The Legislature of Alabama enacted a law entitled "An act to
require locomotive engineers in this state to be examined and
licensed by a board to be appointed for that purpose," in which it
was provided that it should be
"unlawful for the engineer of any railroad train in this state
to drive or operate or engineer any train of cars or engine upon
the main line or roadbed of any railroad in this state which is
used for the transportation of persons, passengers or freight
without first undergoing an examination and obtaining a license as
hereinafter provided."
The statute then provided for the creation of a board of
examiners and prescribed their duties, and authorized them to issue
licenses and imposed a license fee, and then enacted
"That any engineer violating the provisions of this act shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not
less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, and may also be
sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than six
months."
Plaintiff in error was an engineer in the service of the Mobile
and Ohio Railroad Company. His duty was to "drive, operate, and
engineer" a locomotive engine drawing a passenger train on that
road, regularly plying in one continuous trip between Mobile in
Alabama and Corinth in Mississippi, and
vice versa, 60
miles of which trip was in Alabama, and 265 in Mississippi. He
never "drove, operated, or engineered" a locomotive engine hauling
cars from one point to another point exclusively within the
Alabama. After the statute of Alabama took effect, he continued to
perform such regular duties without taking out the license required
by that act. He was proceeded against for a violation of the
statute, and was committed to jail to answer the charge. He
petitioned a state court for a writ of habeas corpus upon the
ground that he was employed in interstate commerce, and that the
statute, so far as it applied to him, was a regulation of commerce
among the states, and repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States. The writ was refused, and the Supreme Court of the Alabama
on appeal affirmed that judgment.
Held:
(1) That the statute of Alabama was not in its nature a
regulation of commerce, even when applied to such a case as
this.
(2) That it was an act of legislation within the scope of the
powers reserved to the states to regulate the relative rights and
duties of persons within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, being intended to operate so as to secure safety of
persons and property for the public.
(3) That so far as it affected transactions of commerce among
the states,
Page 124 U. S. 466
it did so only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely, and not
so as to burden or impede them, and that, in the particulars in
which it touched those transactions at all, it was not in conflict
with any express enactment of Congress on the subject nor contrary
to any intention of Congress to be presumed from its silence.
(4) That so far as it was alleged to contravene the Constitution
of they United States, the statute was a valid law.
The case, as stated by the court, was as follows:
This is a writ of error bringing into review a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State of Alabama affirming a judgment of the
City Court of Mobile. The proceeding in the latter court was upon a
writ of habeas corpus sued out by the plaintiff in error seeking
his discharge from the custody of the Sheriff of Mobile County in
that state under a commitment by a justice of the peace upon the
charge of handling, engineering, driving, and operating an engine
pulling a passenger train upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad used in
transporting passengers within the County of Mobile and State of
Alabama without having obtained a license from the board of
examiners appointed by the governor of said state in accordance
with the provisions of an act entitled "An act to require
locomotive engineers in this state to be examined and licensed by a
board to be appointed by the governor for that purpose," approved
February 28, 1887, and after more than three months had elapsed
from the date of appointment and qualification of said board. The
plaintiff in error, upon complaint, was committed by the examining
magistrate to the custody of the sheriff to answer an indictment
for that alleged offense. The ground of the application for
discharge upon the writ of habeas corpus in the City Court of
Mobile was that the act of the General Assembly of the State of
Alabama, for the violation of which he was held, was in
contravention of that clause of the Constitution of the United
States which confers upon Congress power to regulate commerce among
the states.
The facts, as they appeared upon the hearing upon the return of
the writ, are as follows:
The petitioner, at the time of his arrest on July 16, 1887,
within the County of Mobile, was a locomotive engineer in the
service of the Mobile and
Page 124 U. S. 467
Ohio Railroad Company, a corporation owning and operating a line
of railroad forming a continuous and unbroken line of railway from
Mobile, in the State of Alabama, to St. Louis, in the State of
Missouri, and as such was then engaged in handling, operating, and
driving a locomotive engine, attached to a regular passenger train
on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad within the county and state,
consisting of a postal car carrying the United States mail to all
parts of the union, a southern express car containing perishable
freight, money packages, and other valuable merchandise destined to
Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, and other states, passenger
coaches, and a Pullman palace sleeping car occupied by passengers
to be transported by said train to the States of Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Kentucky. The petitioner's run as a locomotive
engineer in the service of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company was
regularly from the City of Mobile, in the State of Alabama, to
Corinth, in the State of Mississippi, sixty miles of which run was
in the State of Alabama, and two hundred and sixty-five miles in
the State of Mississippi, and he never handled and operated an
engine pulling a train of cars whose destination was a point within
the State of Alabama when said engine and train of cars started
from a point within that state. His train started at Mobile and ran
through without change of coaches or cars, on one continuous trip.
His employment as locomotive engineer in the service of said
company also required him to take charge of and handle, drive, and
operate an engine drawing a passenger train which started from St.
Louis, in the State of Missouri, destined to the City of Mobile, in
the State of Alabama, said train being loaded with merchandise and
occupied by passengers destined to Alabama and other states; this
engine and train he took charge of at Corinth, in Mississippi, and
handled, drove, and operated the same along and over the Mobile and
Ohio Railroad through the States of Mississippi and Alabama to the
City of Mobile. It frequently happened that he was ordered by the
proper officers of the said company to handle, drive, and operate
an engine drawing a passenger train loaded with merchandise,
carrying the United States mail, and occupied by passengers, from
the
Page 124 U. S. 468
City of Mobile, in Alabama, to the City of St. Louis, in
Missouri, being allowed two lay-overs; said train passing through
the States of Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Illinois and into
the State of Missouri.
It was admitted that the petitioner had not obtained the license
required by the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Alabama
of February 28, 1887, and had not applied to the board of
examiners, or any of its members, for such license, and that more
than three months had elapsed since the appointment and
qualification of said board of examiners, the same having been duly
appointed by the governor of the state under the provisions of said
act. The statute of Alabama the validity of which is thus drawn in
question as being contrary to the Constitution of the United States
and the validity of which has been affirmed by the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Alabama now in review is as follows:
"An act to require locomotive engineers in this state to be
examined and licensed by a board to be appointed by the governor
for that purpose."
"SECTION 1.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
Alabama that it shall be unlawful for the engineer of any
railroad train in this state to drive or operate or engineer any
train of cars or engine upon the main line or roadbed of any
railroad in this state which is used for the transportation of
persons, passengers, or freight without first undergoing an
examination and obtaining a license as hereinafter provided."
"SEC. 2.
Be it further enacted that before any
locomotive engineer shall operate or drive an engine upon the main
line or roadbed of any railroad in this state used for the
transportation of persons or freight, he shall apply to the board
of examiners hereinafter provided for in this act and be examined
by said board or by two or more members thereof in practical
mechanics and concerning his knowledge of operating a locomotive
engine and his competency as an engineer."
"SEC. 3.
Be it further enacted that upon the
examination of any engineer as provided in this act, if the
applicant is
Page 124 U. S. 469
found competent, he shall, upon payment of five dollars, receive
a license, which shall be signed by each member of the board, and
which shall set forth the fact that the said engineer has been duly
examined, as required by law, and is authorized to engage as an
engineer on any of the railroads in this state."
"SEC. 4.
Be it further enacted that in addition to the
examination provided for in section two (2), it shall be the duty
of said board of examiners, before issuing the license provided for
in this act, to inquire into the character and habits of all
engineers applying for license, and in no case shall a license be
issued if the applicant is found to be of reckless or intemperate
habits."
"SEC. 5.
Be it further enacted that any engineer who,
after procuring a license as provided in this act, shall at any
time be guilty of any act of recklessness, carelessness, or
negligence while running an engine by which any damage to persons
or property is done, or who shall, within six hours before or
during the time he is engaged in running an engine, be in a state
of intoxication shall forfeit his license, with all the rights and
privileges acquired by it, indefinitely or for a stated period, as
the board may determine after notifying such engineer to appear
before the board and inquiring into his act or conduct. It shall be
the duty of the board to determine whether the engineer is unfit or
incompetent by reason of any act or habit unknown at the time of
his examination, or acquired or formed subsequent to it, and if it
is made to appear that he is unfit or incompetent from any cause,
the board shall revoke or cancel his license and shall notify every
railroad in this state of the action of the board."
"SEC. 6.
Be it further enacted that it shall be the
duty of the governor, as soon after the approval of this act as
practicable, to appoint and commission five skilled mechanics, one
of whom shall reside in Birmingham, one in Montgomery, one in
Mobile, one in Selma, and one in Eufaula, who shall constitute a
board of examiners for locomotive engineers. It shall be the duty
of said board to examine locomotive engineers, issue licenses, hear
causes of complaint, revoke or cancel
Page 124 U. S. 470
licenses, and perform such duties as are provided in this act,
provided that any one of said board shall have authority
to examine applicants for licenses, and if the applicant is found
competent, to issue license to him;
provided further that
for every examination provided in this act, the board or member
thereof making the examination shall be entitled to five dollars,
to be paid by the applicant."
"SEC. 7.
Be it further enacted that all engineers now
employed in running or operating engines upon railroads in this
state shall have three months after the appointment of the board
herein provided within which to be examined and to obtain a
license."
"SEC. 8.
Be it further enacted that any engineer
violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than fifty
nor more than five hundred dollars, and may also be sentenced to
hard labor for the county for not more than six months. "
Page 124 U. S. 472
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS, after stating the facts as above,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 124 U. S. 473
The grant of power to Congress in the Constitution to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, it is
conceded, is paramount over all legislative powers which, in
consequence of not having been granted to Congress, are reserved to
the states. It follows that any legislation of a state, although in
pursuance of an acknowledged power reserved to it, which conflicts
with the actual exercise of the power of Congress over the subject
of commerce must give way before the supremacy of the national
authority. As the regulation of commerce may consist in abstaining
from prescribing positive rules for its conduct, it cannot always
be said that the power to regulate is dormant because not
affirmatively exercised. And when it is manifest that Congress
intends to leave that commerce which is subject to its jurisdiction
free and unfettered by any positive regulations, such intention
would be contravened by state laws operating as regulations of
commerce as much as though these had been expressly forbidden. In
such cases, the existence of the power to regulate commerce in
Congress has been construed to be not only paramount but exclusive,
so as to withdraw the subject as the basis of legislation
altogether from the states.
There are many cases, however, where the acknowledged powers of
a state may be exerted and applied in such a manner as to affect
foreign or interstate commerce without being intended to operate as
commercial regulations. If their operation and application in such
cases regulate such commerce, so as to conflict with the regulation
of the same subject by Congress, either as expressed in positive
laws or implied from the absence of legislation, such legislation
on the part of the state, to the extent of that conflict, must be
regarded as annulled. To draw the line of interference between two
fields of jurisdiction and to define and declare the instances of
unconstitutional encroachment is a judicial question often of much
difficulty, the solution of which, perhaps, is not to be found in
any single and exact rule of decision. Some general lines of
discrimination, however, have been drawn in varied and numerous
decisions of this Court. It has been uniformly held, for example,
that the state cannot by legislation place burdens
Page 124 U. S. 474
upon commerce with foreign nations or among the several states.
"But upon an examination of the cases in which they were rendered,"
as was said in
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S.
99,
93 U. S.
102,
"it will be found that the legislation adjudged in valid imposed
a tax upon some instrument or subject of commerce, or exacted a
license fee from parties engaged in commercial pursuits, or created
an impediment to the free navigation of some public waters, or
prescribed conditions in accordance with which commerce in
particular articles or between particular places was required to be
conducted. In all the cases, the legislation condemned operated
directly upon commerce, either by way of tax upon its business,
license upon its pursuit in particular channels, or conditions for
carrying it on."
In that case it was held that a statute of Indiana giving a
right of action to the personal representatives of the deceased
where his death was caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another was applicable to the case of a loss of life occasioned by
a collision between steamboats navigating the Ohio River, engaged
in interstate commerce, and did not amount to a regulation of
commerce in violation of the Constitution of the United States. On
this point, the Court said (p.
93 U. S.
103):
"General legislation of this kind, prescribing the liabilities
or duties of citizens of a state without distinction as to pursuit
or calling, is not open to any valid objection because it may
affect persons engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Objection
might with equal propriety be urged against legislation prescribing
the form in which contracts shall be authenticated, or property
descend or be distributed on the death of its owner, because
applicable to the contracts or estates of persons engaged in such
commerce. In conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce,
it was never intended to cut the states off from legislating upon
all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their
citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the
commerce of the country. Legislation in a great variety of ways may
affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a
regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution. . . . And
it may be said generally that the legislation of a state, not
directed against commerce or
Page 124 U. S. 475
any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and
liabilities of citizens and only indirectly and remotely affecting
the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens
within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water, or
engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in any other
pursuit."
In that case it was admitted in the opinion of the Court that
Congress might legislate, under the power to regulate commerce,
touching the liability of parties for marine torts resulting in the
death of the persons injured, but that in the absence of such
legislation by Congress, the statute of the state giving such right
of action constituted no encroachment upon the commercial power of
Congress, although, as was also said (p.
93 U. S.
103:)
"It is true that the commercial power conferred by the
Constitution is one without limitation. It authorizes legislation
with respect to all the subjects of foreign and interstate
commerce, the persons engaged in it, and the instruments by which
it is carried on."
The statute of Indiana held to be valid in that case was an
addition to and an amendment of the general body of the law
previously existing and in force regulating the relative rights and
duties of persons within the jurisdiction of the state and
operating upon them even when engaged in the business of interstate
commerce. This general system of law, subject to be modified by
state legislation, whether consisting in that customary law which
prevails as the common law of the land in each state or as a code
of positive provisions expressly enacted, is nevertheless the law
of the state in which it is administered, and derives all its force
and effect from the actual or presumed exercise of its legislative
power. It does not emanate from the authority of the national
government, nor flow from the exercise of any legislative powers
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States,
nor can it be implied as existing by force of any other legislative
authority than that of the several states in which it is enforced.
It has never been doubted but that this entire body and system of
law, regulating in general the relative rights and duties of
persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, without
regard to their pursuits, is subject to change at the will of
the
Page 124 U. S. 476
legislature of each state except as that will may be restrained
by the Constitution of the United States. It is to this law that
persons within the scope of its operation look for the definition
of their rights and for the redress of wrongs committed upon them.
It is the source of all those relative obligations and duties
enforceable by law the observance of which the state undertakes to
enforce as its public policy. And it was in contemplation of the
continued existence of this separate system of law in each state
that the Constitution of the United States was framed and ordained
with such legislative powers as are therein granted expressly or by
reasonable implication.
It is among these laws of the states, therefore, that we find
provisions concerning the rights and duties of common carriers of
persons and merchandise, whether by land or by water, and the means
authorized by which injuries resulting from the failure properly to
perform their obligations may be either prevented or redressed. A
carrier exercising his calling within a particular state, although
engaged in the business of interstate commerce, is answerable,
according to the laws of the state, for acts of nonfeasance or
misfeasance committed within its limits. If he fail to deliver
goods to the proper consignee at the right time or place, he is
liable in an action for damages, under the laws of the state, in
its courts; or if by negligence in transportation he inflicts
injury upon the person of a passenger brought from another state, a
right of action for the consequent damage is given by the local
law. In neither case would it be a defense that the law giving the
right to redress was void as being an unconstitutional regulation
of commerce by the state. This, indeed, was the very point decided
in
Sherlock v. Alling, above cited. If it is competent for
the state thus to administer justice according to its own laws for
wrongs done and injuries suffered, when committed and inflicted by
defendants while engaged in the business of interstate or foreign
commerce, notwithstanding the power over those subjects conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution, what is there to forbid the
state, in the further exercise of the same jurisdiction, to
prescribe the precautions and safeguards foreseen to be necessary
and proper to prevent by anticipation
Page 124 U. S. 477
those wrongs and injuries which, after they have been inflicted,
it is admitted the state has power to redress and punish? If the
state has power to secure to passengers conveyed by common carriers
in their vehicles of transportation a right of action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by the negligence of the carrier in
not providing safe and suitable vehicles, or employees of
sufficient skill and knowledge, or in not properly conducting and
managing the act of transportation, why may not the state also
impose, on behalf of the public, as additional means of prevention,
penalties for the nonobservance of these precautions? Why may it
not define and declare what particular things shall be done and
observed by such a carrier in order to insure the safety of the
persons and things he carries, or of the persons and property of
others liable to be affected by them?
It is that law which defines who are or may be common carriers
and prescribes the means they shall adopt for the safety of that
which is committed to their charge and the rules according to
which, under varying conditions, their conduct shall be measured
and judged, which declares that the common carrier owes the duty of
care, and what shall constitute that negligence for which he shall
be responsible. But for the provisions on the subject found in the
local law of each state, there would be no legal obligation on the
part of the carrier, whether
ex contractu or
ex
delicto, to those who employ him; or if the local law is held
not to apply where the carrier is engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce, then, in the absence of laws passed by Congress or
presumed to be adopted by it, there can be no rule of decision
based upon rights and duties supposed to grow out of the relation
of such carriers to the public or to individuals. In other words,
if the law of the particular state does not govern that relation,
and prescribe the rights and duties which it implies, then there is
and can be no law that does, until Congress expressly supplies it
or is held by implication to have supplied it, in cases within its
jurisdiction over foreign and interstate commerce. The failure of
Congress to legislate can be construed only as an intention not to
disturb what already exists,
Page 124 U. S. 478
and is the mode by which it adopts, for cases within the scope
of its power, the rule of the state law which, until displaced,
covers the subject.
There is no common law of the United States in the sense of a
national customary law, distinct from the common law of England as
adopted by the several states each for itself, applied as its local
law and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own
statutes.
Wheaton v.
Peters, 8 Pet. 591. A determination in a given case
of what that law is may be different in a court of the United
States from that which prevails in the judicial tribunals of a
particular state. This arises from the circumstance that the courts
of the United States, in cases within their jurisdiction, where
they are called upon to administer the law of the state in which
they sit or by which the transaction is governed, exercise an
independent though concurrent jurisdiction, and are required to
ascertain and declare the law according to their own judgment. This
is illustrated by the case of
Railroad Co. v.
Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, where the common law
prevailing in the State of New York in reference to the liability
of common carriers for negligence received a different
interpretation from that placed upon it by the judicial tribunals
of the state -- but the law as applied was nonetheless the law of
that state. In cases, also, arising under the
lex
mercatoria, or law merchant, by reason of its international
character, this Court has held itself less bound by the decisions
of the state courts than in other cases.
Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1;
Carpenter
v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 16 Pet.
495;
Oates v. National Bank, 100 U.
S. 239;
Railroad Company v. National Bank,
102 U. S. 14.
There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that
there is no national common law. The interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the
fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English
common law, and are to be read in the light of its history. The
code of constitutional and statutory construction which therefore
is gradually formed by the judgments of this Court, in the
application of the Constitution and the laws
Page 124 U. S. 479
and treaties made in pursuance thereof, has for its basis so
much of the common law as may be implied in the subject, and
constitutes a common law resting on national authority.
Moore
v. United States, 91 U. S. 270.
The statute of Alabama the validity of which is drawn in
question in this case does not fall within this exception. It would
indeed be competent for Congress to legislate upon its subject
matter and to prescribe the qualifications of locomotive engineers
for employment by carriers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce. It has legislated upon a similar subject by prescribing
the qualifications for pilots and engineers of steam vessels
engaged in the coasting trade and navigating the inland waters of
the United States while engaged in commerce among the states,
Rev.Stat. Tit. 52, §§ 4399-4500, and such legislation
undoubtedly is justified on the ground that it is incident to the
power to regulate interstate commerce.
In
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227, this Court adjudged a law
of the State of Alabama to be unconstitutional, so far as it
applied to vessels engaged in interstate commerce, which prohibited
any steamboat from navigating any of the waters of the state
without complying with certain prescribed conditions, inconsistent
with the Act of Congress of February 17, 1793, in reference to the
enrollment and licensing of vessels engaged in the coasting trade.
In that case, it was said (p.
63 U. S.
243):
"The whole commercial marine of the country is placed by the
Constitution under the regulation of Congress, and all laws passed
by that body in the regulation of navigation and trade, whether
foreign or coastwise, is therefore but the exercise of an
undisputed power. When, therefore, an act of the legislature of a
state prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and
inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the state law must
give way, and this without regard to the source of power whence the
state legislature derived its enactment."
The power might with equal authority be exercised in prescribing
the qualifications for locomotive engineers employed by railroad
companies engaged in the transportation of passengers and goods
among the states, and in that case would supersede
Page 124 U. S. 480
any conflicting provisions on the same subject made by local
authority.
But the provisions on the subject contained in the statute of
Alabama under consideration are not regulations of interstate
commerce. It is a misnomer to call them such. Considered in
themselves, they are parts of that body of the local law which, as
we have already seen, properly governs the relation between
carriers of passengers and merchandise, and the public who employ
them, which are not displaced until they come in conflict with
express enactments of Congress in the exercise of its power over
commerce, and which, until so displaced, according to the evident
intention of Congress, remain as the law governing carriers, in the
discharge of their obligations, whether engaged in the purely
internal commerce of the state or in commerce among the states.
No objection to the statute as an impediment to the free
transaction of commerce among the states can be found in any of its
special provisions. It requires that every locomotive engineer
shall have a license, but it does not limit the number of persons
who may be licensed nor prescribe any arbitrary conditions to the
grant. The fee of five dollars to be paid by an applicant for his
examination is not a provision for raising revenue, but it is no
more than an equivalent for the service rendered, and cannot be
considered in the light of a tax or burden upon transportation. The
applicant is required, before obtaining his license, to satisfy a
board of examiners in reference to his knowledge of practical
mechanics, his skill in operating a locomotive engine, and his
general competency as an engineer, and the board, before issuing
the license, is required to inquire into his character and habits
and to withhold the license if he be found to be reckless or
intemperate.
Certainly it is the duty of every carrier, whether engaged in
the domestic commerce of the state or in interstate commerce, to
provide and furnish itself with locomotive engineers of this
precise description; competent and well qualified, skilled and
sober, and if, by reason of carelessness in the selection of an
engineer not so qualified, injury or loss are caused, the carrier
no matter in what business engaged, is responsible according
Page 124 U. S. 481
to the local law admitted to govern in such cases in the absence
of congressional legislation.
The statute in question further provides that any engineer
licensed under the act shall forfeit his license if at any time
found guilty by the board of examiners of an act of recklessness,
carelessness, or negligence while running an engine, by which
damage to person or property is done, or who shall immediately
preceding or during the time he is engaged in running an engine be
in a state of intoxication, and the board are authorized to revoke
and cancel the license whenever they shall be satisfied of the
unfitness or incompetency of the engineer by reason of any act or
habit unknown at the time of his examination, or acquired or formed
subsequent to it. The eighth section of the act declares that any
engineer violating its provisions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction inflicts upon him the punishment of a fine not
less than $50 nor more than $500, and also that he may be sentenced
to hard labor for the county for not more than six months.
If a locomotive engineer, running an engine, as was the
petitioner in this case, in the business of transporting passengers
and goods between Alabama and other states should, while in that
state, by mere negligence and recklessness in operating his engine,
cause the death of one or more passengers carried, he might
certainly be held to answer to the criminal laws of the state if
they declare the offense in such a case to be manslaughter. The
power to punish for the offense after it is committed certainly
includes the power to provide penalties directed, as are those in
the statute in question, against those acts of omission which, if
performed, would prevent the commission of the larger offense.
It is to be remembered that railroads are not natural highways
of trade and commerce. They are artificial creations; they are
constructed within the territorial limits of a state and by the
authority of its laws, and ordinarily by means of corporations
exercising their franchises by limited grants from the state. The
places where they may be located and the plans according to which
they must be constructed are prescribed by the legislation of the
state. Their operation
Page 124 U. S. 482
requires the use of instruments and agencies attended with
special risks and dangers, the proper management of which involves
peculiar knowledge, training, skill, and care. The safety of the
public in person and property demands the use of specific guards
and precautions. The width of the gauge, the character of the
grades, the mode of crossing streams by culverts and bridges, the
kind of cuts and tunnels, the mode of crossing other highways, the
placing of watchmen and signals at points of special danger, the
rate of speed at stations and through villages, towns, and cities,
are all matters naturally and peculiarly within the provisions of
that law from the authority of which these modern highways of
commerce derive their existence. The rules prescribed for their
construction and for their management and operation, designed to
protect persons and property, otherwise endangered by their use,
are strictly within the limits of the local law. They are not
per se regulations of commerce; it is only when they
operate as such in the circumstances of their application, and
conflict with the expressed or presumed will of Congress exerted on
the same subject, that they can be required to give way to the
supreme authority of the Constitution.
In conclusion, we find, therefore, first that the statute of
Alabama the validity of which is under consideration is not,
considered in its own nature, a regulation of interstate commerce,
even when applied as in the case under consideration; secondly,
that it is properly an act of legislation within the scope of the
admitted power reserved to the states to regulate the relative
rights and duties of persons being and acting within its
territorial jurisdiction, intended to operate so as secure for the
public safety of person and property; and thirdly that so far as it
affects transactions of commerce among the states, it does so only
indirectly, incidentally, and remotely, and not so as to burden or
impede them, and, in the particulars in which it touches those
transactions at all, it is not in conflict with any express
enactment of Congress on the subject nor contrary to any intention
of Congress to be presumed from its silence.
For these reasons, we hold this statute, so far as it is
alleged
Page 124 U. S. 483
to contravene the Constitution of the United States, to be a
valid law.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is therefore
affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY dissented.
