When a collector of revenue has given two a bonds for his
official conduct at different periods, and with different sureties,
a promise by the supervisor to apply his payments exclusively to
the discharge of the first bond, although some of the payments were
for money collected and. paid after the second bond was given, does
not bind the United States, and does not amount to an application
of the payments to the first bond.
The debtor has the option, if he thinks fit to exercise it, and
may direct the application of any particular payment at the time of
making it. If he neglects to make the application, the creditor may
make it if he also elects to apply the payment, the law will make
the application.
DUVALL, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows:
In this cause, the opinion of the Court is required on a single
point. The facts are these:
The Supervisor of the Revenue for the District of Ohio in due
form of law appointed John Arthur Collector
Page 11 U. S. 573
of the Revenue for the first division of the first survey of the
said district. Arthur, on 25 August, 1797, together with the
defendants, his sureties, executed a bond to the United States, in
the penalty of $4,000, with condition that Arthur should truly and
faithfully execute and discharge all the duties of said office
according to law. The supervisor, for greater security to the
government, was in the habit of renewing the commission, and
renewing the office bond, and on 23 March, 1799. Arthur executed
another bond to the United States with Robert Patterson surety, in
the penalty of $6,000 with this condition,
"that if the said John Arthur has truly and faithfully executed
and discharged, and shall continue truly and faithfully to execute
and discharge, all the duties of said office, and shall also render
and settle his accounts according to law, then the obligation to be
void,"
&c.
Arthur proceeded to make the collections, and from the
commencement of his duty 30 June, 1802, was charged with the
collection of $30,584.99 1/2. On the settlement of his account in
the year 1803, he was in arrear $16,181.15 1/2. and suits were
instituted on each of the bonds. The pleadings were the same in
both actions. There was a plea of performance to which the
plaintiffs reply and allege as a breach of the condition that the
defendants have failed to collect and pay over the revenue arising
within his district &c., and are in arrear to the United
States, &c., on which issue was joined. Pending the suits,
Arthur died, and they were prosecuted to judgment against the
sureties only.
The supervisor kept one general account only against the
collector. On the trial, the plaintiffs exhibited on their part the
general account between them and the defendant on which the
balance, as beforementioned, is $16,181.15 1/2. They also exhibited
the balance appearing to be due by terminating the account with the
period when Arthur gave the second bond at the time his first
commission was revoked, which was $6,483.59 1/2.
The defendants, to support the issue on their part, offered the
deposition of a witness who proved that James Morrison, the late
supervisor of the revenue, informed him that Arthur had paid a
sufficient sum to discharge
Page 11 U. S. 574
the bond first given, and that what he had paid should be so
applied. After reading the deposition, the plaintiffs introduced
the supervisor himself to contradict the defendants witness. In his
testimony he admits that the payments made by Arthur if applied to
the first bond would discharge it, and that he might have
frequently told January and others that the whole of the bond would
be paid off if the payments made by Arthur were appropriated
exclusively to its discharge, and that he himself had entertained
the opinion that they ought to be so applied. To repel the
testimony of the supervisor and to support that of their witness,
the defendants produced a clerk in the supervisor's office, who
proved
"that the defendant, January, several times called at the office
of the supervisor on the subject of his bond, expressed his
uneasiness about its remaining out and his desire to get it up.
That the supervisor assured him that Arthur had paid enough to
discharge that bond, and that he might make himself easy, but
refused to give up the bond because he thought that such bonds
ought to remain as vouchers in his office."
The plaintiffs, on this state of the case, moved the court to
instruct the jury that the promise of the supervisor as to the
application of the payments in discharge of the bond, was not of
itself an appropriation of the payments, unless it was followed by
some act of appropriation. The court overruled the motion, and at
the instance of the defendants instructed the jury that if they
believed that the supervisor had made the election and promise as
proven, it was a declaration of his election how the payments made
by Arthur should be applied, and that whether a formal entry in the
books of their appropriation corresponding with that election were
made or not was immaterial, and that the jury ought to consider the
application as made.
To the opinion of the court thus given, the plaintiffs excepted,
and this Court must now decide as to the correctness of the opinion
of the court below.
The law with respect to the application of particular payments
when the debtor owes distinct debts has long
Page 11 U. S. 575
since been settled. The debtor has the option, if he thinks fit
to exercise it, and may direct the application of any particular
payment at the time of making it. If he neglects to make the
application, the creditor may make it; if he also neglects to apply
the payment, the law will make the application.
In this case, a majority of the Court is of opinion that the
rule adopted in ordinary cases is not applicable to a case
circumstanced as this is; where the receiver is a public officer
not interested in the event of the suit, and who receives on
account of the United States, where the payments are
indiscriminately made, and where different sureties, under distinct
obligations, are interested. It will be generally admitted that
monies arising due, and collected subsequently to the execution of
the second bond, cannot be applied to the discharge of the first
bond, without manifest injury to the surety in the second bond; and
vice versa, justice between the different sureties can
only be done by reference to the collector's books, and the
evidence which they contain may be supported by parol testimony, if
any in the possession of the parties interested.
The Court is of opinion that the circuit court erred in the
opinion given, and that it be reversed.
Judgment reversed.