1. Whether a seeming act of the legislature is or is not a law
is a judicial question to be determined by the court, and not a
question of fact to be tried by a jury.
2. The construction uniformly given to the constitution of a
state by its highest court is binding on the courts of the United
States as a rule of decision.
3. An act of the legislature of a state which has been held by
its highest court not to be a statute of that state because never
passed as its constitution requires cannot be held by the courts of
the United States, upon the same evidence between different
parties, to be a law of the state, although referred to in later
statutes of the state as an existing law and assumed to be such in
earlier cases in the state court in which its validity was not, and
by the settled practice of that court could not be,
controverted.
4. The act of the General Assembly of Illinois of Feb. 18, 1857,
purporting to authorize the issue of certain municipal bonds is of
no force or effect by reason of its not appearing by the
legislative journals to have been passed as required by the
Constitution of 1848.
5. Under the statute of Illinois of Feb. 12, 1849, copies of the
original daily journals kept by the clerks of each house of the
legislature, made by persons contracted with or employed for the
purpose, in well bound books furnished
Page 105 U. S. 668
by the secretary of state and afterwards deposited and kept in
his office, are official records, copies of which certified by him
are competent evidence.
6. The printed journals of either house of a legislature,
published in obedience to law, are competent evidence of its
proceedings.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
These actions are brought upon municipal bonds purporting to
have been issued under an Act of the General Assembly of Illinois
of Feb. 18, 1857. The facts of the cases do not substantially
differ from those which appeared when one of the cases was before
this Court at October Term, 1876, and the principles then affirmed
must control the present decision.
See Town of South Ottawa v.
Perkins and
Supervisors of Kendall County v. Post,
94 U. S. 260. Those
principles may be summed up as follows:
First, by the law of the State of Illinois, as often
declared by the supreme court of that state before as well as after
the execution of the bonds in suit, the provisions of the
Constitution of 1848 requiring each house of the legislature to
keep and publish a journal of its proceedings and, on the final
passage of all bills, to take the vote by ayes and noes, and
ordaining that no bill shall become a law without the concurrence
of a majority of all the members elect of each house, are not
merely directory; but if the journals, being produced or proved,
fail to show that an act has been passed in the mode prescribed by
the constitution, the presumption of its validity, arising from the
signatures of the presiding officers and of the executive, is
overthrown and the act is void.
Second, whether a seeming act of the legislature is or
is not a law is a judicial question to be determined by the court,
and not a question of fact to be tried by a jury.
Page 105 U. S. 669
Third, the construction uniformly given to the
constitution of a state by its highest court is binding on the
courts of the United States as a rule of decision.
Fourth, an act of the legislature of a state which has
been held by its highest court not to be a statute of the state
because never passed as its Constitution requires cannot be held by
the courts of the United States upon the same evidence to be a law
of the state.
Fifth, that which is not a law can give no validity to
bonds purporting to be issued under it, even in the hands of those
who take them for value and in the belief that they have been
lawfully issued.
It was accordingly held that the Act of the General Assembly of
Illinois of Feb. 18, 1857, under which the bonds in suit were
issued, having been adjudged by the Supreme Court of that state in
1870 in the cases of
Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160, and
Miller v. Goodwin, 70
id. 659, upon proof that
the journals did not show it to have been enacted in conformity
with the requirements of the constitution, to have never become a
law, and to have conferred no power, although referred to in later
statutes as an existing law, those decisions must govern the action
of the courts of the United States.
The weight of those decisions as authoritative expositions of
the constitution of the state is not affected by the fact that
these plaintiffs were not parties to the suits in which they were
delivered.
Township of Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U. S.
289;
Township of East Oakland v. Skinner,
94 U. S. 255.
Nor is it of any importance that the act of 1857 had been
assumed to be an existing law in
Dunnovan v. Green, 57
Ill. 63, and in
Force v. Batavia, 61
id. 99, for
in each of those cases the validity of the statute was not
controverted, and by the established practice of that court no
evidence of the contents of the journals could be considered on
appeal which had not been produced and made part of the case in the
court below.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Wren, 43
Ill. 77;
Bedard v. Hall, 44
id. 91;
Grob v.
Cushman, 45
id. 119.
See also People v.
Dewolf, 62
id. 253, 256;
Binz v. Weber, 81
id. 288, 291.
The copies of the journals, certified by the secretary of state,
and the printed journals, published in obedience to law,
Page 105 U. S. 670
are both competent evidence of the proceedings in the
legislature.
By virtue of the statute of Illinois of Feb. 12, 1849,
* the copies of
the original daily journals kept by the clerks of the two houses,
made by person contracted with or employed for the purpose as
authorized and directed by that act (though not sworn public
officers), in well bound books furnished by the secretary of state,
pursuant to the duty thereby imposed upon him, and afterwards
deposited and kept in his office, are official records in his
custody, copies of which certified by him are admissible upon
settled rules of evidence, as well as by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois in
Miller v. Goodwin, above
cited, and neither the competency nor the effect of such copies is
impaired by the loss or destruction of the daily journals or
minutes.
The remark of the judge delivering the opinion in
Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 79, "We are not aware of
any law which makes the printed journal evidence of the contents of
the original," was but
obiter dictum (for the case was
decided upon the ground that no copy whatever of the journal had
been made part of the case before the court), and is in conflict
with the general current of decision in that court and in this.
People v. Campbell, 8
id. 466;
Prescott v.
Trustees of Illinois & Michigan Canal, 19
id.
324;
Happel v. Brethauer, 70
Page 105 U. S. 671
id. 166;
Watkins v.
Holman, 16 Pet. 25,
41 U. S. 55-56;
Bryan v.
Forsyth, 19 How. 334;
Gregg v.
Forsyth, 24 How. 179.
For these reasons, the Act of Feb. 18, 1857, under which all the
bonds in suit purport to have been issued, must be held to be of no
force or effect, and the plaintiffs can maintain no action on the
bonds. Upon the attempt made at the argument to support their
validity in the first case under the statute of Nov. 6, 1849, and
in the second case under the statute of March 6, 1867, it is enough
to say that there is nothing in the record to show that either of
those statutes was ever complied with by the defendant in issuing
the bonds or relied on by the plaintiff in purchasing them.
Judgments affirmed.
* By the Constitution of Illinois of 1848, art. 3, sect. 39,
"The General Assembly shall provide by law that the copying,
printing, binding, and distributing the laws and journals shall be
let by contract to the lowest bidder."
By the statute of Jan. 16, 1836, in force at the time of the
adoption of that constitution, the journal of each house of the
General Assembly was required to be "kept in well bound volumes;"
the clerks of each house were required to furnish daily to the
public printer "a copy of the journal kept by them respectively,"
and after the final adjournment to "deposit the original journals
kept by them respectively, with the secretary of state;" and the
secretary of state was required to "superintend the printing of the
journals." Statutes of Illinois of 1839, p. 551; Revised Statutes
of Illinois of 1845, c. 84, sec. 3.
By the statute of Feb. 12, 1849, the secretary of state was
required, before the meeting of the General Assembly, to publish an
advertisement "inviting proposals for copying the laws, joint
resolutions, and journals of the General Assembly," and to "give
the contract to the lowest competent responsible bidder," and was
also required "to furnish a well bound book, in which the journals
shall be copied," and, in case the person contracting for the
copying should fail to perform his contract, to cause the same to
be done by some competent person. 2 Statutes of Illinois (Scates
ed.), p. 734.