A judgment rendered on the merits in an action in a court of
record is a bar to a second suit between the same parties on the
same cause of action, and when the second suit involves other
matter as well as the matters in issue in the former action, the
former judgment operates as an estoppel as to those things which
were in issue there, and upon the determination of which the first
verdict was rendered.
Extrinsic evidence, when not inconsistent with the record and
not impugning its verity, is admissible at the trial of an action
to show that a former action in a court of record between the same
parties, in which judgment was rendered on the merits, involved
matters in issue in the suit on trial and were necessarily
determined by the first verdict.
On the 29th of October, 1873, Ann Maria Deen, the plaintiff in
the court below, leased to one Mary C. C. Perry, of New York, by an
instrument under seal, the house known as No. 4 East Thirtieth
Street of that city, with the furniture therein, for the term of
two years and ten months from the first day of November, 1873 at
the rent of $450 a month, payable in advance, with a clause of
reentry in case of default in the payment of the rent, or in any of
the covenants of the lease. At the same time and upon the same
paper, the defendant, William M. Wilson, of New York, in
consideration of the letting of the premises to the lessee and of
the sum of one dollar paid to him by the lessor, by an instrument
under seal covenanted and agreed with her that if default should be
made at any time by the lessee in the payment of the rent, and
performance of the covenants contained in the lease, he would pay
the rent, or any arrears thereof, and all damages arising from the
nonperformance of the covenants.
No rent was paid by the lessee except for the first month, and
soon after December, 1873, she ceased to occupy the house, and
abandoned it. In March, 1874, the lessor gave
Page 121 U. S. 526
notice to her that, as she had abandoned the house and there was
danger of the furniture's being injured, possession would be taken
and the premises rented for the remainder of the term, and that the
lessor would look to her for any deficiency in the rent and for the
expenses of reletting, as well as for all damages that might be
sustained by reason of the loss of or injury to the furniture. In
April, 1874, the lessor took possession of the premises, and in
November following leased the house, without the furniture, to one
Sherman for two years and five months from December 1, 1874 at
$3,600 a year, payable in half-yearly payments in advance. For the
deficiency of the rent on the original lease, after deducting the
amount collected from the new tenant, the present action was
brought against the defendant as guarantor for the rent.
To the complaint setting forth the lease, the covenant of
guaranty, the new lease, and the deficiency claimed to be due upon
the lease the defendant answered, denying, among other things, the
allegations of abandonment of the premises by the lessee, of notice
to her of the intention of the lessor to resume possession, and of
the amount due, and for a separate defense alleged that in
December, 1873, the plaintiff brought an action in the Marine Court
of the City of New York against the defendant for the rent of the
same premises for that month, and that the defendant recovered
judgment therein against the plaintiff in the action upon the
merits thereof and for costs.
On the trial, to meet the case established by the plaintiff, the
defendant, among other things, gave in evidence the judgment book
of the Marine Court, showing a judgment, entered on the 12th of
March, 1874, in favor of the defendant, William M. Wilson, against
the plaintiff, Ann Maria Deen, for $55.91 costs, and also the
judgment roll in the action containing the summons and complaint,
the answer, minutes of the verdict for the defendant, and the
judgment in his favor. The complaint was upon the same lease as
that upon which this action is brought, and was for rent for the
month beginning on the first day of December, 1873. The answer,
treating the lease
Page 121 U. S. 527
and the covenant upon it as one instrument, set up that
"on or about the 29th day of October, 1873, the plaintiff, by
false and fraudulent statements, obtained the signature of Mary C.
C. Perry and of this defendant to a paper purporting to be a lease
of the premises described in the complaint; that the said Mary C.
C. Perry and this defendant were both misled by the false
representations, and that the said Mary C. C. Perry and this
defendant were induced by their belief in the truth of such
representations to sign the said paper."
It was admitted of record by counsel for the plaintiff that "the
only issue tried" in that action in the Marine Court "was that of
fraud in procuring the lease," and that there was no issue as to
the payment of the rent, or as to the delivery of the lease.
When the evidence was closed and the parties had rested, the
defendant moved that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that
the judgment in the Marine Court was a bar to the action, but the
court denied the motion and the defendant excepted. Afterwards the
court directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for
$12,026.89, the full amount claimed, less the rent for the month of
December, 1873, which they accordingly did. To this direction an
exception was taken.
Page 121 U. S. 531
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 121 U. S. 532
The conclusion we have reached as to the effect of the judgment
of the Marine Court renders it unnecessary to pass upon, or even to
state, the other questions raised in the progress of the trial.
There is nothing in the record tending to impair the force of that
judgment. Notice of appeal from it to the general term of the court
was given, but it does not appear that the appeal was ever
prosecuted. The alleged parol stipulation by counsel, that the
judgment might be vacated, is not admitted, but, if made, it is not
shown to have been acted upon by any entry on the records of the
Marine Court. The proceedings in the suit in the supreme court to
cancel the lease, and the ruling of the court of appeals therein,
that evidence of contemporaneous or preceding oral stipulations
could not be received to control the lease, have no bearing upon
the question before us, and the proceedings in the suit are still
pending. As the case stands before us, the judgment of the Marine
Court is in no respect impaired, and the defendant can invoke in
his behalf whatever it concluded between the parties. The validity
of the lease in suit here was involved there. The answer there
alleged that, by false and fraudulent representations, the
signature of the lessee was obtained to the lease, and that both
she and the defendant Wilson were misled by those representations
to sign the paper. The parties admitted that the only issue in that
action was "that of fraud in procuring the lease." That issue being
found by the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant, the
judgment thereon stands as an adjudication between the parties, by
a court of competent jurisdiction, that the release was obtained
upon false and fraudulent representations of the plaintiff, and
therefore was of no obligatory force. It determined not merely for
that case, but for all cases between the same parties, not only
that there was nothing due for the rent claimed for the month of
December, 1873, but that the lease itself was procured by fraud,
and therefore void.
In
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S.
351, we considered at much length the operation of a
judgment as a bar against the prosecution of a second action upon
the same demand
Page 121 U. S. 533
and as an estoppel upon the question litigated and determined in
another action between the same parties upon a different demand,
and we held, following in this respect a long series of decisions,
that in the former case the judgment, if rendered upon the merits,
is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, a finality to the demand
in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them,
and that in the latter case -- that is, where the second action
between the same parties is upon a different demand -- the judgment
in the first action operates as an estoppel as to those matters in
issue, or points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or verdict was rendered. Of the application of this rule,
Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cowen 120, furnishes an
illustration. There it appeared that two notes had been given upon
the sale of a vessel. On examination, the vessel proved to be
unseaworthy, and the maker of the notes refused to pay them on the
ground of fraudulent representations by the vendor. Thereupon an
action was brought by the holder upon one of the notes in the
Marine Court of the City of New York. The defendant pleaded the
general issue, with notice of a total failure of consideration for
the notes, on the ground of fraud in the sale of the vessel, and
upon that point judgment was rendered in his favor. The holder
thereupon brought an action upon the other note in the Court of
Common Pleas of the City of New York, and at the trial the
defendant offered in evidence, in bar of the action, the record of
the judgment in the Marine Court, the defense being fraud in the
sale of the vessel, and the judgment having been rendered directly
upon that issue between the same parties. The court of common pleas
decided that the judgment was not a bar, but the supreme court of
the state reversed the decision, declaring the law to be well
settled that a judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction
directly upon the point is, as a plea or evidence, conclusive
between the same parties upon the same matter directly in question
in another court, referring to and following the rule laid down by
Chief Justice De Grey in the celebrated case of the Duchess of
Kingston. It was urged that the judgment in
Page 121 U. S. 534
the Marine Court did not affirm any particular fact in issue in
the common pleas, but was general and indefinite, and that, from
the language of the record, it could not be inferred whether the
two cases were founded upon the same or a different state of facts;
but the court answered that it was true the record merely showed
the pleadings and that judgment was rendered for the defendant, but
it showed that it was competent on the trial to establish the fraud
of the plaintiff, and whether fraud was the point upon which the
decision was founded could be proved by extrinsic evidence, and
that the admission of such evidence was not inconsistent with the
record, and did not impugn its verity.
This decision has been frequently cited with approval by this
Court and the courts of every state. It is everywhere recognized as
correctly applying the law as settled in the Duchess of Kingston's
Case. It is not possible to distinguish it from the one before us.
Fraud in procuring the lease, upon which this action is brought,
was the point in issue in the action in the Marine Court between
the same parties, and it having been found by the verdict of the
jury against the plaintiff, and judgment having been rendered upon
that finding, the fact thus established must necessarily defeat any
subsequent action upon the same instrument between those parties.
The effect of the judgment is not at all dependent upon the
correctness of the verdict or finding upon which it was rendered.
It not being set aside by subsequent proceedings, by appeal or
otherwise, it was equally effective as an estoppel upon the point
decided, whether the decision was right or wrong.
Packet
Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 582;
Lumber Co. v.
Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638;
Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg
& Corning Railroad, 20 Wall. 137;
Pray v.
Hegeman, 98 N.Y. 351;
Merriam v. Whittemore, 5 Gray
316.
It is stated in the brief of counsel, and it was repeated on the
argument, that the judgment of the Marine Court has been vacated by
the supreme court of the state since this case was tried, in an
action brought for that purpose. If such be the fact, it cannot be
made available in this Court to obviate an erroneous ruling at the
trial.
Page 121 U. S. 535
During the pendency of the case in this Court, the defendant
below, plaintiff in error here, has died, and the executor of his
estate has been substituted as a party in his place.
Judgment of the court below reversed, and cause remanded
with direction to award a new trial.
