In March, 1848, A S and E S, his wife, settled upon a tract of
public land in what was then the Territory of Oregon and is now
Washington Territory, and from thenceforward continued to reside
upon it and cultivated it for four years as required by the Act of
September 27, 1850, 9 Stat. 496, c. 76. After completing the
required term of cultivation, A S died intestate in January, 1853.
In October, 1853, E S, assuming to act under the Amendatory Act of
February 14, 1853, filed with the Surveyor General of the Territory
proof of the required residence and cultivation by her deceased
husband. In 1855 or 1856, the heirs and the widow agreed upon a
partition, she taking the east half and they the west half. In
1856, the probate court made partition of the west half among the
heirs, and, one of them being a minor, appointed a guardian to
represent him, and directed the guardian to sell, by public
auction, the tract allotted to his ward in the partition. In
accordance therewith, the guardian made such sale and executed and
delivered a deed of the property to N S, the purchaser, who entered
into possession of the tract and made valuable improvements on it,
and from that time on paid the taxes upon it. In May, 1860, the map
of the public survey, showing this donation claim, was approved,
and in June, 1860, final proof of the settlement and cultivation by
A S was made. In Jane, 1862, E S died. In July, 1874, the donation
certificate was issued, assigning the west half to A S and the east
half to E S, and in 1877, under the provisions of Rev.Stat. §
2448 a patent was issued accordingly, notwithstanding the deaths of
the parties. Some years afterwards, the heirs of A S and E S
sold and conveyed to J B their interest in the land so sold to N
S. J B thereupon brought this action against N S for possession of
it.
Held:
(1) That before the Act of February 14, 1853, the settler not
being required to give notice in advance of the public survey, A S
was not in fault for not having given such notice during his
lifetime.
(2) That as the law contemplated that when a joint settlement
had been made by two, the benefit of the donation, in case of the
death of either, should be secured to the heirs, the notice given
by the widow in October, 1853, was sufficient to secure the
donation claim in its entirety.
(3) That the heirs of A S and their privies in estate were
estopped, as against N S, to deny that A S resided on the tract and
cultivated it, and that his widow and children were at the date of
his death entitled, under the statute, to the donation land
claim.
Page 124 U. S. 496
(4) That the widow and the heirs having agreed to a division
among themselves, other persons could not complain of the
arrangement if the Surveyor General afterwards conformed to their
wishes in this respect.
(5) That the proceedings in the probate court were warranted by
the laws of Oregon in force at that time.
(6) That the minor having made no objection to those proceedings
for eleven years after coming of age, and not having indicated an
intention to disavow the sale until the property had greatly
increased in value, his course was equivalent to an express
affirmance of the proceedings, even if they were affected with such
irregularities as, upon his prompt application after coming of age,
would have justified the court in setting them aside.
Hall v. Russell, 101 U. S. 503,
distinguished.
This was an action for the possession of real estate. Judgment
for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. The case is stated in the
opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes before us on appeal from the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Washington. The action was brought by the
plaintiff below, who is appellant here, for the possession of a
tract of land in Clarke County, in that territory, containing about
thirty-five acres, more or less, or which he alleges that he is the
owner and entitled to the possession, but which the defendants
wrongfully withhold from him, and have done so for the last six
years, and of which they have during that time appropriated the
rents and profits.
The plaintiff, in support of his alleged title to the premises,
relies upon conveyances thereof from the heirs of Amos M. Short, in
whose name and that of Esther Short, his wife, a patent of the
United States was issued on the thirteenth of October, 1877, for a
tract of land embracing the premises, in supposed compliance with
the Act of Congress of September 27, 1850, for the protection of
settlers in the Territory of Oregon.
Page 124 U. S. 497
The defendants assert title to the premises through a conveyance
thereof of an earlier date by the guardian of one of the said
heirs, made under the direction of the probate court of the county
after partition had been had between the heirs of their respective
interests.
It appears that on the 8th of March, 1848, Amos M. Short, and
Esther Short, his wife, settled upon a tract of land in the present
County of Clarke and Territory of Washington, then constituting
part of the Territory of Oregon, claiming the same under the laws
of the provisional government of the country, which the inhabitants
had established as early as 1845. By those laws, each settler was
entitled to 640 acres upon complying with certain conditions as to
their improvement. On the fourteenth of August, 1848, Congress
passed an act establishing a government for the territory. 9 Stat.
323, c. 177. The 14th section recognized and continued in force the
laws of the provisional government so far as the same were not
incompatible with the Constitution of the United States and the
principles and provisions of the act, but all laws making grants of
land or otherwise affecting or encumbering the title to lands were
declared to be void. Afterwards, on September 27, 1850, Congress
passed an act commonly called the Donation Act of Oregon, by which
the substantial benefits of the laws of the provisional government
in the acquisition of titles to lands were secured to settlers. It
is entitled
"An act to create the office of Surveyor General of the Public
Lands in Oregon, and to provide for the survey and to make
donations to settlers of the said public lands."
9 Stat. 496, c. 76. By the fourth section of this act, a grant
of land was made to every white settler or occupant of the public
lands in Oregon above the age of eighteen years who was a citizen
of the United States or had made a declaration according to law of
his intention to become a citizen, or who should make such
declaration on or before the first day of December, 1851, and who
was at that time a resident of the territory or might become a
resident before December 1, 1850, and who should reside upon and
cultivate the same for four consecutive years, and otherwise
conform to the provisions of the act. The grant
Page 124 U. S. 498
was of 320 acres of land if the settler was a single man; but if
a married man or if he should become married within one year from
the first day of December, 1850, then it was of 640 acres, one-half
to himself, and the other half to his wife, to be held by her in
her own right, the surveyor general to designate the part inuring
to the husband and that to the wife, and enter the same on the
records of his office.
The section further provided that in all cases where such
married persons had complied with the provisions of the act so as
to entitle them to the grant, whether under the late provisional
government of Oregon or since, and either should die before the
patent was issued, the survivor and children or heirs of the
deceased should be entitled to his share or interest in equal
proportions, except where should otherwise dispose of it by will.
By the sixth section, the settler was, within three months after
survey of the land, or where the survey had been made before the
settlement commenced, then within three months from its
commencement, to notify the surveyor general of the United States
for the territory of the precise tract claimed by him under the
act. By the 7th section, he was, within twelve months after the
survey, or where the survey had been made before the settlement,
within that period after its commencement, to prove to the
satisfaction of the surveyor general, or of such other officer as
might be appointed for that purpose, that the settlement and
cultivation required had been commenced, specifying the time of the
commencement, and after the expiration of four years from the date
of such settlement, whether made under the laws of the provisional
government or not, to prove in like manner by two disinterested
witnesses the continued residence and cultivation required by the
4th section. Such proof being made, the surveyor general or other
officer appointed for that purpose was to issue a certificate
setting forth the facts and specifying the land to which the party
was entitled, and to return the proof thus taken to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, and if he found no valid
objection thereto, a patent was to issue for the land according to
the certificate upon its surrender.
Page 124 U. S. 499
By an act passed on the fourteenth of February, 1853, the
Donation Act was amended, 10 Stat. c. 69, 158, extending the
provisions of the original act to the first of December, 1855, and
requiring any person entitled to the benefit of the fourth section
of that act, who was a resident in the territory on or prior to
December 1, 1850, to file with the surveyor general of the
territory, in advance of the time when the public surveys should be
extended over the particular land claimed by him, if such surveys
had not been previously made, a notice setting forth his claim to
the benefits of that section.
The four-years residence and cultivation required of Amos M.
Short by the Donation Act were completed on the eighth of March,
1852. On the ninth of January, 1853, he died intestate, leaving his
widow and ten children surviving him. Letters of administration on
his estate were issued to her by the Probate Court of Clarke
County, and she was appointed guardian of the minor children.
Subsequently she surrendered her letters of administration, and one
S. Burlingame was appointed administrator in her place, she
continuing guardian of the minor children, with the exception of
one of them, Alfred D. Short, of whom another was appointed
guardian. On the fourth of October, 1853, assuming to follow the
amendatory act of February 14, 1853, she filed with the surveyor
general of the territory the notice in writing required by that
act, showing that her deceased husband, by his residence upon and
cultivation of the land, had complied with the provisions of the
Donation Act, and as such was entitled to its benefit. On the 26th
of May, 1860, the map of the survey of public lands, including the
donation and claim, was approved by the surveyor general, and on
the 19th of June following, the final proof of settlement,
residence upon, and cultivation of the land was made, and on the
31st of July, 1874, the donation certificate was issued, by which
the west half of the claim was assigned to Amos M. Short and the
east half to his wife, Esther, who had died on the 28th of June,
1862. A patent for the donation claim was issued to them and their
heirs bearing date October 13, 1877, by which the west half of the
claim was allotted and granted to Amos M. Short and his
Page 124 U. S. 500
heirs, and the east half was allotted and granted to Esther
Short and her heirs. The patent was issued in this form
notwithstanding the death of Amos and Esther Short, pursuant to
§ 2448 of the Revised Statutes, reenacting the provisions of
the Act of May 20, 1836, which declares that
"Where patents for public lands have been or may be issued in
pursuance of any law of the United States to a person who had died,
or who hereafter dies, before the date of such patent, the title to
the land designated therein shall inure to and become vested in the
heirs, devisees, or assignees of such deceased patentee as if the
patent had issued to the deceased person during life."
Some years after the issue of this patent, the heirs of Amos and
Esther Short conveyed their interest in the land in controversy to
the grantors of the plaintiff.
It would seem that sometime in the year 1855 or in 1856, the
heirs of Amos M. Short and his widow agreed among themselves upon a
division of the donation claim. The widow took the east half, and
the children the west half. In July, 1856, the part thus by
agreement assigned to the children was, by order of the probate
court upon their application, partitioned among them. It was
divided into ten parts, one of which was allotted to each child.
The value of the different allotments was appraised, and, where
necessary to equalize their valuation, owelty was allowed. Of one
of the heirs, Grant H. Short, a minor, a guardian was appointed,
who subsequently, by order of the probate court, sold the property
of his ward for the purpose of raising money with which to pay his
just debts and to furnish him the necessary means of living. The
sale was made at auction to the highest bidder, and the defendant
Nicholas Schofield became the purchaser, and a deed was executed to
him bearing date April 29, 1865. He went at once into possession,
and put improvements upon the property to the value of $2,000, and
ever afterwards paid the annual taxes thereon.
The title thus obtained by the defendant is assailed by the
plaintiff upon the alleged ground that no right to the donation
claim was acquired by the residence and cultivation of Amos
Page 124 U. S. 501
M. Short, he not having notified the surveyor general of his
claim, and that the notice by Esther Short, in October, 1853, being
given after his death, was of no efficacy, and that therefore no
interest in any part of the land passed to his heirs to be
partitioned or sold.
It is undoubtedly true that the Donation Act requires for the
completion of the settler's right to a patent not only that he
should reside upon the land and cultivate it for four years, but
that he should notify the surveyor general of the precise land he
claims. The object of the law was to give title to the party who
had resided upon and cultivated the land, and who was therefore in
equity and justice better entitled to the property than others who
had neither resided upon nor cultivated it. But it was also of
importance to the government to know the precise extent and
location of the land thus resided upon and cultivated. It was
necessary to enable the government to ascertain what lands were
free from claims of settlers, and thus subject to sale or other
disposition. There was nothing, however, in the information to be
communicated which rendered it necessary that it should proceed
from the husband alone. So long as he remained the head of the
family settlement, there was a manifest propriety in its proceeding
from him, but in case of his death, it is not perceived why it
might not come with equal efficacy from his widow, who then took
his place as the head of the family. The law contemplates in all
its provisions that where a settlement has been joint, by the two
together, the benefit of the donation intended for both should be
secured, in case of the death of either, to his or her heirs. It is
true, the notice to the surveyor general was the first proceeding
which informed the public authorities of the intention of the
occupant to avail himself of the benefits of the act and of his
acceptance of the proffered grant. But without the residence and
cultivation required, the notice would be of no efficacy. By the
original act, they might precede the notice, if the public surveys
had not been extended over the land. Until such survey was made, no
notice to the surveyor general was required, and yet the occupant
was not for the want of it to lose the grant which the act
contemplated
Page 124 U. S. 502
as a reward for his continued residence and cultivation. It was
the amendatory act of 1853 which required notice to be given to the
surveyor general in advance of the public surveys, and such notice
could only be given by the widow, the husband being then dead. The
event calling upon him to give the notice had not occurred during
his life -- that is, the survey of the land had not been made. He
was not, therefore, in fault for not giving it. Under these
circumstances, it is not perceived why the widow might not give it,
she and her children being directly interested in the matter. To
hold otherwise, and thus impose a great loss upon them, would seem
to be contrary to the general purpose of the act, which was to
extend its protection to them as well as to the father and husband,
whenever his residence and cultivation had continued for the
required period. Indeed, by the eighth section of the act of 1850
it was provided that upon the death of any settler before the
expiration of the four-years' continued possession required, the
rights of the deceased should descend to the heirs at law of such
settler, including his widow, where one was left, in equal parts,
and that proof of compliance with the conditions of the act up to
the time of his death should be sufficient to entitle them to a
patent. Much more would it seem should the widow and children be
secured in the donation, where the residence and cultivation had
continued for the whole period required, and be permitted to
perform any future act to establish their rights, required by
reason of subsequent legislation. Besides, the act of 1864,
amending the Donation Act, declares that a failure to file the
notice within the time fixed should not work a forfeiture. 13 Stat.
184, c. 154. We are of opinion, therefore, that the notice given by
the widow in October, 1853, was sufficient to preserve the donation
claim in its entirety.
The case of
Hall v. Russell, 101 U.
S. 503, does not conflict with these views. There, the
husband died after residence of less than a year, and it was held
that he had acquired no devisable interest in the property. The
interest which the widow and heirs might take under the 8th section
upon such limited residence and cultivation by the deceased husband
was as donees of the government, and not by descent.
Page 124 U. S. 503
There is another view of this case which would seem to conclude
the appellant as to the sufficiency and legality of this
notification by the widow. The patent of the United States was
issued upon the supposed compliance of the patentees with the
requirements of the Donation Act. That instrument is not in the
record, but we must presume that it follows the usual form of such
instruments, and recites the compliance of the patentees with the
requirements of the act, and the production to the proper officers
of satisfactory proof on that point. The appellant derives all the
title he asserts through conveyances of the heirs of the deceased
settler under the patent. As well observed by the supreme court of
the territory, under these circumstances, these heirs and their
grantees are estopped from
"saying to the prejudice of any grantee of theirs, but that the
husband and ancestor, Amos Short, deceased, duly resided upon and
cultivated for the prescribed period the donation land claim known
as his, or that, by virtue of a full compliance with the essential
requirements of the Donation Act, his widow and children were at
the date of his death, in January, 1853, entitled under the act to
that land claim."
The conditions for the acquisition of the title to the entire
donation tract having been complied with, upon the notice given by
his widow in October, 1853, followed by proof of the continued
residence and cultivation required by the act, what remained to be
done by the officers of the government was to divide the land
between the widow and heirs, assigning to her one-half part and to
the heirs the other half. They having agreed to a division between
themselves, it is not for any others to complain of the arrangement
if the surveyor general afterwards conformed to their wishes in
that respect.
As to the objections taken to the want of jurisdiction in the
probate court of Clarke County to make the partition between the
heirs, or to authorize the guardian of Grant H. Short to sell his
interest, only a few words need be said. That the probate court was
at the time vested with jurisdiction over proceedings for the
partition of real property among
Page 124 U. S. 504
joint owners, and over proceedings for the sale of the property
of minors, upon proper application and showing, appears from the
statutes of the territory then in force. (
See act touching
the relation of guardian and ward of 1855, and act respecting
executors, administrators, and the distribution of real and
personal property of 1854, Laws of Territory of 1854, p. 300, and
of 1855, p. 14). Whatever objections, therefore, there may be to
the act on of the probate court, they cannot arise from want of
jurisdiction over the subjects considered, but must exist, if
having any foundation, in defective proceedings or insufficient
averments. And of objections of this character, we can only say
that the facts touching the partition and sale are not sufficiently
disclosed by the transcript to enable us to pass upon the
objections. The records of the application for the partition, and
of the guardian to sell, and of the proceedings taken in either
matter, are not before us. It appears, however, that for many years
after they came of age, no objection was made by the heirs, who
were minors at the time, to any of the proceedings in partition. On
the contrary, they proceeded at once, after the partition, to
exercise control by themselves or guardians appointed by the
probate court, over the several parts allotted to them, and some of
the heirs sold and conveyed to others their respective portions.
The court below expressly finds that the heirs, who were minors in
1856, after becoming of full age adopted the partition as made and
assented to by their guardians in that year. The minor Grant H.
Short, whose property was sold to one of the defendants, received
the benefit of the moneys obtained upon the sale; they were used to
pay some just debts incurred for him, and to furnish him the
necessaries of life. For eleven years after he became of age, he
made no objection to the proceedings, or by any act indicated his
intention to disaffirm the sale or deed made by his guardian, and
then, in 1878, he gave to the grantors of the appellant a deed of
his interest in the donation claim. In the meantime, the property
had greatly increased in value by the improvements put upon it by
the purchaser and his grantee, Mary Schofield.
Page 124 U. S. 505
Under these circumstances, we think the supreme court of the
territory was correct in its conclusion that the long acquiescence
of the minor, after he became of age, in the proceedings had for
the sale of his property was equivalent to an express affirmance of
them, even were they affected with such irregularities as, upon his
prompt application after becoming of age, would have justified the
court in setting them aside.
Judgment affirmed.