When a municipal corporation with fixed boundaries is dissolved
by law and a new corporation is created by the legislature for the
same general purposes, but with new boundaries embracing less
territory but containing substantially the same population, the
great mass of the taxable property, and the corporate property of
the old corporation which passes without consideration and for the
same uses, the debts of the old corporation fall upon the new
corporation as its legal successor, and powers of taxation to pay
them, which it had at the time of their creation and which entered
into the contracts, also survive and pass into the new
corporation.
The object of the first of these suits was the recovery of a
judgment for money, and of the second the enforcement, by the writ
of mandamus, of the judgment recovered in the first. They were
argued as one case. In the first case, Henry Watson, the defendant
in error, was the plaintiff in the circuit court. He brought his
action against the Port of Mobile to recover the principal money
due on certain bonds issued by the City of Mobile, under its
corporate name, "The Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the
City of Mobile," and the
Page 116 U. S. 290
interest on the same shown to be due by certain coupons thereto
appended. The bonds were issued December 31, 1859, were for $1,000
each, and were payable to the order of the Mobile & Great
Northern Railroad Company on the first day of January, 1879, with
interest at the rate of eight percent per annum. Upon the margin of
each bond was the following recital:
"In pursuance of the terms of the contract between the corporate
authorities of the City of Mobile and the Mobile and Great Northern
Railroad Company, an ordinance approved on the 30th December
instant provides for the sum of $95,000 by a special tax annually
to be applied to the payment of $1,000,000 of bonds to be issued by
the City of Mobile to aid in the construction of the Mobile and
Great Northern Railroad."
The declaration averred that the defendant, the Port of Mobile,
was
"the legal successor of the said the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common
Council of the City of Mobile, and bounden for its debts and for
the payment of the said bonds and coupons."
The defendant pleaded
"That the said alleged bonds and coupons were issued by the
Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City of Mobile, a
different municipal corporation, and not by this defendant, nor by
anyone authorized to bind this defendant in the premises; that this
defendant is not the successor in law nor in fact of the said the
Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City of Mobile, nor is
this defendant legally bounden to pay the said debt."
In the record there was a paper entitled "Agreement of Facts,"
signed by the counsel for the parties. By this paper it was
admitted that the contract between the City of Mobile and the
Mobile and Great Northern Railroad Company, recited in the margin
of the bonds, had been made, and the ordinance therein referred to
had been passed, and that the plaintiff became the legal holder of
the bonds and coupons, for value, before maturity, by the
assignment of the railroad company. It was further agreed that two
acts were passed by the Legislature of Alabama on the 11th day of
February, A.D. 1879, one entitled
"An act to vacate and annul the charter and dissolve
Page 116 U. S. 291
the corporation of the City of Mobile, and to provide for the
application of the assets thereof in discharge of the debts of said
corporation,"
and the other, "An act to incorporate the Port of Mobile, and to
provide for the government thereof." Said acts were referred to and
made part of the agreement. It was further agreed that all the
territory now embraced in the Port of Mobile was formerly embraced
in the City of Mobile; that the territorial extent of the City of
Mobile was about seventeen square miles, and of the Port of Mobile
about eight square miles; that the Port of Mobile covered all the
thickly settled and closely built portion of the City of Mobile;
that the taxable property within the latter, according to the last
assessment made by it prior to the passage of the Acts of February
11, 1879, was $16,255,093, and that all of said taxable property
was embraced within the limits of the Port of Mobile, except about
$900,000, and that about fourteen-fifteenths of the resident
inhabitants of the City of Mobile were resident inhabitants of the
Port of Mobile. It was further admitted that the total indebtedness
of the City of Mobile on February 11, 1879, was about $2,500,000,
and that it had nominal assets of $775,000, which were largely
reduced for the general creditor by prior liens and exemption from
levy by execution.
It appeared by the record that the case was submitted to the
jury on June 29, 1880, which on that day returned a general verdict
for the plaintiff and assessed his damages at $7,308.80, upon which
the court at once rendered judgment in his favor. A writ of error
sued out by the Port of Mobile brings this judgment under
review.
The only question raised upon the trial was whether, as matter
of law, upon the statutes of the State of Alabama, the Port of
Mobile was the legal successor of the City of Mobile, and bound for
the payment of the bonds and coupons sued on. The validity of the
judgment in the case of
The Port of Mobile, Plaintiff in Error
v. Watson will therefore depend upon the answer to that
question.
The plaintiff having obtained his judgment against the Port of
Mobile, sued out, May 27, 1881, execution thereon which on the same
day was returned by the marshal "No property
Page 116 U. S. 292
found." Afterwards, on the 19th day of January, 1882, he filed
in the circuit court his petition, in which he prayed for the writ
of mandamus and charged that the Police Board of the Port of Mobile
had the right, and it was their duty, to assess and levy a special
tax for the satisfaction of his judgment. He therefore prayed for
the writ to compel the Port of Mobile, and its officers charged
with the levying and collection of taxes, to assess, levy, and
collect a special tax for the payment of his judgment.
In order to understand the questions raised by this petition, it
will be necessary to state more fully the contract made by the City
of Mobile with the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad Company in
reference to the issue of the series of bonds in question and the
legislation of the State of Alabama in reference to the City of
Mobile and the Port of Mobile.
By the act of the legislature approved February 29, 1859, the
City of Mobile was authorized to aid the construction of the
railroad of said company by an issue to the company of bonds of the
city to the amount of $1,000,000 under such contract as the city
might make with the railroad company, and was vested with power to
adopt the ordinances necessary to carry out such contract. In
pursuance of this authority, the City of Mobile, on December 30,
1859, entered into a contract with the railroad company in which,
among other things, it was provided that the city should issue to
the railroad company, on or before January 2, 1860, its bonds to
the amount of $1,000,000, and that the city should annually, after
January 1, 1860, provide the sum of $95,000 to be applied to the
payment of the bonds and coupons thereto attached as they became
due by a special tax to be levied and collected by the city for
that purpose, and that the city should pass the bylaws and
ordinances necessary to that end. In pursuance of this contract,
the City of Mobile, on December 30, 1859, passed an ordinance which
provided that for the year 1860 and annually thereafter, there
should be levied and collected a special tax upon the assessed
value of all the taxable property in the City of Mobile sufficient
to produce the said sum of $95,000, and that the money so raised
should be pledged to the payment of said bonds and the interest
coupons.
Page 116 U. S. 293
Upon the faith of the act of the legislature referred to and the
contract and ordinance of the City of Mobile, bonds of the city to
the amount of a million dollars were issued to the railroad
company, and by it assigned and sold.
The City of Mobile having, in the year 1878, made default in the
payment of the interest on its debt, which then exceeded
$2,500,000, the legislature, on February 11, 1879, passed
"An act to vacate and annual the charter and dissolve the
corporation of the City of Mobile, and to provide for the
application of the assets thereof in discharge of the debts of said
corporation."
This act, by its first section, repealed the charter of the City
of Mobile and declared that the corporation of the City of Mobile,
known as "The Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City of
Mobile," was thereby dissolved and abolished.
The act then provided for the appointment by the governor of the
state of three commissioners whose duty it should be to take
possession of all the property and assets of the City of Mobile, to
hold such property and assets upon the same trusts and subject to
the same liens and charges that the same were under when in the
possession of the City of Mobile, and, under the direction and
pursuant to the orders of the Chancery Court of the County of
Mobile, collect the debts and taxes due the city and sell its
property and apply the taxes and debts collected, and the proceeds
of the property sold, to the payment of the debts of the city, the
floating debt to be first paid. The act declared that the
commissioners should have no power to levy any tax or assessment
whatever, but that it should be their duty to treat with the
holders of the funded debt of the City of Mobile with a view to its
adjustment and settlement and to report to the governor the result
of their negotiations, together with the draft of such act as might
be proper to carry into effect any scheme of adjustment that might
result from such negotiations, all of which it was made the duty of
the governor to submit to the legislature.
On the same day, to-wit, February 11, 1879, the legislature
passed "An act to incorporate the Port of Mobile, and provide for
the government thereof."
Page 116 U. S. 294
This act incorporated, under the name of "The Port of Mobile,"
the inhabitants residing within certain specified boundaries, which
included no territory not embraced within the limits prescribed by
the charter of the City of Mobile. The act provided for the
election of eight persons, to be styled the "Mobile Police Board,"
for a tax collector, and other officers, and made it the duty of
the tax collector to collect all taxes and license charges, and to
perform and discharge all such other duties as might be required of
him by the police board. It empowered the police board to levy and
collect, for each year of its existence, upon the assessed value of
all property and subjects of state taxation within the Port of
Mobile a tax of six-tenths of one percent for the purpose of
defraying the expenses of carrying out the provisions of the act,
and made the assessment returned by the Assessor of Mobile county
for the preceding year that on which the tax should be levied and
collected. The act further provided that the police board should
have and exercise the powers thereby conferred on them and no
other, and repealed all conflicting acts and parts of acts.
After the recovery by the plaintiff of his judgment against the
Port of Mobile on June 29, 1880, the Legislature of Alabama, on
December 8, 1880 passed an act which declared that the police board
should not levy any other tax than the six-tenths of one mill on
the dollar authorized by the seventeenth section of the Act of
February 11, 1879, "to incorporate the Port of Mobile and provide
for the government thereof," and the license taxes authorized by §
30 of that act.
The legislature on December 8, 1880, also passed "An act to
adopt and carry into effect the plans for the adjustment and
settlement of the existing indebtedness of the late corporation,"
the City of Mobile, etc. This act was subsequently, on February 24,
1881, reenacted with material amendments.
The amended act provided for an issue of $2,500,000 of the bonds
of the City of Mobile, to be dated January 1, 1881, and to be
payable in twenty-five years, with interest at three percent for
five years, four percent for fifteen years, and five percent for
the remaining five years. These bonds were
Page 116 U. S. 295
to be used by exchanging them for the bonds of the City of
Mobile of the issue of May 1, 1875, but no available provision was
made in the act for the payment or satisfaction of the issue of
which the plaintiff's bonds formed a part. The act further required
the Commissioners of the City of Mobile, immediately after its
passage, to turn over to the police board of the Port of Mobile
"all the real and personal property which was formerly held and
owned" by the City of Mobile "for public use and governmental
purposes," such as public buildings, markets, squares, parks, fire
engines, engine houses, hose and hose carriages, engineering
instruments, and all other property of like character and use,
except only the wharves.
Such was the legislation of Alabama in reference to the City of
Mobile and the Port of Mobile when the plaintiff filed his petition
for the writ of mandamus. The defendants to the petition -- namely,
the Port of Mobile and the police board of the Port of Mobile --
filed a demurrer and also an answer to the petition. In the latter,
they denied that the Port of Mobile was the successor of the City
of Mobile, bounden for its debts and the performance of its duties
in reference to said judgment, and denied that the Port of Mobile
or its police board had any power or that it was their legal duty
to assess, levy, or collect the special tax for the purpose of
paying said judgment.
The plaintiff demurred to this answer and, upon final hearing
upon the demurrer to the petition and the demurrer to the answer,
the circuit court ordered
"That the respondents, the Port of Mobile, the Mobile Police
Board, Richard B. Owen, President, James W. Monette, Robert Adams,
Sylvester J. Russell, Daniel McNeill, Patrick J. Hanlon, John
Henry, Frank P. Andrews, and William Paton, Commissioners of the
Port of Mobile, and members of said police board, do forthwith
assess, levy, and cause to be collected a special tax upon the
property, real and personal, subject to tax by them, the said Port
of Mobile and Mobile Police Board sufficient to pay and satisfy the
said judgment of the relator against the Port of Mobile for the
debts of the said relator, with interest thereon, and the same
cause to be collected in lawful money,
Page 116 U. S. 296
and, as collected, in whole or in part, the same to pay over or
cause to be paid over to said Henry Watson or his lawful attorney
to satisfy the said judgment, with interest thereon."
This judgment is also brought up for review by the writ of error
sued out by the Port of Mobile.
Page 116 U. S. 299
MR. JUSTICE WOODS delivered the opinion of the Court. After
stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:
It is not disputed that the bonds issued by the City of Mobile,
upon which the plaintiff brought suit and removed judgment against
the Port of Mobile, were the valid obligations of the City of
Mobile, which was bound by its contract to levy and collect
annually a tax of $95,000 to be applied to the payment of the
principal and interest of the issue of bonds of which those held by
the plaintiff formed part. It is apparent from the statement of the
case that the Act of February 11, 1879, "to vacate and annul the
charter of the City of Mobile and provide for the application of
the assets thereof in discharge of the debts of said corporation,"
and the act of the same date "to incorporate the Port of Mobile and
to provide for the government thereof," and the several acts
subsequent thereto on the same general subject, make no adequate
provision for the payment of the bonds held by the plaintiff and
other bonds of the same issue, of which, according to the answer of
the Port of Mobile to the petition for the writ of mandamus, there
still remain unsatisfied bonds to the amount of $323,914. The
effect of this legislation is to take from the officers of the City
of Mobile all power to lay a tax for their payment and to leave no
means for their satisfaction. The assets of the City of Mobile
turned over to the commissioners appointed by authority of the act
to vacate its charter, being largely reduced for the general
creditor by prior liens and exemptions from levy by execution, and
their proceeds being first required to be applied to the floating
debt of the city, have afforded no satisfaction to the plaintiff,
and it is not pretended that payment could or would be made to him
out of the proceeds of such assets. If, therefore, the plaintiff
cannot exact payment from the Port of Mobile, the effect of the
legislation referred to is to deprive him of all remedy upon the
bonds issued by the City of Mobile and the contract providing for
their payment, valid when
Page 116 U. S. 300
made and valid still. It is therefore a vital question in the
case whether the Port of Mobile is the legal successor of the City
of Mobile, and bound for its debts. The "agreement of facts" made
in the suit upon the bonds is conceded to be a true statement of
the facts therein recited. From this paper and other admissions
made in the answer of the Port of Mobile of the rule to show cause
and the legislation of the State of Alabama made a part of the
record, it appears that on the day when the act was passed vacating
and annulling the charter and dissolving the corporation of the
City of Mobile, another act was passed to incorporate the Port of
Mobile; that all the territory embraced within the limits of the
Port of Mobile was formed of part of the territory, and included
all the thickly settled and closely built portion of the City of
Mobile; that out of more than $16,000,000 of taxable property of
the City of Mobile, all but $900,000 was included within the limits
of the Port of Mobile, and that fourteen-fifteenths of the
inhabitants of the City of Mobile were inhabitants of the Port of
Mobile. While, therefore, the area of territory of the Port of
Mobile was little more than half that of the City of Mobile, it is
apparent that the former included substantially the same taxable
property and the same body of people as the City of Mobile. It
further appears that all the property, except its wharves, of the
City of Mobile used by it for public and governmental purposes was,
by the authority of the Act of February 24, 1881, turned over and
delivered to the Port of Mobile for its use, without compensation
to be paid therefor.
We are of opinion, upon this state of the statutes and facts,
that the Port of Mobile is the legal successor of the City of
Mobile, and liable for its debts. The two corporations were
composed of substantially the same community, included within their
limits substantially the same taxable property, and were organized
for the same general purposes.
Where the legislature of a state has given a local community,
living within designated boundaries, a municipal organization, and
by a subsequent act or series of acts repeals its charter, and
dissolves the corporation, and incorporates substantially the same
people as a municipal body under a new name for
Page 116 U. S. 301
the same general purpose, and the great mass of the taxable
property of the old corporation is included within the limits of
the new, and the property of the old corporation used for public
purposes is transferred without consideration to the new
corporation for the same public uses, the latter, notwithstanding a
great reduction of its corporate limits, is the successor, in law,
of the former and liable for its debts, and if any part of the
creditors of the old corporation are left without provision for the
payment of their claims, they can enforce satisfaction out of the
new. In illustration and support of this proposition, the following
cases are in point:
In
Girard v.
Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1, it was held by this Court
that the annexation to the City of Philadelphia, having a territory
of only two square miles, of twenty-eight other municipalities,
with all their inhabitants, comprising districts, boroughs, and
townships of various territorial extent, and the changing of its
name, did not destroy its identity or impair its right to hold
property devised to it.
So, in
Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S.
266, it was said by MR. JUSTICE FIELD, in delivering
judgment, that
"when a new form is given to an old corporation, or such a
corporation is reorganized under a new charter, taking in its new
organization the place of the old one, embracing substantially the
same corporators and the same territory, it will be presumed that
the legislature intended a continued existence of the same
corporation, although different powers are possessed under the new
charter and different officers administer its affairs, and in the
absence of express provision of their payment, it will also be
presumed that the legislature intended that the liabilities as well
as the rights of property of the corporation in its old form should
accompany the corporation in its reorganization."
In
O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lea 730, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee went so far as to say
"that neither the repeal of the charter of a municipal
corporation, nor a change of its name, nor an increase or
diminution of its territory or population, nor a change in its mode
of government, nor all of these combined will destroy the identity,
continuity, or succession
Page 116 U. S. 302
of the corporation if the people or territory reincorporated
constitute an integral part of the corporation abolished. . . . The
corporators and the territory are the essential constituents of the
corporation, and rights and liabilities naturally adhere to
them."
In
Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.
S. 514, a municipal corporation had been dissolved, and
its territory divided between and annexed to three adjacent
corporations. Upon this state of facts, the Court held that unless
the legislature otherwise provided, the corporations to which the
territory and the inhabitants of the divided corporation had been
transferred were severally liable for their proportionate share of
its debts, and were vested with its power to raise revenue
wherewith to pay them by levying taxes upon the property
transferred and the persons residing therein.
See also
Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866;
Cuddon v.
Eastwick, 1 Salk. 192;
People v. Morris, 13 Wend.
325;
New Orleans Railroad Co. v. City of New Orleans, 26
La.Ann. 478.
In the case of
Amy v. Selma, recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Alabama and not yet reported, a question almost
identical with the one now in hand was considered. The Legislature
of Alabama had passed an act approved December 11, 1882,
entitled
"An act to vacate and annul the charter and dissolve the
corporation of the City of Selma and to provide for the application
of the assets thereof to the payment of the debts thereof."
That act repealed the charter of the City of Selma and all acts
amendatory thereof and declared the corporation dissolved and all
offices held under any of said acts, except for the purposes and
during the period provided by the repealing act, abolished, and
that all powers of taxation given to the City of Selma by acts of
the legislature were resumed by and lodged in the legislature. It
transferred to the custody and control of the State of Alabama all
property, real and personal, held and used by the corporation for
governmental or other public purposes, and declared that the
inhabitants and territory, within the territorial limits and
jurisdiction of said corporation, were resolved into the body of
the state. The residue of the act was substantially similar to
the
Page 116 U. S. 303
Act of February 11, 1879, "to vacate and annul the charter and
dissolve the corporation of the City of Mobile," etc.
This was followed by an act approved February 17, 1883,
"to incorporate the inhabitants and territory formerly embraced
within the corporate limits of the municipal corporation, since
dissolved, styled the 'City of Selma,' and to establish a local
government therefor."
That act, after reciting the dissolution of the City of Selma
and the repeal of its charter, among many other provisions, formed
the inhabitants residing within the territory formerly covered by
the City of Selma into a municipal corporation under the name and
style of "Selma;" provided for officers of the municipality and
prescribed their duties; authorized them to levy taxes, but
declared that no funds derived by the corporation thereby created
from taxes or any other source should be used for the payment of
any of the debts of the City of Selma, and transferred and made
over to Selma the property which had been held and used by the City
of Selma, to be held and used for the same uses and trusts to which
it had been devoted while in the possession of the City of
Selma.
This act was followed by an Act approved February 19, 1883,
"to carry into effect any plan or scheme for the compromise,
adjustment, and settlement of the existing indebtedness of the late
corporation known as the 'City of Selma,' which might be agreed
upon between the creditors of the said City of Selma and
commissioners appointed under and by virtue of the act . . . of
December 11, 1882."
With this series of acts in force, the Supreme Court of Alabama,
in the case mentioned, was called on to construe the act
"to vacate and amend the charter and dissolve the corporation of
the City of Selma, and to provide for the application of the assets
thereof to the payment of the debts thereof."
It held that this act was without operation upon the debts and
liabilities of the City of Selma lawfully contracted; that the Act
of February 17, 1883, to incorporate the inhabitants and territory
formerly embraced within the limits of the City of Selma was a
reorganization, under the corporate name of Selma, of the same
corporators, and embraced substantially the same territory as the
City of
Page 116 U. S. 304
Selma; that the corporation called "Selma" was the successor of
the City of Selma, and bound for the payment of its debts, and that
a suit at law, founded on a judgment against the City of Selma, was
maintainable against its successor, Selma.
This construction of these statutes of the State of Alabama by
its highest court being in accord with our own views and in harmony
with former decisions of this Court on the same general subject, is
decisive of the question in hand unless there is some material
difference between the legislation concerning the City of Selma and
that concerning the City of Mobile. The only difference that can be
supposed to have any bearing upon the question under discussion is
that the act incorporating Selma embraced the same territory as
that covered by the City of Selma, whereas the Port of Mobile
covered little more than half the territory embraced by the City of
Mobile. We think this difference between the two cases is an
immaterial one. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of
Mobile & Spring Hill Railroad Co. v. Kennerly, 74 Ala.
566, assumed that the City of Mobile and the Port of Mobile had
substantially the same corporators and the same boundaries. And we
are of opinion that the exclusion from the limits of the Port of
Mobile of the sparsely settled suburbs of the City of Mobile, a
territory of little value, as fairly appears by the record, and
consisting, as stated by the counsel for plaintiff, without
contradiction, largely of fields, swamps, and land covered with
water, will not serve to distinguish this case from the case of
Amy v. Selma. We repeat, therefore, that in our judgment
the Port of Mobile is the legal successor of the City of Mobile,
and bound for its debts.
It follows from this proposition that the remedies necessary to
the collection of his debt which the law gave the creditor of the
City of Mobile remain in force against the Port of Mobile. The laws
which establish local municipal corporations cannot be altered or
repealed so as to invade the constitutional rights of creditors. So
far as such corporations are invested with subordinate legislative
powers for local purposes, they are the mere instrumentalities of
the states for the convenient administration of their affairs, and
are subject to legislative
Page 116 U. S. 305
control. But when empowered to take stock in or otherwise aid a
railroad company, and they issue their bonds in payment of the
stock taken, or to carry out any other authorized contract in aid
of the railroad company, they are to that extent to be deemed
private corporations, and their obligations are secured by all the
guarantees which protect the engagements of private individuals.
Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266;
Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.
S. 514.
Therefore the remedies for the enforcement of such obligations
assumed by a municipal corporation, which existed when the contract
was made, must be left unimpaired by the legislature, or, if they
are changed, a substantial equivalent must be provided. Where the
resource for the payment of the bonds of a municipal corporation is
the power of taxation existing when the bonds were issued, any law
which withdraws or limits the taxing power and leaves no adequate
means for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the Constitution
of the United States and is null and void.
Von
Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535;
Edwards v.
Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595;
Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U.
S. 733;
Louisville v. Pillsbury, 105 U.
S. 278;
Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans,
109 U. S. 285.
These propositions receive strong support from the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Alabama.
Commissioners of Limestone County v.
Rather, 48 Ala. 433;
Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala.
145;
Slaughter v. Mobile County, 73 Ala. 134.
It follows that the contract by which, under authority of the
legislature, the City of Mobile agreed to levy a special tax for
the payment of the principal and interest of the class of bonds to
which those held by the plaintiff belong is still in force, and its
obligation rests upon its legal successor, the Port of Mobile.
All laws passed since the making of the contract whose purpose
or effect is to take from the City of Mobile or its successor the
power to levy the tax and pay the bonds are invalid and
ineffectual, and will be disregarded. MR. JUSTICE FIELD, when
delivering the judgment of this Court in
Wolff v. New
Orleans, 103 U. S. 358,
said:
"The courts therefore treating as invalid and void the
legislation abrogating or
Page 116 U. S. 306
restricting the power of taxation delegated to the municipality
upon the faith of which contracts were made with her, and upon the
continuance of which alone they can be enforced, can proceed, and
by mandamus compel at the instance of the parties interested the
exercise of that power as if no such legislation had ever been
attempted."
And so, in
Ralls County Court v. United States,
105 U. S. 733, it
was said by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, speaking for the Court, that
"All laws of the state which have been passed since the bonds in
question were issued, purporting to take away from the county
courts the power to levy taxes necessary to meet the payments, are
invalid, and, under the well settled rule of decision in this
Court, the circuit court had authority, by mandamus, to require the
county court to do all the law, when the bonds were issued,
required it to do, to raise the means to pay the judgment, or
something substantially equivalent."
The Port of Mobile has the machinery and officers requisite for
the assessment of property and for the levy and collection of taxes
to carry on the city government. There is no reason why the taxes
necessary to pay the judgment of the plaintiff cannot be levied and
collected by the same officers. There is no obstacle to the full
and complete performance by the Port of Mobile and the Mobile
Police Board of the duties required by the peremptory writ of
mandamus issued by the circuit court.
It follows from the views we have expressed that the judgment of
the circuit court in favor of the plaintiff for $7,308.80 and costs
against the Port of Mobile, and the judgment directing the
peremptory writ of mandamus to be issued against the Port of Mobile
and the Mobile Police Board for the satisfaction of such judgment,
are both warranted by law.
Judgments affirmed.
