When a petition for a removal of the cause to a circuit court of
the United States is filed in a cause pending in a state court, the
only question left for the state court to determine is the question
of law whether, admitting the facts stated in the petition to be
true, it appears on the face of the record, including the petition,
the pleadings, and the proceedings down to that time, that the
petitioner is entitled to a removal, and if an issue of fact is
made upon the petition, that issue must be tried in the circuit
court.
The federal question brought up by the writ of error in this
case related to the right of removal of the cause to the circuit
court of the United States. The case is stated in the opinion of
the court.
Page 122 U. S. 514
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought in the District Court District Court of
Ramsey county, Minnesota, by Charles L. Dunn, a minor, to recover
damages for personal injuries which he had received while traveling
as a passenger on the railroad of the Burlington, Cedar Rapids
& Northern Railway Company. The company answered the complaint
in the action, and then filed a petition under § 639 of the
Revised Statutes, verified by the oath of its president, for the
removal of the suit to the Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of Minnesota on the ground of prejudice and local
influence. The petition was accompanied by the necessary security.
It set forth that the railway company was an Iowa corporation, and
consequently, in law, a citizen of that state, and Dunn, the
plaintiff, a citizen of Minnesota. Under § 639, a suit cannot
be removed from a state court to a circuit court of the United
States except it be one between a citizen of the state in which the
suit was brought and a citizen of another state, and then only by
the citizen of the latter state. Immediately on the presentation of
the petition for removal, the attorney for the plaintiff filed a
counteraffidavit to the effect that the plaintiff was not a citizen
of Minnesota, but of the Territory of Montana. No further proof
being offered on this point, the court ruled that a case for
removal had not been made out, and that the suit must be retained
for trial. Accordingly, a trial was afterwards had in the state
court, which resulted in a judgment against the company. An appeal
was then taken to the supreme court of the state, where the
judgment of the district court was in all respects affirmed,
including the rulings on the question of removal. To reverse that
judgment, this writ of error was brought.
Page 122 U. S. 515
The assignment of errors presents but a single question, and
that is whether, as after the petition for removal had been filed,
the record showed on its face that the state court ought to proceed
no further, it was competent for that court to allow an issue of
fact to be made upon the statements in the petition and to retain
the suit because on that issue the railway company had not shown by
testimony that the plaintiff was actually a citizen of
Minnesota.
It must be confessed that previous to the cases of
Stone v.
South Carolina, 117 U. S. 432,
and
Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279,
decided at the last term, the utterances of this Court on that
question had not always been as clear and distinct as they might
have been. Thus, in
Gordon v.
Longest, 16 Pet. 97, in speaking of removals under
§ 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was said, p.
41 U. S.
103:
"It must be made to appear to the satisfaction of the state
court that the defendant is an alien or a citizen of some other
state than that in which the suit was brought,"
and in
Railway Company v.
Ramsey, 22 Wall. 328, that "if, upon the hearing of
the petition, it is sustained by the proof, the state court can
proceed no further." In other cases, expressions of a similar
character are found which seem to imply that the state courts are
at liberty to consider the actual facts, as well as the law arising
on the face of the record, after the presentation of the petition
for removal. At the last term, it was found that this question had
become a practical one, about which there was a difference of
opinion in the state courts, and to some extent in the circuit
courts, and so, in deciding
Stone v. South Carolina, we
took occasion to say:
"All issues of fact made upon the petition for removal must be
tried in the circuit court, but the state court is at liberty to
determine for itself whether, on the face of the record, a removal
has been effected."
It is true, as was remarked by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in
Amy v. Manning, 144 Mass. 153, that this
was not necessary to the decision in that case, but it was said on
full consideration, and with the view of announcing the opinion of
the Court on that subject. Only two weeks after that case was
decided,
Carson v. Hyatt came up for determination, in
which the
Page 122 U. S. 516
precise question was directly presented, as the allegation of
citizenship in the petition for removal was contradicted by a
statement in the answer and it became necessary to determine what
the fact really was. We there affirmed what had been said in
Stone v. South Carolina, and decided that it was error in
the state court to proceed further with the suit after the petition
for removal was filed, because the circuit court alone had
jurisdiction to try the question of fact which was involved. This
rule was again recognized at this term in
Carson v.
Dunham, 121 U. S. 421, and
is in entire harmony with all that had been previously decided,
though not with all that had been said in the opinions in some of
the cases. To our minds, it is the true rule and calculated to
produce less inconvenience than any other.
The theory on which it rests is that the record closes, so far
as the question of removal is concerned, when the petition for
removal is filed and the necessary security furnished. It presents
then to the state court a pure question of law, and that is
whether, admitting the facts stated in the petition for removal to
be true, it appears on the face of the record, which includes the
petition and the pleadings and proceedings down to that time, that
the petitioner is entitled to a removal of the suit. That question
the state court has the right to decide for itself, and if it errs
in keeping the case, and the highest court of the state affirms its
decision, this Court has jurisdiction to correct the error,
considering for that purpose only the part of the record which ends
with the petition for removal.
Stone v. South Carolina,
117 U. S. 432,
and cases there cited.
But even though the state court should refuse to stop
proceedings, the petitioning party may enter a copy of the record
of that court, as it stood on the filing of his petition, in the
circuit court and have the suit docketed there. If the circuit
court errs in taking jurisdiction, the other side may bring the
decision here for review, after final judgment or decree, if the
value of the matter in dispute is sufficient in amount.
Railroad Company v. Koontz, 104 U. S.
5,
104 U. S. 15. In
that case, the same as in the writ of error to the state court, the
question will be decided on the face of the part of the record of
the
Page 122 U. S. 517
state court which ends with the petition for removal, for the
circuit court can no more take a case until its jurisdiction is
shown by the record than the state court can be required to let it
go until the record shows that its jurisdiction has been lost. The
questions in the two courts will be identical, and will depend on
the same record -- namely that in the state court ending with the
petition for removal. The record remaining in the state court will
be the original, that in the circuit court an exact copy.
But inasmuch as the petitioning party has the right to enter the
suit in the circuit court notwithstanding the state court declines
to stop proceedings, it is easy to see that if both courts can try
the issues of fact which may be made on the petition for removal,
the records from the two courts brought here for review will not
necessarily always be the same. The testimony produced before one
court may be entirely different from that in the other, and the
decisions of both courts may be right upon the facts as presented
to them respectively. Such a state of things should be avoided if
possible, and this can only be done by making one court the
exclusive judge of the facts. Upon that question there ought not to
be a divided jurisdiction. It must rest with one court alone, and
that, in our opinion, is more properly the circuit court. The case
can be docketed in that court on the first day of the next term and
the issue tried at once. If decided against the removal, the
question is now, by the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552,
put at rest, and the jurisdiction of the state court established in
the appropriate way. Under the Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18
Stat. 470, such an order could have been brought here for review by
appeal or writ of error, and to expedite such hearings, our Rule 32
was adopted.
Upon this record as it now stands, the state court was wrong in
proceeding with the suit, and for that reason,
The judgment of the supreme court is reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion.