The provision in the Constitution of Colorado, that
"All individuals, associations, and corporations shall have
equal rights to have persons and property transported over any
railroad in this state, and no undue or unreasonable discrimination
shall be made in charges or facilities for transportation of
freight or passengers within the state, and no railroad
company,
Page 110 U. S. 668
nor any lessee, manager, or employee thereof, shall give any
preference to individuals, associations, or corporations in
furnishing cars or motive power,"
imposes no greater obligation on a railroad company than the
common law would have imposed upon it.
The provision in the Constitution of Colorado that "every
railroad company shall have the right with its road to intersect,
connect with, or cross any other railroad," only implies a
mechanical union of the tracks of the roads so as to admit of the
convenient passage of cars from one to the other, and does not of
itself imply the right of connecting business with business.
At common law, a railroad common carrier is not bound to carry
beyond its own line, and if it contracts to carry beyond it, it
may, in the absence of statutory regulations, determine for itself
what agencies it will employ, and there is nothing in the
provisions of the Constitution of Colorado which takes away such
right, or imposes any further obligation.
A railroad company has authority to establish its own stations
for receiving and putting down passengers and merchandise, and may
regulate the time and manner in which it will carry them, and in
the absence of statutory obligations, it is not required in
Colorado to establish stations for those purposes at a point where
another railroad company has made a mechanical union with its
road.
A provision in a state constitution which prohibits a railroad
company from discriminations in charges and facilities does not, in
the absence of legislation, require a company which has made
provisions with a connecting road for the transaction of joint
business at an established union junction station, to make similar
provisions with a rival connecting line at another near point on
its line at which the second connecting line has made a mechanical
union with its road.
A provision in a state constitution which forbids a railroad
company to make discrimination in rates is not violated by refusing
to give to a connecting road the same arrangement as to through
rates which are given to another connecting line, unless the
conditions as to the service are substantially alike in both
cases.
This is a bill in equity filed by the Denver & New Orleans
Railroad company, a Colorado corporation, owning and operating a
railroad in that state between Denver and Pueblo, a distance of
about 125 miles, against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railroad Company, a Kansas corporation, owning and operating a
railroad in that state from the Missouri River at Kansas City,
westerly to the Colorado state line, and also operating from there,
under a lease, a road in Colorado from the state line to Pueblo,
built by the Pueblo & Arkansas Valley Railroad Company, a
Colorado corporation. The two roads so operated by the Atchison,
Topeka & Santa
Page 110 U. S. 669
Fe Company form a continuous line of communication from Kansas
City to Pueblo, about six hundred and thirty-four miles. The
general purpose of the suit is to compel the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Company to unite with the Denver & New Orleans Company
in forming a through line of railroad transportation to and from
Denver over the Denver & New Orleans road, with all the
privileges as to exchange of business, division of rates, sale of
tickets, issue of bills of lading, checking of baggage, and
interchange of cars that are or may be customary with connecting
roads, or that are or may be granted to the Denver & Rio Grande
Railroad Company, another Colorado corporation, also owning and
operating a road parallel to that of the Denver & New Orleans
Company between Denver and Pueblo, or to any other railroad company
competing with the Denver & New Orleans for Denver
business.
The facts on which the case depends are these:
It appeared that when the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Company reached Pueblo with its line it had no connection of its
own with Denver. The Denver & Rio Grande road was built and
running between Denver and Pueblo, but the gauge of its track was
different from that of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. Other
companies occupying different routes had at the time substantially
the control of the transportation of passengers and freight between
the Missouri River and Denver. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Company, being desirous of competing for this business, entered
into an arrangement as early as 1879, with the Denver & Rio
Grande Company for the formation of a through line of
transportation for that purpose. By this arrangement, a third rail
was to be put down on the track of the Denver & Rio Grande
road, so as to admit of the passage of cars continuously over both
roads, and terms were agreed on for doing the business and for the
division of rates. The object of the parties was to establish a new
line which could be worked with rapidity and economy, in
competition with the old ones. In the division of prices, the
Denver & Rio Grande Company was allowed compensation at the
rate of a mile and a half for every mile of actual haul. As the
distance from the Missouri River to Pueblo by this route was about
the same as to Denver by the other routes, the through rates
over
Page 110 U. S. 670
this line to and from Denver were usually made about the same as
the rates to and from Pueblo. This was necessary to compete
successfully with other lines for Denver business. Afterwards
another agreement, known as the "tripartite agreement," was entered
into between the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, the Denver &
Rio Grande, and the Union Pacific Railroad Companies, by which
rates were established between Denver and the Missouri River, and
arrangements made for a division of business among these companies,
and for the regulation of their conduct to wards each other, with a
view to avoiding competition between themselves or from others.
In 1882, the Denver & New Orleans Company completed its road
between Denver and Pueblo, and connected its track with that of the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, in Pueblo, twelve or fifteen
hundred feet easterly from the junction of the Denver & Rio
Grande, and about three-quarters of a mile from the Union Depot at
which the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe and the Denver & Rio
Grande interchange their business, and where each stops its trains
regularly to take on and let off passengers and receive and deliver
freight. The Denver & New Orleans Company has erected at its
junction with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe platforms and
other accommodations for the interchange of business, and before
this suit was begun, the general superintendent of the Denver &
New Orleans Company made a request in writing of the general
manager of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe as follows:
"That through bills of lading be given via your line and ours,
and that you allow all freight consigned via Denver & New
Orleans Railroad to be delivered this company at point of junction,
and on such terms as exist between your road and any other line or
lines; that you allow your cars, or cars of any foreign line,
destined for points reached by the Denver & New Orleans
Railroad, to be delivered to this company and hauled to destination
in same manner as interchanged with any other line; that you allow
tickets to be placed on sale between points on line of Denver &
New Orleans Railroad and those on line of Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad, or reached by either line; that a system of
Page 110 U. S. 671
through checking of baggage be adopted; that a transfer of
United States mail be made at point of junction. In matter of
settlements between the two companies for earnings and charges due,
we will settle daily on delivery of freight to this line; for
mileage due for car service, and for amounts due for tickets
interchanged, we agree to settle monthly, or in any other manner
adopted by your line, or as is customary between railroads in such
settlements."
This request was refused, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Company continued its through business with the Denver & Rio
Grande as before, but declined to receive or deliver freight or
passengers at the junction of the Denver & New Orleans road, or
to give or take through bills of lading, or to sell or receive
through tickets, or to check baggage over that line. All passengers
or freight coming from or destined for that line were taken or
delivered at the regular depot of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Company in Pueblo, and the prices charged were according to the
regular rates to and from that point, which were more than the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe received on a division of through
rates to and from Denver under its arrangement with the Denver
& Rio Grande Company.
By the Constitution of Colorado, art. 15, corporations can only
be formed in that state under general laws, subject to alteration
and repeal, and the law under which the Pueblo & Arkansas
Valley Railroad Company was organized, conferred power, among
others:
"Second, to cross, intersect, or connect its railroad with any
other railway."
"Third, to connect at state line with roads of other states and
territories."
"Fourth, to receive and convey passengers and property on its
railway."
"Fifth, to erect and maintain all necessary and convenient
buildings and stations, fixtures and machinery, for the
convenience, accommodation, and use of passengers, freights, and
business interests, or which may be necessary for the construction
and operation of said railway. "
Page 110 U. S. 672
"Sixth, to regulate the time and manner in which passengers and
property shall be transported, and the compensation to be paid
therefor."
General Laws of Colorado, 1877.
Sections 4 and 6 of article 15 of the Constitution of Colorado
are as follows:
"SEC. 4. All railways shall be public highways, and all railroad
companies shall be common carriers. Any association or corporation
organized for the purpose shall have the right to construct and
operate railroad between any designated points within this state,
and to connect at the state line with railroads of other states or
territories. Every railroad company shall have the right with its
road to intersect, connect with, or cross any other railroad."
"SEC. 6. All individuals, associations, and corporations shall
have equal rights to have persons and property transported over any
railroad in this state, and no undue or unreasonable discrimination
shall be made in charges or facilities for transportation of
freights or passengers within the state, and no railroad company,
nor any lessee, manager, or employee thereof, shall give any
preference to individuals, associations, or corporations in
furnishing cars or motive power."
No other provisions of the Constitution or of the statutes of
the state have been referred to as affecting the questions here
involved.
A large amount of testimony is found in the record as to the
custom of connected roads in respect to the interchange of business
and the formation of through lines. From this it appears that while
through business is very generally done on through lines formed by
an arrangement between connecting roads, no road can make itself a
part of such a line, so as to participate in its special
advantages, without the consent of the others. Oftentimes new
roads, opening up new points, are admitted at once on notice,
without a special agreement to that effect, or in reference to
details; still, if objection is made, the new road must be content
with the right to do business over the line in such a way as the
law allows to others that have no special contract interest in the
line itself. The manner
Page 110 U. S. 673
in which its business must be done by the line will depend not
alone on the connection of its track with that of the line, but
upon the duty which the line as a carrier owes to it as a customer.
No usage has been established which requires one of the component
companies of a connecting through line to grant to a competitor of
any of the other companies the same privileges that are accorded to
its associates, simply because the tracks of the competing company
unite with its own and admit of a free and convenient interchange
of business. The line is made up by the contracting companies to do
business as carriers for the public, and companies, whose roads do
not form part of the line, have no other rights in connection with
it than such as belong to the public at large, unless special
provision is made therefor by the legislature or the contracting
companies.
Upon this state of facts the circuit court entered a decree
requiring the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company to stop all
its passenger trains at the platform built by the Denver & New
Orleans Company where the two roads joined, and to remain there
long enough to take on and let off passengers with safety, and to
receive and deliver express matter and the mails. It also required
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company to keep an agent there,
to sell tickets, check baggage, and bill freight. All freight
trains were to be stopped at the same place whenever there was
freight to be taken on or delivered, if proper notice was given.
While the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company was not required
to issue or recognize through bills of lading embracing the Denver
& New Orleans road in the route, or to sell or recognize
through tickets of the same character, or to check baggage in
connection with that road, it was required to carry freight and
passengers going to or coming from that road at the same price it
would receive if the passenger or freight were carried to or from
the same point upon a through ticket or through bill of lading
issued under any arrangement with the Denver & Rio Grande
Company or any other competitor of the Denver & New Orleans
Company for business. In short, the decree, as entered, establishes
in detail rules and regulations for the working of the Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe and Denver & New Orleans roads, in
connection
Page 110 U. S. 674
with each other as a connecting through line, and, in effect,
requires the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company to place the
Denver & New Orleans Company on an equal footing as to the
interchange of business with the most favored of the competitors of
that company, both as to prices and facilities, except in respect
to the issue of through bills of lading, through checks for
baggage, through tickets, and, perhaps, the compulsory interchange
of cars.
From this decree both companies appealed; the Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Company, because the bill was not dismissed, and the
Denver & New Orleans Company because the decree did not fix the
rates to be charged by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company
for freight and passengers transported by it in connection with the
Denver & New Orleans, or make a specific division and
apportionment of through rates between the two companies, and
because it did not require the issue of through tickets and through
bills of lading, and the thorough checking of baggage.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
After reciting the facts in the foregoing language he
continued:
The case has been presented by counsel in two aspects:
1. In view of the requirements of the Constitution of Colorado
alone, and
2. In view of the constitutional and common law obligations of
railroad companies in Colorado as common carriers.
We will first consider the requirements of the constitution, and
here it may be premised that section 6 of article 15 imposes no
greater obligations upon the company than the common law would have
imposed without it. Every common carrier must carry for all to the
extent of his capacity, without undue or unreasonable
discrimination, either in charges or facilities. The
Page 110 U. S. 675
constitution has taken from the legislature the power of
abolishing this rule as applied to railroad companies.
So in sec. 4, there is nothing specially important to the
present inquiry except the last sentence: "Every railroad company
shall have the right with its road to intersect, connect with, or
cross any other railroad." Railroad companies are created to serve
the public as carriers for hire, and their obligations to the
public are such as the law attaches to that service. The only
exclusively constitutional question in the case, is therefore
whether the right of one railroad company to connect its road with
that of another company, which has been made part of the
fundamental law of the state, implies more than a mechanical union
of the tracks of the roads so as to admit of the convenient passage
of cars from one to the other. The claim on the part of the Denver
& New Orleans Company is that the right to connect the roads
includes the right of business intercourse between the two
companies, such as is customary on roads forming a continuous line,
and that if the companies fail or refuse to agree upon the terms of
their intercourse a court of equity may, in the absence of
statutory regulations, determine what the terms shall be. Such
appears to have been the opinion of the circuit court, and
accordingly in its decree a compulsory business connection was
established between the two companies, and rules were laid down for
the government of their conduct toward each other in this new
relation. In other words, the court has made an arrangement for the
business intercourse of these companies such as, in its opinion,
they ought in law to have made for themselves.
There is here no question as to how or where the physical
connection of the roads shall be made, for that has already been
done at the place, and in the way, decided upon by the Denver &
New Orleans Company for itself, and the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Company does not ask to have it changed. The point in
dispute upon this branch of the case therefore is whether, under
the Constitution of Colorado, the Denver & New Orleans Company
has a constitutional right, which a court of chancery can enforce
by a decree for specific performance, to form the same business
connection, and make
Page 110 U. S. 676
the same traffic arrangement, with the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Company as that company grants to, or makes with, any
competing company operating a connected road.
The right secured by the constitution is that of a connection of
one road with another, and the language used to describe the grant
is strikingly like that of sec. 23 of the charter of the Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Company, given by Maryland on the 28th of
February, 1827, c. 123, Laws of Maryland 1826, which is in these
words:
"That full right and privilege is hereby reserved to the
citizens of this state, or any company hereafter to be incorporated
under the authority of this state, to connect with the road hereby
provided for, any other railroad leading from the main route, to
any other part or parts of the state."
At the time this charter was granted, the idea prevailed that a
railroad could be used like a public highway by all who chose to
put carriages thereon, subject only to the payment of tolls and to
reasonable regulations as to the manner of doing business,
Lake
Sup. & Miss. R. Co. v. v. United States, 93 U. S.
442; but that the word "connect" as here used, was not
supposed to mean anything more than a mechanical union of the
tracks is apparent from the fact that when afterwards, on the 9th
of March, 1833, authority was given the owners of certain factories
to connect roads from their factories with the Washington branch of
the Baltimore & Ohio Company, and to erect depots at the
junctions, it was in express terms made
"the duty of the company to take from and deliver at said depot
any produce, merchandise, or manufactures, or other articles
whatsoever, which they (the factory owners) may require to be
transported on said road."
Maryland Laws of 1832, c. 175, sec, 16. The charter of the
Baltimore & Ohio Company was one of the earliest ever granted
in the United States, and while from the beginning it was common in
most of the states to provide in some form by charters for a
connection of one railroad with another, we have not had our
attention called to a single case where, if more than a connection
of tracks was
Page 110 U. S. 677
required, the additional requirement was not distinctly stated
and defined by the legislature.
Legislation regulating the duties of connected roads because of
their connection is to be found in many of the states, and it began
at a very early day in the history of railroad construction. As
long ago as 1842, a general statute upon the subject was passed in
Maine, Stats. of Maine, 1842, c. 9; and in 1854, c. 93, a tribunal
was established for determining upon the "terms of connection" and
"the rates at which passengers and merchandise coming from the one
shall be transported over the other," in case the companies
themselves failed to agree. Other states have made different
provisions, and as railroads have increased in number, and their
relations have become more and more complicated, statutory
regulations have been more frequently adopted, and with greater
particularity in matters of detail. Much litigation has grown out
of controversies between connected roads as to their respective
rights, but we have found no case in which, without legislative
regulation, a simple connection of tracks has been held to
establish any contract or business relation between the
companies.
No provision is to be found in any of the constitutions of the
several states, having special reference to the government of
railroad corporations, before that of Illinois, which was ratified
by a vote of the people on the second of July, 1870. Sec. 12 of
art. 11 of that constitution is as follows:
"Railways heretofore constructed, or that may hereafter be
constructed, in this state, are hereby declared public highways,
and shall be free to all persons for the transportation of their
persons and property thereon, under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law. And the General Assembly shall, from time to
time, pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges
for the transportation of passengers and freight on the different
railroads of this state."
During the same year, an amendment to the Constitution of
Michigan was adopted in these words:
"SEC. 1. The legislature may from time to time pass laws
Page 110 U. S. 678
establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportation of passengers and freight on different railroads in
this state, and shall prohibit running contracts between such
railroad companies, whereby discrimination is made in favor of
either of such companies as against other companies owning
connecting or intersecting lines of railroad."
The Constitution of West Virginia, adopted in 1872, contained
(sec. 9, art. 11) an exact copy of sec. 12, art. 11 of the
Constitution of Illinois, with an addition of these words:
"And providing for the correction of abuses, the prevention of
unjust discriminations between through and local, or way freight,
and passenger tariffs, and for the protection of the just rights of
the public, and shall enforce such laws by adequate penalties."
In 1873, a new constitution was adopted in the State of
Pennsylvania. Secs. 1 and 3 of art. 17 are as follows:
"SEC. 1. All railroads and canals shall be public highways, and
all railroads and canal companies shall be common carriers. Any
association or corporation organized for the purpose shall have the
right to construct and operate a railroad between any points within
this state, and to connect at the state line with railroads of
other states. Every railroad company shall have the right with its
road to intersect, connect with, or cross any other railroad, and
shall receive and transport each the other's passengers, tonnage,
and cars, loaded or empty, without delay or discrimination."
"SEC. 3. All individuals, associations, and corporations shall
have equal right to have persons and property transported over
railroads and canals, and no undue or unreasonable discrimination
shall be made in charges for, or in facilities for, transportation
of freight or passengers within the state, or coming from or going
to any other state. Persons and property transported over any
railroad shall be delivered at any station at charges not exceeding
the charges for transportation of persons and property of the same
class in the same direction to any more distant station, but
excursion tickets may be issued at special rates."
Since that time new constitutions have been adopted in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana,
Page 110 U. S. 679
Missouri, Nebraska, and Texas. In Georgia, sec. 2, art. 4,
authority was given the legislature to regulate fares and freights
and to prevent unjust discriminations, and in Nebraska, sec. 4,
art. 11, the provision in the Constitution of Illinois was
substantially followed; but in Alabama, sec. 21, art. 13, Arkansas,
sec. 1, art. 17, California, sec. 17, art. 12, Louisiana, art. 243,
Missouri, secs. 12-14, art. 12, and Texas, sec. 1, art. 10, the
whole of sec. 1, art. 12 of that of Pennsylvania is included
without any material change of phraseology. In Colorado, however,
while all the rest of that section is adopted, these words are
omitted: "And shall receive and transport each other's passengers,
tonnage, and cars, loaded or empty, without delay or
discrimination." And so, while the first sentence of sec. 3, art.
12, is included, in language almost identical, the last sentence,
which provides that passengers and property shall be delivered at
all stations at charges not exceeding the charges to a more distant
station, is left out, and the following inserted in its place:
"And no railroad company, nor any lessee, manager, or employee
thereof, shall give any preference to individuals, associations, or
corporations in furnishing cars or motive power."
Both these alterations are significant, and we cannot avoid the
conclusion that their purpose was to leave the legislature free to
act, in the regulation of the duties of connected roads, toward
each other as the public good might require, for it is always to be
borne in mind that while constitutional provisions of this
character are intended as securities for the rights of the people,
they may operate also as limitations on the powers of the
legislature. To our minds it is clear that the constitutional right
in Colorado to connect railroad with railroad does not of itself
imply the right of connecting business with business. The railroad
companies are not to be connected, but their roads. A connection of
roads may make a connection in business convenient and desirable,
but the one does not necessarily carry with it the other. The
language of the constitution is that railroads may "intersect,
connect with, or cross" each other. This clearly applies to the
road as a physical structure, not to the corporation or its
business.
This brings us to the consideration of the second branch of
Page 110 U. S. 680
the case, to-wit, the relative rights of the two companies at
common law, and under the constitution, as owners of connected
roads, it being conceded that there are no statutory regulations
applicable to the subject.
The constitution expressly provides
1. That all shall have equal rights in the transportation of
persons and property;
2. That there shall not be any undue or unreasonable
discrimination in charges or facilities, and
3. That preferences shall not be given in furnishing cars or
motive power.
It does not expressly provide:
1. That the trains of one connected road shall stop for the
exchange of business at the junction with the other, nor
2. That companies owning connected roads shall unite in forming
a through line for continuous business, or haul each other's cars.
nor
3. That local rates on a through line shall be the same to one
connected road not in the line as the through rates are to another
which is, nor
4. That if one company refuses to agree with another owning a
connected road, to form a through line, or to do a connecting
business, a court of chancery may order that such a business be
done, and fix the terms.
The question then is whether these rights, or any of them, are
implied either at common law, or from the constitution.
At common law, a carrier is not bound to carry except on his own
line, and we think it quite clear that if he contracts to go
beyond, he may, in the absence of statutory regulations to the
contrary, determine for himself what agencies he will employ. His
contract is equivalent to an extension of his line for the purposes
of the contract, and if he holds himself out as a carrier beyond
the line, so that he may be required to carry in that way for all
alike, he may, nevertheless, confine himself in carrying to the
particular route he chooses to use. He puts himself in no worse
position, by extending his route with the help of others, than he
would occupy if the means of transportation employed were all his
own. He certainly may select
Page 110 U. S. 681
his own agencies and his own associates for doing his own
work.
The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company, as the lessee of
the Pueblo & Arkansas Valley Railroad, has the statutory right
to establish its own stations and to regulate the time and manner
in which it will carry persons and property and the price to be
paid therefor. As to all these matters, it is undoubtedly subject
to the power of legislative regulation, but in the absence of
regulation it owes only such duties to the public, or to
individuals, associations, or corporations, as the common law, or
some custom having the force of law, has established for the
government of those in its condition. As has already been shown,
the Constitution of Colorado gave to every railroad company in the
state the right to a mechanical union of its road with that of any
other company in the state, but no more. The legislature has not
seen fit to extend this right, as it undoubtedly may, and
consequently the Denver & New Orleans Company comes to the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company just as any other customer
does, and with no more rights. It has established its junction and
provided itself with the means of transacting its business at that
place, but as yet it has no legislative authority to compel the
other company to adopt that station or to establish an agency to do
business there. So far as statutory regulations are concerned, if
it wishes to use the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe road for
business, it must go to the place where that company takes on and
lets off passengers or property for others. It has as a railroad
company no statutory or constitutional privileges in this
particular over other persons, associations, or corporations. It
saw fit to establish its junction at a place away from the station
which the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company had, in the
exercise of its legal discretion, located for its own convenience
and that of the public. It does not now ask to enter that station
with its tracks or to interchange business at that place, but to
compel the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company to stop at its
station and transact a connecting business there. No statute
requires that connected roads shall adopt joint stations, or that
one railroad company shall stop at or make
Page 110 U. S. 682
use of the station of another. Each company in the state has the
legal right to locate its own stations, and, so far as statutory
regulations are concerned, is not required to use any other.
A railroad company is prohibited, both by the common law and by
the Constitution of Colorado, from discriminating unreasonably in
favor of or against another company seeking to do business on its
road; but that does not necessarily imply that it must stop at the
junction of one and interchange business there, because it has
established joint depot accommodations and provided facilities for
doing a connecting business with another company at another place.
A station may be established for the special accommodation of a
particular customer, but we have never heard it claimed that every
other customer could, by a suit in equity, in the absence of a
statutory or contract right, compel the company to establish a like
station for his special accommodation at some other place. Such
matters are, and always have been, proper subjects for legislative
consideration, unless prevented by some charter contract; but, as a
general rule, remedies for injustice of that kind can only be
obtained from the legislature. A Court of Chancery is not, any more
than is a court of law, clothed with legislative power. It may
enforce, in its own appropriate way, the specific performance of an
existing legal obligation arising out of contract, law, or usage,
but it cannot create the obligation.
In the present case, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe and the
Denver & Rio Grande companies formed their business connection
and established their junction or joint station long before the
Denver & New Orleans road was built. The Denver & New
Orleans Company saw fit to make its junction with the Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Company at a different place. Under these
circumstances, to hold that, if the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
continued to stop at its old station, after the Denver & New
Orleans was built, a refusal to stop at the junction of the Denver
& New Orleans was an unreasonable discrimination as to
facilities in favor of the Denver & Rio Grande Company, and
against the Denver & New Orleans, would be, in effect, to
declare that every railroad company which
Page 110 U. S. 683
forces a connection of its road with that of another company has
a right, under the constitution or at the common law, to require
the company with which it connects to do a connecting business at
the junction, if it does a similar business with any other company
under any other circumstances. Such, we think, is not the law. It
may be made so by the legislative department of the government, but
it does not follow, as a necessary consequence, from the
constitutional right of a mechanical union of tracks, or the
constitutional prohibition against undue or unreasonable
discrimination in facilities.
This necessarily disposes of the question of a continuous
business, or a through line for passengers or freight, including
through tickets, through bills of lading, through checking of
baggage, and the like. Such a business does not necessarily follow
from a connection of tracks. The connection may enable the
companies to do such a business conveniently when it is
established, but it does not of itself establish the business. The
legislature cannot take away the right to a physical union of two
roads; but whether a connecting business shall be done over them
after the union is made depends on legislative regulations, or
contract obligation. An interchange of cars, or the hauling by one
company of the cars of the other, implies a stop at the junction to
make the exchange or to take the cars. If there need be no stop,
there need be no exchange or taking on of cars.
The only remaining questions are as to the obligation of the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company to carry for the Denver
& New Orleans when passengers go to, or freight is delivered
at, the regular stations, and the prices to be charged. As to the
obligation to carry, there is no dispute, and we do not understand
it to be claimed that carriage has ever been refused when applied
for at the proper place. The controversy, and the only controversy,
is about the place and the price.
That the price must be reasonable is conceded, and it is no
doubt true that in determining what is reasonable the prices
charged for business coming from or going to other roads connecting
at Pueblo, may be taken into consideration. But the relation of the
Denver & New Orleans Company to the
Page 110 U. S. 684
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe is that of a Pueblo customer,
and it does not necessarily follow that the price which the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe gets for transportation to and from
Pueblo, on a division of through rates among the component
companies of a through line to Denver, must settle the Pueblo local
rates. It may be that the local rates to and from Pueblo are too
high, and that they ought to be reduced, but that is an entirely
different question from a division of through rates. There is no
complaint of a discrimination against the Denver & New Orleans
Company in respect to the regular Pueblo rates; neither is there
anything except the through rates to show that the local rates are
too high. The bill does not seek to reduce the local rates, but
only to get this company put into the same position as the Denver
& Rio Grande on a division of through rates. This cannot be
done until it is shown that the relative situations of the two
companies with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, both as to the
kind of service and as to the conditions under which it is to be
performed, are substantially the same, so that what is reasonable
for one must necessarily be reasonable for the other. When a
business connection shall be established between the Denver &
New Orleans Company and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe at
their junction, and a continuous line formed, different questions
may arise; but so long as the situation of the parties continues as
it is now, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the prices
charged by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, for the
transportation of persons and property coming from or going to the
Denver & New Orleans, must necessarily be the same as are fixed
for the continuous line over the Denver & Rio Grande.
Our attention has been called to several cases in the English
courts where the question of reasonable or unreasonable preference
by rail way companies has been considered, but they all arose under
the "railway and canal traffic act, 1854," 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31,
and furnish but little aid in the determination of the present
case. They are instructive and of high authority as to what would
be undue or unreasonable preferences among competing customers, but
none of them relate to the rights of connected railroads where
there is no provision in law for their
Page 110 U. S. 685
operation as continuous lines for business. And here it is
proper to remark that in the very act under which these cases arose
it is provided that
"Every railway company . . . working railways . . . which form
part of a continuous line of railway . . . communication . . .
shall afford all due and reasonable facilities for receiving and
forwarding by one of such rail ways . . . all the traffic arriving
by the other, without any unreasonable delay, and without any . . .
preference or advantage, or prejudice or disadvantage, . . . and so
that no obstruction may be offered to the public desirous of using
such railways . . . as a continuous line of communication, and so
that all reasonable accommodation may, by means of the railways . .
. of the several companies, be at all times afforded to the public
in that behalf."
If complaint was made of a violation of this provision,
application could be made to the courts for relief. Were there such
a statute in Colorado, this case would come before us in a
different aspect. As it is, we know of no power in the judiciary to
do what the Parliament of Great Britain has done, and what the
proper legislative authority ought perhaps to do, for the relief of
the parties to this controversy.
All the American cases to which our attention has been called by
counsel relate either to what amounts to undue discrimination
between the customers of a railroad company, or to the power of a
court of chancery to interfere, if there is such a discrimination.
None of them hold that, in the absence of statutory direction, or a
specific contract, a company having the power to locate its own
stopping places can be required by a court of equity to stop at
another railroad junction and interchange business, or that it must
under all circumstances give one connecting road the same
facilities and the same rates that it does to another with which it
has entered into special contract relations for a continuous
through line and arranged facilities accordingly. The cases are all
instructive in their analogies, but their facts are different from
those we have now to consider.
We have not referred specially to the tripartite agreement or
its provisions, because, in our opinion, it has nothing to do
Page 110 U. S. 686
with this case as it is now presented. The question here is
whether the Denver & New Orleans Company would have the right
to the relief it asks if there were no such contract, not whether
the contract, if it exists, will be a bar to such a right. The real
question in the case, as it now comes before us, is whether the
relief required is legislative in its character or judicial. We
think it is legislative, and that upon the existing facts a court
of chancery can afford no remedy.
The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
remanded, with direction to
Dismiss the bill without prejudice.
