The refusal of the court to instruct the jury at the close of
the plaintiff's evidence that he is not entitled to recover cannot
be assigned for error if the defendant afterwards introduces
evidence.
A policy of insurance against "bodily injuries, effected through
external, accidental and violent means," and occasioning death or
complete disability to do business, provided that
"this insurance shall not extend to death or disability which
may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or
disease, or by suicide, or self-inflicted injuries,"
covers a death by hanging one's self while insane.
Statements in an application for a policy of insurance
expressing the applicant's understanding of what will be the effect
of the insurance cannot control the legal construction of the
policy afterwards issued and accepted, although the application
warrants the facts stated therein to be true, and the policy is
expressed to be made "in consideration of the warranties made in
the application."
This was an action against an accident insurance company upon a
policy beginning thus:
"In consideration of the warranties made in the application for
this insurance, and of the sum of fifty dollars, this company
hereby insures Edward M. Crandal, by occupation, profession, or
employment a president of the Crandal Manufacturing Company,"
in the sum of ten thousand dollars for twelve months, ending May
23, 1885, payable to his wife, the original plaintiff,
"within thirty days after sufficient proof that the insured at
any time within the continuance of this policy, shall have
sustained bodily injuries, effected through external, accidental,
and violent means, within the intent and meaning of this contract,
and the conditions hereunto annexed, and such injuries alone shall
have occasioned death within ninety days from the happening
thereof, or, if the insured shall sustain bodily injuries by means
as aforesaid, which shall, independently of all other causes,
immediately and
Page 120 U. S. 528
wholly disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and
every kind of business pertaining to the occupation under which he
is insured, then, on satisfactory proof of such injuries, he shall
be indemnified against loss of time caused thereby in the sum of
fifty dollars per week for such period of continuous total
disability as shall immediately follow the accident and injuries as
aforesaid, not exceeding, however, twenty-six consecutive weeks
from the time of the happening of such accident."
Then followed certain conditions, the material part of which was
as follows:
"Provided always that this insurance shall not extend to hernia,
nor any bodily injury of which there shall be no external and
visible sign, nor to death or disability which may have been caused
wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease or by the taking
of poison or by any surgical operation or medical or mechanical
treatment, and no claim shall be made under this policy when the
death or injury may have been caused by dueling, fighting,
wrestling, unnecessary lifting, or by overexertion or by suicide or
by freezing or sunstroke or self-inflicted injuries."
The application was signed by the assured, and began as
follows:
"The undersigned hereby applies for a policy of insurance
against bodily injuries effected through external and accidental
violence, said policy to be based upon the following statement of
facts, which I hereby warrant to be true."
The rest of the application consisted of fifteen numbered
paragraphs stating the name, age, residence, and occupation of the
applicant, the amount, term, and payee of the policy applied for;
affirming that he had never been "subject to fits, disorders of the
brain, or any bodily or mental infirmity;" that he had not "in
contemplation any special journey or any hazardous undertaking,"
and that his "habits of life are correct and temperate;" and
expressing his understanding of the effect of the insurance in
several particulars, the last of which was as follows:
"15. I am aware that this insurance will not extend to hernia,
nor to any bodily injury of which there shall be no
Page 120 U. S. 529
external and visible sign, nor to any bodily injury happening
directly or indirectly in consequence of disease, nor to death or
disability caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or by
disease, or by the taking of poison, or by any surgical operation
or medical or mechanical treatment, nor to any case except when the
accidental injury shall be the proximate and sole cause of
disability or death."
The assured died July 7, 1884, and the plaintiff soon afterwards
gave to the defendant written notice and proofs of the death which
stated that the assured, while temporarily insane, hanged himself
with a pair of suspenders attached to a door-knob in his bedroom.
At the trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the death of
the assured was caused by strangulation from his so hanging
himself, and, against the defendant's objection and exception, was
permitted to introduce evidence tending to show that he was insane
at the time. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the
defendant moved the court to instruct the jury that under the law
and the evidence in the case, the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant
excepted. The defendant then introduced evidence, and the case was
argued to the jury.
The jury, under instructions to which no exception was taken,
and in answer to specific questions from the court, returned a
special verdict that Edward M. Crandal made the application; that
the defendant issued the policy; that the premiums were fully paid,
and the policy was in force at the time of his death; that he
hanged himself on July 7, 1884, and thereof died on the same day;
that he was insane at the time of his act of self-destruction, and
that due notice and proof of death were given to the defendant;
and, according to what, upon these facts, the opinion of the court
in matter of law might be, found for the plaintiff in the full
amount of the policy, or for the defendant. The court overruled a
motion for a new trial and rendered judgment on the verdict for the
plaintiff. 27 F. 40. The defendant sued out this writ of error.
Page 120 U. S. 530
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above reported,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The refusal of the court to instruct the jury at the close of
the plaintiff's evidence that she was not entitled to recover
cannot be assigned for error, because the defendant at the time
requesting such an instruction, had not rested its case, but
afterwards went on and introduced evidence in its own behalf.
Grand Trunk Railway v. Cummings, 106 U.
S. 700;
Bradley v. Poole, 98 Mass. 169. The
subsequent instructions to the jury were not excepted to. No error
is assigned in the previous rulings upon evidence, except in the
admission, against the defendant's objection and exception, of
evidence tending to prove the insanity of the assured. The only
other matter open upon this record is whether the judgment for the
plaintiff is supported by the special verdict, which finds that
while the
Page 120 U. S. 531
policy was in force, the assured died by hanging himself, being
at the time insane, and that due notice and proof of death were
afterwards given.
The single question to be decided therefore is whether a policy
of insurance against "bodily injuries, effected through external,
accidental, and violent means," and occasioning death or complete
disability to do business, and providing that
"this insurance shall not extend to death or disability which
may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or
disease, or by suicide or self-inflicted injuries"
covers a death by hanging oneself while insane.
The decisions upon the effect of a policy of life insurance
which provides that it shall be void if the assured "shall die by
suicide," or "shall die by his own hand" go far toward determining
this question. This Court, on full consideration of the conflicting
authorities upon that subject, has repeatedly and uniformly held
that such a provision, not containing the words "sane or insane,"
does not include a self-killing by an insane person, whether his
unsoundness of mind is such as to prevent him from understanding
the physical nature and consequences of his act or only such as to
prevent him, while foreseeing and premeditating its physical
consequences, from understanding its moral nature and aspect.
Life Ins. Co. v.
Terry, 15 Wall. 580;
Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins.
Co., 93 U. S. 284;
Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232;
Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U.
S. 121. In the last case, which was one in which the
assured hanged himself while insane, the Court, repeating the words
used by Mr. Justice Nelson when Chief Justice of New York, said
that "self-destruction by a fellow being bereft of reason can with
no more propriety be ascribed to the act of his own hand than to
the deadly instrument that may have been used by him for the
purpose," and "was no more his act, in the sense of the law, than
if he had been impelled by irresistible physical force." 109 U.S.
109 U. S. 132;
Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill 73. In a
like case, Vice Chancellor Wood (since Lord Chancellor Hatherley)
observed that the deceased was "subject to that which is really
just as much an accident as if he had fallen from the
Page 120 U. S. 532
top of a house."
Horn v. Anglo-Australian Ins. Co., 30
Law Journal (N.S.) Ch. 511, 7 Jurist (N.S.) 673. And in another
case, Chief Justice Appleton said that "the insane suicide no more
dies by his own hand than the suicide by mistake or accident," and
that, under such a policy, "death by the hands of the insured,
whether by accident, mistake, or in a fit of insanity, is to be
governed by one and the same rule."
Eastabrook v. union Ins.
Co., 54 Me. 224, 227, 229. Many of the cases cited for the
plaintiff in error are inconsistent with the settled law of this
Court, as shown by the decisions above mentioned.
In this state of the law, there can be no doubt that the assured
did not die "by suicide" within the meaning of this policy, and the
same reasons are conclusive against holding that he died by
"self-inflicted injuries." If self-killing, "suicide," "dying by
his own hand," cannot be predicated of an insane person, no more
can "self-inflicted injuries," for in either case it is not his
act.
Nor does the case come within the clause which provides that the
insurance shall not extend to "death or disability which may have
been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease." If
insanity could be considered as coming within this clause, it would
be doubtful, to say the least, whether, under the rule of the law
of insurance which attributes an injury or loss to its proximate
cause only, and in view of the decisions in similar cases, the
insanity of the assured, or anything but the act of hanging
himself, could be held to be the cause of his death.
Scheffer
v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249,
105 U. S. 252;
Trew v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co., 5 H. & N.
211, and 6 H. & N. 839, 845;
Reynolds v. Accidental Ins.
Co., 22 Law Times (N.S.) 820;
Winspear v. Accident Ins.
Co., 42 Law Times (N.S.) 900,
aff'd, 6 Q.B.D. 42;
Lawrence v. Accidental Ins. Co., 7 Q.B.D. 216, 221;
Scheiderer v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 13.
But the words "bodily infirmities or disease" do not include
insanity. Although, as suggested by Mr. Justice Hunt in
Life Ins. Co. v.
Terry, 15 Wall. 580, insanity or unsoundness
Page 120 U. S. 533
of mind often, if not always, is accompanied by or results from
disease of the body, still, in the common speech of mankind, mental
are distinguished from bodily disease. In the phrase "bodily
infirmities or disease," the word "bodily" grammatically applies to
"disease" as well as to "infirmities," and it cannot but be so
applied without disregarding the fundamental rule of interpretation
that policies of insurance are to be construed most strongly
against the insurers who frame them. The prefix of "bodily" hardly
affects the meaning of "infirmities," and it is difficult to
conjecture any purpose in inserting it in this proviso other than
to exclude mental disease from the enumeration of the causes of
death or disability to which the insurance does not extend.
In the argument for the plaintiff in error, some stress was laid
on the fact that the concluding paragraph of the application
differs in form of expression so as to include mental as well as
bodily diseases. It is by no means clear that this is so, but if it
were, it would not affect the case. The whole application is not
made part of the contract, and the only mention of it in the policy
is in the opening words, "In consideration of the warranties made
in the application for this insurance." This does not include all
the statements in the application, but only those which are
warranties. Some of them may be; others clearly are not. The
statements as to the age, occupation, previous state of health, and
present habits of the assured, and as to his other insurance, may
be warranties on his part. Those as to the amount, terms, and payee
of the policy applied for certainly are not. The statements
expressing his understanding of what will be the effect of the
insurance are statements not of fact, but of law, and cannot
control the legal construction of the policy afterwards issued and
accepted.
The death of the assured not having been the effect of any cause
specified in the proviso of the policy and not coming within any
warranty in the application, the question recurs whether it is
within the general words of the leading sentence of the policy, by
which he is declared to be insured "against bodily injuries
effected through external, accidental, and violent means." This
sentence does not, like the proviso, speak
Page 120 U. S. 534
of what the injury is "caused by," but it looks only to the
"means" by which it is effected. No one doubts that hanging is a
violent means of death. As it affects the body from without, it is
external, just as suffocation by drowning was held to be in the
cases of
Trew, Reynolds, and
Winspear, above
cited. And according to the decisions as to suicide under policies
of life insurance before referred to, it cannot, when done by an
insane person, be held to be other than accidental.
The result is that the judgment of the circuit court in favor of
the plaintiff was correct, and must be
Affirmed.
