When a person who has been in the habit of dealing With an agent
has no knowledge of the revocation of his authority, he is
justified in acting upon the presumption of its continuance.
A court of equity will not enjoin a judgment at law unless it is
shown that the complainant was prevented from resorting to a legal
defense by fraud or unavoidable accident, without fault or
negligence on his part; but it will do so if the matters set up in
the bill as a ground of relief constitute equities as a defense in
the action at law.
In the United States courts, a recovery in ejectment can be had
upon the strict legal title only, and a court of law will not
uphold or enforce an equitable title to land as a defense in such
action.
On the only issue of fact raised by the pleadings, the
allegations of the bill are sustained by the proof.
This was a suit in equity brought in the United States circuit
court in 1883 by the appellees, George Christian and Jerry Stuart,
against the appellant, Joel Johnson, praying an injunction to
restrain him from enforcing a judgment in ejectment which he
obtained in that court against said appellees for the recovery of
certain lands in their possession, and to quiet their title to said
lands against the claims of said appellant.
The bill alleged that one Julia J. Johnson, on the 8th day of
March, 1871, as guardian of appellant, then a minor, loaned through
her agent, Lycurgus L. Johnson, to one James F. Robinson, out of
the funds of said appellant, $9,387.95, for which said James F.
Robinson delivered to said Lycurgus L. Johnson notes for the
amount, payable to Mrs. Julia J. Johnson, as guardian, and to
secure said loan executed to Johnson a deed of trust conveying to
him, as trustee for said Julia J. Johnson, as guardian for
appellant, certain lands therein described, with the usual power of
sale upon failure to pay the aforesaid notes when due; that after
this transaction, the said appellees bargained for and purchased
from Robinson a tract
Page 128 U. S. 375
of 500 acres, being part of the land conveyed by the aforesaid
trust deed, the said complainants agreeing to pay therefor 120
bales of cotton, which they averred to be a fair and adequate
consideration, and the full value of the lands.
The bill further alleged that the said purchase was made with
the full knowledge and consent of the said Lycurgus L. Johnson,
who, in his capacity as said trustee and also as general agent of
the said Julia J. Johnson, as guardian aforesaid, agreed and
contracted that if the complainants would pay over to the said
Julia J. Johnson the price agreed to be paid for said lands
according to the terms of the purchase from Robinson as above
stated, the amount should be credited on the debt of Robinson, and
the said tract purchased by them should be released from the deed
of trust. That this contract and agreement of her said trustee and
agent was ratified and confirmed by the said Julia J. Johnson, as
guardian, who received the entire consideration agreed by them to
be paid for said land, with a full knowledge of and acquiescence in
said contract and agreement. That the said complainants had, in
accordance with the stipulations and requirements of said trustee
and agent, paid over the price agreed for said 500 acres of land,
every dollar of the proceeds of which had gone to said Julia J.
Johnson, as guardian of appellant, who had since then become of
age.
The complainants further stated that afterward, the said
Lycurgus L. Johnson having departed this life, his administrators
advertised and sold, under the deed of trust, all the lands
mentioned therein, including the said tract of 500 acres bought and
paid for by complainants; and that they were bought in by the
defendant, Joel Johnson, who was then of lawful age.
That afterwards said defendant, claiming by virtue of said sale
and purchase, instituted his suit in ejectment on the law side of
the court, and that the complainants not being admitted to
interpose in said ejectment suit their equitable defense to the
same, he did at the term 1888 obtain a judgment in ejectment
against them, and now seeks to oust them of the possession of said
lands by writ of possession founded on said judgment.
Page 128 U. S. 376
The prayer of the bill was that the judgment in ejectment may be
enjoined, and that the title of the complainants may be quieted,
and such further relief, etc.
Joel Johnson, in his answer, denied that said Lycurgus L.
Johnson was the agent and business manager of said guardian, Mrs.
Julia J. Johnson, or that he acted as such in and about her
business as guardian, and asserted that if any contract or
agreement such as that alleged in the bill was made with said
appellees by said Lycurgus L. Johnson, it was not made with the
knowledge or by the authority of said Julia J. Johnson, as guardian
aforesaid, expressed or implied, nor in any manner recognized or
ratified by her receipt of any of the consideration paid by said
appellees for said land with knowledge of any such contract or
agreement. Further answering, he said,
"That if complainants are not protected by their vendor, it will
be a great wrong to them, but one for which this defendant is not
in any manner responsible."
The complainants filed a general replication to this answer. A
preliminary injunction was granted which the court, on final
hearing, made perpetual. From this decree, the defendant
appealed.
Page 128 U. S. 377
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only issue of fact raised by the pleadings relates to the
agency of Lycurgus L. Johnson for Mrs. Julia J. Johnson, in her
capacity as guardian of appellant, in the loan of the funds of her
ward to Robinson, upon the security binding the real estate of
Robinson, and the subsequent transactions with appellees as vendees
of a part of that land, and upon this point we are of opinion that
the allegations of the bill are abundantly sustained by the
proof.
Page 128 U. S. 378
James F. Robinson, the vendor of the appellees, testified
substantially that he knew that Mr. Johnson acted as the agent for
Mrs. Julia J. Johnson, in her capacity as guardian of Joel Johnson,
in some matters, and especially in the loan of the money to him;
that about the 1st of January, 1871, he borrowed from Mrs. Julia J.
Johnson, as guardian of Joel Johnson, the sum of $9,387.95, made
the negotiation with Mr. Lycurgus L. Johnson exclusively, and that
he had no recollection of ever having talked with Mrs. Johnson
about the matter until after the death of Mr. L. L. Johnson. All
the transactions in regard to this loan were made with Mr. L. L.
Johnson or under his direction. At the time he negotiated the loan
of $9,387.95, he executed, jointly with his wife, Mary F. Robinson,
a deed of trust on certain lands to Mr. L. L. Johnson, as trustee,
to cover said loan. And in his cross-examination on this point, he
states that he does not think Mrs. Johnson was present at the time
the loan was made. Believes she was not present. Mr. Johnson
delivered to witness a check for the loan. It was her check, he
thinks. Saw from the records in the recorder's office that Mrs.
Johnson signed the deed of trust to secure the loan. Referring to
the transaction with appellees, he says he was acquainted with the
plaintiffs in the case. . . . Part of the lands embraced in the
deed of trust were subsequently sold by himself and wife to the
plaintiffs in this suit. When he was negotiating the sale with the
plaintiffs, which was about a year after he borrowed the money, he
told them there was a deed of trust on the land held by Mr. L. L.
Johnson. He went with either Christian or Stuart -- he does not
remember which, possibly either or both -- to see Mr. Johnson about
the matter, and Mr. Johnson agreed with them and himself (Robinson)
that upon the payment to him, acting for Mrs. Johnson, or to Mrs.
Johnson herself, of the purchase money agreed upon, that he would
quitclaim to them the land. The plaintiffs have paid for the land
the price agreed upon, which was 120 bales of cotton, 420 or 425
pounds each. The purchase price was all paid in cotton, excepting
$1,035, which was paid in money by Mr. W. W. Ford, which sum was
the estimated value of some
Page 128 U. S. 379
thirty-odd bales of cotton, balance then due. The plaintiffs not
having the cotton ready, and being anxious to complete their
payments and perfect their title to the land, he agreed that the
balance of cotton due him might be paid in money at the market
value of cotton at that time. Mr. Ford made the valuation, and paid
the money to Mrs. Johnson for them. In his cross-examination on
this point, he says that the object of the visit of himself with
the plaintiffs to see Mr. Johnson was to convince the plaintiffs
that, upon the payment of the purchase price for the land, they
would get a good title to the place. Mr. Johnson agreed that, upon
the payment of the purchase money for the place, that he would
release any claim that he might have against the property as
trustee. He supposed that Mr. Johnson was acting for Mrs. Johnson
at that time, as he had been previously and afterwards. In his
reexamination, he states that he thinks he informed Mr. Johnson of
every pound of cotton received from the plaintiffs, directed him
how to ship it, and such of the cotton shipped to his own account
was shipped with his consent, with the understanding that the
proceeds were to be turned over to Mrs. Johnson, or to Mr. Johnson
for her.
His testimony as to the payment of the purchase money to Mrs.
Johnson, and her acceptance of it as paid in consideration of the
land purchased by the appellees under the agreement, is fully
corroborated by the testimony of W. W. Ford, who testifies that he
was a merchant and near neighbor of Mrs. Johnson, and made out the
accounts current, and kept the accounts for Mrs. Johnson. The
settlement of Mrs. Johnson as guardian, filed in the probate court,
was made out by witness from data furnished by Mrs. Johnson. He
also made out the statement of the account marked "Exhibit B." It
contains all the items of account between James F. Robinson and
Mrs. Julia J. Johnson, as guardian of Joel Johnson. There are in
that statement four items of credit on said loan that witness can
trace to Christian and Stuart as payments on their purchase from
Major Robinson, to-wit, $431.99, $1,035, $804.53, $1,000. This
statement was made out from his own knowledge, and from information
furnished by Mrs. Johnson. The
Page 128 U. S. 380
item of $1,000 was paid to her by Lycurgus L. Johnson, and
repaid to him by cotton from Christian and Stuart, appellees.
Credit was endorsed on the note by Mrs. Johnson herself. She told
witness he paid it. The item $431.99 was received from Christian
and Stuart in cotton, and witness knows she got the money. The
$1,035 witness paid for Christian and Stuart. In the spring of
1879, the plaintiffs came to witness, and asked him to pay for them
the balance on their purchase of the land from Robinson. This
amount was settlement in full of balance by Major Robinson with
plaintiffs for their land. The valuation of the cotton was made by
witness, with the consent of Robinson and Christian and Stuart.
Witness had told Mrs. Johnson that plaintiffs owed a balance of
$1,035 for the purchase money of lands they had purchased from
Major Robinson, and that witness was going to pay it for them. She
afterwards sent to witness for the money, and he paid it.
Plaintiffs gave witness their note for the amount. Numerous other
witnesses sustained the testimony of Robinson and Ford. The
appellant only introduced the deposition of his guardian, in
support of the denials in the answer. Mrs. Johnson denies that she
authorized her brother, L. L. Johnson, to transact any business for
her with Major Robinson; states that he refused to have anything
further to do with the business, that he never acted as her agent
as guardian; that she never authorized anyone to make a promise to
the plaintiffs that their lands should be released from the deed of
trust upon paying the price they had agreed to pay for the same;
that if her brother, L. L. Johnson, did receive cotton from
plaintiffs, it was without her knowledge, and that Mr. Ford never
paid any money for plaintiffs on account of said loan.
Upon this testimony, we see no grounds for disturbing the decree
of the court below. The denial on the part of Mrs. Johnson of her
brother's agency, owing to her imperfect conception as to what
constitutes an agent and to her vague recollection of her own acts,
is contradicted by the facts of which she herself testifies and by
the account marked "Exhibit B," made out under her direction, in
which the receipts of the payment
Page 128 U. S. 381
by cotton of the appellees are set out, the last of which is the
item of $1,035 cash for balance on demand against Stuart and
Christian, thus recognizing the receipts of the cotton and the
validity of the preceding payments made to her brother as her
agent, and received by herself. Her denial of his authority to make
a promise to the plaintiffs that their land should be released from
the deed of trust upon their paying the price they had agreed to
pay for the same is contradicted by her subsequent declaration, in
these words: "I did say to my brother that if these men would pay
the $3,000, they should have a deed --
i.e., I agreed to
it." Upon her testimony alone, it is clear that every act of
Lycurgus L. Johnson in connection with this transaction, in every
stage of its progress, from the loan to Robinson to the payment of
the balance of the purchase money due from the appellees, was
ratified by her as guardian of appellant.
In a single instance, she consented to his action as her agent
in respect of her guardianship -- reluctantly, she says, but
nevertheless consented -- and ratified it absolutely and without
qualification. No act or contract of his was disavowed by her to
the appellees, with whom, as her agent, he was dealing, and from
whom he was collecting payments in her behalf. Not being notified
of revocation of his authority as her agent, they were clearly
justified in acting upon the presumption of its continuance. Story
on Agency §§ 90, 93;
Hatch v. Coddington,
95 U. S. 48;
Insurance Co. v. McCain, 96 U. S. 84.
Appellant's counsel contend that the matters set up in the bill
could have been pleaded as a defense in the suit of the appellant
against them in ejectment, and as there is no averment that
appellees were prevented from interposing those matters as a
defense in said action by accident of any kind, or by the fraud of
appellant, unmixed with any fault or negligence on their part, the
bill should have been dismissed.
To this we cannot agree. The principle laid down in the
decisions cited in support of the objection is that a court of
equity will not enjoin a judgment at law unless it is shown that
the complainant was prevented from resorting to a legal defense by
fraud or unavoidable accident, without any fault
Page 128 U. S. 382
or negligence on his part; but that it will do so if the matters
set up in the bill as a ground of relief constitute equities
unavailable as a defense in the action at law. In the action of
ejectment, the issue was squarely upon the plaintiff's legal title.
There is nothing in the case to except it from the general rule
that in the United States courts a recovery in ejectment can be had
upon the strict legal title only, and that a court of law will not
uphold or enforce an equitable title to land as a defense in such
action.
Bagnell v.
Broderick, 13 Pet. 436,
38 U. S. 450;
Hooper v.
Scheimer, 23 How. 235;
Foster v. Mora,
98 U. S. 425;
Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U. S. 74,
124 U. S. 85.
The facts alleged in appellees' bill for the purpose of showing
their equitable title to the land in dispute could not be set up by
them as a plea in the action ejectment to defeat the strictly legal
title of appellant.
It is said that if appellees are obliged to resort to equity to
quiet their title, Robinson, their vendor, whose failure to have
their payments properly appropriated caused their lands to be sold
under the deed of trust previously given by him, should have been
made a party to the suit and called upon to see that the land had
been paid for; if not already, that it be paid for now.
We think this position untenable. The answer to it is that the
decree which the appellees asked for, and was rendered by the court
below, granting them the relief sought for, did not undertake to
settle, and did not in effect settle, any rights or liabilities of
Robinson, or of any other person not before the court as a party to
the record.
The dealings between Robinson and appellant's guardian, and the
rights and obligations growing out of them, are distinct from the
question of title between the parties to this suit, and have no
connection with it except as evidence tending to throw light upon
that question.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.
