An averment that the complainant in a bill of equity "resides"
in a state is not an averment that he is a citizen of the state, so
as to give a circuit court of the United States jurisdiction over
the subject matter by reason of citizenship of the parties.
When the jurisdiction of a circuit court depends upon the
citizenship of the parties, and that court takes jurisdiction and
renders judgment, and the record in this Court in error or on
appeal fails to show the requisite citizenship, the judgment will
be reversed and the case remanded by this Court on its own motion,
and the party in default adjudged to pay costs here.
These two causes were argued and submitted together. The case is
stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are appeals from a decree dismissing the original bill and
a cross-bill in a suit begun in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Northern District of Alabama by George M. Everhart
against the Huntsville Female Academy, George W. F. Price, Martha
T. Rison, Myra J. Erwin, Robert M. Erwin, William H. Erwin, Joseph
B. Erwin, and Marcus A. Erwin, and in which Hugh L. Clay, as
administrator
de bonis non of Abraham R. Erwin, deceased,
was afterwards
Page 120 U. S. 224
added as a defendant, but, on looking into the record, we find
no sufficient evidence of the jurisdiction of the circuit court,
which depends alone on the citizenship of the parties. It is stated
in the original bill that Everhart is a resident of Wisconsin, and
the same fact is also shown by the testimony; but this, as it has
often been held, is not enough. An averment of residence is not the
equivalent of an averment of citizenship for the purposes of
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States. According to the
pleadings, the Huntsville Female Academy is an Alabama corporation,
and the other defendants are residents of either Alabama or
Tennessee. The decree dismissing both the original and cross-bills
is reversed, because the record fails to show the jurisdiction of
the circuit court; but as the fault rests alone on Everhart, the
complainant in the original bill, whose duty it was to put on
record the facts necessary to show the jurisdiction, the reversal
will be at his costs in this Court. This whole subject has already
been considered twice during the present term, once in
Continental Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.
S. 237, and again in
Peper v. Fordyce,
119 U. S. 469. The
reasons for our judgment sufficiently appear in the opinions
delivered in those cases. If on the return of the case to the
circuit court it is made to appear that the citizenship necessary
for the jurisdiction existed at the time the suit was brought, it
will be for that court to determine whether an amendment of the
pleadings ought to be allowed so as to cure the present
defects.
The decree of the circuit court is reversed at the costs of
the appellant Everhart and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.