If an official act of an executive officer in the Land Office is
challenged for error of law or for fraud in a judicial proceeding
between private parties in a court of the United States, no
jurisdiction attaches unless the controversy relates to rights
existing in the parties, or one of them, derived from the act and
unless definite relief or redress under some known head of judicial
jurisdiction is demanded.
The Acts of June 21, 1860, 12 Stat. 71, and February 25, 1569,
15 Stat. 275, having referred to the Land Office and the Department
of the Interior the adjustment of the claims of settlers within the
Las Animas grant in Colorado, and their definition by the
prescribed surveys and plats, and of all questions of possession
and of boundary and of conflict, the free course of that
administration, within the limit of the law, cannot be interrupted
or interfered with by the judicial power.
If the plaintiff's contention is well founded that the duty of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office to take up, hear, and
determine his appeal exists, that duty, so far as relates to
entering upon its performance, is strictly ministerial, and his
remedy is at law by mandamus, and not in equity.
The controversy in this case being confined to the conflicting
claims of actual settlers "holding possession under titles or
promises to settle" made by Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain, and
established under the provisions of the Acts of June 21, 1860, 12
Stat. 71, and February 25, 1869, 15 Stat. 275, and it appearing
from the pleadings, as amended, that the plaintiff below did not
aver an equitable interest in himself in the lands which here so
established in favor of the defendant, and that the only remedy
which he sought was to have it judicially determined that the
defendant's title was obtained by means of the fraudulent act
Page 123 U. S. 190
of an executive officer in the Land Office, whereby the
plaintiff was illegally deprived of a right of appeal from the
decision of that officer touching his own claims,
held
that the pleadings presented no question to give a circuit court
jurisdiction in equity over the case.
Under the treaty with Mexico of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Cornelio
Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain claimed title, under a Mexican grant made
in 1843, to a large tract of land embraced within the Huerfano,
Pisipa, and Cucharos Rivers to their junction with the Arkansas and
Animas, known as the "Las Animas Grant," and supposed to cover and
include about twenty-two square leagues, lying in the Territory of
New Mexico, but within the limits of the present State of Colorado,
and equivalent to four million of acres.
By the act to confirm certain private land claims in the
Territory of New Mexico approved June 21, 1860, 12 Stat. 71,
Congress confirmed the claim of Vigil and St. Vrain, but only to
the extent of eleven square leagues to each of said claimants. By
the second section of that act, it was provided
"That, in surveying the claims of said Cornelio Vigil and Cerap
St. Vrain, the location shall be made as follows, namely, he survey
shall first be made of all tracts occupied by actual settlers
holding possession under titles or promises to settle, which have
heretofore been given by said Vigil and St. Vrain, in the tracts
claimed by them, and after deducting the area of all such tracts
from the area embraced in twenty-two square leagues, the remainder
shall be located in two equal tracts, each of square form, in any
part of the tract claimed by the said Vigil and St. Vrain selected
by them, and it shall be the duty of the Surveyor General of New
Mexico immediately to proceed to make the surveys and locations
authorized and required by the terms of this section."
The fourth section of the act provides
"That the foregoing confirmation shall only be construed as
quitclaims or relinquishments on the part of the United States, and
shall not affect the adverse rights of any other person or persons
whomsoever."
This statute was amended by the Act of February 25, 1869, 15
Stat. 275, 440, as follows:
Page 123 U. S. 191
"Chapter XLVII --
An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to
confirm certain private land claims in the Territory of New
Mexico.'"
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled that the
exterior lines of the Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain claims of
eleven leagues each, subject to claims derived from said parties as
confirmed by the Act of Congress approved twenty-first June, 1860,
United States Statutes, volume twelve, page seventy-one, shall be
adjusted according to the lines of the public surveys, as nearly as
practicable, with the limits of said claims, yet in as compact a
form as possible, and the claims of all actual settlers upon the
tracts heretofore claimed by the said Vigil and St. Vrain, holding
possession under titles or promises to settle, which have been made
by said Vigil and St. Vrain, or their legal representatives, prior
to the passage of this act, who may establish their claims within
one year from the passage of this act, to the satisfaction of the
register and receiver of the proper and district, shall in like
manner be adjusted according to the subdivisional lines of survey,
so as to include the lands so settled upon or purchased, and the
areas of the same shall be deducted and excluded from the adjusted
limits of the claims of said Vigil and St. Vrain, respectively, and
the claims of all other actual settlers falling within the limits
of the located claims of Vigil and St. Vrain shall be adjusted to
the extent which shall embrace their several settlements upon their
several claims being established either as preemption or
homesteads, according to law, and for the aggregate of the areas of
the latter class of claims the said Vigil and St. Vrain, or their
legal representatives, shall be entitled to locate a like quantity
of public lands, not mineral, according to the lines of the public
surveys, and not to exceed one hundred and sixty acres in one
section."
"SEC. 2.
And be it further enacted that it shall be the
duty of the General Land Office to cause the lines of the public
surveys to be run in the regions where a proper location would
place the said Vigil and St. Vrain claims, and that the expense of
the same shall be paid out of any moneys in the Treasury
Page 123 U. S. 192
not otherwise appropriated; yet before the confirmation of the
said Act of June 21, 1860, shall become legally effective, the said
Vigil and St. Vrain, or their legal representatives, shall pay the
cost of so much of said surveys as inures to their benefit
respectively, and that all settlers of the said third class whose
claims may be adjusted as valid shall have the right to enter their
improvements by a strict compliance with the preemption or
homestead laws."
"SEC. 3.
And be it further enacted that, upon the
adjustment of the Vigil and St. Vrain claims according to the
provisions of this act, it shall be the duty of the Surveyor
General of the district to furnish proper approved plats to said
claimants or their legal representatives, and so in like manner to
said derivative claimants, which shall be evidence of title, the
same to be done according to such instructions as may be given by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office."
"SEC. 4.
And be it further enacted that immediately
upon running the lines as provided in section second of this act,
the Surveyor General of said district shall notify the said Vigil
and St. Vrain, or their agents or legal representatives, of the
fact of such survey being made, and said claimants shall, within
three months after notice of such survey, select and locate their
said claims in accordance with such survey, and the provisions of
this act, and of the act to which this is amendatory, so far as the
same is not changed by this act, and shall within said time furnish
the Surveyor General with the description of such location,
specifying the lines of the same. And the parties failing to make
such selection and location in such manner and within such time
shall be deemed and held to have abandoned their claim, and their
rights and equities under this act, and the act to which this is
amendatory shall cease and terminate."
"SEC. 5.
And be it further enacted that in case of the
neglect or refusal of the said Vigil and St. Vrain, or either of
them, to accept of the provisions of this act and the act to which
this is amendatory, and to locate their said claims as provided
therein, no suit shall be brought or proceedings instituted
Page 123 U. S. 193
in any of the courts of the United States by such party or by
anyone claiming through or under them, to establish or enforce said
claims, or for any cause of action founded upon the same, after six
months from the passage of this act."
The time fixed by § 1 of the last-recited act for
establishing the derivative claims was extended by a joint
resolution of April 28, 1870, 16 Stat. 373, 663, by which it was
directed that the act should be so construed
"as to authorize the presentation of such derivative claims
within one year from the completion and approval of the
subdivisional surveys contemplated by said act of twenty-fifth
February, 1869."
In pursuance of the Act of February 25, 1869, and within the
time limited by the joint resolution of April 28, 1870, there were
presented to Irving W. Stanton and Charles A. Cook, the Register
and Receiver at Pueblo, Colorado, claims on behalf of about
thirty-nine derivative claimants to lands within the limits of the
Las Animas grant, covering in all more than 183,553.85 acres. Among
them was the claim of William Craig for 127,000 acres, and that of
Thomas Leitensdorfer for about 16,000 acres, which were filed on
the 23d of October, 1872. The register and receiver acted upon all
the claims, rejecting that of Leitensdorfer and twenty-two others
amounting to more than 85,939.32 acres. They decided favorably, in
whole or in part, on thirteen claims. To twelve of these claimants
they allowed 24,362.98 acres; the remaining 73,251.55 acres were
awarded to Craig. The decisions of these officers upon these claims
bear date February 23, 1874, and were immediately reported to the
General Land Office. Nineteen of the claimants whose claims had
been rejected, and among them Leitensdorfer, appealed from the
decisions in favor of Craig, and against themselves, respectively.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office entertained the appeals
so far as to decide that an appeal would lie in such cases, and
from that decision Craig appealed from the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to the Secretary of the Interior. This appeal
was entertained, and the Secretary of the Interior rendered a
decision sustaining the authority of the Commissioner of the
General
Page 123 U. S. 194
Land Office to entertain and determine the appeals from the
register and receiver.
About the 25th or May, 1875, Craig applied to the President for
an order directing that the Surveyor General of Colorado be
required to issue a plat of the survey of the land awarded to Craig
by the decision of the register and receiver. Being advised by the
Attorney General, to whom the matter was referred, that under the
terms of the acts of Congress relating to the subject, the
decisions of the register and receiver were final, from which no
appeal would lie to the Commissioner, 15 Opinions Attorneys General
94, the President, on March 2, 1877, made an order directing the
Commissioner of the General Land Office to instruct the Surveyor
General of Colorado to deliver to Craig an approved plat of the
land adjudged to him by the register and receiver of the Pueblo
Land District in the State of Colorado dated February 23, 1874. The
Commissioner of the General Land Office on March 7, 1877,
instructed the Surveyor General of Colorado to prepare a plat of
the lands specified and awarded by the register and receiver to
Craig.
Before that plat was delivered, Leitensdorfer, on May 4, 1877,
filed his bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Colorado against William L. Campbell, the
Surveyor General of the United States for Colorado, and Craig. In
this bill he set out the matters above stated, and in addition
thereto alleged that his own title was derived by mesne conveyances
from Eugene Leitensdorfer, to whom Vigil and St. Vrain had conveyed
an undivided one-sixth of the entire grant to them, which would
have amounted to about 682,724 1/6 acres if the whole grant had
been confirmed, but which he had reduced to twenty-five sections,
amounting to about 16,000 acres, to correspond with the reduced
grant as confirmed by act of Congress. The bill further alleged
that the reduced tract thus claimed by the complainant before the
register and receiver was in or near the valleys of the Las Animas
or Purgatoire River and tributaries, in Pueblo Land District, Las
Animas County, Colorado, naming and identifying certain sections
and half-sections
Page 123 U. S. 195
as composing it, and admitted that the claim of the complainant,
as thus reduced, did not conflict on the ground with the derivative
claim of Craig.
The bill further alleged that the complainant produced evidence
before the register and receiver to establish, in addition to the
preceding allegations of his bill, "the continuous inhabitancy and
cultivation of his claim by himself since May, 1862, which
inhabitancy and cultivation still continue."
The bill also alleged that the final delivery by the Surveyor
General of the plat of survey of the derivative claims of Craig, as
ordered by the President, would be merely a ministerial act of the
Surveyor General, and therefore the subject of an injunction; that
such plats, under § 3 of the Act of February 25, 1869, could
only issue after the final adjustment of the whole of said
confirmation of twenty-two leagues, and of the several derivative
claims constituting the same, and that said plats, when so
furnished, would be evidence of title, and would divest the United
States of the fee simple in favor of the derivative claimants
receiving such plats;
"that the plat ordered to be delivered by the Surveyor General
to or for Craig would leave no part of said confirmation applicable
to complainant's claim or the claims of the other derivative
claimants whose appeals are now pending before the Commissioner,
and would in fact preclude the Commissioner from considering the
appeals of complainant and of the other derivative claimants; that
complainant's claim is not in conflict on the ground with Craig's
claim, but is many miles distant, and the mass of the derivative
claims under Vigil and St. Vrain, though greatly exceeding the
quantity confirmed, are competitors for area, but not for specific
locations; that for these reasons the delivery of Craig's plat, or
of the plat of any derivative claim whatever, before the final
decision by the Commissioner and Secretary of the said appeals now
pending before the Commissioner, and the final adjustment by them
of the whole mass of said derivative claims, would be against
equity and the rights of complainant and other appellants in said
appeals, and would inflict on complainant and said appellants
irreparable injury. "
Page 123 U. S. 196
The prayer of the bill was for a perpetual injunction to
restrain the delivery of the plat and survey of the derivative
claim of Craig
"until the appeals of complainant and of the other derivative
claimants under them, now pending before the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, shall be tried and finally adjudged on their
merits, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
according to law, and until it shall appear by such final judgment
that said Craig, or other derivative claimants under said Vigil and
St. Vrain, or either, are entitled to plats as evidence of
title,"
and also for an injunction to the same effect in the meantime.
The bill also contained a general allegation to the effect that the
register and receiver were corrupted by Craig, and fraudulently
induced to make the award in his favor.
On the 21st of May, 1877, a temporary injunction was granted as
prayed for on certain conditions, one of which was that the
complainant, within thirty days, should
"commence proceedings in the proper court of the District of
Columbia having for their object an order on the General Land
Office to hear and determine the appeals mentioned and described in
the said bill of complaint as having been taken by the said
complainant from the decision of the register and receiver of the
land office at Pueblo in respect to the lands described in the said
bill."
On the 25th of June, 1877, an affidavit was filed showing that
on the 19th of June the complainant had caused to be filed in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia a petition and affidavit
for a mandamus against the Commissioner of the General Land Office
praying for a writ commanding him to proceed to hear and determine
the said appeals.
On July 13, 1877, the present case was heard on a demurrer to
the bill, and on a motion to dissolve the injunction, when an order
was made dissolving the injunction and sustaining the demurrer,
with leave to the complainant to file an amended and supplemental
bill, which he accordingly did. That bill, filed on October 6,
1877, reciting all the matters contained in the original bill,
alleges in addition that, in the Supreme
Page 123 U. S. 197
Court of the District of Columbia on July 3, 1877, the motion of
the complainant for a rule on the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to show cause why the writ of mandamus should not issue
against him to require him to proceed with the hearing of the
appeals alleged to be pending before him, was denied by that court
at special term on the ground, among others, that no appeal lay to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office from such decisions,
and that he did not appeal from said judgment, because he was
advised by counsel that no appeal would lie from such a judgment.
The bill further alleges that, after the dissolution of the
injunction, the Commissioner of the General Land Office delivered
to Craig an approved plat of the survey of the lands according to
the area allowed to him by the register and receiver at Pueblo.
The bill reiterates the charges of corruption and fraud as
against Craig and the register and receiver in the original bill,
and further shows
"That, for the reasons hereinbefore stated, said duplicate plats
of defendant Craig are intrinsically illegal and void
ab
initio, and that Craig had or has no title to said lands, St.
Vrain having sold his interest before Craig purchased; that the
order of the President, which said plats are intended to enforce,
is also, for reasons hereinbefore stated, intrinsically illegal and
void
ab initio, and was granted under the erroneous belief
by the President that no controversy existed respecting the
quantity of land embraced in said plats; that said plats were
issued in mistake of law and fact, and leave no land applicable to
the derivative claims of your orator and the other said appellants
before the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and in fact
prevent him from trying their appeals now lawfully pending before
him, and are in the nature of a cloud on the titles of your orator
and the said appellants to their respective derivative claims, and
that your orator fears said duplicate plats, if left uncancelled,
would cause irreparable mischief to him and to all the other said
appellants before the said Commissioner."
The prayer of the amended bill, therefore, is that
"the approved plats of the derivative claim of defendant
William
Page 123 U. S. 198
Craig, signed by defendant Campbell on the 26th of May, 1877, be
decreed void from the beginning, and that said defendant William
Craig be forever enjoined from prosecuting any suit in law or
equity on said approved plat or plats as evidence of title, or that
Craig be adjudged as holding the same in trust for plaintiff and
other derivative claimants, and that defendant William Craig, and
agents, and defendant William L. Campbell, as United States
Surveyor General of Colorado, and his successors in office, and all
under them, be ordered, within a time to be limited by this Court,
to deliver the said plats to the court, and that the said plats be
thereupon cancelled, and he prays for all other general and special
relief applicable to the case."
To this amended and supplemental bill Campbell and Craig filed
separate demurrers. The demurrer of Campbell was sustained, and the
bill as to him ordered to be dismissed. The demurrer of Craig was
overruled, and thereupon, on the 7th of October, 1878, Craig filed
his answer to the amended bill.
The answer of Craig denies the title of Leitensdorfer to any
interest in the land, and asserts the title of Craig himself to the
land awarded to him by the decision of the register and receiver;
it denies all charges of fraud and corruption against them and
himself, and claims that the award and decision of the register and
receiver, under the Act of Congress of February 25, 1869, is final
and conclusive, subject to no appeal to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office or to the Secretary of the Interior, and sets
up the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia dismissing the application for a mandamus as a
conclusive judgment on the question. A replication was filed to
this answer, and, the cause being put at issue, a large amount of
proof was taken consisting of documentary evidence and the
testimony of witnesses.
It further appears that after the 4th of March, 1877, when a new
administration came into office, an application was made to the
Secretary of the Interior on behalf of the complainant asking for a
stay of proceedings under the order of the President, and that the
matter might be reopened for hearing before
Page 123 U. S. 199
the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the appeal from
the decision of the register and receiver. This application was
referred to the Attorney General, who gave an opinion that the
official acts of the officers of the preceding administration could
not be reviewed by their successors in office. 15 Opinions
Attorneys General 208.
On the 8th of January, 1878, a patent was issued by the United
States to William Craig, and to his heirs and assigns forever, for
the land included within the approved plat, in conformity, as it
recites, with § 2447 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, and with the stipulation that, in virtue of the provisions
of that section, the patent
"shall only operate as a relinquishment of title on the part of
the United States, and shall in no manner interfere with any valid
adverse right to the same land nor be construed to preclude a legal
investigation and decision by the proper judicial tribunal between
adverse claimants to the same land."
On January 30, 1879, before final hearing, the complainant
dismissed the bill and amended bill so far as by the prayer it was
sought to hold the defendant Craig liable as trustee for the
complainant of the title to the lands conveyed to him.
The opinion and decision of the register and receiver in favor
of Craig's claim recites the grounds of the award as follows:
"His claim does not rest wholly upon the shadowy foundation of
uncertain and vague promises, but is backed by conveyances which
remove all suspicion or doubt from his asserted rights, and in our
opinion cannot be postponed to any other claim than those above
recited. If his claim rested on promises to settle only, it might
be said that the promises dated as far back as 1855, and the month
of March of that year; that he went on the land promised; that he
offered his resignation in the army in consequence of it; that it
was not accepted; that in December, 1862, he was appointed agent
for the grant by St. Vrain, and then again resigned, and was
refused acceptance; that in the spring of 1863, he began the
improvement of his land, finally got out of the army in 1864, and
moved on the land, where he has since resided continuously, and has
expended $200,000 in improvements thereon,
Page 123 U. S. 200
the patent deeds of St. Vrain showing the extent of his rights
-- deeds which appear to have been duly recorded soon after
execution -- thus preventing anyone being deceived as to the
property claimed by him."
The decision of the register and receiver against the claim of
Leitensdorfer is based upon these grounds,
viz., that
there is no sufficient proof of the paper title by which he claims
an undivided one-sixth of the original Mexican grant; that that
paper title, even if proven, would not entitle him to anything as
against actual settlers, but only to one-sixth of any surplus which
might be ascertained after satisfying the claims of that class, and
that Leitensdorfer was not entitled to claim as an actual settler,
even supposing that he had taken possession of a particular
location, for the reason that he does not show himself to have
acquired that possessory interest from either of the original
grantees.
The cause having proceeded to final hearing, a decree was
entered July 2, 1880, whereby it was
"Ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the decision or award of
the register and receiver of the land described in the bill and
pleadings of date the 23rd of February, 1874, in favor of the
defendant William Craig, is fraudulent and void, and it is further
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the patent for the said lands
issued to defendant William Craig on the 8th day of January, 1878,
be, and it is hereby, declared and decreed to be null and void, and
that the approved plat or plats delivered to defendant William
Craig, as evidence of title to the land described in the bill by
William Campbell, Surveyor General, be, and the same are hereby,
declared and decreed to be null and void."
From that decree this appeal is prosecuted. Pending the appeal
in this Court, both parties having died, the cause has been revived
in the names of their respective personal representatives.
Page 123 U. S. 202
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the Court.
By reference to the provisions of the act of 21st of June, 1860,
12 Stat. 71, and of the act of the 25th of February, 1869, 15 Stat.
275, it will appear that after the survey of the exterior
Page 123 U. S. 203
lines of the Las Animas grant, the claims first to be provided
for were those of all actual settlers holding possession under
"titles or promises to settle" made by Vigil and St. Vrain or their
legal representatives prior to the passage of the act. It was
required that those claims, within one year from the passage of the
act, should be established to the satisfaction of the register and
receiver of the proper land district when they were to be adjusted
according to the subdivisional lines of survey so as to include the
lands so settled upon or purchased. It follows, of course, that
these were to be surveys of distinct locations, which might be
widely separated from each other in different parts of the original
Mexican grant, but of course within its exterior limits. The grant
itself, however, having been confirmed only to the extent of
twenty-two square leagues, it also follows that these surveys in
their aggregate areas were not to exceed that quantity. If,
however, there were other actual settlers within the limits of the
original grant to Vigil and St. Vrain not claiming title from or
under them, but merely by reason of their actual possession, their
several settlements might be established either as preemption
rights or homesteads, according to law, but the quantities were not
to be deducted from the twenty-two square leagues. If any part of
this quantity of twenty-two square leagues should remain
unexhausted by the claims of actual settlers holding possession
under "titles or promises to settle" made by Vigil and St. Vrain,
and therefore called in this record "derivative claims," any such
surplus was to be located in two equal tracts, each of square form,
in any part of the tract covered by the original grant, for the
benefit of Vigil and St. Vrain, and their assigns or
representatives.
It is conceded by all parties to this record that in point of
fact the claims of the first class, including Craig's, being those
of actual settlers holding possession under titles or promises to
settle made by Vigil and St. Vrain, exhausted the whole quantity of
the grant as confirmed and reduced to twenty-two square leagues.
The controversy now is therefore confined to the conflicting claims
of this class.
It is further to be observed that the complainant
Leitensdorfer
Page 123 U. S. 204
lays no claim to any part of the lands embraced in the survey
and plat and covered by the patent issued to Craig. He does not
allege or complain that any lands belonging in equity to him were
awarded to another. He admits that he was not an actual settler
upon, and held no possession of, any part of that tract. On the
contrary, the possession which he does allege and the title which
he asserts have reference to another and distinct tract of land
which, as he alleges, lies within the exterior boundaries of the
original Las Animas grant, but several miles distant from any part
of the tract allotted and patented to Craig. He therefore does not
claim as a part of his case in equity that Craig holds the legal
title to any lands in trust for him. The prayer of the amended
bill, so far as it asserted any right to such relief, was expressly
withdrawn, and has been abandoned by counsel in argument.
The case presented, therefore, by the complainant is not one of
that class of which many instances may be found in the reports of
the decisions of this Court, where a defendant holding the legal
title under a patent from the United States has been declared to
hold that legal title merely as trustee for a complainant with a
superior equity, and decreed to hold for or to convey to the true
owner. The right of the complainant in this case to relief is
supposed to rest upon different grounds. The injury which he
alleges is that Craig wrongfully obtained from the register and
receiver an award of lands to which he had no rightful claim,
whereby the whole quantity of the confirmed grant has been reduced
and absorbed so as to exclude the complainant from that share to
which he was entitled. The wrong of which he complains is that
Craig fraudulently and corruptly procured the award and decision of
the register and receiver in his own behalf, and against
Leitensdorfer, and that the latter has been illegally cut off from
his right to appeal from the decision of the register and receiver
in favor of Craig and against himself by the illegal and
unauthorized issue and delivery to Craig by the Surveyor General of
the approved plat of the survey of the lands awarded to him,
confirmed by the subsequent issue of a formal patent relinquishing
the title of the United States to the same
Page 123 U. S. 205
tract. This is a short but accurate statement of the
complainant's case as he presents it for examination and analysis,
and for which we are to seek a rule of decision.
The fraud and corruption alleged against Craig, and which, for
the purposes of the case, we are at present to assume to have been
proved, as it was in fact found by the decree appealed from, do not
necessarily vitiate Craig's claim of title nor establish that of
Leitensdorfer. The charge is that Craig bribed the register and
receiver to make the award which they did in his favor. It may
nevertheless be true that the award ought so to have been made upon
the merits. So the register and receiver may have been right in
rejecting the claim of Leitensdorfer. This possibility is tacitly
admitted, for the bill does not ask a declaration and decree that
Craig has no valid claim, nor a decree establishing the claim of
Leitensdorfer, and it is plainly not within the jurisdiction of the
circuit court to grant any such relief even if it were asked.
The ascertainment of what persons came within the description of
actual settlers under titles or promises to settle upon the Las
Animas grant, and the proper limits of their actual settlement and
possession, and the adjustment thereof by suitable surveys, were
entrusted by the acts of Congress on that subject in the first
instance to the determination of the register and receiver of the
proper land district, and in case by law an appeal lies from their
decision, then to those superior officers in the Land Office and
the Department of the Interior to whom such an appeal might be
taken. The adjustment of these claims and their definition by the
prescribed surveys and plats establishing them in their appropriate
locations within the limits of the original grant, and all
questions of possession, of boundary, and of conflict constitute a
part of the administration of the law confided to that branch of
the executive department. The free course of that administration
within the limits of the law cannot be interrupted or interfered
with by the judicial power. Undoubtedly private rights of great
value and importance may be involved, and the exercise of executive
discretion may require decisions in favor of some and against
others in a conflict of interests and
Page 123 U. S. 206
claims. But as all these claims and titles and interests arise
under the law which refers their settlement to executive officers,
that reference is itself a condition and qualification of the
right, and the latter is altogether subject to its consequences.
When the department has exercised its discretion and exhausted its
function, the legal and equitable effect of what it has done or
failed to do may be drawn in question when necessary to the
determination of conflicting rights between private parties in a
judicial proceeding; but as long as the alleged rights which are
the subject of contention are in the course of adjudication by the
special tribunal, to which they are referred for settlement, the
function of that tribunal cannot be displaced by courts of justice.
And what the complainant in this case really asks for as his
ultimate relief is that the way may be cleared for him to the
exercise of the right of appeal, which he claims from the adverse
decision of the register and receiver to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office by the removal of those obstructions which he
alleges have been illegally interposed against him by the issue of
the approved survey and plat by the Surveyor General of Colorado
upon the order of the President, in disregard and denial of his
right of appeal, and the subsequent issue of the patent, in
consequence of which the Commissioner of the General Land Office
and the Secretary of the Interior have decided that they are
precluded from now entertaining the complainant's appeal. It is
supposed that these obstructions are removed by the decree of the
circuit court, which adjudges that the decision and award of the
register and receiver in favor of Craig is fraudulent and void and
annuls and declares void the approved plat delivered to Craig by
the Surveyor General of Colorado and the patent issued to him for
the same lands. The decree seeks to destroy the foundation and
muniments of Craig's title to the particular lands described in the
plat and patent, but it does not award those lands to anyone else,
and it does not assume to establish the title of Leitensdorfer to
those which he claims. What is the effect of this decree? In any
action brought by a stranger to this record against Craig for the
recovery of the lands covered by his patent, this
Page 123 U. S. 207
decree could not operate as evidence against him. It can only be
effective by way of estoppel, and a stranger to the record cannot
avail himself of an estoppel by which he is not himself bound. Nor
can the decree be supposed to operate upon the record of the survey
and plat and of the decision of the register and receiver as they
remain recorded in the Land Department, so as to render them null
and void as if they had never existed, and bind and oblige the
officers of the Department of the Interior to proceed in the
administration of the law with reference to these lands as if
nothing of that sort had taken place. The decree operates only
in personam and
inter partes. The courts have no
control of the public records of the Land Department, nor
supervision over the conduct of its officers otherwise than as it
can be exercised in appropriate cases by the writ of mandamus,
besides which, to annul the decision of the register and receiver,
if that were possible, would be to destroy the foundation of the
complainant's appeal and restore the matter to the condition in
which it was when all the claims were pending before the register
and receiver. This result is not within the scope of the
complainant's bill.
If, on the other hand, the operation of the decree is limited so
as to cancel and annul the approved plat delivered by the Surveyor
General and the patent issued thereupon, leaving the decision of
the register and receiver to stand as the subject of an appeal to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, supposed to be still
pending, the case of the complainant for equitable interference
does not seem to be bettered. For in that event, what power has the
circuit court, sitting in Colorado as a court of equity, to enforce
and make effective the complainant's supposed right of appeal? The
decree does not operate upon the officers whose action is invoked
as necessary to secure the complainant's alleged rights. The
process of a court of equity is not appropriate to the exigency,
and the circuit court of the United States in Colorado has no
jurisdiction, either at law or in equity, over the officers of the
Land Department to compel them to entertain the appeal. Neither is
there reason to suppose that the Land Department
Page 123 U. S. 208
will on the basis of such a decree
sua sponte proceed
with the appeal as pending, or take such action on the application
of the complainant.
The ground on which Mr. Schurz, as Secretary of the Interior,
upon the advice of the Attorney General, Mr. Devens, declined to
reopen and rehear the case was that the matter had been finally
acted upon by his predecessor in office. 15 Opinions Attorneys
General 208. That fact remains, notwithstanding a decree in this
case declaring the survey and plat and patent to Craig to be
illegal and invalid. Such a declaration and decree operates only in
the case and between the parties to this record. It does not
operate, as has been already stated, upon the public records of the
Land Department in which they are recorded, nor does it bind and
oblige the executive officers of the government in control of that
department. Such a decree therefore would grant to the complainant
no practical relief; it would be vain and nugatory.
The ground which it is claimed in argument justifies such a
decree is that, pending Leitensdorfer's appeal to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office, the delivery by the Surveyor General of
the approved survey and plat, under the order of the President, was
illegal and void, and that by reason thereof, the subsequent issue
of the patent could not operate as a confirmation or conveyance of
the title. But if the order of the President, interrupting the
course of the appeal in the Land Department, and the action of the
officers of that department in compliance with it, were illegal,
and therefore void, they were and are of no force and efficacy
either at law or in equity, and are not binding on any succeeding
incumbents of the offices of Commissioner of the General Land
Office or Secretary of the Interior. It follows that the case of
the complainant, based upon his right to prosecute his appeal, is
as complete without such a decree as with it. If the duty of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office to entertain and determine
that appeal exists as contended, it is a legal duty. That duty is
to take up, consider, and adjudge the rights of the parties in
interest, and the entertaining of the appeal is a purely
ministerial act, although the questions
Page 123 U. S. 209
to be considered in the course of that appeal are to be resolved
by the exercise of official discretion and judgment. Nevertheless
it is quite clear, as it has been oftentimes decided, that the duty
of entering upon their consideration and proceeding to their
determination is strictly ministerial. The remedy in such cases is
at law, by means of a writ of mandamus, and not in equity.
Ex
Parte Parker, 120 U. S. 737;
Ex Parte Brown, 116 U. S. 401. If,
to such a writ, issued by a competent court, the officer should
make return that he was precluded from entertaining the appeal by
reason of the prior action of a predecessor in office, under the
order of the President, the question of the sufficiency of that
return would be presented to the court issuing the writ, and would
involve necessarily the adjudication of the questions mooted in
this case. If such a return should, in such a tribunal, be adjudged
to be sufficient, then the complainant would be without remedy, for
the right which he claims, if it exists, is a legal right
cognizable in courts of law, and not a right resting upon any
equity within the jurisdiction of chancery courts. If, on the other
hand, such a return in such a proceeding should be adjudged to be
insufficient, then the complainant would have the remedy which he
is here seeking by a direct and effective process binding upon the
parties whose conduct he is seeking to control. In either
alternative, therefore, it is equally conclusive that the
complainant cannot obtain in this cause the relief which he seeks
and which alone is adequate to the redress of the wrong of which he
complains.
This conclusion is not disturbed or affected by the assumption
that the decision and award of the register and receiver was
obtained by corrupt and fraudulent practices for which Craig is
responsible. The right of appeal from that decision to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, if it exists in any case,
is not hindered by the fraudulent character of the decision
appealed from, and the appeal itself is the mode pointed out by law
for the correction of any error that may be shown in the decision
complained of, whether that error has been produced by the practice
of fraud and corruption or was merely an honest mistake. The proof
of such fraud
Page 123 U. S. 210
and corruption does not, as has been already stated, demonstrate
error. The decision may be right notwithstanding the fraud, and on
the appeal Craig's title, as it now stands upon the approved survey
and plat and the patent, may be adjudged to be valid, and any error
in it we must assume will be corrected, whether fraudulent or
innocent. The question of fraud, therefore, alleged against Craig
and the register and receiver, in view of the relief asked, is
immaterial.
There is an alternative in which it might be supposed that the
question of fraud in procuring the decision of the register and
receiver, and thereby obtaining the muniments of title on which
Craig's claim now rests, might become material for determination in
a judicial cause. That alternative is the supposition, contrary to
that on which the complainant rests his case, that the decision of
the register and receiver, the issue of the approved survey and
plat, and of the patent based thereon, are final and conclusive
upon the Department of the Interior, and not subject to the appeal
taken to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. It may be
asked whether such a determination of inferior officers of the Land
Department, involving private rights and interests of great
magnitude and value, infected with fraud, is to be protected from
attack by judicial process. We are told that "equity has always had
jurisdiction of fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment, and it
does not depend upon discovery."
Jones v.
Bolles, 9 Wall. 364,
76 U. S. 369.
That equity will interfere by a proper proceeding where the
executive power has exhausted itself.
Commissioner v.
Whiteley, 4 Wall. 522;
Gaines v.
Thompson, 7 Wall. 347;
Litchfield
v. Register and Receiver, 9 Wall. 575;
Samson v.
Smiley, 13 Wall. 91;
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72;
Warren v.
Van Brunt, 19 Wall. 646. That
"the officers of the Land Department are specially designated by
law to receive, consider, and pass upon proofs presented with
respect to settlements upon the public lands with a view to secure
rights of preemption. If they err in the construction of the law
applicable to any case, or if fraud is practiced upon them or they
themselves are chargeable with fraudulent practices, their rulings
may be reviewed and annulled by the courts when a
Page 123 U. S. 211
controversy arises between private parties founded upon their
decisions."
Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330,
91 U. S. 340;
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530. This
doctrine is undoubtedly true, but its limitation is found in the
statement that such rulings "may be reviewed and annulled by the
courts when a controversy arises between parties founded upon their
decisions." The jurisdiction to determine such questions does not
arise in the courts of the United States by virtue of any power of
supervision given to them whereby they have a right to control, to
correct, to reverse, and to dictate the procedure and action of
executive officers within the scope of the duties confided to them
by law. No such power of revision is given, and none such can be
exercised. Such a function is not judicial; it is administrative,
executive, and political in its nature. The abstract right to
interfere in such cases has been uniformly denied by judicial
tribunals as breaking down the distinction so important and well
defined in our system between the several separate and independent
branches of the government, and where the character of the
interference sought falls within that designation, the application
for it has been uniformly denied.
The case is different in a litigation between parties involving
a contest of conflicting claims, where, under some known head of
jurisdiction, definite relief or redress may be conclusively
administered in favor of one and against the other party. In such
cases, the right at law or in equity belongs to one or the other of
the constestants; to which of the two it should be awarded is the
judicial question involved. The solution of that question may
depend upon the effect to be given, either at law or in equity, to
some action or determination of the executive officers charged in
the first instance with duties of administration in connection with
the subject of the litigation -- such as, for example, the officers
of the Land Department in the administration of the system of law
in reference to the public domain of the United States. It is in
such cases that the question has most frequently arisen. In those
cases, it has indeed been held, as claimed, that if the executive
officer has made a mistake of law in his administration, if he has
exercised
Page 123 U. S. 212
power without authority of law, if his determination has been
procured by the fraudulent practices of one party upon the officer
or upon the opposite party, or if the officer has himself
fraudulently decided in favor of one and against the other, a court
of justice will give effect to the rights of the parties as between
themselves notwithstanding the errors and the frauds alleged and
shown. The principle is that
"The decision of the officers of the Land Department, made
within the scope of their authority on questions of this kind, is
in general conclusive everywhere except when considered by way of
appeal within that department, and that as to the facts on which
their decision is based, in the absence of fraud or mistake, that
decision is conclusive even in courts of justice when the title
afterwards comes in question. But that in this class of cases, as
in all others, there exists in the courts of equity the
jurisdiction to correct mistakes, to relieve against frauds and
impositions, and, in cases where it is clear that those officers
have by a mistake of the law given to one man the land which on the
undisputed facts belonged to another, to give appropriate
relief."
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530,
96 U. S. 535;
Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330;
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72;
Marquez v. Frisbie,
101 U. S. 473;
Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514;
Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420,
104 U. S. 425;
White v.
Cannon, 6 Wall. 443;
Silver v.
Ladd, 7 Wall. 219,
74 U. S.
228.
In
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.
S. 636,
104 U. S. 647,
it was said:
"If in issuing a patent, its officers took mistaken views of the
law, or drew erroneous conclusions from the evidence, or acted from
imperfect views of their duty, or even from corrupt motives, a
court of law can afford no remedy to a party alleging that he is
thereby aggrieved. He must resort to a court of equity for relief,
and even there his complaint cannot be heard unless he connect
himself with the original source of title, so as to be able to aver
that his rights are injuriously affected by the existence of the
patent and he must possess such equities as will control the legal
title in the patentee's hands."
And in
Silver v.
Ladd, 7 Wall. 219,
74 U. S. 228,
the doctrine was
Page 123 U. S. 213
stated in these terms:
"The relief given in this class of cases does not proceed upon
the ground of annulling or setting aside the patent wrongfully
issued. That would leave the title in the United States, and the
plaintiff might be as far from obtaining justice as before. And it
may be well doubted whether the patent can be set aside without the
United States' being a party to the suit. The relief granted is
founded on the theory that the title which has passed from the
United States to the defendant inured in equity to the benefit of
the plaintiff, and a court of chancery gives effect to this equity
according to its forms in several ways."
But if the court, by reason of other circumstances, is powerless
to adjust and adjudge with final and conclusive effect the opposing
claims of the litigating parties so as to award to one what has
been wrongfully given to another, then the mere circumstance that
the official act of the executive authority is challenged for error
of law or for fraud does not and cannot constitute the ground of an
independent jurisdiction. It is only as necessarily incident to the
proper decision of a case at law or in equity between parties
regularly in court for a determination of their rights as between
themselves that such questions can be discussed or decided. Where
the whole force of the judgment is spent upon a mere declaration
that the act in question is void for want of authority, or voidable
by reason of being infected with fraud, and it cannot, consistently
with known principles of law or equity, go further by changing the
relations between the parties to the suit toward each other, or
toward the subject matter of the litigation, the case is not
judicial. This is precisely the present case. Here a declaration by
a decree that the decision of the register and receiver was
fraudulent, and therefore voidable -- that the action of the
President in ordering the issue of the approved survey and plat by
the Surveyor General of Colorado, and its delivery in pursuance
thereof, and the subsequent issue of the patent to Craig, were
without warrant of law, and therefore void absolutely -- does not
decide the controversy raised by Leitensdorfer nor settle and
adjudge the rights of any of the parties thereto. Nor does it, as
we have already shown, remove any obstacles
Page 123 U. S. 214
which have been wrongfully and unjustly interposed by the
defendant to the prosecution in another forum of the rights which
the complainant seeks to recover. It is entirely inefficacious for
any such result because, as already intimated, if the acts
complained of are, as complainant contends, void as being without
authority of law, then they can have no legal effect whatever, and
cannot be set up by the officers of the Department of the Interior
as reasons for refusing to entertain and determine the appeals of
Leitensdorfer from the decision of the register and receiver to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office. If in point of fact such a
right of appeal is secured to him by the law, and the officer whose
duty it is to hear and determine it refuses without just reason so
to do, the proper remedy is by a writ of mandamus, and not by a
bill in equity.
But it is shown in this record that Leitensdorfer, in pursuance
of an interlocutory order of the circuit court and as a condition
on which the original injunction was granted, in June, 1877, made
his application to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
for a mandamus against the Commissioner of the General Land Office
to require him to proceed with the hearing of the appeals alleged
to be pending before him, and that his application was denied by
that court, and he alleges that he did not appeal from that
judgment because he was advised by counsel that no appeal would lie
from such a judgment. But this is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon a court of equity. We are not called upon in this
cause to decide whether the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia at special term is or is not erroneous, nor
whether an appeal would lie from it, nor whether by law
Leitensdorfer is entitled to be heard before the Commissioners of
the General Land Office upon his appeal from the decision of the
register and receiver. What we do say, and all we say, is that if
he is entitled to such an appeal, his remedy is not by a bill in
equity.
For these reasons, the decree of the circuit court is
reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the
bill, and it is so ordered.
