of aiding in
the improvement of the navigation of the Des Moines River by the
Act of August 8, 1846, 9 Stat. 77, c. 103, and to the State of Iowa
for a like purpose by the joint resolution of March 2, 1861, 12
Stat. 251, and by the
Page 142 U. S. 511
Act of July 12, 1862, 12 Stat. 543, c. 161, having been
sustained by this Court in eight litigations between private
parties, to-wit: in
Dubuque & Pacific Railroad
v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66;
Wolcott v.
Des Moines Co., 5 Wall. 681;
Williams
v. Baker, 17 Wall. 144;
Homestead
Co. v. Valley Railroad, 17 Wall. 153;
Wolsey v.
Chapman, 101 U. S. 755;
Litchfield v. Webster County, 101 U.
S. 773;
Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad v. Des
Moines Valley Railroad, 109 U. S. 329, and
Bullard v. Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railroad,
122 U. S. 167, is
now held to be good against the United States, as a grant
in
praesenti.
It is an undoubted proposition of law that the grantor of lands
conveyed in trust is the only party to challenge the title in the
hands of the trustee, or others holding under him, on account of a
breach of that trust.
It appearing that the United States is only a nominal party,
whose aid is sought to destroy the title of the Navigation Company
and its grantees in order to enable settlers to protect their
titles, initiated by settlement and occupancy, the Court holds the
case of
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.
S. 338, to be applicable, where it was held that when a
suit is brought in the name of the United States to enforce the
rights of individuals, and no interest of the government is
involved, the defense of laches and limitations will be sustained
as though the government were out of the case.
Where relief can be granted only by setting aside an evidence of
title issued by the government, in the orderly administration of
the affairs of the Land Department, the evidence in support must be
clear, strong and satisfactory.
A general averment of fraud in a bill in equity, though
repeated, is to be taken as qualified and limited by the specific
facts set forth to show wherein the transaction was fraudulent, and
in such case demurrer to the bill admits only the truth of the
facts so set forth and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.
The knowledge and good faith of a legislature are not open to
question, but the presumption is conclusive that it acted with full
knowledge and in good faith, and in this case the circumstances
surrounding the transaction not only preclude the idea of
misconduct or ignorance on the part of the legislature, but it is
clear that the Navigation Company was a
bona fide
purchaser within the meaning of the resolution of 1861, and
intended as a beneficiary thereunder.
The Court stated the case as follows:
On August 8, 1846, an act was passed by the Congress of the
United States granting certain lands to the then Territory of Iowa,
to aid in the improvement of the navigation of the Des Moines
River, 9 Stat. 77. The first section defined the extent of the
grant, and is in these words:
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives
Page 142 U. S. 512
of the United States of America in Congress assembled
that there be, and hereby is, granted to the Territory of Iowa, for
the purpose of aiding said territory to improve the navigation of
the Des Moines River from its mouth to the Raccoon Fork (so-called)
in said territory, one equal moiety, in alternate sections of the
public lands (remaining unsold, and not otherwise disposed of,
encumbered, or appropriated) in a strip five miles in width on each
side of said river, to be selected within said territory by an
agent or agents to be appointed by the Governor thereof, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States."
On January 9, 1847, the territory in the meantime having become
a state, its first General Assembly passed a joint resolution
accepting this grant. A question soon arose as to its extent. The
northern limit of the improvement was the Raccoon Fork, and the
contention on one side was that the grant extended no further than
the improvement, and on the other that, there being no limitation
in the granting clause, it included lands on either side of the
river up to its source, or at least to the northern boundary of the
state.
This question was submitted at various times to the general
executive officers of the United States having charge of the Land
Department, with the result that conflicting opinions were given by
them thereon. On February 23, 1848, Richard M. Young, the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, by letter addressed to the
state authorities, ruled that
"the state is entitled to the alternate §§ within five
miles of the Des Moines River, throughout the whole extent of that
river, within the limits of Iowa."
On March 2, 1849, Robert J. Walker, Secretary of the Treasury,
to whose department at that time the control of the administration
of public lands belonged, replying to a communication from the
representatives of the State of Iowa in Congress, sustained the
ruling of the commissioner of the General Land Office. In his
letter he says:
"I concur with you in the views contained in your communication,
and am of the opinion that the grant in question extends, as
therein stated, on both sides of the river from its source to its
mouth,
Page 142 U. S. 513
but not to lands on the river in the State of Missouri. I have
transmitted your communication and accompanying papers, with a copy
of this letter, to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office."
On June 1, 1849, notice was issued from the General Land Office
to the registers and receivers of the local land offices to reserve
from sale all the odd-numbered sections within five miles of the
river up to the northern limits of the state, and lists were
directed to be prepared of the sales and locations within those
limits already made, with a view of certifying the remainder to the
state. After these lists had been completed but before any further
action was taken, the Department of the Interior was created by
Congress and the administration of public lands transferred to that
department, and on April 6, 1850, Thomas Ewing, the Secretary of
the Interior, ruled that the Raccoon Fork was the limit of the
grant. His ruling is contained in a letter of that date to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, as follows:
"Sir: Having considered the question submitted to me connected
with the claim of the State of Iowa to select, under the Act of
August 8, 1846, lands for the improvement of the Des Moines River,
I am clearly of the opinion that you cannot recognize the grant as
extended above the Raccoon Fork without the aid of an explanatory
act of Congress. It is clear to my mind from the language of the
Act of August 8, 1846, itself that it was not the intent of the act
to extend it further."
He, however, added this further direction:
"As Congress is now in session and may take action on the
subject, it will be proper in my opinion to postpone any immediate
steps for bringing into market the lands embraced in the state's
selections."
Application was made to the President to reverse this ruling.
The question was referred by the President to the Attorney General,
and, on July 19, 1850, Reverdy Johnson, the then Attorney General,
advised the President that he concurred with the views of the
Secretary of the Treasury and dissented from those of the Secretary
of the Interior
Page 142 U. S. 514
holding that the grant extended to the northern limits of the
state.
Before any action was taken on this opinion, President Taylor
died and a new administration succeeded, and on June 30, 1851, the
then Attorney General, John J. Crittenden, in response to inquiry,
gave it as his opinion, differing from his predecessor, that the
grant terminated at the Raccoon Fork. The Secretary of the Interior
concurred in the opinion of the Attorney General, but at the same
time continued the reservation of the lands from market made by his
predecessor, and afterwards, believing that the question of title
was one for the decision of the courts, approved the selection made
by the state up to the northern limits, without prejudice to the
rights of other parties. His letter of instructions to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, of date October 29, 1851,
was in these words:
"Department of the Interior"
"
Washington, October 29, 1851"
"Sir: I herewith return all the papers in the Des Moines case,
which were recalled from your office about the first of the present
month. I have reconsidered and carefully reviewed my decision of
the 26th of July last, and, in doing so, find that no decision
which I can make will be final, as the question involved partakes
more of a judicial than an executive character, which must
ultimately be determined by the judicial tribunals of the country;
and although my own opinion on the true construction of the grant
is unchanged, yet in view of the great conflict of opinion among
the executive officers of the government and also in view of the
opinions of several eminent jurists which have been presented to me
in favor of the construction contended for by the state, I am
willing to recognize the claim of the state and to approve the
selections without prejudice to the rights, if any there be, of
other parties, thus leaving the question as to the proper
construction of the statute entirely open to the action of the
judiciary. You will please therefore, as soon as may be
practicable, submit for my approval
Page 142 U. S. 515
such lists as may have been prepared, and proceed to report for
like approval lists of the alternate sections claimed by the State
of Iowa above the Raccoon Fork as far as the surveys have
progressed or may hereafter be completed and returned."
"Very respectfully, etc.,"
"A. H. H. STUART,
Secretary"
"The Commissioner of the General Land Office"
And the lists, having been made out, were by the Secretary
approved in the qualified way indicated in the letter, and
thereafter transmitted to he state authorities and to the local
land offices.
Subsequently, and at its December term, 1859, the question as to
the extent of the grant came before this Court, and in the case of
Dubuque & Pacific Railroad
v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66, it was held that the
Raccoon Fork was the northern limit of the grant, and that the
state took no title to lands above that fork. After this decision,
and on March 2, 1861, a joint resolution passed Congress in these
words:
"
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that all the
title which the United States still retain in the tracts of land
along the Des Moines River and above the mouth of the Raccoon Fork
thereof in the State of Iowa which have been certified to said
state improperly by the Department of the Interior as part of the
grant by act of Congress approved August 8, 1846, and which is now
held by
bona fide purchasers under the State of Iowa, be,
and the same is hereby, relinquished to the State of Iowa."
12 state. 251.
And on July 12, 1862, the following act:
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the
grant of lands to the then Territory of Iowa, for the improvement
of the Des Moines River, made by the Act of August 8, 1846, is
hereby extended so as to include the alternate sections (designated
by odd numbers) lying within five miles of said river between
Page 142 U. S. 516
the Raccoon Fork and the northern boundary of said state. Such
lands are to be held and applied in accordance with the provisions
of the original grant, except that the consent of Congress is
hereby given to the application of a portion thereof to aid in the
construction of the Keokuk, Fort Des Moines and Minnesota Railroad
in accordance with the provisions of the act of the General
Assembly of the State of Iowa, approved March 22, 1858. And if any
of said lands shall have been sold or otherwise disposed of by the
United States before the passage of this act excepting those
released by the United States to the grantees of the State of Iowa
under the joint resolution of March 2, 1861, the Secretary of the
Interior is hereby directed to set apart an equal amount of lands
within said state to be certified in lieu thereof,
provided that if the said state shall have sold and
conveyed any portion of the lands lying within the limits of this
grant the title of which had proved invalid, any lands which shall
be certified to said state in lieu thereof by virtue of the
provisions of this act shall inure to and be held as a trust fund
for the benefit of the person or persons, respectively, whose
titles shall have failed as aforesaid."
12 Stat. 543, c. 161.
Long prior to the last three matters noticed, the state had
taken action in respect to the improvement of the Des Moines River
and had disposed of the lands covered by the grant as it was
claimed to be, including those above as well as those below the
Raccoon Fork. Such action and disposition had been in this way:
some work was done by the state, in the first instance, through its
board of public works. Thereafter, and on December 17, 1853, a
contract was made with Henry O'Reilly therefor. This was released
on June 8, 1854, and on June 9, 1854, a new contract was entered
into between the state and the principal defendant herein, the Des
Moines Navigation and Railway Company. By its terms, the navigation
company was to expend in the improvement not less than $1,300,000,
and to receive in pay the lands at $1.25 per acre, the lands to be
conveyed from time to time, as $30,000 worth of work was done, in
pursuance to the original act of Congress.
Page 142 U. S. 517
Under this agreement, the navigation company proceeded to do
some work on the improvement. On March 22, 1858, the State of Iowa
passed an act whose recital and first clause are as follows:
"Whereas the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company have
heretofore claimed, and do now claim, to have entered into certain
contracts with the State of Iowa by its officers and agents
concerning the improvement of the Des Moines River in the State of
Iowa, and whereas, disagreements and misunderstandings have arisen
and do now exist between the State of Iowa and said company, and it
being conceived to be to the interest of all parties concerned to
have said matters and all matters and things between said company
and the State of Iowa settled and adjusted, now therefore be it
resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa that for the
purpose of such settlement, and for that purpose only, the
following propositions are made by the state to said company: that
the said company shall execute to the State of Iowa full releases
and discharges of all contracts, agreements, and claims with or
against the state, including rights to water rents which may have
heretofore or do now exist, and all claims of all kinds against the
State of Iowa, and the lands connected with the Des Moines River
improvement, excepting such as are hereby by the state secured to
the said company, and also surrender to said state the dredge boat
and its appurtenances belonging to said improvement, and the State
of Iowa shall, by its proper officer, certify and convey to the
said company all lands granted by an act of Congress approved
August 8, 1846, to the then Territory of Iowa, to aid in the
improvement of the Des Moines River, which have been approved and
certified to the State of Iowa by the general government, saving
and excepting all lands sold or conveyed, or agreed to be sold or
conveyed, by the State of Iowa, by its officers and agents, prior
to the 23d day of December, 1853, under said grant, and said
company, or its assignees, shall have right to all of said lands as
herein granted to them as fully as the State of Iowa could have
under or by
Page 142 U. S. 518
virtue of said grant, or in any manner whatever, with full power
to settle all errors, false locations, omissions, or claims in
reference to the same, and all pay or compensation therefor by the
general government, but at the costs and charges of said company,
and the state to hold all the balance of said lands, and all
rights, powers, and privileges under and by virtue of said grant,
entirely released from any claim by or through said company, and it
is understood that among the lands excepted and not granted by the
state to said company are 25,487.87 acres lying immediately above
Raccoon Fork, supposed to have been sold by the general government,
but claimed by the State of Iowa."
Revised Laws of Iowa, 1860, p. 906.
The proposition of settlement made by this act was accepted by
the navigation company on April 15, 1858, and the terms of the
settlement carried into effect. On April 28, 1858, the Governor of
the state certified to the President the amount expended in the
work and the amount of land to be conveyed to the navigation
company under the settlement. The certificate was in these
words:
"Executive Chamber, Iowa"
"
Des Moines, April 28, 1858"
"To his Excellency James Buchanan, President of the United
States: "
"I, Ralph P. Lowe, Governor of the State of Iowa, as required by
Act of Congress approved August 8, 1846, 'granting certain lands to
the Territory of Iowa to aid in the improvement of the navigation
of the Des Moines River in said territory,' do hereby certify that
there has been expended from time to time prior to the date hereof
on the improvement of said river, as the work has progressed, and
the money has been required, under certain contracts made by the
State of Iowa with the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company,
the sum of three hundred and thirty-two thousand six hundred and
thirty-four 4/100 dollars, ($332,634.04), and in consideration of
said expenditures on said improvement, and in pursuance of the
provisions of the act of Congress approved as aforesaid,
Page 142 U. S. 519
there will be conveyed to said Des Moines Navigation and
Railroad Company two hundred and sixty-six thousand one hundred and
seven 23/100 acres (266, 107 23/100 acres) of the land belonging to
said grant, and which have been certified and approved to the State
of Iowa under said act for the prosecution of the improvement of
said River Des Moines. In testimony whereof I, Ralph P. Lowe,
Governor of the State of Iowa, have caused the great seal of the
State of Iowa to be hereunto affixed, together with my
signature."
"[Seal] RALPH P. LOWE "
"By the Governor:"
"ELUAH SELLS,
Secretary of State"
And on the 3d day of May, 1858, the Governor conveyed to the
navigation company, by 14 deeds, the lands referred to.
On September 28, 1889, the present suit was commenced by the
filing of the bill in behalf of the United States in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Northern District of Iowa, in
which bill the complainant prayed that on final hearing, a decree
might be entered cancelling and setting aside the certificate of
the United States made by the Secretary of the Interior, the
resolution of settlement passed by the General Assembly of the
State of Iowa, and the deeds of the Governor to the navigation
company, made in pursuance of such settlement and quieting and
confirming plaintiff's title to all the lands. To this bill were
made parties defendant the navigation company and several
individuals holding title to tracts of land by conveyance from it.
The navigation company demurred to the bill; the other defendants
answered. Proofs were taken under the issues presented by the bill
and answer, and on final hearing a decree was entered sustaining
the demurrer of the navigation company, and on the merits
dismissing the bill. 43 F. 1. From such decree the United States
has appealed to this Court.
Page 142 U. S. 527
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prior to the decision of this Court in
Dubuque
&c. Railroad Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66,
which decision was announced in 1860, it was a disputed question
whether the grant extended above the Raccoon Fork. The opinions and
rulings of the executive officers of the government were
conflicting, and it is not strange that many settled upon these
lands in the belief that they were public lands of the United
States, and open to settlement. But if they were not in fact open
to settlement -- if the title legally and fairly passed to the
navigation company -- no relief from the hardships occasioned by
their mistake can be furnished by the courts, whose functions are
limited to declaring where, in the face of conflicting claims, the
title really rests. We pass therefore to the consideration of the
matter of title.
It will be observed, in the first place, that there is in this
case no question as to the priority of claim. The single question
is whether the defendant's title is good as against the
Page 142 U. S. 528
government. If so, it is unquestionably prior to all claims of
the settlers, for, as appears, as early as June, 1849, the lands to
the northern limits of the state were reserved from settlement and
sale by direction of the Land Department, and this reservation was
continued in force notwithstanding the subsequent conflicting
rulings as to the extent of the grant and the adjudication of this
Court as to the extent of its limits. The validity of this
reservation was sustained in the case of
Wolcott v.
Des Moines Company, 5 Wall. 681, decided at
December term, 1866. In that case, it was held that even in the
absence of a command to that effect in the statute, it was the duty
of the officers of the Land Department, immediately upon a grant's
being made by Congress, to reserve from settlement and sale the
lands within the grant, and that if there was a dispute as to its
extent, it was the duty to reserve all lands which upon either
construction might become necessary to make good the purposes of
the grant. This ruling as to the power and duty of the officers of
the Land Department has since been followed in many cases.
Bullard v. Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railroad,
122 U. S. 167, and
cases cited in the opinion.
As lands properly reserved are not open to settlement or sale,
it follows that the lands above Raccoon Fork were at the time of
the passage of the resolution of 1861 wholly within the disposing
power of Congress, and no rights could have attached, by occupancy
or otherwise, which would burden the title, or either legally or
equitably affect any grant or disposition which Congress might then
see fit to make. By that resolution, Congress relinquished to the
state all the title of the United States (and that was a full and
absolute title) to such tracts of land as were then held by
bona fide purchasers under the state law, and by the act
of the succeeding year the grant was in terms extended to the
northern limits of the state, so that all alternate sections above
the Raccoon Fork not theretofore disposed of by the state to
bona fide purchasers thereby passed to the state. As the
original grant in 1846 was, within settled rules of construction, a
grant
in praesenti, Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey ante,
142 U. S. 241,
which was a mere extension of
Page 142 U. S. 529
the grant, took effect and passed title at once to the state,
and the resolution of 1861, which was in terms a relinquishment,
also operated as an immediate transfer of title. By the
reservation, therefore, full title was retained in the United
States, and by the resolution of 1861 and the act of 1862 the same
full title passed
eo instanti to the state.
But if by the resolution title passed to the state, it also at
the same time passed through the state to the real beneficiaries of
this resolution, to-wit,
bona fide purchasers under the
State of Iowa. Section 1202 of the Code of Iowa of 1851 reads as
follows:
"Where a deed purports to convey a greater interest than the
grantor was at the time possessed of, any after-acquired interest
of such grantor, to the extent of that which the deed purports to
convey, inures to the benefit of the grantee."
The deeds made by the state to the navigation company recite
that
"The State of Iowa does hereby sell, grant, bargain, and convey
to the said Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company the
following referred to and described lands, to-wit [describing
them], to have and hold the above-described lands and each and
every parcel thereof with all the rights, privileges, immunities,
and appurtenances of whatever nature thereunto belonging."
These were deeds purporting to convey a full title. That is the
general rule, and such is the import of section 1232, Code of Iowa
of 1851, prescribing forms for deeds.
Even if there were no such statute with respect to
after-acquired titles, the manifest intent of Congress in the
resolution was not to transfer the title to the state, to be by it
disposed of as it saw fit, but to the state solely for the benefit
of
bona fide purchasers. The inference from the language,
standing by itself, is made certain by the act of 1862, where it
refers to the lands covered by this resolution as lands "released
by the United States to the grantees of the State of Iowa under the
joint resolution of March 2, 1861." This is an interpretation by
Congress of the scope of that resolution, and shows to whom
Congress intended that the lands should pass.
Was the navigation company a
bona fide purchaser under
the state? Of course, if it was, the other defendants who
Page 142 U. S. 530
hold under it also were. It is claimed by the appellant that the
bona fide purchasers referred to were certain parties who
had bought portions of these lands from the State of Iowa, paying
cash therefor, for the purpose of making homes, and who had taken
possession thereof, and were then occupying the same. But the term
"
bona fide purchaser" has a well settled meaning in the
law. It does not require settlement or occupancy. Anyone is a
bona fide purchaser who buys in good faith and pays value.
To limit the term as here used to settlers is to interpolate into
the statute a restriction which neither the language nor the
surrounding circumstances justify. The term itself, as stated, has
no such restricted meaning, and while it may be that there were
individuals holding tracts which they had separately settled on and
paid for, yet it was also true that the great body of the lands had
been conveyed to the navigation company in payment for work done on
the Des Moines improvement. This was a well known fact, and if
Congress had intended to distinguish between settlers and other
purchasers, it would not have used language whose well understood
meaning included both. If anything can be drawn from the debates in
Congress at the time of the passage of this resolution, it sustains
this construction. As appears from the Senate proceedings, when the
resolution was pending, the fact that a large portion of these
lands had been conveyed to the navigation company for work done on
the improvement was stated, and an attempt was made to limit the
relinquishment to lands "by the said state sold to actual
settlers." Instead of that, the words now used were inserted,
to-wit, "
bona fide purchasers under the State of Iowa."
Congressional Globe, pt. 2, 2d Sess. 36th Cong. 1130-1133.
Independently, however, of any inference from these congressional
proceedings, there can be no doubt that a party doing work under a
contract with the state, making a settlement, and receiving a
conveyance of these lands in payment for that work is a
bona
fide purchaser. If so, this cause of action fails, and the
bill must be dismissed.
But the case does not rest here. The title to these lands has
often been brought in question in cases determined by this
Page 142 U. S. 531
Court, and its uniform ruling has been in favor of the validity
of the title of the navigation company. A review of some of these
cases will be instructive. In
Wolcott v. Des Moines Company,
supra, it appeared that Wolcott had purchased from the
navigation company, the principal defendant in this case, a half
section of land above the Raccoon Fork, and received a warranty
deed therefor. On the decision in
Dubuque & Pacific
Railroad v. Litchfield, supra, that the grant extended only to
the Raccoon Fork, he sued the navigation company for breach of
covenant, alleging that the title to the tract sold had failed.
This Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court against him.
After referring to its decision in respect to the extent of the
grant of 1846, it quoted the resolution of 1861 and the act of
1862, and added:
"If the case stopped here, it would be very clear that the
plaintiff could not recover, for although the state possessed no
title to the lot in dispute at the time of the conveyance to the
Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, yet, having an
after-acquired title by the act of Congress, it would inure to the
benefit of the grantees, and so in respect to their conveyance to
the plaintiff. This is in accordance with the laws of the State of
Iowa."
It then noticed the contention of the plaintiff that the title
to this tract did not pass to the navigation company by this later
legislation, because prior thereto, and on May 15, 1856, Congress
had made a grant to the state of six alternate sections on each
side of certain proposed railroads, to aid in their construction.
The tract was within the limits of this grant, but the Court held
that the title to it did not pass thereby, because of the previous
reservation made in 1849, the grant, by its terms, excepting from
its operation all lands reserved by
"any act of Congress, or in any other manner by competent
authority, for the purpose of aiding in any objects of internal
improvements, or for any purpose whatsoever."
It will be seen that this decision not only determined the
validity and scope of the reservation, but also interpreted the
effect of the resolution as operating to transfer full title to the
navigation company.
In 1872, the cases of
Williams v.
Baker and
Cedar Rapids Railroad Co. v. Des
Moines Nav. Co., 17 Wall. 144, and
Page 142 U. S. 532
Homestead Co. v. Valley
Railroad, 17 Wall. 153, were decided. The first two
cases were disposed of by one opinion. Both were suits to quiet
title. One side claimed under the river grant, and the other under
the railroad grant of 1856. Decrees in favor of the river grant
were sustained. In the opinion, the Court noticed the long contest
as to the scope of the original grant and the final determination
thereof in the case of
Railroad Company v. Litchfield. It
then observed:
"This decision was received as a final settlement of the long
contested question of the extent of the grant. But it left the
State of Iowa, which had made engagements on the faith of the lands
certified to her, in an embarrassed condition, and it destroyed the
title of the navigation company to lands of the value of hundreds
of thousands of dollars, which it had received from the state for
money, labor, and material actually expended and furnished. What
was also equally to be regretted was that many persons, purchasers
for value from the state or the navigation company, found their
supposed title an invalid one."
And after referring to the legislation of 1861 and 1862, it
added:
"This legislative history of the title of the State of Iowa, and
of those to whom she had conveyed the lands certified to her by the
Secretary of the Interior as a part of the grant of 1846, including
among her grantees the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company,
needs no gloss or criticism to show that the title of the state and
her grantees is perfect unless impaired or defeated by some other
and extrinsic matter which would have that effect,"
and closed the opinion in these words:
"We therefore reaffirm first that neither the State of Iowa nor
the railroad companies, for whose benefit the grant of 1856 was
made, took any title by that act to the lands then claimed to
belong to the Des Moines River grant of 1846, and second that by
the joint resolution of 1861 and the act of 1862, the State of Iowa
did receive the title for the use of those to whom she had sold
them as part of that grant, and for such other purposes as had
become proper under that grant."
In the third case, which was also a contest between a claimant
under the railroad grant and parties claiming under the river
Page 142 U. S. 533
grant, the validity of the latter was affirmed, and in its
opinion, the Court said:
"It is therefore no longer an open question that neither the
State of Iowa nor the railroad companies, for whose benefit the
grant of 1856 was made, took any title by that act to the lands
then claimed to belong to the Des Moines River grant of 1846, and
that the joint resolution of 2d of March, 1861, and the act of 12th
of July, 1862, transferred the title from the United States and
vested it in the State of Iowa for the use of its grantees under
the river grant."
Again, in 1879, the question of this grant came before this
Court in
Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.
S. 755. In that case, the claim adverse to the river
grant originated in this way: on September 4, 1841, Congress passed
an act, 5 Stat. 453, by the eighth section of which there was
granted to each state 500,000 acres of land for purposes of
internal improvement. By the Constitution of Iowa, under which the
state was admitted, this grant was appropriated to the use of
common schools (Constitution of Iowa 1846, Article 9, "School Funds
and Schools," section 3), and this appropriation was assented to by
Congress by a special act, 9 Stat. 349. On July 20, 1850, the agent
of the state having charge of the school lands selected the
particular tract in controversy as a part of this school grant, and
thereafter, and in 1853, the appropriate proceedings being had, a
patent was issued by the state to Wolsey. The grant of 1841 was one
which required selection, and so no rights accrued to the state to
this tract under such grant until the selection on July 20, 1850;
but that, as we have seen, was several months after the lands had
been reserved for the river grant. The court, in an elaborate
opinion by Chief Justice Waite, reviewed all the legislation and
the previous decisions of the Court and reaffirmed those decisions.
The deed from the state to the navigation company, under which
Chapman claimed, being subsequent to the patent from the state to
Wolsey, it was contended that the former could not question the
title thus previously conveyed. Upon this matter, the Court
said:
"Of this we entertain no doubt. If the state had no title when
the patent issued to Wolsey, he
Page 142 U. S. 534
took nothing by the grant. No question of estoppel by warranty
arises; neither does the after-acquired title inure to the benefit
of Wolsey, because when the United States made the grant in 1861,
it was for the benefit of
bona fide purchasers from the
state under the grant of 1846. This is evident as well from the
tenor of the joint resolution of 1861 as from the act of 1862. The
relinquishment under the joint resolution is of all the title which
the United States retained in the tracts of land above the Raccoon
Fork,"
"which have been certified to said state improperly by the
Department of the Interior as part of the grant by the Act of
Congress approved August 8, 1846, and which is now held by
bona
fide purchasers under the State of Iowa,"
and by the act of 1862, the lands are in terms to be held and
applied in accordance with the provisions of the original grant.
This legislation, being
in pari materia, is to be
construed together, and manifests most unmistakably an intention on
the part of Congress to put the state and
bona fide
purchasers from the state just where they would be if the original
act had itself granted all that was finally given for the river
improvement. The original grant contemplated sales by the state in
execution of the trust created, and the
bona fide
purchasers referred to must have been purchasers at such sales.
This being so, the grant, when finally made, inured to the benefit
of Chapman, rather than Wolsey.
At the same term, the case of
Litchfield v. County of
Webster was decided,
101 U. S. 773. The
question in that case was at what time the title to these lands
passed from the United States and the lands became subject to
taxation. In disposing of that question, the Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court, observed:
"We think, however, that for the year 1862 and thereafter they
were taxable. By the joint resolution, Congress relinquished all
the title the United States then retained to the lands which had
before that time been certified by the Department of the Interior
as part of the river grant, and which were held by
bona
fide purchasers under the state. No further conveyance was
necessary to complete the transfer, and the description was
sufficient to identify the property. The title thus relinquished
inured at once to the benefit of the
Page 142 U. S. 535
purchasers for whose use the relinquishment was made. All the
lands involved in this suit had been certified, and Litchfield, or
those under whom he claims, were
bona fide purchasers from
the state."
Again, in 1883, the case of
Dubuque & Sioux City
Railroad v. Des Moines Valley Railroad, 109 U.
S. 329, came to this Court on error to the Supreme Court
of the State of Iowa. This was an action to recover lands and quiet
title, and in which the parties respectively claimed under the
railroad grant of 1856 and the river grant, and again the Chief
Justice delivered the opinion of the Court, and in it said:
"The following are no longer open questions in this Court: . . .
That the Act of July 12, 1862, c. 161, 12 Stat. 543, transferred
the title from the United States and vested it in the State of Iowa
for the use of its grantees under the river grant.
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company, 5 Wall. 681;
Williams v.
Baker, 17 Wall. 144;
Homestead Company v. The
Valley Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 153;
Wolsey
v. Chapman, 101 U. S. 755,
101 U. S.
767."
Still later, and in 1886, another attempt was made to disturb
the title held under the river grant in the case of
Bullard v.
Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railroad, 122 U.
S. 167, which also came here on error to the Supreme
Court of the State of Iowa. The contention in that case in behalf
of the plaintiff in error was that the resolution of 1861, which
relinquished to the state the title to lands held by
bona
fide purchasers under it, operated to terminate the
reservation from sale made by the Land Department for the benefit
of the river grant, and thus left all lands above the Raccoon Fork
not then held by
bona fide purchasers open to settlement,
and free for the attaching of any other grant from that time and up
to the act of 1862, which in terms extended the river grant to the
northern limits of the state, and of course included all lands,
whether held by
bona fide purchasers or otherwise. But
this Court sustained the decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa and
ruled that the reservation from sale made by the Land Department
was not terminated by the resolution of 1861, but continued in
force until the act of 1862.
Page 142 U. S. 536
Such have been the decisions of the Court in respect to this
grant and titles -- decisions running through twenty-five years,
all affirming the same thing and all without dissent. It would
seem, if the decisions of this Court amount to anything, that the
title of the navigation company to these lands was impregnable.
Indeed, the emphatic language more than once used, as quoted above,
appears like a protest against any further assault upon that
title.
Nor has this line of decisions been confined to this Court. It
runs through the reports of the Supreme Court of Iowa. In addition
to the two cases, heretofore referred to, coming from that court to
this, and in which its decisions were sustained, may be noticed the
following:
Bellows v. Todd, twice before that court, and
reported in 34 Ia. 18, and 39 Ia. 209. This was an action of
ejectment, brought by Bellows, holding under the navigation
company, against Todd, claiming to have settled upon the premises
under the preemption and homestead laws of the United States in
1860. On the first trial, the court refused to give the following
instruction:
"If the jury find from the evidence that the lands in
controversy were certified to the State of Iowa in 1853 under the
act of Congress of 8th August, 1846, and that the same have been
conveyed by the State of Iowa to the Des Moines Navigation and
Railroad Company, and by said company to plaintiff's grantors, and
by them to the plaintiff in this action, then the plaintiff is
entitled to recover."
When the case came before the supreme court, 34 Ia., the refusal
to give this instruction was adjudged error and the case remanded
for a new trial. On the second trial, the plaintiff requested the
following instruction:
"The plaintiff in this action claims title to the lands
described in his petition under conveyances from the grantees of
the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, and the defendant,
as one ground of his defense, alleges that he has been in the
continuous occupation and possession of said land for ten years
prior to the commencement of this action, and that by reason of
such occupation and possession, his title is superior and paramount
to that of the plaintiff; but if the jury find from the evidence
that this land was certified
Page 142 U. S. 537
to the State of Iowa under the Act of Congress of August 8,
1846, and has been conveyed by the state to the Des Moines
Navigation and Railroad Company, under which plaintiff holds, then,
the state having acquired title to said land by the joint
resolution of Congress of March 2, 1861, the title of the state so
acquired inures to the benefit of said company and its grantees and
the plaintiff, and if this action was commenced within ten years
from the date of the passage of said joint resolution, then the
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action notwithstanding the
alleged occupation and possession of defendant,"
which was refused, and in 39 Ia. the refusal to give this
instruction was adjudged error and the judgment reversed, and the
case remanded. The significance of this instruction is apparent
inasmuch as the action was commenced on May 19, 1870, less than ten
years from the resolution of March, 1861. In its opinion in this
last case, the court observes:
"That the title which the state acquired under the resolution of
March 2, 1861, inured to the benefit of the Des Moines Navigation
Company and its grantees, under the circumstances set forth in the
instruction, is elemental. Revision, § 2210; Code, §
1931."
In addition, there is a series of cases, of which
Stryker v.
Polk County, 22 Ia. 131;
Litchfield v. Hamilton
County, 40 Ia. 66, and
Goodnow v. Wells, 67 Ia. 654
are examples, in which it was held that these lands were subject to
taxation for the year 1861. Of course they could not be subject to
taxation unless by the resolution the title had passed not simply
from the United States, but also through the state to its grantees,
and repeatedly, in different ways, is it asserted in the opinions
in these cases that the title had so passed. We have thus a
concurrence of opinion on the part of the Supreme Court of Iowa and
this Court for a quarter of a century in favor of the validity of
the title acquired by the navigation company. It would seem as
though the period of rest as to this question of title ought by
this time to have been reached.
But the government is the complainant, induced, doubtless, to
bring this suit by the act of the legislature of March 28, 1888,
which purports to relinquish for the state its trust, and
Page 142 U. S. 538
to reconvey to the United States all its right and title to
these lands, as well as by the urgent appeals of the settlers, and
the claim is that its presence as a party introduces new questions
into the litigation -- questions not at all affected by the prior
decisions. It is the original grantor, and its contention is that
while the title of its grantee may be unassailable by other
persons, it has the right to challenge it because the grant was
made in trust for a specific purpose, and that trust has not been
properly executed, nor the lands appropriated to the purposes
thereof. That the proposition of law which underlies this claim is
correct cannot be doubted. The grantor of lands conveyed in trust
may be the only party with power to complain of the breach of that
trust, or, on account of such breach, to challenge the title in the
hands of the trustee or others holding under him, and the title
conveyed, voidable alone at its instance, may be good as against
all the world besides.
Before, however, examining the applicability of this proposition
of law to the case at hand, one or two preliminary thoughts
naturally arrest the attention. There has been long delay in
presenting this claim. A third of a century has passed since the
state conveyed to the navigation company, and more than a quarter
of a century since Congress relinquished and granted to the state
the title to these lands. During that time, there have been
marvelous changes in the population, the industries, the business
interests of the state; legislatures and courts have been busy
determining rights and establishing relations based upon the
vesting of title in the navigation company. A proposition to
destroy this title, and to put at naught all that has been
accomplished in respect thereto and based thereon during these
years is one which may well make us pause. While it is undoubtedly
true that when the government is the real party in interest, and is
proceeding simply to assert its own rights and recover its own
property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
limitation,
United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga &c.
Railway, 118 U. S. 120,
118 U. S. 125;
United States v. Insley, 130 U. S. 263, yet
it has also been decided that where the United States is only a
formal party, and the suit is brought in its name to
Page 142 U. S. 539
enforce the rights of individuals, and no interest of the
government is involved, the defense of laches and limitation will
be sustained as though the government was out of the case and the
litigation was carried on in name as in fact for the benefit of
private parties.
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.
S. 338. In that case, a bill was brought by the United
States to set aside certain patents issued to one Roswell Beebe,
and the charge was that Beebe, by fraudulent practices, obtained
the patents. But it also appeared that certain individuals claimed
to have equitable titles to the land by virtue of prior locations,
and that the effect of a decree cancelling the patents would be
simply to enable such other parties to perfect their equitable
titles. Forty-five years had elapsed since the patents were issued,
and this Court, declining to enter into any inquiry as to whether
the patents were fraudulently obtained, ruled that the defense of
laches was complete, because the government was only a nominal, and
not the real, party in interest.
The history of the present litigation shows that the long
contest has been between the navigation company and its grantees,
on the one side, and settlers claiming the right to preemption or
homestead, or parties claiming under the railroad grants, on the
other. The bill alleges:
"And complainant further alleges and charges that at the time of
the side settlement of 1858, and at all other times theretofore,
there existed in the Constitution of the State of Iowa, from the
time of the admission of said state into the union in 1846, a
provision in the words following, to-wit:"
"The General Assembly shall not locate any of the public lands
which have been or may be granted by Congress to this state, and
the location of which may be given to the General Assembly, upon
lands actually settled, without the consent of the occupant. The
extent of the claim of any occupant so exempting shall not exceed
three hundred and twenty acres."
"That at the time of the pretended settlement so made between
the State of Iowa and the said navigation company, and at all times
when the state has attempted to dispose of lands covered by the
grant of 1846 and the said act of 1862, which are in controversy in
this suit, said lands were occupied by
Page 142 U. S. 540
persons who had settled upon them in tracts of not more than 320
acres to each person, in the belief that they were open to
location, settlement, preemption, and purchase under the land laws
of the United States, and at said time they were occupying said
lands in tracts not larger than 320 acres to each, and the said
State of Iowa was thereby and therefore prohibited under said
constitutional provision from disposing or attempting to dispose of
any of the lands in controversy, since none of said persons so
occupying said lands consented to any sale or disposition of them
whatever."
And in the brief of the Attorney General it is stated that
"the contest here is not between
bona fide settlers as
against each other, but this litigation is in the interests of
bona fide settlers against speculators who have
appropriated these lands in violation of law and of the principles
of common honesty."
The district judge, deciding this case in the court below,
said:
"Any purpose to call in question the title of parties in actual
possession, holding under the state or the navigation company, is
expressly disclaimed in the bill, it being averred that the benefit
of a decree in favor of complainant is sought only as to such lands
as are now actually occupied by settlers who do not hold title
under the state or the navigation company, the same amounting to
109,057 acres."
And, after deciding the legal question in favor of the
navigation company, he goes on to discuss and suggest what in
equity and justice the government should do for the benefit of
these settlers. We should be closing our eyes to manifest facts if
we did not perceive that the government was only a nominal party,
whose aid was sought to destroy the title of the navigation company
and its grantees, in order to enable the settlers to perfect their
titles, initiated by settlement and occupancy; and, in that event,
the delay of thirty years is such a delay as a court of equity
forbids. At any rate, it makes most apt the observation of Mr.
Justice Miller, speaking for the Court in the case of
United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61,
98 U. S. 64, in
which case a bill had been filed to set aside a decree rendered
more than twenty years before:
"It is true that the United States is not bound by the statute
of limitations as an
Page 142 U. S. 541
individual would be. And we have not recited any of the
foregoing matters found in the bill as sufficient of itself to
prevent relief in a case otherwise properly cognizable in equity.
But we think these are good reasons why a bill which seeks, under
these circumstances, to annul a decree thus surrounded by every
presumption which should give it support, shall present on its face
a clear and unquestionable ground on which the jurisdiction it
invokes can rest."
Even if this be regarded as a bill brought by the United States
simply to protect its own interests and recover its own property,
still it is well settled that where relief can be granted only by
setting aside a grant, a patent, or other evidence of title issued
by the government in the orderly administration of the affairs of
the Land Department, the evidence in support must be clear, strong,
and satisfactory. Muniments of title issued by the government are
not to be lightly destroyed.
Kansas City, Lawrence &c.
Railroad v. Attorney General, 118 U.
S. 682;
Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.
S. 325,
121 U. S. 381;
Colorado Coal Company v. United States, 123 U.
S. 307. In the second of these cases, Mr. Justice
Miller, speaking for the Court, said:
"It is not to be admitted that the titles by which so much
property in this country and so many rights are held, purporting to
emanate from the authoritative action of the officers of the
government, and, as in this case, under the seal and signature of
the President of the United States himself, shall be dependent upon
the hazard of successful resistance to the whims and caprices of
every person who chooses to attack them in a court of justice; but
it should be well understood that only that class of evidence which
commands respect, and that amount of it which produces conviction,
shall make such an attempt successful."
Returning now to the special contention on the part of the
government: it is scarcely necessary to determine whether the trust
was one following the lands, or merely in the proceeds of the sales
of the lands, and whose faithful performance is a question only
between the United States and the state, as was finally determined
to be the State of the trust created by the "swamp land" grant.
Mills County v. Railroad
Companies,
Page 142 U. S. 542
107 U. S. 557. We
pass rather to inquire in what manner the state performed the
duties or trust imposed by the acceptance of this grant, insofar as
such performance affects the title to the lands in controversy. The
general purpose of the grant was to aid the territory or state in
improving the navigation of the Des Moines River. The second
section of the act prescribed the conditions under which the
territory or state might sell the lands, as follows:
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted that the lands hereby granted
shall not be conveyed or disposed of by said territory, nor by the
state to be formed out of the same, except as said improvements
shall progress -- that is, the said territory or state may sell so
much of said lands as shall produce the sum of thirty thousand
dollars, and then the sales shall cease, until the governor of said
territory or state shall certify the fact to the President of the
United States that one-half of said sum has been expended upon said
improvement, when the said territory or state may sell and convey a
quantity of the residue of said lands, sufficient to replace the
amount expended, and thus the sales shall progress as the proceeds
thereof shall be expended, and the fact of such expenditure shall
be certified as aforesaid."
The third section declared that the price should not be less
than the minimum price of other public lands. So that all that the
act provided for was that the state should appropriate the lands to
the improvement of the river; that it should make no sales at less
than $1.25 per acre, and that its sales should not anticipate its
expenditures by more than $30,000. Now it is not pretended that the
state appropriated the lands to any other purpose, or that the
price at which it sold was less than $1.25 per acre. The contract
between it and the navigation company provided for conveyances only
as the work progressed, and money was expended by the company, and
the settlement proposed by the legislature and accepted by the
company, and the certificate made by the Governor to the President,
showed that the navigation company had expended money enough to
justify the conveyance of all the lands which were in fact
conveyed. On the face of the
Page 142 U. S. 543
transaction therefore the duties imposed by the trust were
exactly and properly performed, and the title to the navigation
company passed to it in strict compliance with the very letter of
the statute. But it is earnestly contended that the navigation
company was not a
bona fide purchaser; that while it
claimed to have expended $330,000 on the improvement, in truth it
had not expended half that amount; that by means of its false
representations, and by threats of bringing suit against the state
and obtaining damages against it, it induced the legislature to
pass the resolution of 1858, offering terms of settlement; that the
work of improving the river was unfinished, not more than one-tenth
of the work necessary therefor having been done, and that the state
has wholly abandoned the undertaking.
With respect to the last two allegations, it is not perceived
how, if true, they can affect the title of the navigation company
to lands deeded by the state to it in payment of work done. Surely
the title to lands which the state conveyed at the inception of the
undertaking, either for cash or for work done thereon, cannot fail
because the state failed to complete the improvement. No land could
have been sold if the purchaser's title had depended upon such a
condition.
If we examine the testimony, there is nothing in it worthy of
mention tending to impeach the
bona fides of the
transaction between the state and the navigation company. Only one
witness was offered by the plaintiff to prove the amount of work
done by the navigation company, and the influences by which the
action of the legislature was induced, and his testimony carries on
its face abundant evidences of its own unworthiness. In the face of
the deliberate proceedings of the legislature and the executive
officers of the state in respect to a matter of public interest,
open to inspection and of common knowledge, something more than the
extravagant and improbable statements of one witness, made thirty
years after the event, is necessary to overthrow the settlement.
Indeed, counsel for the government make slight reference to this
testimony, but rest their case upon the allegations of the bill,
which, as against the principal defendant, the navigation
company,
Page 142 U. S. 544
were admitted by demurrer. It is urged that there is an express
averment that the navigation company and its grantees are not, and
never were,
bona fide purchasers of the lands or any part
thereof. But such a general averment, though repeated once or
twice, is to be taken as qualified and limited by the specific
facts set forth to show wherein the transaction between the state
and the navigation company was fraudulent. Where a bill sets out a
series of facts constituting a transaction between two parties, a
demurrer admits the truth of those facts, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, but not the conclusion which the
pleader has seen fit to aver. And the fact which stands out
conspicuously is the resolution proposing settlement which passed
the Legislature of the State of Iowa in March, 1858. That act is
beyond challenge. The knowledge and good faith of a legislature are
not open to question. It is conclusively presumed that a
legislature acts with full knowledge, and in good faith. It is
true, the bill alleges that its passage was induced by the
navigation company by false representations and threats of suits,
but such an allegation amounts to nothing. In Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed. 222, the author, citing several
cases, observes:
"From what examination has been given to this subject, it
appears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a
question of power -- that is, a question whether the legislature in
the particular case, in respect to the subject matter of the act,
the manner in which its object is to be accomplished, and the mode
of enacting it, has kept within the constitutional limits, and
observed the constitutional conditions. In any case in which this
question is answered in the affirmative, the courts are not at
liberty to inquire into the proper exercise of the power. They must
assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. If
evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was before the
legislature when the act was passed, and if any special finding was
required to warrant the passage of the special act, it would seem
that the passage of the act itself might be held to be equivalent
to such finding. And although it has sometimes been urged at the
bar that the courts ought to inquire into the
Page 142 U. S. 545
motives of the legislature where fraud and corruption were
alleged, and annul their action if the allegations were
established, the argument has in no case been acceded to by the
judiciary, and they have never allowed the inquiry to be entered
upon."
See also Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87;
Ex Parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506;
Doyle v. Continental
Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535;
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678. And
in this case, the circumstances surrounding the transaction
preclude the idea of misconduct or ignorance on the part of the
legislature. The threat of suit, when the state could not be sued
except at its own will, could not have been very persuasive. The
work done by the navigation company was open to inspection. It was
done along the line of the principal river in the state. It was in
fact made a matter of examination and report, and while the amount
expended by the navigation company might not have been known to the
exact dollar, yet in a general way the cost of what had been done
could easily have been ascertained, and must have been known. But
if no lack of good faith can be imputed to the state, the party
making the offer of settlement, does it not follow necessarily that
none can be imputed to the navigation company, the party accepting
the offer; for how can fraud be imputed to one who simply accepts
terms of settlement voluntarily offered by another? And if this
settlement was made in good faith, and without fraud, is it not
clear that the navigation company, taking the lands which the state
offered in payment for the work which it had done, took those lands
as a
bona fide purchaser, and therefore comes within the
letter and spirit of the resolution of 1861? And here the
significance of this resolution is evident. It was passed by
Congress after the settlement proposed by the Iowa Legislature in
1858 had been accepted by the navigation company, and deeds had
passed in accordance therewith. Its passage imports full knowledge
of antecedent facts upon which it is based. In
Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678,
127 U. S. 686,
referring to action had by the legislature of the state, this Court
said:
"The Legislature of Pennsylvania, upon the fullest
investigation, as we must conclusively presume, and upon reasonable
grounds,
Page 142 U. S. 546
as must be assumed from the record,"
etc. So Congress, by this resolution of 1861, knowing that this
settlement had been offered by the State of Iowa and accepted by
the navigation company; knowing that such act on the part of the
legislature conclusively implied full knowledge and good faith, and
that an acceptance of such offered settlement by the navigation
company also implied good faith; knowing, also, that the
conveyances made under this settlement embraced the major portion
of the lands, must be assumed to have approved such settlement and
intended to relinquish to the navigation company the title supposed
to have been conveyed by the settlement and deeds. Surely it cannot
be that when it knew the import and implication of the legislative
act, Congress thought to repudiate it or invite investigation into
a matter which otherwise stood foreclosed of all inquiry. As its
own acts were free from imputation, it knew that the acts of the
Legislature of the State of Iowa were also free from imputation,
and that a settlement which that legislature had offered could not
be challenged for fraud, and with that knowledge it confirmed the
title which the Legislature of Iowa had attempted to convey.
Surely, under those circumstances, the courts are not at liberty to
probe the matters surrounding this settlement, to see if some party
did not misrepresent the facts and utter falsehoods. So, if we
narrow the inquiry to the mere language of the bill, in view of all
the facts disclosed therein and of those legislative and judicial
proceedings which are matters of common knowledge and need not be
averred, it is evident that the government has not made out its
case; and if we broaden the inquiry to all the facts disclosed by
the testimony, it is clear beyond doubt that the navigation company
was a
bona fide purchaser within the meaning of the
resolution of 1861, and intended as a beneficiary thereunder.
It follows from these conclusions that there was no error in the
ruling of the circuit court dismissing the bill, and its decree
is
Affirmed.
