1. A "statement" of the case, according to the law regulating
civil proceedings in the Territory of Arizona, takes the place of a
bill of exceptions when the alleged errors of law are set forth
with sufficient matter to show the relevancy of the points taken,
and though prepared for and used on a motion for a new trial, it is
available on appeal from the judgment when, by stipulation of the
parties, it is made a part of the record for that purpose.
2. In an action for legal services, the opinions of attorneys as
to their value are not to preclude the jury from exercising their
"own knowledge and ideas" on the subject. It is their province to
weigh the opinions by reference to the nature of the services
rendered, the time occupied in their performance, and other
attending circumstances, and by applying to them their own
experience and knowledge of the character of such services. The
judgment of a witness is not, as a matter of law, to be accepted by
the jury in place of their own.
This was an action brought in a district court of Arizona to
recover the sum of $2,000 alleged to be owing by the defendants to
the plaintiffs for professional services as attorneys and
counselors at law in that territory in 1877 and 1878. The complaint
alleges that the services were performed in several suits and
proceedings, upon a retainer by the defendants, and that they were
reasonably worth that sum. The answer is a general denial.
On the trial, one of the plaintiffs testified to the rendition
of the services by them in several suits, stating generally the
nature of each suit, the service performed, and its value. Five
attorneys at law also testified to the value of the services; three
of whom were called by the plaintiffs and two by the defendants.
They differed widely in their opinions, the highest estimate
Page 105 U. S. 46
placing the value of the services at $5,440, the lowest at
$1,000.
The court instructed the jury that in determining the value of
the plaintiffs' services, they might consider their nature, the
length of time they necessarily occupied, and the benefit derived
from them by the defendants; that the plaintiffs were entitled to
reasonable compensation for the services rendered, and that the
reasonableness of the compensation was a fact to be determined from
the evidence as any other controverted fact in the case, and then
proceeded as follows:
"The services rendered were skilled and professional, and for
the purpose of proving to you the value of that class of services
rendered, professional gentlemen, attorneys at law, claiming to be
familiar with the value of such services, have testified before
you. If you accredit these witnesses with truthfulness, their
testimony should have weight with you, and the fact as to what is a
reasonable compensation should be determined from the evidence
offered, and not from your own knowledge or ideas of the value of
that class of services. In other words, you must determine the
value of the services rendered from the evidence which has been
offered before you, and not from your own knowledge or ideas of the
value of such services."
The defendants thereupon asked the court to instruct the jury as
follows:
"In determining the value of the plaintiffs' services the jury
are not bound by the testimony of the expert witnesses; that
testimony may be considered by the jury; but if, in their judgment,
the value fixed by those witnesses is not reasonable, they may
disregard it, and find the amount which, in their judgment, would
be reasonable."
"In determining the value of the plaintiffs' services the jury
are not bound by the opinions of the witnesses, unless the jury
shall find from all the evidence taken together, including the
nature of the services, the time occupied in the performance of
them, and the result of them, and the benefit derived by the
defendants from the rendition of said services, that said opinions
are correct."
The court refused to give these instructions, and an
exception
Page 105 U. S. 47
was taken. The jury thereupon gave a verdict for the plaintiffs
for $1,800; upon which judgment was entered. A statement of the
proceedings at the trial was then prepared, which, among other
things, set forth the alleged errors of law excepted to by the
defendants. This statement was used on a motion for a new trial,
which was denied, and by stipulation it was embodied in the papers
for the appeal to the supreme court of the territory from the
judgment, as well as from the order denying the new trial. The
order and judgment were both affirmed, and to review the judgment,
the case is brought to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The defendants in error object to the use of the statement,
which sets forth the exceptions taken, as not constituting a part
of the record before us. The ground of the objection is, that the
statement was prepared for and used on the motion for a new trial,
with the disposition of which this Court cannot interfere. The
objection would be tenable but for the stipulation of the parties
that the statement might be used on appeal from the judgment. A
statement of the case, according to the law regulating civil
proceedings in the territory, takes the place of a bill of
exceptions, when the alleged errors of law are set forth with
sufficient matter to show the relevancy of the points taken. It is
not the less available on appeal from the judgment when, by
stipulation, it is embodied in the record for that purpose, though
used on the motion for a new trial. We have had occasion to refer
to this subject in
Kerr v. Clampitt, which arose in Utah,
where a similar system of procedure in civil cases obtains, and it
is unnecessary to repeat what is there said.
95 U. S. 95 U.S.
188.
The only question presented for our consideration is whether the
opinions of the attorneys, as to the value of the professional
services rendered, were to control the judgment of the jury so
Page 105 U. S. 48
as to preclude them from exercising their "own knowledge or
ideas" upon the value of such services. That the court intended to
instruct the jury to that effect is, we think, clear. After
informing them that in determining the value of the services, they
might consider their nature, the time they occupied, and the
benefit derived from them, also, that the plaintiffs were entitled
to reasonable compensation for the services, and that the
reasonableness of the compensation was a fact to be determined from
the evidence, it proceeded to call special attention to the
testimony of the attorneys, and told the jury that if they
accredited these witnesses with truthfulness, their testimony
should have weight, and the fact as to what is reasonable
compensation should be "determined from the evidence offered," and
not from their own knowledge or ideas of the value of that class of
services, and emphasized the instruction by repetition, as
follows:
"You must determine the value of the services rendered from the
evidence that has been offered before you, and not from your own
knowledge or ideas as to the value of such services."
This language qualifies the meaning of the previous part of the
instruction. It is apparent from the context that by the words
"evidence offered" and "evidence that has been offered before you,"
reference was made to the expert testimony, and to that alone.
Taken together, the charge amounts to this: that while the jury
might consider the nature of the services and the time expended in
their performance, their value -- that is, what was reasonable
compensation for them -- was to be determined exclusively from the
testimony of the professional witnesses. They were to be at liberty
to compare and balance the conflicting estimates of the attorneys
on that point, but not to exercise any judgment thereon by
application of their own knowledge and experience to the proof made
as to the character and extent of the services; that the opinions
of the attorneys as to what was reasonable compensation was alone
to be considered. That the defendants so understood the charge is
evident from the qualifications of it which they desired to obtain,
and the jury may in like manner have so understood it. And as we so
construe it, we think the court erred, and that it should have been
qualified by the instructions requested. Those instructions
correctly presented the law of
Page 105 U. S. 49
the case. It is true that no exception was taken to the charge,
but its modification was immediately sought by the instructions
requested, and to the refusal to give them an exception was taken.
Objection to the charge was thus expressed as affirmatively and
pointedly as if it had been directed in terms to the language used
by the court.
It was the province of the jury to weigh the testimony of the
attorneys as to the value of the services by reference to their
nature, the time occupied in their performance, and other attending
circumstances, and by applying to it their own experience and
knowledge of the character of such services. To direct them to find
the value of the services from the testimony of the experts alone
was to say to them that the issue should be determined by the
opinions of the attorneys, and not by the exercise of their own
judgment of the facts on which those opinions were given. The
evidence of experts as to the value of professional services does
not differ in principle from such evidence as to the value of labor
in other departments of business or as to the value of property. So
far from laying aside their own general knowledge and ideas, the
jury should have applied that knowledge and those ideas to the
matters of fact in evidence in determining the weight to be given
to the opinions expressed, and it was only in that way that they
could arrive at a just conclusion. While they cannot act in any
case upon particular facts material to its disposition resting in
their private knowledge, but should be governed by the evidence
adduced, they may, and to act intelligently they must, judge of the
weight and force of that evidence by their own general knowledge of
the subject of inquiry. If, for example, the question were as to
the damages sustained by a plaintiff from a fracture of his leg by
the carelessness of a defendant, the jury would ill perform their
duty and probably come to a wrong conclusion if, controlled by the
testimony of the surgeons not merely as to the injury inflicted,
but as to the damages sustained, they should ignore their own
knowledge and experience of the value of a sound limb. Other
persons besides professional men have knowledge of the value of
professional services, and while great weight should always be
given to the opinions of those familiar with the subject, they are
not to
Page 105 U. S. 50
be blindly received, but are to be intelligently examined by the
jury in the light of their own general knowledge; they should
control only as they are found to be reasonable.
As justly remarked by counsel, the present case is an excellent
illustration of the error of confining the jury to a consideration
merely of the opinions of the experts. Of the five attorneys who
were witnesses, no two agreed, and their estimates varied between
the extremes of $1,000 and $5,440. Directing the jurors to
determine the value of the professional services solely upon these
varying opinions was to place them in a state of perplexing
uncertainty. They should not have been instructed to accept the
conclusions of the professional witnesses in place of their own,
however much that testimony may have been entitled to
consideration. The judgment of witnesses, as a matter of law, is in
no case to be substituted for that of the jurors. The instructions
tended to mislead as to the weight to be given to the opinions of
the attorneys, especially after qualifications of them designed to
correct any misconception on this head were refused.
In
Anthony v. Stinson, a question similar to the one
here presented came before the Supreme Court of Kansas, and a like
decision was reached. The instruction given at the trial that the
testimony of certain lawyers as to the value of professional
services should be the guide of the jury, and that they should be
governed by it in finding the value of the services rendered, was
held to be erroneous, the court observing that the jury were not to
be instructed as to what part of the testimony before them should
control their verdict; that in order to control it, the testimony
of experts should be of such a character as to outweigh by its
intrinsic force and probability all conflicting testimony, and that
they could not be required to accept as a matter of law the
conclusions of the witnesses instead of their own. 4 Kan. 211.
In
Patterson v. Boston, which arose in Massachusetts,
the question was as to the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff
for his property, taken to widen a street in Boston. The trial
court instructed the jury that in estimating the amount of the
damages, if any of them knew, of his own knowledge, any material
fact which bore upon the issue, he ought to disclose it
Page 105 U. S. 51
and be sworn, and communicate it to his fellows in open court in
the presence of the parties, but that in making up their verdict,
they might rightfully be influenced by their general knowledge on
such subjects as well as by the testimony and opinions of
witnesses. The case being taken to the supreme court of the state,
it was held that these directions were not open to exception. Said
Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for the court:
"Juries would be very little fit for the high and responsible
office to which they are called, especially to make an
appraisement, which depends on knowledge and experience, if they
might not avail themselves of those powers of their minds when they
are most necessary to the performance of their duties."
20 Pick. (Mass.) 159, 166.
In
Murdock v. Sumner, the same court, speaking through
the same distinguished judge, said that "the jury very properly
exercise their own judgment and apply their own knowledge and
experience in regard to the general subject of inquiry." In that
case, a witness had testified as to the quality, condition, and
cost of certain goods and given his opinion as to their worth, and
the court said that
"the jury were not bound by the opinion of the witness; they
might have taken the facts testified by him as to the cost,
quality, and condition of the goods, and come to a different
opinion as to their value."
22 Pick. 156.
In like manner, in this case, the jurors might have taken the
facts testified to by the attorneys as to the character, extent,
and value of the professional services rendered, and then come to a
different conclusion. The instructions given, whilst stating that
the nature of the services rendered, the time occupied in their
performance, and the benefit derived from them might be considered
by the jury, directed them that they should be governed by the
opinions of the experts as to the value of the services, and in
effect forbade them to exercise their own knowledge and ideas on
that kind of services. This error would have been avoided if the
instructions requested by the defendants had been given.
Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.
