Payment to an attorney in fact, constituted such by power of
attorney executed by the claimants before the allowance of their
claim by Congress or by the proper department, is good as between
the government and such claimants, where the power of attorney has
not been revoked at the time payment is made, notwithstanding the
provisions of the Act of July 29th, 1846, entitled "An Act in
relation to the payment of claims," and the Act of February 26th,
1853, entitled "An Act to prevent frauds upon the Treasury of the
United States." 9 Stat. 41, and 10 Stat. 170.
Suit to recover $200,070.34 from the United States, the same
having been previously paid to a person holding the duly executed
power of attorney of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs claiming that
the power was absolutely void under the provisions of the acts
contained in 9 Stat. 41, and 10 Stat. 170.
By a decree passed March 25, 1868, in the District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York, certain sums
of money were ascertained to be due on account of the illegal
capture of the British steamer
Labuan and her cargo by a
cruiser of the United States.
On the 6th day of February, 1869, William Bailey, William
Leetham, James Leetham, and Elizabeth Leetham, British subjects,
executed and delivered a power of attorney -- in which they
described themselves as then or late owners of said steamer --
constituting one A. E. Godeffroy, of New York, their attorney, with
authority to receive from the government of the United States, and
from all and every person or persons whom it might concern to pay
or satisfy the same, all moneys then or which might thereafter
become due and payable to them with reference to said vessel
Labuan; upon receipt thereof, to execute acquittances,
releases, and discharges for the same; and, upon nonpayment
thereof, to collect said moneys by such necessary actions, suits,
or expedients as their attorney deemed proper.
Page 109 U. S. 433
By an Act of Congress approved July 7, 1870, it was, among other
things, provided
"That there be paid, out of any money in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to William Bailey, William Leetham, and
John Leetham, of England, or their legal representatives, owners of
the British steamer
Labuan, $131,221.30, with interest
from June 2, 1862, to the time of payment, and five thousand
dollars without interest."
The act declares that such sums are due under the
before-mentioned decree of March 25, 1868. At the date of this act,
the owners, in different proportions, of the
Labuan were
William Bailey, William Leetham, and the executors and executrix of
John Leetham, who were William Leetham, James Leetham, and
Elizabeth Leetham.
An account between the United States and said owners, based upon
the said Act of July 7, 1870, having been examined, adjusted,
admitted, and certified by the proper officers of the Treasury, a
warrant was made upon which a draft was issued on the Treasurer of
the United States for the sum of $200,070.34, payable "to Wm.
Bailey, Wm. Leetham, and John Leetham, of England, or their legal
representatives, or order." This draft was delivered to Godeffroy,
with this endorsement thereon: "Pay on the endorsement of A. E.
Godeffroy, atty. in fact. R. W. TAYLOR, Comptroller." The draft
having been endorsed in the names of the payees by himself as their
attorney in fact, Godeffroy received the proceeds, but has never
paid to the parties named in the act of Congress, or to anyone for
them, any part of the sum collected by him from the United States.
The Treasury Department refused, although requested by appellants
or their agents, to make further payment. Thereupon this action was
brought in the Court of Claims to recover the amount specified in
the act of Congress. Judgment was rendered for the United States,
and the present appeal questions the correctness of that
judgment.
Page 109 U. S. 435
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. After
reciting the facts, he continued:
It is contended on behalf of appellants that the power of
attorney executed in 1869 to Godeffroy -- upon the authority of
Page 109 U. S. 436
which alone was payment made to him -- was, under the laws of
the United States, absolutely null and void; consequently no
payment under it could bind the claimants or discharge the
government from its obligation to pay the sums specified in the act
of 1870. This presents the controlling question on the present
appeal. Its determination depends upon the construction to be given
to the Act of July 29, 1846, 9 Stat. 41, entitled "An act in
relation to the payment of claims," and to the first and seventh
sections of the Act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stat. 170), entitled
"An act to prevent frauds upon the Treasury of the United
States."
The act of 1846 related to claims against the United States
allowed by a resolution or act of Congress. That statute directed
that they should not be paid to any other person than the claimant,
his executor or administrator, unless upon the production to the
proper disbursing officer of a warrant of attorney executed "after
the enactment of the resolution or act allowing the claim." The
first section of the act of 1853 declares that
"All transfers and assignments hereafter made of any claim upon
the United States, or any part of or share thereof or interest
thereon, whether absolute or conditional and whatever may be the
consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney or orders or
other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim or any
part or share thereof shall be absolutely null and void unless the
same shall be freely made and executed in the presence of at least
two attesting witnesses after the allowance of such claim, the
ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for
the payment thereof."
That act further provides (§ 7) that its provisions and those of
the act of 1846 shall
"apply and extend to all claims against the United States,
whether allowed by special acts of Congress or arising under
general laws or treaties or in any other manner whatever."
These enactments have been under examination in several cases
heretofore decided in this Court, some of which are now relied on
to support the proposition that officers of the Treasury were
forbidden, by statute, from recognizing Godeffroy, under any
circumstances, as agent of claimants, with authority,
Page 109 U. S. 437
as between them and the government, to receive the warrant and
draft when issued. But we do not understand that any of these cases
involved the precise question now presented for determination.
In
United States v. Gillis, 95 U.
S. 414, it was ruled that a claim against the United
States could not be assigned so as to enable the assignee to bring
suit against the government in his own name in the Court of Claims.
In
Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484, the
question was as to the validity of certain orders drawn by a
claimant before the allowance of his claim, upon the attorneys
having it in charge, directing the latter to pay certain sums out
of the proceeds when collected, and which orders, being accepted by
the attorneys, were purchased by Spofford in good faith and for
value. Upon the Treasury warrant's being issued, the claimant
refused to admit the validity either of the orders he had given or
the acceptances made by his attorneys. Thereupon Spofford sought by
suit against the claimant and his attorneys to enforce a compliance
with the orders and acceptances, of which he had become assignee
and holder. The Court adjudged that the transfer or assignment to
Spofford was, under the act of 1853, carried into the Revised
Statutes, § 3477, a nullity as between him and the claimant. No
question arose in that case as to what would have been the effect
upon the rights of the claimant had the officers of the government
recognized the assignment to Spofford. In
Erwin v. United
States, 97 U. S. 392, it
was ruled that the act of 1853 applied to cases of voluntary
assignments of demands against the government, and did not embrace
cases where the title is transferred by operation of law. "The
passing of claims to heirs, devisees, or assignees in bankruptcy,"
said the Court, "are not within the evil at which the statute
aimed."
But what was said in
Goodman v. Niblack, 102
U. S. 559, seems to be more directly in point. That was
the case of a voluntary assignment by a debtor of his property for
the benefit of creditors, including his rights, credits, effects,
and estate of every description. The assignment embraced a claim of
the assignor arising under a contract with the United States.
It
Page 109 U. S. 438
was adjudged in the court of original jurisdiction that as to
that claim the assignment was rendered invalid by the act of 1853.
But the language of this Court, speaking by MR. JUSTICE MILLER,
was:
"It is understood that the circuit court sustained the demurrer
under the pressure of the strong language of the opinion in
Spofford v. Kirk. We do not think, however, that the
circumstances of the present case bring it within the one then
under consideration or the principles there laid down. That was a
case of the transfer or assignment of a part of a disputed claim,
then in controversy, and it was clearly within all the mischiefs
designed to be remedied by the statute. Those mischiefs, as laid
down in that opinion and in the others referred to, are mainly two:
1. the danger that the rights of the government might be
embarrassed by having to deal with several persons instead of one,
and by the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the
original transaction; 2. that by a transfer of such a claim against
the government to one or more persons not originally interested in
it, the way might be conveniently opened to such improper
influences in prosecuting the claim before the departments, the
courts, or the Congress as desperate cases, where the reward is
contingent on success, so often suggest."
"But these considerations,' the Court proceeded to say, 'as well
as a careful examination of the statute leave no doubt that its
sole purpose was to protect the government, and not the parties to
the assignment."
These cases show that the statutes in question are not to be
interpreted according to the literal acceptation of the words used.
They show that there may be assignments or transfers of claims
against the government which are not forbidden.
In the case before, us no question arises as to the transfer or
assignment of a claim against the government. The question is
whether payment to one who has been authorized to receive it by the
power of attorney executed before the allowance of the claim by the
act of Congress was good as between the government and the claimant
where, at the time of payment,
Page 109 U. S. 439
such power of attorney was unrevoked. If, in respect of
transfers or assignments of claims, the purpose of the statute, as
ruled in
Goodman v. Niblack, was to protect the
government, not the claimant in his dealings with the government,
it is difficult to perceive upon what ground it could be held that
the statutory inhibition upon powers of attorney in advance of the
allowance of the claim and the issuing of the warrant can be used
to compel a second payment after the amount thereof has been paid
to the person authorized by the claimant to receive it. A mere
power of attorney given before the warrant is issued -- so long, at
least, as it is unexecuted -- may undoubtedly be treated by the
claimant as absolutely null and void in any contest between him and
his attorney in fact. And it may be so regarded by the officers of
the government whose duty it is to adjust the claim and issue a
warrant for its amount. But if those officers chose to make payment
to the person whom the claimant, by formal power of attorney, has
accredited to them as authorized to receive payment, the claimant
cannot be permitted to make his own disregard of the statute the
basis for impeaching the settlement had with his agent. To hold
otherwise would be inconsistent with the ruling heretofore made --
and with which, upon consideration, we are entirely satisfied --
that the purpose of Congress by the enactments in question was to
protect the government against frauds upon the part of claimants
and those who might become interested with them in the prosecution
of claims, whether before Congress or the several departments. The
title of the act of 1853 suggests this purpose. It is to prevent
frauds upon the Treasury. An effectual means to that end was to
authorize the officers of the government to disregard any
assignment or transfer of a claim, or any power of attorney to
collect it, unless made or executed after the allowance of the
claim, the ascertainment of the amount due thereon, and the issuing
of the warrant for the payment thereof. Other sections of the
statute -- those forbidding officers of the government and members
of Congress from prosecuting or becoming interested in claims
against the government and those punishing the bribery or undue
influencing of such officers or members -- sustain the view
Page 109 U. S. 440
that what was in the mind of Congress was to protect the
government in the matter of claims against it. But if the
protection of claimants was at all in the mind of Congress when
passing the acts of 1846 and 1853, it is quite certain that the
courts should not, to the injury of the government, extend that
protection to those who elected not to avail themselves of the
provisions of those statutes. Here it is not denied that the power
of attorney executed in 1869 embraces and was intended to embrace
the claims arising out of the decree of 1868, from whatever source
the money in satisfaction of it might be derived. Nor is it
pretended that such power of attorney had been revoked prior to the
adjustment and payment of the claims in question.
It seems to us -- looking at the mischiefs intended to be
remedied by these statutes and giving the words of Congress a
reasonable interpretation -- that the officers of the Treasury were
at liberty, as between the government and the claimants, to
recognize the unrevoked authority which the latter had given to
Godeffroy, without restriction as to time, to receive from anyone
whom it might concern to pay all sums of money due or to become due
and payable on account of the seizure of the vessel
Labuna.
The judgment must therefore be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
