When, after all the pleadings are filed in a cause in a circuit
court of the United States between citizens of the same state, it
appears that the averments in the declaration which alone gave the
court jurisdiction are immaterial in the determination of the
matter in dispute, and are made for the purpose of creating a case
cognizable by the court, it is the duty of the circuit court to
dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, a citizen of
California, brought suit against other citizens of the same state
to recover possession of lands in Los Angeles County, California,
alleging that the action arose "under the laws of the United States
and the treaty known as the Treaty of Guadelupe-Hidalgo." After
answers were filed, the case was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error to review
that judgment. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error sued out under § 5 of the Act of
March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, for the review of an order of
the circuit court dismissing a suit brought by Robinson, a citizen
of California, against other citizens of the same state for want of
jurisdiction. The claim on the part of the plaintiff in error is
that, upon the face of the complaint, it appears that the suit is
one arising under the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States, and that consequently the circuit court had
jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the
Page 121 U. S. 523
action, but on examination we find that according to the
plaintiff's own showing in his complaint, his rights all depend on
the boundaries of the Rancho Los Bolsas, granted by the Mexican
government to Manuel Nieto, and confirmed and patented to his
representatives by the United States under the Act of March 3,
1851, c. 41, 9 Stat. 631, "to ascertain and settle the private land
claims in the State of California." Primarily these boundaries
depend on the description of the land granted as found in the
patent issued under the decree of confirmation, and it nowhere
appears that either the Constitution or any law or treaty of the
United States is involved in this.
It is true that in the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the
several defendants claim to be the owners of parts of the Rancho
Santiago de Santa Ana, adjoining the Rancho Los Bolsas on the east,
granted by the Mexican government to Antonio Yorba in 1810, and
confirmed and patented by the United States to Bernard Yorba and
others in 1855, and that if the ranchos overlap, the title of the
defendants is the best, because the grant of the Rancho Santiago de
Santa Ana is the oldest and has precedence. He also alleges that
the defendants claim "that they are
third persons' as to whom
the patents of Los Bolsas are not conclusive under the act of"
1851, just referred to, and there are also some allegations as to
the authority of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under
the laws of the United States, to order a resurvey of the Rancho
Santiago de Santa Ana, which has been once surveyed so as to
exclude the premises in dispute. Many of the defendants answered,
denying that they were in possession of any portion of the premises
in dispute, and others claiming that they were in possession "by
and with the consent of plaintiff, made and given to defendants by
plaintiff's agent, R. J. Northam, on or about the ___ day of June,
1882, and not otherwise." Others claim to be in possession "in
severalty under and by virtue of written contracts for the
conveyance of said several tracts of land . . . by the said
plaintiff to said defendants." None of the defendants in their
answers claim title under the grant of the Rancho Santiago de Santa
Ana.
Upon the pleadings, the court dismissed the suit, evidently
Page 121 U. S. 524
for the reason that it did not "really and substantially involve
a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction" of that court.
Such was the clear duty of the court under the act of 1875 unless
from the questions presented by the pleadings it distinctly
appeared that some right, title, privilege, or immunity, on which
the recovery depended would be defeated by one construction of the
Constitution or some law or treaty of the United States or
sustained by an opposite construction.
Starin v. New York,
115 U. S.
257.
Even if the complaint, standing by itself, made out a case of
jurisdiction, which we do not decide, it was taken away as soon as
the answers were in because, if there was jurisdiction at all, it
was by reason of the averments in the complaint as to what the
defenses against the title of the plaintiffs would be, and these
were of no avail as soon as the answers were filed and it was made
to appear that no such defenses were relied on. The circuit court
cannot be required to keep jurisdiction of a suit simply because
the averments in a complaint or declaration make a case arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States if,
when the pleadings are all in, it appears that these averments are
immaterial in the determination of the matter really in dispute
between the parties, and especially if, as here, they were
evidently made "for the purpose of creating a case" cognizable by
the circuit court when none in fact existed. The provision in
§ 5 of the act of 1875, requiring the circuit court to proceed
no further and dismiss the suit when it satisfactorily appears that
"such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy properly within" its jurisdiction, applies directly to
this case as it stands on the pleadings. The answers show that the
case made by the complaint was fictitious and not real. The
defendants either disclaim all interest in the land or claim title
under and not adverse to that of the plaintiff.
The order dismissing the case is affirmed.